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A CRITICAL HISTORY OF 

PHILOSOPHICAL 
THEORIES 



AARON SCHUYLER 




o a 3 



RICHARD G. BADGER 

THE GORHAM PRESS 
BOSTON 



Copyright, 1913, by Richard G. Badger. 
All rights reserved 



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The Gorham Press, Boston, U, S, A. 

©0I.A351925 



PREFACE 

Philosophy is the result obtained by the employment of 
reason in the discovery of those fundamental principles that 
give unity and harmony to knowledge. It seeks to reduce 
complexity to simplicity, and multiplicity to unity, and to find 
the ultimate reality. Facts acquired by observation are ex- 
plained by reason. 

The history of philosophy is the record of these speculations 
and their results. A critical history of philosophy is a dis- 
criminating examination of the theories of the philosophers 
of the various schools, in order to test and confirm their truth, 
to expose their errors, to trace the relations of the different 
systems, the conflict of their principles, the occasions of their 
appearance, and the order of their development. 

To understand the principles maintained by the philoso- 
phers of the various schools, the conflict of their principles, 
the reasons for their theories, and the connection of the various 
systems, is to understand philosophy itself. The phenome- 
nal world is the product of two factors — the external world and 
the human mind; philosophy deals with both. 

Uncritical thought accepts appearance as the sole reality. 
Science classifies phenomena and determines their laws, while 
philosophy attempts to find a rational explanation of phe- 
nomena as facts of experience. That is. Science treats of 
phenomena and their laws, while philosophy seeks for causes 
and the rational explanation of phenomena. Nothing can be 
more interesting or more stimulating to thought than the 
study of the relations of philosophy and science. 

It will be found that no system of philosophy is without 
some merit, though it may be only a crude beginning, or a 
one-sided attempt to give an account of the mystery of ex- 
istence. Broad views are requisite, if we wish to avoid the 
errors of all partial or incomplete systems. 

As the mission of philosophy is to give a rational explanation 
of the phenomenal, it cannot, therefore, disregard the facts of 
experience, and still be true to its calling. On the other hand, 
to deal exclusively with phenomena, discarding the necessary 
principles which afford their rational explanation, is to aban- 
don the guide of reason, or to resolve it into transformed sen- 
sation. 

Herein is revealed the chief conflict in philosophy, as it 
exists between the empirical and rational schools. To 



PREFACE 

neglect facts is to lose sight of that which is to be explained; to 
discard necessary principles is to miss their true explanation. 
Either course is one-sided and doomed to failure. True phil- 
osophy is a combination of the two methods — ^the observation 
of phenomena, and their explanation by the aid of rational 
principles. 

No study is more interesting than that of the theories and 
speculations of philosophers. These theories will pass in re- 
view in the course of this treatise, and their truth or falsity 
will be critically and candidly examined. If the reader will 
study these investigations, neither in a partisan spirit, nor in 
the temper of controversy, he will not fail of his reward. The 
distinction between things and ideas accords with the un- 
biased good sense of mankind. 

The proper attitude of a philosopher is not that of a disciple 
of a great master, nor that of an advocate of a certain school 
of philosophy, but that of an independent thinker, and as 
such he will confer a benefit on other thinkers, not because of 
agreement, but rather because of divergence, and on that ac- 
count his investigations will receive a more hearty welcome. 
Philosophy is the love of wisdom. 



CONTENTS 



Chapter 



PAGE 



I. The Milesian School 9 

II. The Eleatic School 18 

III. Heraclitus and Pythagoras 18 

IV. Empedocles, Anaxagoras, the Atomists. ... ^3 
V. The Sophists 32 

VI. Socrates and Immediate Successors 42 

VII. Plato 53 

VIII. Aristotle 63 

IX. The Epicurean and Stoic Schools. 71 

X. Skepticism in Philosophy 82 

XI. Eclecticism, Neo-Platonism, Gnosticism. . . 96 

XII. Patristic Philosophy. , . 107 

XIII. Scholastic Philosophy — First Period 117 

XIV. Scholastic Philosophy— Second Period 127 

XV. Transition to Modem Philosophy 142 

XVI. Modern Philosophy — Cartesian 158 

XVII. Modern Philosophy— Metaphysical 172 

XVIII. Modern Philosophy— Enghsh 188 

XIX. Berkeley and Hume 208 

XX. Kant 227 

XXI. Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling 250 

XXII. Hegel 267 

XXIII. Herbart, Schopenhauer, Hartmann 280 

XXIV. Reid, Stewart, Brown 293 

XXV. Hamilton, Ferrier, McCosh. 304 

XXVI. Associational and Empirical Philosophy. . . 321 

XXVII. Associational and Empirical Philosophy, 

(continued) 339 

XXVIII. French Enlightenment Philosophy 351 

XXIX. Reaction, Eclecticism, Positivism 367 

XXX. Later German Philosophy 383 

XXXI. Philosophy of Evolution 402 



A CRITICAL HISTORY 

OF 

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 



F 



A CRITICAL HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

CHAPTER I 

The Milesian School 

The Milesian School of Philosophy received its name from 
Miletus, the city of its chief philosophers — Thales, Anaxi- 
mander and Anaximines. The term Ionic Philosophy is often 
applied to the Milesian School; but this term is too generic 
as it would include the philosophy of Heraclitus, which is dis- 
tinct from that of the Milesian School, though the two are 
species of the same genus. Tlie^term Milesian School is, 
therefore, specifically what is needed. 

1. Thales (640-548 B. C.)— Thales of Miletus was the first 
of the Milesian Philosophers, and, in fact, he was the first 
Greek philosopher. Standing by common consent, at the 
head of the seven wise men of Greece, the leader in philosophic 
speculation, noted for his mathematical, astronomical and 
scientific attainments, and for his practical sagacity and po- 
litical influence, he is to be regarded as no ordinary man. 

It is said that Thales predicted the solar ecUpse which oc- 
curred, according to the Julian calendar. May 28, 585 B. C. 
The probability, however, is that he only explained the cause 
of the eclipse after its occurrence. As a civil engineer, he 
superintended the changing of the course of the river Halys, 
by order of Croesus. His political influence is seen in that he 
dissuaded the Milesians from allying themselves with Croesus 
against Cyrus. 

In opposition to the poets who explained the phenomena 
of the world by the intervention of mythical divinities, Thales 
sought for the principle of things in nature itself. He was, 
therefore, a natural philosopher. He found the ultimately 
real, the principle of the universe, in water, which he supposed 
to be endowed with life and motion. The important part 
which water evidently plays in the economy of nature, no 
doubt, confirmed him in this opinion. The first principle 
V ^PXVf is that from which all things are generated. 

It is not probable, as Aristotle conjectured, that Thales was 





10 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

led to this view by the old mythological notion of the poets. 
Homer and Hesiod, who had ascribed the origin of all things 
to Oceanus and Tithys, or because the gods swear by water, 
for his whole proceeding is in opposition to mythology. His 
theory was based on the observation of facts; but that water 
is the principle of things, that it is the living and life-giving 
principle, affording by its motions, its modifications, its thick- 
ening and thinning, a satisfactory explanation of the count- 
less phenomena of nature, cannot, for a moment, be enter- 
tained, though it plays no unimportant part. 

How then can the theory of Thales be regarded as philo- 
sophical? Not because it gave a true explanation of the phe- 
nomena of nature, but because of its right methods, in dis- 
carding the mythical, and in seeking a natural explanation 
of things, and because of its aim in attempting to reduce mul- 
tiplicity to unity and complexity to simplicity. The spirit 
of the theory of Thales is truly philosophical; for philosophy 
is the employment of reason in the discovery of those funda- 
mental principles which give unity and harmony to thought. 
It goes back of phenomena to their conditions and cause. 
Science classifies phenomena, names and defines the classes, 
and discovers and verifies the laws according to which the 
phenomena occur. 

2. Anaximander (610-547.) — ^Anaximander lived at Mi- 
letus, and was contemporary with Thales, though younger. 
He was a profound and influential thinker, pre-eminent for 
his geographical, mathematical, and astronomical knowledge. 

Believing that water, the principle of Thales, is too deter- 
minate, since any definite form requires explanation, Anaxi- 
mander conceiving that the ground of all things must itself 
be without form, yet boundless, and thus permitting the sep- 
aration from itself of any form, or even opposite forms, as- 
sumed ri dpxy, the origin, first principle, or essence of things 
to be TO aTreipav, the infinite, unlimited, unbounded, or 
indeterminate. The r6 aweipov cannot, however, be pure 
unbounded space, which cannot be the origin of any thing; it 
must, therefore, be unbounded substance, analogous to ether, 
from which opposite elements, as hot and cold, moist and dry, 
are separated in the work of creation. 

The apxVy or original essence, Anaximander probably 
held to be formless matter, as distinct from particular 



THE MILESIAN SCHOOL 11 

kinds of matter. It must be indeterminate, unbounded sub- 
stance, TO a7r€ipov, original, uncreated and eternal, not ex- 
hausted in the production of the universe. To assume it 
produced by something back of itself, would be to assume the 
first principle not the first, which is a contradiction. 

It is evident that if we assume this first principle to be 
spirit, instead of matter, and endowed with intelligence and 
will, we have the God of Theism. 

Anaximander held that after the universe has run its course, 
it will collapse and return to its former nebular condition, 
which will develop, as in the past, and so on, over and over 
again, an eternal repetend. 

The apxVf or t6 airtipov, of Anaximander, is the equiv- 
alent of the one substance of Spinoza, which he called Deus 
vel Natura. The evolution of the apxv anticipated, by two 
thousand years, the nebular hypothesis of Kant and La Place. 

As a thinker, Anaximander was the most profound of the 
Milesian Philosophers. He sought for the foundation of 
things, which was itself without foundation, and therefore 
original and eternal. It is evident that something, other than 
space and time, must be original and eternal, otherwise there 
never would have been any other reality, save space and time 
themselves. 

3. Anaximines (588-524.) — Anaximines rejected water, the 
principle of Thales, as too determinate, also to aTrupav, 
the principle of Anaximander as too indeterminate, and as- 
sumed air as the first principle. His system may, therefore, 
be regarded as a compromise between the philosophy of 
Thales and that of Anaximander. 

Anaximines held that by rarification air became fire, and 
by condensation wind, clouds, water, rocks, metals. He con- 
sidered air to be the substance of mind or spirit, as indicated 
by such words as ^vxv^ irvevfrn. The earth he believed to 
be a great circle, having thickness or depth, floating on the 
air. The thesis of Thales and the antitheses of Anaximander 
were thus combined in the synthesis of Anaximines. If water 
is too definite, air is so too, only perhaps, in a less degree. 

4. Diogenes of Apollonia (478-428.) — Though not a Mi- 
lesian, as to residence, Diogenes accepted Air, the principle 
of Anaximines, as the first principle, and held it to be intelli- 
gent; but this is implicit in the view of Anaximines, that air 



12 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

is the substance of mind or spirit. The assignment of intelli- 
gence to air, a material substance, conflicts with the later 
theory of Anaxagoras, that Novs, or spirit, is the first principle 
or originator of all other things. Here we see the beginning 
of a conflict continued to the present day, between Spiritual- 
ism and Materialism. 

5. Remarks on the Milesian School, 1. The Milesian 
philosophy discarded the mythical explanation of phenomena 
in favor of the natural. Its point of departure was physical, 
and its philosophers were natural philosophers. 2. Neither 
water, the principle of Thales, nor air, that of Anaximines,' 
can be regarded as the first principle; for they are too deter- 
minate, and need to be accounted for. The principle, to 
airupav, of Anaximander, rests on higher ground, 
though it was not necessary to assume it material, which 
Anaximander did. He might as well have assumed it NoOs, 
that is Mind or Spirit, as Anaxagoras afterwards did, or left 
the alternative between matter and spirit to be decided later, 
according to which one would best explain the phenomena. 
8. The Milesian philosophy is truly philosophical in aim, 
though there is no reason to suppose that it found the real 
first principle. 4. It has great interest as the beginning of 
philosophy. 



CHAPTER II 

The Eleatic School 

The philosophers of this school were Xenophanes, Parmen- 
ides, and Zeno. Melissus of Samos was an adherent and 
supporter of this school, though not an original philosopher. 

1. Xenophanes (circ. 5721-480.) — Xenophanes, the founder 
of the Eleatic philosophy, was a native of Colophon, a city of 
Ionia, in Asia Minor. In consequence of the Persian con- 
quest of Ionia, Xenophanes left Colophon, and traveled as a 
poet and a rhapsodist through the cities of Greece, and finally 
settled in Elea, a city in Southern Italy. From Elea this 
school of philosophy derived its name. 

Xenophanes held that "there is one God supreme among 
gods and men, resembling mortals neither in form nor in 
mind." Accordingly he sharply criticised the prevailing 
anthropomorphic conception of the gods, who in popular 
mythology, as in the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, were rep- 
resented in the likeness of men, and characterized by human 
faults, and were guilty of base immoralities. He said, in 
ridicule of this view: "If oxen and lions could paint, they 
would make the pictures of their gods in their likeness — ^horses 
would make them like horses, oxen like oxen." He said, in 
fact: "Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; 
Thracians give them blue eyes and red hair. " 

Xenophanes was not an Atheist, for he speaks of the one 
supreme God; he was not a Polytheist, for he considered the 
other so-called gods, mythical. He was a Pantheist, since he 
denied the plurality of gods, and affirmed that the universe, 
not the phenomenal universe but the unchangeable, essential 
universe, is itself the Divine Being. He condemned the cus- 
tom of exalting the physical qualities of men, as strength and 
agility, above their intellectual and moral attainments, as is 
done, when in public assemblies, the victor in athletic games, 
the boxer, the wrestler, the runner,is assigned the seat of honor 
above the philosopher or public benefactor. 

18 



14 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Xenophanes held that philosophy is reasonable opinion, 
only probability, rather than certain knowledge. In common 
with all the Eleatic philosophers, his thoughts were concerned 
with the antitheses, being and not-being, the one and the 
many, the permanent and the changeable, the universal and 
the particular, assigning reality to being, the one, the perma- 
nent, the universal, and denying it to not-being, the many, 
the changeable, the particular. 

Greater importance was assigned to the principles of reason 
than to the deliverances of the senses; hence the Eleatic phil- 
osophy is dialectical, logical, metaphysical, rather than sen- 
sational and empirical. 

Xenophanes held to the truth of the axiom: Ex nihil 
nihil Jit, regarding it as self-evident that nonentity has no 
power of generation, which is an incontrovertible truth. He 
maintained that being, in the sense of unchangeable substance, 
is the principle of the universe, the ultimately real, and that 
change is not-being, the unreal. As being is unchanging 
substance, void space is not being, is in fact, inconceivable and 
impossible. 

Xenophanes also held that whatever be the apparent 
changes in the phenomenal world, the one, the permanent, 
the unchangeable unity, is the only real, the essential universe, 
the principle of all things, the ultimate and the absolute being, 
the same from everlasting to everlasting. This view, changed 
from the pantheistic to the theistic conception, expresses the 
highest Christian thought of the present day. Theism holds 
that God is the ground of the universe, though distinguishable 
from it, while pantheism maintains that the universe itself is 
God in the unity of its essential being. 

The ultimate reality is, without doubt, unchangeable in its 
essence, though it is not inactive, since it is the eternal First 
Cause whose energy produced the universe. The phenomenal 
though changeable, cannot be regarded as non-existent; for 
if non-existent it could not change. The Eleatic philosophy 
failed to explain change, and, therefore, denied its reality, but 
the fact of change is not disproved by its denial. 

2. Parmenides (cir. 520-440.) — Parmenides, the most re- 
nowned of the philosophers of the Eleatic school, was held in 
high esteem by Plato, and greatly venerated by the thinkers 
of antiquity. He may be regarded as the metaphysician of 



THE ELEATIC SCHOOL 15 

the Eleatic School. Unchangeable being, the one only reality 
which to the mind of Xenophanes, was a poetic conception, 
became to the mind of Parmenides, a necessary truth appre- 
hended by reason. 

Parmenides, therefore, dwelt on the distinction between 
being and not-being, regarding it as self-evident that being 
is the true, the permanent, the unchangeable, the immutable, 
the principle, not simply pictured by the imagination, but ap- 
prehended, at once, by the reason as the necessary reality, 
while not-being is apprehended as the false, the transitory, 
the changeable, the mutable, the unreal. The phenomenal, 
however, is not refuted by its denial. It is the business of 
philosophy to account for the phenomenal, not to deny its 
reality. 

The philosophy of Parmenides is known from his poem 
"Concerning Nature," a fragment of which has been pre- 
served. The poem consists of two parts, the first " Concern- 
ing Truth/' the second ''Relating to Opinion.'' 

Parmenides represents himself as going in pursuit of truth 
in a chariot drawn by impetuous horses, symbols of the pas- 
sions, escorted by the nymphs of the sun, symbols of the senses. 
At length he reaches two gates where the goddess of justice 
and truth stood with keys and opened the gates, the one the 
entrance to the path of light, the other to that of darkness. 
The first path is the way of reason leading to truth, to being, 
the constant, the real; the second path is the way of the senses 
leading to falsehood, to not-being, the variable, the unreal, the 
non-existent. 

It is right here that the philosophy of Parmenides fails. 
The real is not necessarily the unchangeable; it may be either 
constant or variable. The sum of the three angles of a plane 
triangle is the constant two right angles, while the sum of the 
sides is a variable that may have any length between the lim- 
its zero and infinity; but the sum of the sides, though variable, 
is no less real than the sum of the angles though constant. 

According to Parmenides, the changeable, the phenomenal 
universe of the senses does not exist; but if it has no existence, 
how can it change? It is not being, if being is the unchange- 
able. The truth is, the phenomenal, the appearance through 
the senses, though not permanent, is real as appearance; it 
finds its ground and explanation in the truth of being^ the un- 



16 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

changeable, which is apprehended by reason. An event has 
its explanation in cause, the energy of substantial being. 

Viewing the unchangeable as true being, and the changeable 
as not-being, Parmenides could not reconcile the two, and 
therefore denied existence to the changeable. Accordingly 
we have the world of unity, the essential real world, appre- 
hended by reason, and the phenomenal, the unreal world of 
the senses. Parmenides, however, did not save the phenomenal 
world by calling it the world of appearances, but annihilated 
it by calling it not-being in the sense of the non-existent; it 
exists, if changeable, but is explained by the essentially un- 
changeable. Being, not the inactive dead-head, but substance, 
energetic reality, involving power or capability of casual ac- 
tivity, is really the true eternal first principle. 

3. Zeno (circ. 500-440.) — Zeno was not only a philosopher, 
but a patriot, and died a martyr in the defense of the liberty of 
Elea, his native city. He is to be distinguished from Zeno, 
the founder of the Stoic philosophy. 

Zeno may be called the logician of the Eleatic school, as Par- 
menides was its metaphysician. Parmenides aflBrmed that 
reason apprehended the unchangeable as the real, and, there- 
fore, since two contradictories cannot both be true, the change- 
able must be unreal. Zeno undertook to prove, by the re- 
ductio ad absurdum method of reasoning, that the changeable 
is impossible. 

To prove the impossibility of motion, he said that Achilles, 
the swift-footed, could never overtake the slow-going tortoise. 
To use modern measurements, let us assume that, on a straight 
road, the tortoise is ahead of Achilles one furlong, or 40 rods, 
the length of one side of a square field containing 10 acres, and 
that both are running in the direction from Achilles to the tor- 
toise, Achilles running 10 times as fast as the tortoise. When 
Achilles has reached the first position of the tortoise it is not 
there, but is 1/10 of a furlong ahead, and when Achilles has 
reached that second position of the tortoise, it is 1/100 fur. 
ahead, and when Achilles has reached that third position, the 
tortoise is 1/1000 fur. ahead and so on ad infinitum; there- 
fore, in finite time, Achilles never could overtake the tortoise; 
but as he does overtake it, and could actually pass it, we have 
here a contradiction, on the supposition that motion is real; 
hence motion is not real. Let us see: 



THE ELEATIC SCHOOL 17 

Let t denote the time required, and that Achilles can reach 
the first position of the tortoise in 1 minute, then he can reach 
the second position in 1/10 of a minute, after reaching the 
first, and the third in 1/100 of a minute after reaching the sec- 
ond, and so on; hence, 

(1) t =1 +1/10 +1/100 +1/1000 + . . . , ad infinitum. 
Multiplying both members of (1) by 1/10, we have 

(2) 1/10 / =1/10+1/100+1/1000+ ... ad infinitum. 
Substracting equation (2) from (1), member by member, 

we have 

(3) 9/10 / =1; .' .t =10/9 minutes =1 1/9 minutes. 
Observe that excepting the term (1) the second members 

are alike, and will cancel in the subtraction. 

To show that the sum of an infinite number of decreasing 
terms may not exceed a finite limit, take 1/2 of anything, the 
half of the remainder, or 1/4 of the thing, then 1/2 of the re- 
maining 1/4, or 1/8 of the thing, and so on ad infinitum, and 
we shall have 1/2 +1/4 +1/8 +1/16 + . . . , ad infinitum, 
which can never exceed 1, or the thing itself, since we never 
take the whole of what is left, but only 1/2 of it. 

Zeno said a finite body is impossible; for let it be divided 
into an infinite number of parts, the sum of the parts should 
equal the whole. The parts either have magnitude or no 
magnitude. If the parts have magnitude, the sum would 
have infinite magnitude, since there are an infinite number of 
parts; but if the parts have no magnitude, the whole would 
have no magnitude, since the sum of any number of zeros is 
zero. To refute this reasoning let the body h be divided into 
n parts,each part is 1/n 6,and the sum of the parts nxl/nb ==b 
whatever be the value of n, since the ns cancel. 

Remarks: 1. The Eleatic philosophy, though claiming to 
be based on reason, was one-sided and therefore imperfect, 
and doomed to failure. 

2. A reaction was inevitable, and this appeared in the phi- 
losophy of Heraclitus. 



CHAPTER III 

Heraclitus and Pythagoras 

These philosophers can be conveniently treated in the same 
chapter. They are not directly related, though each stands 
as the founder and embodiment of a system. 

1. Heraclitus (circ. 535-475.) — Heraclitus, the son of Bly- 
son, was born at Ephesus, and was of noble family. He was 
a descendant of Androclus, the founder of Ephesus. His 
hereditary right to the chief magistracy he resigned in favor 
of his younger brother that he might devote himself to the 
study of philosophy, despairing also of accomplishing any- 
thing for the state on account of the corruptions of the people. 

Heraclitus stands for the opposition to the Eleatic School, 
and therefore denied the permanent, which the Eleatics af- 
firmed, and affirmed the changeable, which the Eleatics denied. 

The Eleatics could not reconcile the permanent and change- 
able, and therefore denied the changeable. They took for 
their principle Being, that is the permanent, the unchange- 
able. They called the changeable not-heing, the non-existent. 

Neither did Heraclitus attempt to reconcile the permanent 
and the changeable. He therefore denied the permanent, 
and took for his principle Becoming, unceasing change, such 
as we see in nature, in the vicissitudes of summer and winter, 
day and night, growth and decay. Unceasing change is go- 
ing on in everything, though at different rates. Things ap- 
parently permanent, as rocks, have internal activities which 
never cease. 

Becoming, the principle of Heraclitus, seems therefore more 
perfectly to represent the universe, as it appears to us, than 
Being, the principle of the Eleatics. Becoming, however, is 
known to us empirically, through the senses, and by conscious- 
ness, and is not therefore a principle of reason. Back of all 
change there must be something permanent, the First Cause, 
the origin of the changing. The First Cause, though essen- 
tially immutable, in its essence, is not therefore dormant, but 

18 



HERACLITUS AND PYTHAGORAS 19 

by ceaseless energy is carrying forward the universe to its final 
consummation. Change, however, cannot be the first princi- 
ple. Every change requires a cause. Motion may be as 
natural to a body as rest, and therefore needs no explanation; 
but every change in motion, whether in velocity or direction, 
requires a cause. The explanation of every change is found 
in cause, the essential energy of substantial being. Change, 
therefore, being phenomenal and known by experience, needs 
to be accounted for, and cannot be the first principle, the true 
universal. As an evient, any change needs explanation. 
The first principle is, therefore, not change, but cause, which 
is apprehended by reason as energy or efficiency, and manifests 
itself in every movement as energetic being. The principle 
of change, and even of being itself, is the energy which main- 
tains its own existence and the stability, the order, and the 
harmony of the universe. Cause is, therefore, a deeper first 
principle than the material sensibles of the Milesians, or the 
being of the Eleatics, or the becoming of Heraclitus. In 
cause we reach the true explanation of change. 

His principle of incessant change and his love of paradox 
led Heraclitus to affirm contraries of the same object, as that 
a thing is and at the same instant, is not. Thus, to test this 
hypothesis, let water at the freezing point be subjected to heat 
and call the states of temperature. A, B, C, etc., then Heracli- 
tus would say: A is not- A, and not- A is B; B is not-B, and 
not-B is (7, and so on. 

Let us subject this process of thought to a little vigorous 
logic: If A is not- A and not- A is jB, then A is B; if B is not-B 
and not-B is C, then B is C, and since A is 5, then A is C, and 
so on till the water boils. Then the water is freezing and boil- 
ing, and at the same instant, has all intermediate tempera- 
tures ! 

The law of thought that conflictives cannot exist in the same 
object, at the same time, forbids the affirmation that A is 
not- A, but no law of thought forbids us saying that not- A is B, 
Diverse attributes may exist in the same object at the same 
time, but not conflictive attributes, since they would destroy 
each other. A body may be both spherical and red at the 
same time, but can not be at the same instant, both spherical 
and cubical. 

Heraclitus uttered many profound truths, as: "A man's 



20 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

character is his fate." "Wisdom is the foremost virtue." 
" Lovers of wisdom should know many things. " 

2. Pythagoras (circ. 580-500.) — Many mythical stories 
cling about the life of Pythagoras, but from the most reliable 
accounts, those given by Philolaus, a Pythagorean and a con- 
temporary of Socrates, and by Aristotle, and later by Sextus 
Empiricus, we learn that he was the son of Mnesarchus, an 
engraver. He was born in Samos, one of the principal and 
most fertile of the islands of the Aegean Sea. At the age of 
twenty he traveled for twelve years, visiting Ionia, Phoenicia, 
and probably Egypt, and finally settled at Crotona, in Magna 
Graecia, or Southern Italy, where he founded a school of phi- 
losophy. He taught mathematics, physics, astronomy, and 
morals. 

According to Heraclitus, Pythagoras was the most learned 
man of his time. Thales introduced geometry into Ionia, 
but Pythagoras raised it to the rank of a science. He made 
many mathematical discoveries among which is the celebrated 
theorem, still known as the Pythagorean: The square of the 
hypotenuse of a right triangle is equivalent to the sum of the 
squares of the other sides. In honor of this discovery, it is said, 
he offered a hecatomb of oxen as a sacrifice to the immortal 
Gods. In astronomy, Pythagoras, or more probably his 
successors, taught the theory of a central fire around which 
revolved the heavenly bodies including the sun and the earth. 

In his school at Crotona, Pythagoras not only taught math- 
ematics and astronomy and philosophy, but inculcated the 
importance of seeking for physical and mental perfection, and 
of cultivating the art of self-control, good manners, and up- 
right moral character. 

Silence for one year was required of the novitiate in the 
meetings of the society and a rigid discipline was imposed on 
all the members. Women were admitted to his school on 
terms of equality with men, a remarkably advanced step for 
that early age. 

Pythagoras was, therefore, a social, moral and political re- 
former, but the aristocratic character of his society, its secret 
methods and wide-spread influence, excited suspicion, and 
aroused the hostility of the common people. The society was 
broken up by a mob, and its members dispersed. Pythagoras 
went to Metapontum where he spent the rest of his life in 
comparative quiet. 



HERACLITUS AND PYTHAGORAS 21 

The doctrines of Pythagoras have been obscured by legends; 
disregarding the myths, we may still derive, from the most 
reliable sources, a fairly correct knowledge of his doctrines. 
To account for the order of the universe, Pythagoras assumed 
number as the first principle. Mathematical relations are 
found everywhere, and seem to afford explanation of the order 
of the universe, which is, therefore, a cosmos abounding in 
harmony and proportion. Even morals were represented by 
geometric symbols. Thus a square stood for justice which 
may throw light on the modern expression, '' 'I will do it on 
the square, " and his mathematical principles stood for moral 
truths. His first principles were, however, arithmetical 
rather than geometrical, perhaps because the properties, even 
of geometric forms, were expressed by ratio, which is essen- 
tially number. Pythagoras thus conceived number, which is 
present in all things, to be a truer first principle than water, or 
indeterminate matter, or air, the principles of the Milesians. 
A principle of reason, instead of a material principle, was as- 
sumed as the explanation of the phenomena of the universe. 

It is evident, however, that number does not constitute the 
essence of things. Thus take ten horses and ten trees. The 
number is the same. If the number is the essence the two 
groups ought to be essentially alike, which is not the case. 
Number, therefore, does not account for the difference, nor 
for the peculiarity of anything whatever; it affords no expla- 
nation of essence. 

Pythagoras regarded number as consisting of two parts or 
elements, unity and plurality, the one and the many, the limit 
and the indefinite. Take the number ten. Now ten is one 
ten, not two tens, nor three tens, nor any other number of tens, 
but one ten, yet this one ten consists of ten units, and this 
constitutes its plurality. The same is true of five or two; but 
when we come down to one, the element usually plural reaches 
into its limit one. 

Take the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4. The Pythagoreans regarded 
1 as standing for a point or monad, 2 for a line or duad, 8 for a 
surface or triad, 4 for a solid or tetrad. They also noticed 
that 14-2+3+4 =10 the decad. Unity in multiplicity is, 
therefore, the key to the Pythagorean philosophy. 

The Pythagoreans discovered many remarkable properties 
of numbers. Thus the striking relations subsisting between 



22 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

the three series of numbers, the first the natural numbers, 
the second the odd numbers, the third the square numbers, 
were probably first discovered by them. Write these num- 
bers as follows : 

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.. .n 

1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19...2n-l 

1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 36, 49, 64, 81, 100.. .n^ 

Any odd number is found by multiplying the corresponding 
natural number by 2, and subtracting 1 from the product; 
and any square number, that is the square of any natural num- 
ber, is found by adding the corresponding odd number to the 
next preceding square number. 

Pythagoras also accepted the doctrine of metempsychosis, 
or the transmigration of souls, which he adopted from the 
Orphic mysteries; but this doctrine, though fascinating to 
many minds, is not supported by valid evidence. 

As a philosopher, Pythagoras was a remarkable man, and 
morally he was well worthy the veneration he received. 
Among his disciples his word was taken as authority, and when 
any of his followers could say, in support of his opinion, Ipse 
dixit, that is, Pythagoras has said so, that closed the contro- 
versy. 

What have we found thus far, worthy to be taken as the 
first principle.^ 

If we add energy, intelligence, and will to the Infinite of 
Anaximander, or to the Being of the Eleatics, we may find 
the First Cause or principle of all things; but the first princi- 
ple cannot be found in the change of Heraclitus, nor in the 
number of Pythagoras. 



CHAPTER IV 

Empedocles, Anaxagoras, the Atomists 

1. Empedocles (circ. 490-430.) — Empedocles, a native of 
Agrigentum, in Sicily, was a descendant of a noble family, 
and a man of imposing personality and varied attainments — a 
physician, a philosopher, a prophet, a magician. 

He won a chariot race, as his father, Meton, had done before 
him. He gained great popularity by his liberality and ad- 
vocacy of the rights of the people. All eyes were turned on 
him wherever he appeared, as at the Olympic games, with 
priestly robes, a golden girdle, and a Delphic crown. 

His love of distinction and desire to be accounted more than 
human, to be worshipped as a god, led him to pose as a mira- 
cle worker, and gave currency to the mythical story that after 
a banquet given in his honor, in his old age, he cast himself into 
the crater of Mt. Etna, in order that people, not knowing his 
end, might believe that he was transported to the gods in a 
blaze of glory. The volcano, however, it is said, betrayed 
his secret by casting forth his brazen sandals. But the fact 
that such a story was reported shows that he was human and 
notoriously vain. Undoubtedly he possessed great talents 
and in moral character, save his vanity, he may be ranked with 
Heraclitus and Pythagoras. 

The classing of Empedocles, with reference to the schools 
of philosophy has given rise to considerable discussion. His 
poem "On Nature" seems to place him in an intermediate 
position between the Milesians and the Eleatics. He held, 
moreover, opinions resembling certain other schools, though, 
as we shall see, he had original views of his own. 

Instead of a single principle, as water or air of the Milesians, 
he assumed four elements — fire, air, water, earth. To account 
for change, the four elements were supposed to be moved by 
the two forces, love and hatred, which Empedocles probably 
regarded as attributes of the four elements, and not as ad- 
ditional elements. Love is exhibited in attraction, concord, 
union, organization; hatred in repulsion, discord, separation, 
dissolution. 

23 



24 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

With the Eleatics, Empedocles placed a low estimate on the 
deliverances of the senses, holding that reason alone gives true 
knowledge, but he differed from them in admitting the reality 
of change, not in the elements themselves, but in their com- 
bination and separation, and in the movement of bodies. 

Empedocles held that the knowing subject, and the known 
object must be of like nature — an assumption that has exerted 
a powerful influence on speculation from his time to the pres- 
ent. Like, according to Empedocles, is perceived by like. 
We know an external object by means of an internal cognate 
nature, as external fire by internal fire, and so on for the other 
elements, or their mixtures. The fact, however, is that un- 
like things act more powerfully on each other than like, as 
a hot and cold body affect each other more than two hot bodies 
or two cold. 

Empedocles explained perception by little images coming 
as effluxes, from the objects perceived through the senses. 
In case of vision, a two-fold efflux takes place, one from the 
object to the eye, the other from the eye to the object, the 
perceived image is the result of the meeting of the two streams. 
The sensations of smell and taste result from the penetration 
of particles of matter into the organs of the senses. His ex- 
planation of perception, though crude, was the beginning of 
the theory of the knowledge of external objects, and entitles 
Empedocles to be called the first psychologist. 

His most interesting speculation, however, relates to the 
origin of plants and animals — love combining the fit elements, 
and hate separating the unfit unions, leaving the rare com- 
binations of parts suitable to each other, somewhat in illus- 
tration of Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest. 

With Pythagoras, Empedocles held the theory of the trans- 
migration of souls, and with Xenophanes, he objected to the 
anthropomorphic conception of the gods, as presented in the 
popular mythology of the poets. He declared God to be a 
pure spirit, without body or members; but he did not develop 
the theistic view of God as the Noi)?, or reason, or as the effi- 
cient cause of the universe, as did Anaxagoras, or as the up- 
holder of all things by the word of his power. Nevertheless, 
it is to be admitted that Empedocles, by his originality, gave 
philosophy an impulse, and hastened its evolution. 



EMPEDOCLES, ANAXAGORAS, THE ATOMISTS 25 

3. Anaxagoras (circ. 500-428.) — ^Anaxagoras was a native 
of Clazomenae in Asia Minor. He surrendered his prop- 
erty to his relatives and relinquished his prospects of political 
preferment that he might engage in the pursuit of knowledge 
and devote himself especially to the study of philosophy. 
With the current philosophical systems, he was well versed. 

At an early age he removed to Athens, then rapidly becom- 
ing the center of Greek culture. He acquired a distinguished 
reputation for his attainments in mathematics and astronomy 
and by his dignity and uprightness, he gained the warm friend- 
ship of Pericles and other distinguished citizens of Athens. 

His explanation of celestial phenomena, as eclipses, by 
natural causes, led the people to suspect that he disbelieved 
in the gods of the popular religion. Bigots, ready to accuse 
him of Atheism, were not wanting. He was charged with in- 
fidelity, and though eloquently defended by Pericles, was 
banished from the city. He retired to Lampsacus, where he 
lived greatly respected by the citizens, who at his death, gave 
him funeral honors and caused to be inscribed on his tomb : 
"Here lies Anaxagoras, who of all men penetrated farthest in- 
to the celestial world." His memory was kept alive by the 
fact that the school children were allowed a holiday each year, 
on the anniversary of his death. 

In respect to his theory of knowledge, he held that while the 
phenomena gained through the senses are to be accepted as 
facts, yet they are delusive and untrustworthy in regard to 
the true nature of objects, reason alone giving true knowledge 
of the essence, or the first principles of things. 

Not satisfied with a single principle, as water, indeterminate 
matter, or air, as held by the Milesians, nor with the four prin- 
ciples, earth, water, air, fire of Empedocles, he assumed an 
indefinite number of primitive elements or germs, originally 
so intimately mixed that if any portion be taken that portion 
would contain every kind of element included in the whole, 
so would a part of that portion, and a part of that part, and 
so on indefinitely, however small the parts; that is, the parts 
are similar in kind to the whole and to each other, a con- 
dition or state of matter called by Aristotle ojULOLOfieprj. This 
homogeneous mixture (fxiyfm), a chaos of elements, may be 
likened to the airtipov of Anaximander. 



26 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

To account for the cosmos, Anaxagoras postulated an intelli- 
gent principle, vovs, mind, or reason, separate from the fuyfjua 
the mixed mass. The vov^ knowing all things, past, present 
and future, reduced the chaos to cosmos, arranging everything 
with design according to reason. The original elements were 
thus separated and rearranged with fitness, till the solid earth, 
the water, the air, and the fiery ether were collected together, 
all in their proper places; and organic beings of the vegetable 
and animal kingdoms were produced and endowed with life 
and mind according to their rank. According to the Atom- 
ists, the cosmos was formed by the combination of unlike ele- 
ments, but according to Anaxagoras by the separation of un- 
like elements, and the combination of the like, brought about 
by the action of the vov<:. 

Stars were thrown off from the earth by its rapid rotation, 
and ignited by passing through the fiery ether. The sun is 
a fiery mass, much larger than the stars, and the moon, shining 
with light borrowed from the sun, is a habitable world, having, 
like the earth, mountains and valleys, and bodies of water. 

Anaxagoras makes the vovs a transcendent being who 
formed the cosmos from chaos with design, according to a ra- 
tional plan, but who then seems to abandon it to physical and 
mechanical causes, acting according to natural laws; and for 
this he was censured by Aristotle, who nevertheless praises 
him for the hypothesis of an original intelligent cause, which 
acted with design in forming the cosmos and giving to it law 
and order. Aristotle says: " When a man said that there was 
in nature, as in animals, an intelligence which is a cause of the 
arrangement and order of the universe, this man alone ap- 
peared to have preserved his reason, in the midst of the follies 
of his predecessors. Now we know that Anaxagoras first 
openly maintained these views." 

Did Anaxagoras regard the vovs as material or as spiritual? 
Probably he regarded it as the finest and purest kind of matter 
as certainly did Archelaus, his disciple. But by making sub- 
stance the genus of which matter and spirit are the species, 
we are saved from confusion. Matter is substance, mechani- 
cally inert and impenetrable; spirit is substance endowed with 
intellect, sensibility and will, manifested in thought, feeling 
and volition. 

No system of philosophy can explain change without pos- 
tulating cause as an efficient principle. 



EMPEDOCLES, ANAXAGORAS, THE ATOMISTS 27 

In the Ionic school a vital force, or life, was assumed as an 
inherent property of matter to account for its rarification or 
condensation. In the Eleatic school, so far as being, or un- 
changeableness, was considered as the only reality, no cause, 
or active principle, was required to account for its actuality; 
but even the Eleatics admitted some cause for apparent chang- 
es. Becoming, or the continued change of the Heraclitean 
system, requires cause for its explanation. Number of the 
Pythagorean system, though expressing the proportion of 
things, did not account for change, which, they admitted, 
requires cause. Earth, air, fire and water, the four elements 
given by Empedocles, were acted on by love and hatred, caus- 
ing union and separation. The Atomists supposed their 
atoms endowed with the forces of attraction and repulsion. 
Anaxagoras assumed vovs as the efficient cause of the har- 
mony and the changes in the universe. Really, according to 
all the schools, cause is the first principle; it is their common 
essential element. 

The system of Anaxagoras is really dualistic, assuming, as 
it does, two principles — the fuyfjia and the vov<s, the vovs 
transcendent, apart from the /Aty/^a, and operating on it 
from without. The immanence of the vovs is, however, a 
more tenable view and is consistent with its continued action 
in sustaining and controling the cosmos. Calling atoms points 
of energy exerted by the vovs, we have Theistic Monism. 

2. The Atomists. — Leucippus and Democritus were the 
principal philosophers of the Atomic school — Leucippus, the 
founder, and Democritus, the expositor. 

(1) lucucippus (circ. 490- ) — Leucippus assumed two first 
principles — space and atoms. Space by itself, apart from 
atoms, is an infinite void, or extension in all directions, with- 
out limit. An atom [ara/xos], as seen by the derivation of 
its name, is an indivisable solid, one that can not be cut into 
parts. The atomic theory of matter is the theory which as- 
serts that bodies are made up of atoms. The counter theory, 
that of continuity, asserts that a body can be divided into 
halves, each half into halves or fourths of the whole, each 
fourth into eighths, and so on ad infinitum. 

The atomic theory conceives the atom, whatever be its 
magnitude, as a perfect solid, entirely filling, without pores, 
or vacant spaces, the volume enclosed by its surface. This 



28 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

theory also regards atoms as without qualitative diflferences 
but as possessing quantitative differences of magnitude, form, 
order, position, motion. These two theories correspond to the 
two ways of regarding quantity — the arithmetical and the 
geometrical. Numbers are discontinuous, and the passage 
from one number to another is jper saltum, but a geometrical 
magnitude, as a line, is continuous. The question now is, 
which of these conceptions will best explain the constitution 
of bodies? 

In regard to the limits of divisibility, we may consider four: 
The ^practical limit is reached when we have pulverized a body, 
by grinding it into as fine parts as possible by any mechanical 
means within our power. The physical limit is the molecule, 
which cannot be divided without changing the nature of the 
body. The chemical limit is the atom, two or more of which 
are the ultimate elements of the molecule. The metaphysical 
limit is zero. To understand this take the atom as solid mat- 
ter without pores, which, however small, has magnitude, 
otherwise it is nothing. The atom, though not actually divi- 
sible, is divisible in thought however small it may be, since it 
must have some magnitude. Its half, therefore, has magni- 
tude, and is divisible in thought, likewise its fourth, its eighth, 
and so on ad infinitum. The parts, as the process of division 
is continued, continually decreasing and approaching zero 
as their limit, which they can never reach, are therefore in- 
finitesimals, since an infinitesimal is a decreasing variable 
whose limit is zero. 

The latest theory of matter is that its ultimate elements 
are electrical points thus displacing the solid atom — electrons, 
positive and negative, the probable constituent elements of 
matter. 

(2) Democritus (circ. 470-380) — Democritus of Abdera, the 
disciple and friend of Leucippus was an extensive traveler, a 
voluminous writer, and one of the most learned men of his 
time. He elaborated the atomic theory and applied it in 
explaining both physical and mental phenomena. According 
to this theory, atoms are the ultimate components of all things 
and are themselves uncaused, and therefore eternal. They 
are in motion; hence space, as the condition of motion, is 
necessary and eternal. Atoms are infinite in number, but 
on account of their minuteness being infinitesimal in size, do 



EMPEDOCLES, ANAXAGORAS, THE ATOMISTS 29 

not completely fill all space, as proved by the fact of their mo- 
tion. By their interactions, they produce the various bodies 
of the universe. Solids are formed by rough atoms which, 
clinging together, are held firmly in their places. Liquids are 
composed of smooth, round atoms which freely move among 
themselves. In gases, the action between the atoms is re- 
pellent rather than attractive. The soul is composed of finer 
atoms. The earth was supposed to be round, not like a ball, 
but flat like a great wheel, floating on the air. 

To Democritus the structure of the human body was an 
object of great admiration, yet he assigned a higher value to 
the soul, which consisted of smooth, round, exceedingly mi- 
nute particles of fire, distributed through the whole body, 
and is replenished by the act of breathing. The particular 
activities of the soul have their location in special organs of 
the body. He explained sight, as did Empedocles, by the 
meeting of two streams of effluxes, one from the eye towards 
the object, the other from the object to the eye. In the other 
senses, perception arises through the sensations caused by the 
contact of the effluxes with the organs. The brain is the seat 
of thought, the heart of affection, and the liver of desire. 

Democritus discriminated sharply between perception and 
thought, ascribing to thought the higher value, as alone giving 
us true knowledge of the nature of things. This accords with 
the definition: Philosophy is the rational apprehension and 
application of first principles. The imperfection of sensible 
knowledge is the chief occasion of error; for all knowledge be- 
gins with sensation, and there is nothing, according to Democ- 
ritus, ever to be found in thought, that has not been acquired 
through the senses by the experience of sensation. 

Democritus held that the soul is conscious as long as the 
soul-atoms properly combine, in sufficient numbers, within 
the body, and that sleep follows as a consequence of the escape 
of many of the soul-atoms from the body. Death occurs when 
all these atoms have left the body, and though they still exist, 
the personality is broken up by their separation; that is, the 
soul does not survive death. This conclusion, however, is 
drawn from the hypothesis of the separation of the soul-atoms 
at death, which is by no means certain; for the supposition 
that the soul-atoms can leave the body in organic union is 
equally tenable, in which case the soul would survive, and the 



30 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

personality be preserved; and hence the immortahty of the 
soul is not disproved, even if we grant the material hypothesis 
of Democritus. 

The popular gods of mythology, Democritus did not accept, 
yet he supposed that there are beings in the atmosphere simi- 
lar to men, but superior to them in knowledge and power, 
some friendly and some hostile, and that they can cause 
dreams by sending effluxes to the soul-atoms left in the body 
of the sleeper. These beings, though longer lived than man, 
are still not immortal, as they gradually lose their soul-atoms; 
but Democritus did not know but that these beings may ac- 
quire, as well as lose, soul-atoms, and so continue in being and 
hence be immortal. 

Democritus held that necessity, or fate, is above all gods, 
and that happiness consists in a serenity of mind which is best 
secured by cheerfully submitting to the inevitable, by mod- 
eration of desire and a well-ordered life. 

The doctrines of the Atomists were transmitted through 
their disciples: by Metrodorus of Chios, who drew from the 
Atomic philosophy, certain skeptical inferences bearing on 
the possibility of knowledge; by Protagoras, the sophist; by 
Anaxarchus, who accompanied Alexander in his victorious 
career; by Nausiphanus who instructed Epicurus in the phil- 
osophy of Democritus; by Lucretius, the Latin poet, who ac- 
cepted and forcibly promulgated the doctrines of Democritus 
and Epicurus, and who rejoiced in deliverance from super- 
stitions induced through belief in the existence of the gods. 

In regard to void space, Democritus disagreed with the 
Eleatics, who called it not-being, and asserted its impossibility, 
while Democritus affirmed two original realities, atoms and 
void space, asserting that the motion of atoms implied void 
space between them into which they could move. Of course 
void space has no substantial being, but were all sub- 
stances, whether matter or spirit, swept from existence, in- 
finite space, or pure extension, would remain. 

Democritus advanced the theory of perception and hence 
of knowledge by reducing all the senses to that of touch. In 
sight, the distant object perceived is not in touch with the eye, 
but light from the object, by its vibrations, comes in contact 
with the retina. In hearing, vibrations of the air, coming from 
a distant object, as a ringing bell, strike the drum of the ear. 



EMPEDOCLES, ANAXAGORAS, THE ATOMISTS 31 

In touch, of course, there is contact, and the same is true of 
taste and smell. The doctrines of the Atomists were seized 
upon by Epicurus, Lucretius and others, as the means of 
getting rid of the superstition of the intervention of the gods, 
as the explanation of the phenomena of nature, by giving a 
natural explanation. An echo was produced by the reflection 
of sound waves, and not by the mocking voice of a spirit. 
The loss to poetry was a gain to science. 



CHAPTER V 
The Sophists 

The Sophists, wise men according to the literal signification 
of the name, were superior teachers, who took pay for giving 
instruction in the art of making life a success. They claimed 
to be practical, and their claim was generally acknowledged 
to be just. In a dialogue called after his name, Protagoras, 
the chief of the Sophists, is represented by Plato, who was not 
inclined to give him undue credit, as saying: "The lesson 
which I have to teach is prudence and good counsel, both in 
respect to domestic matters, that the man may manage his 
household aright, and in respect to public affairs, that he may 
be thoroughly qualified to take part, both by deed and word 
in the business of the state." This fairly states the claim 
made by the Sophists. 

The subjects taught by the Sophists, though varying some- 
what with the different teachers, included philosophy, the 
technical points of legal practice, and oratory, including dia- 
lectics, rhetoric, and elocution. In giving instruction in these 
things, the Sophists, for a considerable period, gained great 
popularity. Wealthy young men flocked to their lecture 
rooms to receive the advantages of their instruction. 

As teachers, the Sophists constituted a class or profession, 
not a sect or school, as each one taught, in his own way, what 
he deemed proper; but as philosophers, they held to a common 
principle, though diflFering somewhat in the details of their 
speculations. 

A person calling himself a Sophist, that is, a wise man, over- 
steps the line of modesty, and by claiming too much, naturally 
exposes himself to criticism. Thus the name Sophist, was 
brought into contempt, and came to signify a conceited fellow, 
an unsound reasoner, one that preferred victory to truth. 

The Sophists have been often charged with a laxity of morals 
and accused of corrupting the young men of Athens; but the 
philosopher Lewes, and Grote, the historian, have vindicated 

32 



THE SOPHISTS 33 

their personal moral character and clearly freed them from 
the charge of teaching a morality unacceptable to the Athe- 
nian people. To achieve success, as public teachers, they must 
conform to the accepted morality. But neither Lewes nor 
Grote has proved the soundness of their philosophy, nor that 
the drift of their moral teaching had not a tendency to laxity 
in conduct. 

The Sophists inaugurated the era of criticism, which led to 
the philosophy of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; but their 
critical method contained the seeds of skepticism, which germi- 
nating bore rank fruit. 

Of the Sophists we shall treat chiefly of the principal ones — 
Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias and Isocrates, and incidentally 
of some others. 

1. Protagoras (circ. 481-411.) — Protagoras, a native of Ab- 
dera, was a friend of Democritus of the same city, and the first 
to call himself a Sophist. He taught in various cities, and 
by his eloquence, gained great reputation. He visited Athens 
on several occasions, and enjoyed the friendship of Pericles. 

His views respecting the gods, though simply agnostic, not 
atheistic, gave great offense to the Athenian people. Fanatical 
opposition was aroused against Protagoras who like Anaxag- 
oras, was banished from the city, and died in exile, and his 
books publicly burned in the market place. The immediate 
cause of his banishment was probably the following passage 
found in his book entitled Ilept ^ewv: *' Respecting the 
gods, I know neither whether they exist nor what are their 
attributes; the uncertainty of the subject, the shortness of 
human life and many other causes, debar me from the knowl- 
edge. " This statement, reasonably moderate, as it seems to 
us who do not believe in the mythic gods, could not be toler- 
ated by the Athenians, zealous in the cause of their national 
religion; and it is to be observed that Protagoras was ban- 
ished not on moral grounds, but because of the religious in- 
tolerance of the people. 

It is not with Protagoras as a teacher that we are to deal, 
but with Protagoras as a philosopher. He assumed for his 
principle certain doctrines of other philosophers, especially 
of Heraclitus, Democritus, and perhaps that also of Anaxag- 
oras, that mind is the controlling principle. 

According to HeracHtus, "All things flow;" the flux is the 



34 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

real. But according to Democritus, this flux is phenomenal, 
subjective, known only through the senses, and there is noth- 
ing in thought not found in sensation; but sensation is known 
only to the individual himself; it is his own experience; no one 
else is conscious of it; but sensation is known by mind, the real 
principle. 

When Protagoras announced his maxim: Man is the 
measure of the universe^ he did not mean by man the class man^ 
but the individual man, and he knows only his own sensations. 
Whatever sensation any man has, that for him is true, and 
he alone can know its truth, as a fact of experience. Each 
man, is, therefore, the sole judge of his own good or evil. What 
seems good or bad to him is good or bad, and to seek the good 
or to shun the bad is right, but to seek the bad or to shun the 
good is wrong. This is the ethics of nature, as opposed to the 
ethics of society; it is egoism, not altruism. 

Let us now see how this sensational philosophy becomes 
critical, skeptical and immoral in its tendency. 

The Milesians assumed water, indeterminate matter, or 
air, as their first principle and by its thickening or thinning, 
all things are produced; but to account for this thickening or 
thinning, which as a change, required a cause, they postulated 
life. Here, as we believe, comes in the criticism of Protagoras 
who says to the lonians : The changing phenomena you know 
through the senses; but you do not know, by the senses, the 
cause of the changing phenomena. You assume life, but this 
is mere hypothesis, and your philosophy, founded on an as- 
sumption, has no solid basis, and is therefore invalid. 

To the Eleatics, Protagoras would say: You postulate 
being, permanent existence, and deny change; but you cannot 
by sensation know this so-called being, which, as unchange- 
able, is a dead-heady and cannot explain anything; but sensa- 
tion, as phenomenal, as continually changing, the only thing 
you can know, you deny. You affirm what cannot be known 
and deny the reality of the only thing you can know. Of 
what avail, therefore, is your philosophy as an explanation 
of the uni verse. f^ It is vain and preposterous. 

To the Pythagoreans, Protagoras could say : You call num- 
ber the essence of things. Take three men and three trees, 
the number three, which you call one three, expresses the ratio 
of the collection of men to one man, the unit of the collection 



THE SOPHISTS 35 

of men, or the ratio of the collection of trees to one tree, the 
unit of the collection of trees. The ratio three is the same in 
the two cases; but are the two collections the same? Are the 
men and the trees identical? The men are not trees, neither 
are the trees men. It is clear, therefore, that the number three 
which expresses their numerical sameness, does not express 
their essential difference. The same thing holds, in like cases, 
where different things are compared. Number is not, there- 
fore, the essence of things, and the Pythagorean principle of 
number utterly fails to explain the phenomena of the uni- 
verse. 

To Heraclitus, Protagoras would say: I accept your prin- 
ciple of change, if by change you mean change in sensations, 
which is the only change we know anything about; but as a 
Hylozoist, you seem to hold to a principle of life, symbolized 
by fire, as the cause of change; but cause is not known by sen- 
sation, and is, therefore, not known at all. 

To Empedocles, Protagoras would say: Your elements, 
earth, water, air, fire, you suppose to be actuated by love or 
hatred in combining or separating. You know love and ha- 
tred, as subjective phenomena; but you do not know them, as 
causing the union or separation of your supposed elements, 
for causes are not known by sensation. 

To the Atomists, Protagoras would say: I accept your 
principle that all knowledge is derived through sensation; and 
by this principle, which you first clearly stated, I criticize all 
the systems of philosophy, yours not excepted; for what do 
you know about atoms? Did you ever see, or hear, or touch, 
or taste, or smell an atom? How do you know there are 
atoms? You do not know them by the senses, and therefore 
do not know them at all. Your philosophy has no basis in 
knowledge. 

To Anaxagoras, Protagoras would say: You assume a 
chaos of matter with all the elements intimately mixed; but 
you know nothing of this matter as an objective thing; all you 
know is phenomenal, subjective experience gained through the 
senses. You assume vov^, as an organizer of your supposed 
mixed matter, as the principle or cause which rendered the 
chaos of matter the cosmos, or universe of order; but what do 
you know of the vovs, objective to yourself, as the cause 
of the cosmos? I grant subjective intelligences; for I am 



36 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

conscious of changing sensations which are all that can be 
known. Your vov<; is, therefore, hypothetical, and your phi- 
losophy void, as it lacks a known basis, and will satisfy no one 
seeking for truth. 

Thus the philosophy of Protagoras is both critical and skep- 
tical. Granting the assumption that all knowledge is de- 
rived through sensation, all the systems considered crumble 
into dust, leaving nothing but changing elusive sensations, 
not even the senses as objective organs. This conclusion is 
melancholy enough to please the most thorough-going skep- 
tic. 

Let us subject to criticism the assumption that all knowl- 
edge is derived through sensation, and the skeptical opinion 
held by the majority of philosophers that sense knowledge is 
delusive. The Greek philosophers generally have exagger- 
ated the physiological differences in the sense organs of differ- 
ent individuals. There are, of course, great differences in 
abnormal individuals, but general similarity in average cases. 
Again the different senses are mutually corrective — a false 
report of one is corrected by a true report of another. A 
mere visual image may be mistaken for a material object, or 
the reverse, but the sense of touch will correct the false testi- 
mony of sight. Salt looks like sugar, but when put on straw- 
berries, by the mistake of the housekeeper, the taste of the 
guests soon detects the blunder. The assertion that sensa- 
tion is the only source of knowledge, making all knowledge 
valid only for the individual, is void of truth. Man, the gener- 
ic man, also the individual, has a rational nature, common to 
all men. Reason does not depend on the organization of the 
senses, is not affected by their imperfection, and is essentially 
the same in all normally developed human beings. Its func- 
tion is not feeling, but is the apprehension of necessary truth, 
relating to the conditions of the phenomenal, deducing logical 
consequences from admitted premises, or rising, by induction, 
from particular cases to general principles. Do not all rational 
minds assent to the principle that every event requires a cause? 
Do not all who understand the demonstrations know the 
truth of the theorems of Geometry? Have not large induc- 
tions been made in science, such as the law of universal 
gravitation? These inductions furnish the major premise 
for deductions. 



THE SOPHISTS 37 

Protagoras assumed that man is simply a bundle of sensa- 
tions; it would be better to say man is a sensibility; the par- 
ticular sensations come and go, and depend on many contin- 
gencies, but the sensibility, the susceptibility of sensation, 
abides; yet it does not tell the whole truth to call man a sensi- 
bility; man is also a rational being, he has reason, and rational 
knowledge of necessary truth. Philosophy should not over- 
look either contingent facts or necessary truth. 

What of the moral tendency of sensational philosophy? If 
each individual man is, for himself, the measure of the uni- 
verse, the sole judge of his own truth, will he not be inclined to 
believe that his own good is paramount? That his own pleas- 
ure, his individual happiness, and not the welfare of society, 
is the proper object of his pursuit? His individual pleasures 
and pains are real to him; the restrictions of society are artifi- 
cial, arbitrary, and often tyrannical. Why, then, he inquires, 
should I not obey the superior ethics of nature, rather than 
the inferior ethics of society? Making this choice, he seeks 
for sensational pleasures, regardless, as is likely, of the rights 
or happiness of his fellow beings. His ethics is Hedonic 
Egoism. This tendency, with this result, was found in Epi- 
cureanism. 

2. Prodicus (circ. 465-395.) — Prodicus was a native of 
lulis, a city in the island of Ceos. He first came to Athens 
as the accredited agent of his native island, when he was 
a young man. He soon became known as an eloquent speaker 
and a successful teacher. The aim of his instruction was to 
prepare young men for success in life. He was himself 
a good illustration of a successful man, as he acquired, by his 
teaching, both popularity and affluence. His moral and re- 
ligious teaching did not arouse opposition, and may, therefore, 
be considered as not unacceptable to the Athenian people. 

Prodicus is a good illustration of the fact that a Sophist 
was not necessarily immoral or irreligious, as the Athenians 
understood these terms. He is the author of a beautiful 
story called The Choice of Hercules, which may be found in 
Xenophon's Memorabiha. The purpose of this production is 
to incite young men to a noble ambition for a life of virtue 
and by strenuous effort to achieve results worthy of the appro- 
bation of the wise and good, and of the gratitude of their fel- 
low citizens. This clearly shows that the teaching of a Soph- 



38 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

ist may be better than that to which their philosophy logically 
leads. 

Prodicus considered the mythic gods to be personifications 
of the forces of nature; hence he did not deny or doubt their 
existence as personifications, since he did not question the 
existence of the forces of nature. He was a good rhetorician, 
both as a writer and as an orator. He did great service by 
his clear discriminations as to the meaning and proper choice 
of words, and in his suggestions in regard to style. Less 
theoretical, but more practical than Plato, he lived a useful 
and honorable life, highly respected by all who had the honor 
of his acquaintance. 

3. Gorgias (circ. 483-375.) — Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily 
was sent by his fellow citizens, at the head of the embassy, to 
ask protection for their city against the encroachments of the 
Syracusans. Having accomplished the object of his mission, 
he chose Athens for his residence, at the invitation of the citi- 
zens, and engaged in giving instruction in oratory. Finally 
he removed to Thessaly, where he continued to teach for the 
rest of his life. As an orator he was eloquent, though florid 
in style and pompous in manner. 

In philosophy he was a skeptic. He maintained the fol- 
lowing propositions: 

(1) Nothing exists. (2) If anything does exist, it can- 
not be known. (3) If anything exists and is known, the fact 
of its existence cannot be communicated. In his support of 
these propositions, Gorgias displays unusual logical acumen, 
and in this respect he compares well with the Eleatic Zeno. 

His proof of the first proposition, so far as it can be gath- 
ered and filled out from a fragmentary report, runs thus : If 
anything exists, it is either being or not-being, or both being 
and not-being. It cannot be both being and not-being, for 
they are contradictory; it cannot be not-being, for not-being 
is the negation of existence; if anything exists, it is therefore 
being. Now, if being exists, it is either eternal, or it began 
to be ; if it began to be, then it either sprang from non-entity 
into being, or was produced; it did not spring from non- 
entity into being, for non-entity being nothing, cannot spring; 
it was then produced, and if produced, it was produced either 
by being or not-being, but not-being has no power of pro- 
duction; therefore it was produced by being, which is the 
very thing to be accounted for, and cannot be the explana- 



THE SOPHISTS 39 

tion of itself. Being, therefore, did not begin to be, and hence 
is eternal, and if eternal, then infinite, a perfect solid, filling 
space without any void, which leaves no room for anything 
else, and therefore excludes even the phenomenal universe, 
the only thing known to be real; hence it is false that being 
exists; therefore it is true that being does not exist; that is, 
nothing exists. 

Gorgias assumes that an eternal thing, the infinite in time 
involves the infinite in space, which is not necessarily true; 
to suppose an atom eternal is not to suppose it infinitely large. 
Now, something is, for the phenomenal is immediately and 
certainly known, and is therefore real; hence something is 
eternal; for if not, non-entity must have jumped into being, 
which is impossible, since non-entity, being nothing, cannot 
jump. There is, therefore, not only existence, but eternal 
existence. If one should inquire for the cause of eternal exist- 
ence, the reply is, such inquiry supposes eternal existence, not 
eternal. An eternal existence, having no beginning, requires 
no cause, and in fact, excludes cause; for whatever has a cause 
has a beginning and is not eternal. 

In regard to the second proposition, If anything exists, it 
cannot be known, Gorgias accepts the principle of Empedocles 
that the knowing subject and the known object must be of 
like nature, also the Eleatic signification of being, as the 
unchangeable. He then argues thus: If being is known 
by thought, then thought must be being, and if thought is 
being, then everything we think exists, which is not true, 
for we can think of the non-existent, which makes the non- 
existent existent, which is contradictory and impossible. 
Again, if thought is being, it is unchangeable, but we know 
that thought is fleeting, and is, therefore, not unchangeable, 
and hence it cannot be being. Therefore the supposition 
which makes being knowable is false, since it makes change- 
able thoughts unchangeable; hence being is unknowable; 
that is, if anything exists, it can not be known. 

The above reasoning, instead of proving the proposition 
that if anything exists it cannot be known, which we know to 
be false, disproves rather the principle of Empedocles, on 
which the reasoning is based, that the subject and object of 
knowledge must be of like nature; it also disproves the 
principle of the Eleatics, that existing being is unchangeable. 
Finite existences are certainly variable. 



40 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

In support of the third proposition, that if anything exists 
and is known, it cannot be communicated, Gorgias urged 
the inadequacy of language, that words, at best, are neither 
things nor the ideas of things, but symbols expressing im- 
perfectly the meaning intended to be conveyed. The hearer, 
therefore, does not get the exact thought of the speaker, and 
the same is true of the reader, who does not get the precise 
meaning of the writer. Words are incapable of expressing 
exact thought. 

The outcome of this sweeping criticism is skepticism; for 
if nothing can be certainly known, what is called knowledge is 
simply opinion, and when opinions clash, there is no test for 
deciding which is true. A low estimate is placed upon truth, 
since truth, so-called, is resolvable into mere probability. 
With such views, a sophist would strive, not to establish the 
truth, but by plausible arguments, to convince his hearers, 
and gain the victory. 

Criticism, however, led to a more thorough study of 
thought itself in the analysis of the reasoning process, and in 
the discrimination between valid and invalid arguments, 
which appeared in the philosophy of Socrates and Plato, and 
culminated in the logic of Aristotle. 

4. Isocrates (436-338.) Isocrates was not a sophist in the 
ordinary acceptation of the term; he was greater, and wiser, 
and better. 

Like the majority of the sophists, he taught oratory, 
though not the pettifogging oratory of the law courts, but 
the eloquence of the statesman. In his teaching, he sought 
to enlarge the mental horizon of his students, in giving them 
broader views, by discoursing, not alone on Athenian affairs, 
but on Hellenic interests, involving the welfare of all the 
States of Greece. 

He saw the folly of the petty ambition of the several Grecian 
cities, Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, to be the ruling power in 
Greece. Had the States of Greece formed a federal Govern- 
ment, to which all should be admitted on terms of equality, 
the States preserving their autonomy in local affairs, and 
cultivating intelligence and moral virtue, there seems to be 
no reason why Greece might not have gained supremacy 
in the world, and remained to this day the dominant power. 

It was the desire of Isocrates to see the discordant States 



THE SOPHISTS 41 

of Greece lay aside their jealousies, and unite under the 
leadership of Philip, of Macedon, for the conquest of Persia. 
To this end he labored, and even wrote letters to Philip, 
urging him to make this great conquest. 

In his moral teaching, he did not elaborate a philosophic 
basis for Ethics, but as we cannot have exact knowledge in 
practical affairs of life, he held that we must be content with 
those opinions, which are most reasonable, knowledge, so- 
called, is opinion, and truth is probability. 

He was a thorough instructor, and trained the learner to 
rely on his own efforts in producing satisfactory results. 
His own essays received that artistic finish in literary form, 
which made them models of style in prose composition. His 
merits, as a rhetorician, were recognized by Cicero, through 
whom his influence has extended to the literature of modern 
times. 

The teaching of Isocrates indicates a healthy reaction 
against the extreme teaching of the Sophists, and a transition 
to sounder views and better practices. He may be regarded 
as a connecting link between the Sophistic and the Platonic 
Philosophy. 

Of other sophists, Hippias of Ellis, distinguished for 
rhetorical talent and scientific iattainments, said that law is a 
tyrant, since it forces men to do contrary to nature; Polus, a 
rhetorician, a disciple of Gorgias, was distinguished for his 
style of oratory; Thrasymachus held that might makes right, 
as seen by Plato's report of him in the first book of the 
Republic. 



CHAPTER VI 

Socrates and Immediate Successors 

1, Socrates (469-399). The principal sources of informa- 
tion respecting Socrates, since he left no writings of his own, 
are Xenophon's MemorabiUa and the Dialogues of Plato. In 
addition to these sources, we have also the cross-lights of 
Aristophanes, the comic poet, and the biographical references 
to him made by Aristotle. 

Aristophanes, the consummate artist that he was, found 
Socrates a fine subject for caricature, which he employed 
with telling effect, in the comedy of the Clouds. Aristophanes 
stood for the old regime in morals and religion, and despised 
the sophists, with whom he reckoned Socrates, not recogniz- 
ing the difference. Aristotle really gives nothing concerning 
Socrates not found in Plato, but what he says of him is valu- 
able by way of confirmation. 

The Memorabilia of Xenophon is apologetic, intended to 
vindicate the character of Socrates from the unjust reproach 
of his enemies, by giving his conversations as they occurred. 
Xenophon was a warm friend and an admiring disciple of 
Socrates. He was not a philosopher, but a historian and a 
military officer, and though he intended to present Socrates 
in a favorable light, there is no reason to distrust his testi- 
mony. Plato was a philosopher, a deep thinker, and in his 
dialogues, Socrates stands, not only as the advocate of his 
own opinions, but also the champion of those of Plato who, 
in many respects, had advanced beyond the teachings of his 
master, so that it is difficult to determine whether the opinion 
advanced is due to Socrates or to Plato. When Xenophon 
and Plato agree in assigning a certain opinion to Socrates, 
we may rely on their united testimony as substantially true. 

Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, a statuary, and of 
Phaenarete, a midwife. He for sometime followed the pro- 
fession of his father. A draped group of the Graces, pre- 
served in the Acropolis to the time of Pausanius, the historian, 

42 



SOCRATES AND IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS 43 

A. D. 160, was considered to be the work of Socrates. In 
delivering men of their latent thoughts, he likened his pro- 
fession to that of his mother. 

His appearance was not prepossessing. His low stature, 
corpulent figure, protruding stomach, thick neck, flat turned- 
up nose, spreading nostrils, projecting eyes, at once attracted 
attention, and quite likely incited sarcastic remarks of many 
whom he daily encountered. 

Socrates, no doubt, received the ordinary education of the 
Athenian youth, and probably, for a time, turned his atten- 
tion to physical science, which he found to be unsatisfactory, 
consisting merely of speculations, and yielding no valuable 
results. The secrets of nature he regarded as beyond the 
reach of human knowledge, and to pry into them was in his 
opinion, presumptuous and offensive to the gods. 

He was undoubtedly acquainted with the astronomical 
theories of Anaxagoras, and his doctrine of the Novs, also 
with the physical opinions of Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxag- 
oras. He probably had listened to the lectures of Protag- 
oras, and took lessons in language of Prodicus. 

While the teaching of the sophists gave the skill requisite 
to secure victory in disputation, and to achieve a successful 
career in life, it led to an indifference to truth and a laxity of 
morals, which was utterly distasteful to Socrates, who there- 
fore turned his attention to the study of man, chiefly in his 
intellectual, moral, social and political relations. He did 
not call himself a sophist, a wise man, for he asserted his 
ignorance, but a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, a learner 
seeking after knowledge. As an investigator, he sought 
truth wherever it was to be found, especially truth pertain- 
ing to man. Socrates, therefore, accepted the precept in- 
scribed on the temple at Delphi, yvwOi creavrov, know 
thyself, as the injunction most important to be obeyed, and 
was the first to proclaim the sentiment: " The proper study 
of mankind is man, " 

The Pythian oracle had declared him to be the wisest of 
all men. Socrates wondered how this could be, when he was 
conscious of his own ignorance. To test the truth of the 
oracle, and thus to confirm his faith, Socrates questioned 
various persons reputed for wisdom, as statesmen, poets, 
sophists, and found them ignorant respecting the very things 



44 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

of which they professed to have knowledge; yet he failed to 
convince them of their ignorance, though in attempting to 
do so, he made them his enemies. He then concluded that 
the oracle was right in declaring him to be the wisest of 
men, for he alone knew his own ignorance. 

He was a great humorist, and this gave a relish to his 
conversation to the delight of his friends; but he made many 
enemies,by occasionally resorting to irony, or biting sarcasm. 

He professed to be guided by a Daemon, that is by a genius, 
or spirit, whose voice he implicitly obeyed. What was this 
genius? This is a question which has occasioned not a little 
controversy. Was it a guardian angel, his conscience, or the 
reflex of his own thoughts? It is sometimes said that Socrates 
heard this voice only in prohibition, restraining him from 
doing anything that was not best to be done; but that he 
received positive instructions to pursue a certain line of con- 
duct is evident from what he said to the judges, at his trial, 
as reported by Plato in the Apology: "I should tell you, with 
all respect and affection, that I will obey the god rather than 
you, and that I will persist, until my dying day, in cross- 
questioning you, exposing your want of wisdom and virtue, 
and reproaching you till the defect is remedied." 

Socrates was not a dogmatic philosopher, proclaiming his 
own opinions as if they were known to be true, neither was 
he a teacher in the sense that he poured knowledge into the 
minds of his pupils, but he was an educator, in that, by 
skillful questions, he drew out what was latent in the mind of 
the learner. The thing that was latent, however, was not 
the knowledge, but the ability to know, or the act of knowing. 
First, however, he led him, by cross-questions, to see his 
ignorance, or convinced him of holding erroneous opinions, 
so that his mind, free from error, was in condition to be led, 
step by step, to apprehend the truth for himself. The 
learner then did not passively receive the truth, but made 
the discovery by his own thought. 

Socrates accepted, with the sophists, the principle that 
man is the measure of the universe, but differed from them in 
regard to the meaning attached to the word man. By man 
the sophists meant the individual man, who knew immedi- 
ately only his own sensations, which are fleeting, and differ 
in different men; but by man, Socrates meant the generic 



SOCRATES AND IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS 45 

man, or all men having, not only fleeting sensations, but 
reason, which is essentially the same in all, and that this 
common endowment, reason, is the essential characteristic of 
man, and is a far better measure of the universe than the 
changing sensations. As each normal man has reason, in 
common with other individuals of the genus, it is possible, 
therefore, to reach conclusions that will command general 
assent. 

What is the end to be sought .^^ The sophists answered 
pleasure, sensational enjoyment, but pleasure is best ac- 
quired by a successful career, by securing wealth, attaining 
to a high social position, political power or influence. These 
things, according to the sophists, are the benefits of virtue. 
The value of these benefits Socrates did not deny, but con- 
tended that there are other benefits, and of a higher order — 
the rational satisfactions that come from conduct that accords 
with the dictates of reason. Though Socrates makes happi- 
ness the ultimate end of right conduct, yet it is not chiefly 
hedonic pleasure, which is not objectionable, if properly 
restricted to what is morally lawful, but chiefly the pure 
satisfaction resulting from the discovery or apprehension of 
truth, from the consciousness of rectitude, from noble achieve- 
ment or heroic effort. Virtue is to be pursued, because it 
alone gives rational satisfaction, which is the highest happi- 
ness, the ultimate good. To be worthy of happiness is happi- 
ness itself. 

Since a virtuous life yields the best results, why do not men 
pursue virtue.^ Socrates answered, they do not, because of 
ignorance. He reasoned thus: All men seek happiness; but 
virtue is the only means to true happiness; therefore, all men 
would be virtuous, or do right, if they only knew what is 
right; hence virtue can be taught, and is identical with true 
knowledge. This reasoning would hold good, if all men were 
like Socrates, who was conscientious, and had complete con- 
trol of himself; but he seemed not to realize the strength of 
appetite in the average man, nor the pressure of desire for 
immediate gratification, while the rewards of virtue are less 
intense, and very often somewhat remote. It is, however, 
true that assured high moral conduct requires the supremacy 
of reason. 

Socrates drew around him a throng of enthusiastic dis- 
ciples of the better class of the young men of Athens. He 



46 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

frequented the gymnasia and the market places, and con- 
versed with any one willing to hear him or to engage in argu- 
ment. A crowd soon gathered to listen to the dispute, or 
to enjoy the confusion of his defeated antagonist, who was 
drawn on, by one skillful question after another, till he was 
entangled in a jungle of contradictions; but after exposing 
error, Socrates led on to positive truth. Socrates showed the 
importance of the classification of objects into genera, species 
and individuals, and taught how to frame correct definitions 
by referring the object defined to its genus, and giving its 
characteristic or differential quality. He reasoned from 
analogy, also by induction; but he differed from Bacon, a 
leader in modern science, in some respects : Bacon said inter- 
rogate nature and make your inductions from external 
phenomena. Socrates said interrogate man, and make your 
inductions from internal phenomena. Bacon said study 
things. Socrates said study thoughts. Both performed 
a service of inestimable value. 

The method of Socrates was such as to make enemies; and 
though he was a law-abiding citizen, and had been a brave 
soldier, he was accused of not worshipping the gods, whom 
the city worships, of introducing new divinities of his own, 
and of corrupting the youth of Athens. He was brought 
to trial on these charges, and found guilty. Making no 
effort to conciliate his judges, but rather to exasperate them, 
he was condemned to suffer death. The part of his speech 
he made after his sentence, as reported by Plato in the Apol- 
ogy is a masterly and noble effort, and in passages rises even 
to the grandeur of sublimity. 

Socrates could not be put to death, according to law, till 
after the ship should return that had sailed to Delos the day 
before, for the festival of Apollo. He remained in prison 
during the interval, which was thirty days, calmly conversing 
with his friends, as reported by Plato in the Phaedo and the 
Crito. He drank the poison hemlock without change of 
countenance, walked about till his legs became weary, then 
lay down and calmly fell asleep. Thus died Socrates, the 
first of the Ethical Philosophers. 

It now remains to summarize: Socrates held that man has 
not only a sensibility, with varying sensations, but also a 
common rational nature, and can apprehend universal, 



SOCRATES AND IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS 47 

necessary truth; that with this view of the generic man, it 
can be truthfully held that man is the measure of the universe; 
that it is important to classify things into genera, species, 
and individuals, to form true concepts of things, and to em- 
body these concepts in true definitions; that reasoning by 
induction, deduction and analogy reveals the truth; that the 
mind must see its ignorance, and relieve itself from false 
opinions, before it can form true opinions; that self knowledge 
is the most important knowledge; that vice is the consequence 
of ignorance, and virtue of knowledge; that the ultimate end 
is rational happiness; that happiness is secured by knowing 
the wrong and avoiding it, and by knowing and doing what is 
right; that the right is the rational pursuit of the Ultimate 
end; that Ethics is the most important of all the sciences, 
and that the virtues it inculcates are to be exhibited in the 
practical conduct of life. 

2, Immediate Successors of Socrates, These are Euclid, 
Aristippus and Antisthenes. 

(1) Euclid (circ. 445.) Euclid, of Megara, was the found- 
er of the Megaric school. He is not to be confounded with 
Euclid, the famous mathematician of Alexandria. Euclid 
was a zealous disciple of Socrates. By diligent study of the 
works of Parmenides and Zeno, the Eleatic, he became well 
versed in Eleatic philosophy. He was so ardent a disciple 
of Socrates, that though the citizens of Megara were forbid- 
den, on pain of death, to visit Athens, Euclid, disguised as 
a woman, came to Athens by night and listened with delight 
to the conversations of Socrates. After the death of Socrates, 
his disciples, through fear of violence from the Athenians, 
took refuge with Euclid, for a time, at Megara. 

The foundation of the Megaric philosophy was the com- 
bination of Being, the metaphysical principle of the Eleatics 
with the Good, the moral principle of Socrates. Being, the 
immutable, identical with the Noi;s of Anaxagoras, or with 
€f>p6vrj(TL^, wisdom, or Oeos, of Socrates, the one Good, 
€v TO dyadov, is with Euclid, the only existent. Evil is 
not-being, the non-existent. The Good, then, is identical 
with the God of Theism, with the ultimate reality whose 
existence, as Spencer declares, is of all things the most certain, 
or with that power in the universe, not of ourselves, which 
works for righteousness, according to Matthew Arnold. 



48 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The combination of the Eleatic Being with the Socratic 
Good can be effected only by attributing goodness to being; 
but this Being, vovs, or 0eos, is objective, while the ulti- 
mate good, according to Socrates, is subjective, that is, 
happiness or rational enjoyment. The two principles can 
not be identified, but can be related as cause and effect. 
Let the vous, the Oeos, the objective goodness, be appre- 
hended by reason, and loved by the affections of any man, 
who renounces vice and cherishes virtue, and the result of 
this mystic union of the divine and the human, is religious 
experience, the ultimate good, the highest enjoyment of 
which man, as a rational being, is susceptible. This view, 
if fully comprehended, is likely to be acceptable to all Theists. 
The good is genuine religious experience, 

Euclid's dialectic, or science of thought, differs from that 
of Socrates, in that he repudiated analogical reasoning as 
unsound, while he employed the reductio ad absurdum of 
Zeno, which Socrates regarded as sophistical, yet it is power- 
ful when used in refutation. 

Analogy and induction may be advantageously employed, 
if regarded as giving only probable conclusions, to be tested 
by experience or experiment. The reductio ad absurdum 
method is a powerful form of reasoning, based on the prin- 
ciple that no two truths can conflict with each other, or that 
all truths exist in harmony. This is a necessary principle of 
reason. 

The chief followers of Euclid were Eubulides, the inventor 
of several paradoxes, the instructor of Demosthenes and the 
opponent of Aristotle; Diodorus Chronus, who attempted to 
prove the impossibility of motion; and Stilpo, famous for his 
lectures. 

The disputatious character of the Megaric philosophers 
fastened upon them the name cpwrrtKot, wranglers, and 
their speculations degenerated into trivial sophisms, as for 
example the Sorites, or heap, which runs thus : Is one grain of 
corn a heap.^ No; are two grains? No; are three grains? and 
so on, till the answer is, yes, there is now a heap. Then 
one grain makes the difference between a heap and no heap 
at all, which is ridiculous, if not absurd; but if it is said, no 
number of grains will make a heap, that is still more ridicu- 
lous. 



SOCRATES AND IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS 49 

The chief merit of Eudid and of the Megaric School rests 
in making beings the vovs, or 0cos, the objective good, 
and harmony with universal being the subjective. The sub- 
jective good, according to Socrates, is rational satisfaction. 
The objective Oeos, as cause, acting on the rational and 
moral nature of man, produces the highest good, the most 
perfect satisfaction of which a human being is susceptible. 
The highest objective good is God himself; the highest sub- 
jective good is the enjoyment of the love of God which he 
bestows only on those who pursue truth and love righteous- 
ness. 

(2) Aristippus (435-356). Aristippus of Cyrene, a lux- 
urious city of northern Africa, was the founder of the Cy- 
renaic school of philosophy. Sent on business to Greece by 
his father Aristocles, a wealthy merchant of Cyrene, he 
attended the Olympic games, where he heard of Socrates, 
and attracted by his fame, he went to Athens and united 
with the other disciples of the great master. 

Aristippus accepted the teaching of Socrates, that happiness 
is the ultimate end of conduct; but in the term happiness, 
Socrates included all kinds of enjoyment from sensational 
pleasure to rational satisfaction. To render the conception 
of happiness more definite, Aristippus restricted it to sensa- 
tional pleasure, for even the aesthetic pleasures attending 
beauty is derived through the senses. While holding pleasure 
to be the only good, and pain the only evil, Aristippus re- 
commended moderation, or self-control in the pursuit of 
pleasure. He held that both pleasure and pain are positive ; 
each is more than the absence of the other. 

Aristotle calls Aristippus a sophist, probably because he 
accepted the principle, that we have no certain knowledge of 
external objects, but only of our sensations, and that there 
is no common criterion of truth, but each person, knowing 
only his own sensations, is for himself the measure of the 
universe. In this we detect the influence of Protagoras 
but in devoting his attention to moral conduct, rather than 
to physical science, he was a disciple of Socrates. He held, 
with Socrates, that the supreme aim of each man is to secure 
his own happiness; but Aristippus found happiness in pleas- 
ure, while Socrates found it chiefly in rational enjoyment. 
Aristippus, however, advocated justice, since injustice does 



50 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

not pay; for it incites retaliation, and awakens in the wrong- 
doer apprehension of danger; therefore to secure peace of 
mind, it is advisable to obey the laws. 

The philosophy of Aristippus is, therefore, a combination 
of the sophistic and Socratic teaching; but considered as a 
development of the Socratic philosophy, it is partial, or one- 
sided. 

The reason why the Cyrenaic philosophy advocated the 
pursuit of pleasure, is found in Aristippus himself, who did 
not take happiness as embracing both sensational pleasure 
and rational enjoyment. Aristippus was by nature inclined 
to pleasure, and he had formed the habit of luxurious indul- 
gence; he would, therefore, interjjret happiness to mean sen- 
sational pleasure rather than rational enjoyment; hence the 
drift of the Cyrenaic philosophy to seek present momentary 
pleasure; for the past is gone, and the future is uncertain. 

Aristippus taught philosophy to his daughter. Arete, who 
in turn taught it to her son, Aristippus, the younger. The 
Cyrenaic philosophy was the fore-runner of the Epicurean 
philosophy. 

(3) Antisthenes (444-371). Antisthenes, the founder of 
the Cynic philosophy, was the son of an Athenian of the same 
name, and a Thracian mother. He took lessons in Rhetoric 
of Gorgias, and afterwards became a disciple of Socrates, 
whom he greatly admired for his independence in thought 
and stern moral character. 

After the death of Socrates, he opened a school to which 
foreigners and half-breeds were admitted in the gymnasium 
called Cynosarges, from which the name of the sect is sup- 
posed to be derived, though some derive it from Kuwy, a 
dog, on account of the snappish disposition of the Cynics. 

Instead of making pleasure the object of pursuit, as did 
Aristippus, Antisthenes regarded virtue as the only thing 
worthy of human effort, since it alone gives rational satis- 
faction. Pleasure he regarded as something to be despised 
and avoided. Hence the Cynic School is the opposite of the 
Cyrenaic, though both claimed to be based on the teaching 
of Socrates. The explantion is this: Socrates made happi- 
ness the ultimate end of action; but happiness is a genus 
resolvable into two species, sensational pleasure and rational 
satisfaction. Aristippus took the first, sensational pleasure. 



SOCRATES AND IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS 51 

as representing the Socratic conception of happiness, and 
Antisthenes took the second, the rational satisfaction of 
virtue. 

Antisthenes despised effeminacy, luxury, and even beauty, 
and considered it virtuous to deny himself all pleasure, to 
endure pain and hardship, to live on coarse food, and for 
dress, to wear a single rough cloak, ragged and dirty; yet he 
was haughty and vain, so much so that Socrates said to him : 
*'I see thy vanity, Antisthenes, peering through the holes of 
thy cloak." No doubt, Socrates, by his ow^n example, gave 
some countenance to the extreme asceticism of Antisthenes. 
Though Socrates claimed no merit for his manner of dress, 
yet in him it was a merit, since he practised economy that he 
might be able to teach gratuitously. 

Admiring virtue for its own sake, and despising vice, 
Antisthenes had strength of will and energy of character to 
carry his purpose into execution. He had some literary 
ability, as his writings were commended by competent 
judges. When asked to state the advantage of Philosophy, 
he replied: "Philosophy enables a man to be company for 
himself." 

Antisthenes objected to definitions, as expressing mere 
subjective impressions, and not the objective attributes of 
things, and for this Aristotle called him an ignoramus. 
The truth is, a definition expresses our knowledge of an 
object, and not simply our sensations or impressions; at least, 
a definition expresses our understanding of an object, our 
conception, opinion, or belief. Of course, there is liability 
to error, in our judgment; that is possible; but there is a prob- 
ability of correctness; it is the best we can do. Antisthenes 
carried the view of Socrates, that pleasure is inferior to 
rational satisfaction, to the extreme of regarding pleasure 
as pernicious, as an evil to be avoided. A proper discrimina- 
tion between lawful and unlawful pleasures sets the whole 
matter in a true light. 

{Ji) Diogenes (circ. 412-328). Diogenes was the son of a 
banker of Sinope. The father having been convicted of 
debasing the coinage, the son, implicated in the same act, 
fled to Athens. Reduced from affluence to poverty, and 
attracted by the life of Antisthenes, and his praise of poverty, 
Diogenes offered himself to Antisthenes, as a pupil. Antis- 



52 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

thenes repelled him, and raising his knotted staff, threatened 
to strike. Diogenes replied: "Strike, but your staff is not 
hard enough to conquer my perseverance." The reply won 
the admiration of Antisthenes, and gained the day, and 
Antisthenes received Diogenes as a disciple. As long as 
Antisthenes lived, Diogenes remained with him, and then 
set up for himself, living in a tub, which served for a house. 
The Cynics seemed never so happy as when they were 
miserable. 

Diogenes was ignorant, and contributed nothing to philoso- 
phy. Though filthy and disgusting, he gained reputation 
for wit, and the keenness of his sarcasm. The following will 
serve as specimens: Going through the streets of Athens in 
the daytime, with a lighted torch, peering into the faces of 
those he met, and being asked what he was looking for, replied 
a man. When Zeno's argument against motion was repeated 
to him, he answered it by getting up and walking. Alexan- 
der going to visit him, found him in his tub, and inquired: 
"What can I do for you?" Diogenes replied: "Get out of 
my sun-shine." Taken captive by pirates, he was asked 
what he could do, replied: "Govern men, therefore, sell me 
to a man who needs a master. " Xeniades, a wealthy Corin- 
thian, struck with this reply, bought him, gave him his 
liberty, and made him tutor to his children. 

Sometimes he found more than his match, as when he 
entered unbidden into the parlors of Plato, who was enter- 
taining company, and stamped, with his dirty feet, on the 
rich carpets, saying, "Thus I trample on the pride of Plato. " 
*'Yes/' said Plato, ''with greater pride,'' 



CHAPTER VII 

Plato 

Plato (427-347.) Plato, the son of Ariston, was a descend- 
ant of Solon, and a relative of Critias, one of the thirty tyrants 
of Athens. His name, at first, was Aristocles, which was 
changed to Plato, on account, it is said, of the breadth of his 
shoulders, or perhaps of his forehead. 

Having received a good elementary education, he became, 
at the age of twenty, a disciple of Socrates with whom he con- 
tinued ten years. After the death of Socrates, he retired 
with Euclid to Megara; thence he went to Cyrene, where he 
studied mathematics with Theodorus; from Cyrene he went 
to Egypt, and conversed with the priests, but was not favor- 
ably impressed with their wisdom. He also visited Italy and 
made himself acquainted with the philosophy of Pythagoras. 

Returning to Athens, after an absence of about eight 
years, he found young men waiting for his instruction, and he 
opened a school in the grove of Acadedemus, a beautiful 
park, adorned with trees, and containing a temple suitable 
as a place for giving instruction, which was presented to him 
as a gift from his friends. Here he lived, and taught, and 
wrote, for the greater part of forty years, and in this delight- 
ful retreat, his disciples and friends gathered for instruction 
and conversation. 

In the fortieth year of his age, he visited Sicily, chiefly to 
see Mt. Etna, and went to Syracuse at the invitation of the 
tyrant Dionysius, who, taking offense at the plainness of 
Plato's speech, ordered him to be sold as a slave. Anniceris 
of Cyrene bought him, and immediately gave him his liberty. 
Plato visited Syracuse in the reign of Dionysius II, hoping to 
obtain from him territory sufficient for a colony in which he 
could put his political theories to a practical test, but the 
land was not secured. He visited Syracuse a third time that 
he might reconcile Dionysius and his uncle, Dion, who had 
become enemies, but this mission also proved fruitless. 

53 



54 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Plato was amply equipped for his work, having a mind of 
great breadth and depth, a wonderful command of language, 
an extensive knowledge of all the systems of philosophy, and 
of the learning and literature of the age. With Parmenides 
the Eleatic, he accepted being as the immutable truth of 
reason, with Pythagoras, number and mathematics, with 
Heraclitus, becoming, ceaseless change, the knowledge gained 
by the senses, with Anaxagoras the vovs, with Socrates, 
Ethics and the dialectic method. Plato is equal to the sum 
of all of them, so that we may write : 

Plato = Parmenides -f Pythagoras + Heraclitus -f Anaxag- 
oras + Socrates. 

In the dialogues which are generally accepted as genuine, 
Plato discussed the leading doctrines of Parmenides, Pythag- 
oras, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, the sophists, and subjected 
them to the searching criticism of the Socratic method. 
When Socrates is introduced, as one of the interlocutors, he 
may, in general, be taken to represent the views of Plato. 

The dialogue form largely obviates the objection raised by 
Plato himself against the method of giving instruction 
through books, that books can not talky nor answer questions, 
nor satisfy doubts, nor silence objections, but in a dialogue, 
objections can be anticipated and answered, and every phase 
of the subject presented and discussed. The fertile mind of 
Plato could do this, so that the dialogue, in his hands, is a 
vivid representation of an actual, earnest discussion. 

All of value in preceding systems were introduced into 
these dialogues, as well as many of their errors, and sub- 
jected to a searching criticism, by arguments, pro and con, 
presented by selected champions. This is well shown in the 
first book of the Republic, where the view of the sophist, 
that justice is the will of the strongest, or that might makes 
right, is presented, with great assurance by Thrasymachus, 
and ably criticised and refuted by Socrates. 

We shall make no attempt to classify the dialogues of 
Plato according to their subject-matter, which has often 
been tried with no accordant results, but shall endeavor to 
present the method and the leading doctrines, so far as posi- 
tive doctrines can be found in the writings of a consummate 
critic, who takes more interest in the discussion than in the 
conclusion, or leaves it without explicit statement. Our 



PLATO 56 

criticisms deal with the doctrines generally accepted as 
Plato's, rather than with dates or the genuineness and 
authenticity of documents. 

To return to the Republic, whatever may have been Plato's 
theories of civil government, his more mature political views 
are presented in the Laws, the Republic presents an ideal 
government, designed rather to teach ethics than politics. 
In a civil state there are workmen, soldiers, and ruling classes; 
and the health and prosperity of the state depends on the 
harmonious co-operation of these classes according to the 
principles of justice, each class performing its own functions, 
and refraining from encroaching on the rights of the other 
classes. The virtues of the working class are industry, 
temperance, and obedience; the virtue of the soldiers is 
courage and prompt action, so that they may assist the rulers 
in maintaining order and repelling invasion; the virtue of 
the rulers is wisdom, so that they may pass wholesome laws, 
and justly govern the state. 

According to this analogy, Plato treats of the individual, 
who has sensations, appetites and desires, which liken him 
to the workmen. The individual also has combative pro- 
pensities, corresponding to the courage of the soldiers; and 
above these, he has reason, represented by the wisdom of 
the rulers in the state, who should be characterized by prac- 
tical sagacity. 

The Republic may be regarded as a polemic against the 
sophistic view of virtue. The sophist regarded man as 
individual, as sensational, and his good as pleasure, and 
hence their ethical precept: Get as much pleasure out of life 
as "possible; but this precept naturally leads to lawless grati- 
fication, and this was the tendency of their teaching, though 
some of the wisest of the sophists recommended obedience 
to the laws, for the sake of avoiding trouble; but as the law 
is conventional, be unjust if it will bring you wealth or honor, 
provided you can conceal your injustice, and so escape lia- 
bility to the law, and the punishment consequent on detec- 
tion. 

On the other hand, Plato taught that, as the prosperity 
of the state is secured through the wisdom of the rulers, and 
the subordination of the other classes, each class respecting 
the rights of the other classes, according to justice, so the 



56 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

welfare of the individual requires that reason should direct, 
the will enforce, the appetites and desires submit, all working 
together in the healthful harmony of the complete virtues of 
temperance, courage and wisdom; and this organic virtue 
of justice constitutes the health and the happiness, and 
greatest welfare of every man, and the welfare of the state. 

The sophist held that injustice, when concealed, would be 
to the individual, preferable to justice, if it brought greater 
worldly prosperity; but Plato denies this by affirming that 
injustice mars the symmetry of the soul, introduces discord, 
engenders disease, and destroys its peace; hence no external 
advantage can be a sufficient recompense for the loss of the 
virtue of justice. Thus, while injustice corrupts, disorgan- 
izes, degrades, condemns, destroys, justice gives peace of 
mind, the consciousness of rectitude, which alone is satis- 
factory to a rational being. Therefore, justice should be 
practiced and injustice avoided by every right-minded man. 
It should, however, be remembered that justice is not an 
abstraction, but is fair dealing; it has for its end the good of 
all concerned. Not to be satisfied with justice, but to seek 
to do injustice, masks a corrupt nature. A just man is just 
because justice alone satisfies his reason and conscience, 
affording him the highest and the purest enjoyment, and 
because it promotes the welfare of society. 

The doctrine truly distinctive in the philosophy of Plato 
is, however, his theory of ideas. The science of ideas he 
calls dialectic. A sensation is a particular feeling; it is what 
it is felt to be, and nothing else; but an idea is general; it 
represents any object of a class. Meeting with any object 
of a known class, we instantly recognize it, as belonging to 
that class, because it corresponds to our idea or concept of 
that class. In thinking, we go beyond a particular object, and 
think of other objects like it. These objects, though each 
has individual qualities differing from any qualities of the 
other objects of the class, have also common or like qualities 
which entitle them, and all like them, to be taken together 
as constituting a class characterized by the common qualities. 
The conception of these common qualities, taken together, 
which in modern philosophy is called the concept of the class, 
Plato called an idea, and Aristotle the form, as we shall here- 
after more fully explain. The idea is expressed in the defini- 
tions. 



PLATO 57 

There is, then, in every object of a class a particular ele- 
ment, the combination of the qualities peculiar to the in- 
dividual, and a universal element, the combination of all the 
common qualities of the class; and the conception of this 
combination of common qualities is the concept, idea or form 
of the class. Thus, Plato dealt with the content y or com- 
bination of the common qualities of a class, our conception 
of which is called a concept, rather than with the extent or 
the class itself, including the objects having the common 
qualities corresponding to the concept. In this respect 
Plato was followed by Hegel. 

It is, however, to be observed that Plato gave to the 
combination of common qualities, which he called idea, an 
independent existence, apart from the objects of the class, 
also from the human mind, and from the mind of God. The 
idea is thus to be distinguished from the concept; for the 
idea has a real objective existence, according to Plato, while 
the concept is the notion of the idea formed by the human 
mind or by the mind of God The idea is the universal. 
Says Zeller: "This universal does not exist merely in our 
thought or in the thought of Deity. It exists purely for 
itself and in itself, and is always in the same form, subject 
to no change of any kind; it is the eternal pattern of that 
which participates in it, but separate from it, and only to be 
contemplated with the intelligence." In the objects of a 
class, we find the becoming , the fleeting world of Heraclitus; 
in the ideas, we have the being, the permanent world of 
Parmenides. 

Ideas, in the Platonic sense, can, however, be regarded as 
independent of the human mind, only as God's creations or 
ideals, the patterns to which the objects of the various classes 
conform. They are not known to the human mind by 
intuition, or direct contemplation, as Plato supposed, but 
by an examination of various objects of a class, abstracting 
and combining the common or similar qualities, of which 
combination our notion is the concept. The individuals of 
a class comprise two kinds of elements — the common elements 
of the class, and the elements peculiar to the individuals. 
The common elements classify, the peculiar elements identify. 
The common element is prominent in classification, the 
peculiar in identification. 



58 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The idea, or universal element, however, cannot, by itself 
without the particular element, be represented by the imagi- 
nation; it can only be thought. Thus, take, for illustration, 
the triangle, a polygon having three sides and three angles. 
The three sides and three angles, as a combination, con- 
stitute the Platonic idea of triangle. Now, can this pure 
idea, the combination of the sides and angles, apart from the 
particular elements, be represented by the imagination? If 
so, it can be exhibited by a diagram drawn on paper or on 
the black-board; but when the diagram is drawn, a figure 
always appears having particular, as well as universal 
elements; it will have one right angle, or one obtuse angle, 
or all the angles will be acute; also no two sides will be equal, 
two sides will be equal, or all three sides will be equal; again 
a triangle may be conceived so small as to be invisible to 
the naked eye, or so large that its sides would reach the 
stars. It is therefore, evident that the conceivable particular 
triangles are infinite in number, while they all conform to the 
idea, triangle having three sides and three angles. The 
particular triangle may be erased, as having no particular 
importance, but the idea triangle abides. 

With Plato, the idea is the essential thing; a particular 
instance is non-essential and unimportant, and may disappear 
from existence or drop from thought as readily as a particular 
diagram can be erased from the black-board. This is per- 
haps the reason why certain philosophers called particular 
instances not-being,'^ ihsit ^is, not unchangeable. A tree 
starting from a seed which sprouts, may grow, for years and 
for centuries, till it becomes the towering monarch of the 
forest, then decline, and die and disappear. 

Plato held, with Pythagoras, the doctrine of the trans- 
migration of souls, and by it attempted to account for our 
knowledge of ideas, calling them innate or reminiscences 
brought from a previous state of existence; but the theory of 
transmigration is purely mythical, having no foundation in 
fact. Is a child born with the idea of a triangle or of a 
crocodile? He has, of course, the innate power, in germ, 
which when developed, will give him these ideas, not however, 
by intuition or direct contemplation, but as derived from 
the objects of a class by the logical processes of generaliza- 
tion and induction. 



PLATO 59 

Plato's doctrine of ideas is called realism, which, however, 
is not to be confounded with realism in art, or with realism, 
a doctrine that we have immediate knowledge of external 
material objects. In opposition to Plato's realism, we have 
the theories of nominalism and conceptualism — nominalism 
holds that the name of the class is the only universal; con- 
ceptualism holds that the idea or concept has only a mental 
existence; but the common qualities, corresponding to the 
concept, exist in every object of the class. The very mean- 
ing of the words idea or concept is that of a mental existence. 
Idea and concept may, without error, be regarded as identical 
in thought, though they have been conceived as formed in 
different ways. 

In modern usage, an idea signifies a mental picture or 
image formed by the act of imagination while a concept is a 
logical construction, formed by thought, and has an objec- 
tive correlate, a corresponding reality independent of the 
mind. That the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal 
to two right angles is a truth independent of any human mind; 
but a knowledge of this truth, when discovered, is a sub- 
jective thought, a mental fact, the mind's own possession. 
The truth of a triangle, a polygon having three sides and 
three angles, is objective and is the common or universal, or 
constant element of every actual or possible triangle, what- 
ever be the particular or accidental values of the sides and 
angles. The conception or thought of this truth is subjec- 
tive, and is the idea or concept of the class triangle. These 
illustrations make the meaning of concept clear. 

Though the Platonic idea of concept of the class triangle, 
involving only the essential or universal elements, cannot be 
represented by the imagination as an image or mental picture, 
yet the idea of a particular triangle, involving elements, both 
the essential and individual, can be represented as an image, 
or mental picture. I can think, but cannot represent, as 
an idea or mental picture, the genus man; but I can both 
think and represent the idea or image of a particular man 
whom I have seen. 

The truth involved in ideas or concepts is real, objective, 
necessary, constant, universal, and is the nexus holding to- 
gether the individuals of the class; but the idea or concept of 
the class is subjective, but not innate, since it is the product 
of the mental activity of comparison and generalization. 



BO PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

If the idea is innate, as Plato held, it is subjective; but he 
also held the idea to be objective. How can it be both sub- 
jective and objective? The necessary eternal truth is objec- 
tive; the apprehension of this truth is subjective, though not 
innate, but the product of thought. 

What is the relation of necessary reality to the Divine 
mind? As necessary, it is eternal and therefore coeval with 
God, whose knowledge of it is an eternal idea or concept, 
the divine pattern of objective things stripped of their particu- 
lar qualities. As a divine idea, it is objective to the human 
mind. 

Many interesting points are brought out in the various 
dialogues. The difficulty of framing good definitions is 
illustrated in the attempt to define courage in the Laches, 
modesty in the Charmides, and friendship in the Lysis. 

In the Protagoras and the Meno, the question is raised. 
Can virtue be taught? The conclusion seems to be reached 
that there is a natural unconscious virtue, which springs up 
spontaneously as by inspiration; but Protagoras claims that 
as virtue is not one but many, he can, by his instruction, 
improve men in the practice of those virtues which Providence 
has bestowed upon them. 

Is virtue identical with knowledge? That they are not 
strictly identical is shown by the fact that men of little 
knowledge are sometimes virtuous, and that men of great 
knowledge are often vicious. Again men frequently do 
wrong with their eyes fully open to the evil consequences; 
and here is ample knowledge but a lack of wisdom. Rational 
morality, however, of the highest type, requires rational 
knowledge of the Science of Ethics. The science of virtue 
can be taught. The subjective virtue, which chooses always 
to do right, is freely settled by the person himself. The dis- 
covery of objective virtue, or what is right in conduct, is an 
art that can be taught. 

Plato gives the Socratic view that all knowledge is latent 
in the mind, and requires only to be brought out, which may 
be done by skillful questions. The better view is that the 
power of discovering truth is innate, though this power, 
at first weak, may be developed and strengthened by exercise. 
When the right steps are taken in due order, so as to bring 
out the evidence. 



PLATO 61 

In the Euthyphro, the questions are raised : Does God love 
holiness because it is holy, or is it holy because God loves it? 
Does God will righteousness because it is righteous, or is it 
righteous because God wills it? God has a good reason, no 
doubt, for loving holiness and for willing righteousness. His 
love is not arbitrary, neither is his will. He loves what is 
good because it is good, and wills what is right because it is 
right. Hence, as God loves the good, and wills the right; 
knowing his love or will, we know the good or the right. 

The Apology is a great work of art. It has three parts: 
(1) What Socrates said before conviction. (2) What he 
said after conviction, and before the sentence. (3) What 
he said after the sentence. 

Socrates did not seek to gain acquittal, but to give reasons 
for his manner of life. After conviction, as it was a capital 
charge, he had the right, before the sentence, of pleading for 
the mitigation of the penalty; but instead of proposing a 
milder punishment, he boldly claimed that he was entitled to 
be maintained at the prytaneum, as a public benefactor. 
After the sentence, he declares that his accusers have done 
an unjust act for which they will pay the penalty; but that 
for himself, as a good man, no evil can befall him, and that 
he will either fall into an eternal sleep, or go to a better world 
where there are no unjust judges. 

In the Meno the pre-existence of the soul, and its immortal- 
ity are referred to as traditional beliefs; but reasons for these 
beliefs are given in the Phaedo which, with elaborate art, 
exhibits profound faith in a future life. 

The Symposium discourses of love, and shows its deep 
signification by the consequences, as offspring in natural 
love, goodness in moral love, great deeds in love of fame, 
perfection of character in love of excellence. 

The Phaedrus continues the discourse on love, explains 
the psychology of the soul, asserts the superiority of oral 
discourse over written and explains the relation of universals 
to particulars. 

In the Gorgias, the antagonism between the Socratic and 
Sophistic views of virtue is elucidated; it is shown that 
justice is not the same as the will of the strongest; that 
pleasure is not identical with the good; that only a life of 
philosophic virtue, not the art taught by sophistic rhetoric, 
will avail before the righteous judge. 



62 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The Republic continues the discourse on justice in the 
state and in the individual, speaks of the higher education 
and character of the rulers, and describes the declension of 
the state and of individuals, through descending stages of 
corruption, to that of tyranny, the stage of final injustice. 

Plato's writings are not all consistent with one another. 
The fact is Plato was an investigator, an inquirer after truth, 
in the acquisition of which he continued to make progress 
all his life. As a philosopher, he was a lover of justice, 
goodness, truth and beauty, and recognized the idea of each 
as an objective reality, the object of rational knowledge; 
but whether any particular thing is just good, true or beauti- 
ful, is a matter of opinion. 

In certain dialogues as Euthydemus, Philebus, Theatetus, 
Sophist, Statesman and Parmenides, all manner of questions 
concerning virtue and knowledge, being and not-being, are 
raised and discussed, the details of which need not be given, 
but they mark a transition stage of thought from the Repub- 
lic to the Laws. 

Plato shows that he is not only a speculative but a practical 
philosopher, when in the Laws, he describes a form of govern- 
ment which he hopes will be adopted by some of the Grecian 
states, and thus the cause of truth be advanced, and human 
progress promoted. 

In Ethics, Plato accepted the extreme views, neither of the 
Cyrenaics nor of the Cynics. Hedonism is refuted by the 
unsatisfactory nature of sensational pleasure, and Cynicism 
by the inseparable connection between virtue and the higher 
form of rational enjoyment. 

Plato held with Socrates that virtue is identical with 
knowledge, that Ethics is a science that can be taught; but 
that different classes of the people require different virtues. 
The rulers need the virtue of wisdom; the mass of the people 
the virtue of temperance; soldiers that of valor; and all the 
virtue of justice, which unites and harmonizes the powers of 
the individual soul as well as the different classes of the state. 
He refuted the ethics of the sophists, by showing that man's 
proper nature is not sensational, but rational, and that his 
highest good must come from conformity to his proper 
nature. 



CHAPTER VIII 

Aristotle 

Aristotle (384-322). Aristotle was a native of Stagira, a 
Greek City on the western side of the Strymonic gulf, and 
near Pella, the capital city of Macedonia. From the place 
of his birth, he is often called the Stagirite. He was the son 
of Nicomachus, eminent for his learning and authorship of 
works on Medicine and Natural History, and honored as 
physician to Amyntas, King of Macedon. 

After the death of his parents, Aristotle was assigned to 
the care of Proxenus, who instructed him in all the known 
sciences of the time. After the death of Proxenus, Aristotle 
went to Athens, and studied philosophy and science from 
the costly books which his abundant means enabled him to 
purchase. 

On the return of Plato from his long journey to the East 
in search of light, Aristotle joined his school at the Academia, 
and remained with him, an attentive listener and profound 
student, for about twenty years. Plato soon recognized 
the powers of his eager pupil and called him the Mind of his 
School, and as such he was recognized by his fellow students. 

After the death of Plato, Aristotle went to the court of his 
friend Hermias, ruler of Atarneus in Asia Minor, and re- 
mained with him three years, when he was appointed by 
King Philip, tutor to his son, Alexander, then fifteen years of 
age. Thus the greatest conqueror of antiquity had the 
greatest instructor. 

When Alexander started on his career of conquest, Aristotle 
opened a school at Athens in the shady walks around the 
temple of Lycean Apollo, from which his school was called 
the Lyceum. Aristotle was not appointed successor to 
Plato in the Academy, probably on account of some diver- 
gencies of opinion; but in his own school, he v/as free to 
develop his own philosophy in his own way. Walking with 
his pupils in the shady paths, he conversed with them on 

63 



64 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

the deep truths of philosophy and science. Thence he was 
called the peripatetic philosopher, and his school of philosophy 
the Peripatetic School. 

Here, iVristotle remained thirteen years, ardently engaged 
in teaching and in writing those great works which, for 
hundreds of years, stood to the world as the standards of 
\ philosophic and scientific truth. 

Aristotle bequeathed his library, including his own works, 
to Theophrastus, his nephew and chief disciple, who suc- 
ceeded him in the Lyceum, and who, in turn, bequeathed 
them to Neleus, a peripatetic scholar. Neleus took the 
collection to his home in Scepsis, Asia Minor, and concealed 
these writings in a vault to prevent them from being seized 
by the King of Pergamus, who was collecting books for his 
royal library, and they were lost to the world for 187 years. 
About 100 years B. C., they were bought by Apellicon, a 
wealthy collector of books, and taken to Athens. About 86 
B. C, Sulla, a Roman general, on taking Athens, seized the 
library of Apellicon and sent it to Rome. 

Tyrannion, a friend of Cicero, collected the manuscripts 
of Aristotle, and Andonicus of Rhodes, arranging the scattered 
fragments under appropriate heads, published the authorized 
and henceforth accepted edition of the philosophic and 
scientific works of Aristotle. 

While the genuine works of Aristotle were concealed in the 
vault, many forgeries were published claiming to be genuine, 
but with these we are not concerned. Notwithstanding the 
forgeries, the true doctrines of Aristotle were quite well- 
known, even while his books were concealed. Some of 
Aristotle's works have been lost and are know only by the 
quotations made from them by early writers. 

The following are regarded genuine: Topics, Prior Analy- 
tics, Posterior Analytics, Sophistical Refutations, Art of 
Rhetoric, Nichomachean Ethics, Politics, Art of Poetry, A 
Physical Discourse, The Heavens, Generation and Destruc- 
tion, Meteorologies, Researches about Animals. The Soul, 
Sense and the Sensible, Memory and Recollection, Sleep and 
Waking, Dreaming and Prophecy ing in Sleep, Longevity and 
Shortlivedness, Youth and Old Age, Life and Death, Respira- ' 
tion. Parts of Animals, Organization of Animals, The Meta- 
physics. The Categories and Interpretation are of doubtful 
genuineness. 



ARISTOTLE 65 

The philosophy of Aristotle is closely related to that of 
Plato. Both philosophers regarded the agreements of the 
objects of a class as their essence, and of more importance 
than their diflPerences, the universal outranking the particu- 
lar. 

The subjective idea of a class, Plato held to be innate, a 
reminiscence from a pre-existent state. He also regarded 
the idea objective, existing apart from the objects of the 
class, as the pattern after which they were formed, to which 
they correspond, and by which they are identified as belong- 
ing to that class. This essential characteristic of a class, 
Aristotle called the form, and held that, as a combination of 
attributes, it has an objective existence in every object of 
the class. The form, as found in one object of a class, is 
similar, though not strictly identical to that found in every 
other object of the class. Aristotle held that the concept 
of the form of a class is subjective, though he rejected the 
mythical notion of Plato that it is a reminiscence brought 
from a pre-existent state. 

Plato attached great importance to the idea, and made 
little account of the individuals; Aristotle found the form in 
each individual of the class. The individuals have impor- 
tance as exhibiting the form, which is not strictly identical 
in all the objects of a class, though essentially similar. 

How does the human mind gain a knowledge of the form, 
or combination of similar common attributes? Aristotle 
answers by careful examination of individuals of a class, and 
finding their similar characteristics, the combination of which 
is the objective form. The subjective idea is the concept of 
the objective form. 

In the idea of Plato and the form of Aristotle, we find the 
mental peculiarities of these two great philosophers. Plato 
was practical and ideal, Aristotle was practical and real; 
Plato was literary, Arisototle, scientific; Plato soared into the 
regions of the super-sensible, Aristotle kept in close contact 
with concrete facts; Plato's writings show artistic finish, 
Aristotle's logical thought; Plato is read for pleasure, Aristotle 
for instruction; each in his way is surpassingly great. 

Aristotle's logical treatises were called by Andronicus The 
Organon. There were, however, good logicians before Aris- 
totle, as Zeno, the Eleatic, who was called by Aristotle him- 



66 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

self, the inventor of dialectic, that is, of logic, as he seems 
to be the first systematically to employ the reductio ad ah- 
surdum method; but this method was afterwards also em- 
ployed by Euclid, the Megarian. All the mathematicians 
and philosophers are reasoners. Socrates and Plato were 
skillful and cogent reasoners. Aristotle, however, was the 
first to reduce logic to an exact and systematic science. 
Under his treatment, the Syllogism, the type and test of 
deductive reasoning, was brought to such perfection that it 
has stood the test of two thousand years. 

The question will, no doubt, occur to many minds : Has not 
John Stuart Mill proved that the syllogism always involves 
the fallacy called petitio principii, the begging ot the question .f^ 
With all due respect to the ability of Mr. Mill, it may be 
said, unhesitatingly, that he has proved no such thing. He 
takes the following for criticism: All men are mortal; Socrates 
is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal. Mill says: If you do 
not know that Socrates is mortal, you do not know that all 
men are mortal; and that to be able to affirm the major 
premise. All men are mortal, you must assume the conclusion, 
Socrates is mortal; that is, you must beg the question. 

Mill selected the most favorable case for his criticism, 
where the major premise is a probable induction; but to reach 
this induction, we do not have to examine all the objects of 
the class, but only such a number as will make the conclusion 
highly probable. Let us slightly vary the example and 
raise the question, is Gabriel mortal.^ There is said to be 
an angel Gabriel, and I knew a man whose name was Gabriel. 
Now suppose we say: All men are mortal; Gabriel is an 
angel; nothing follows; but let us say. All men are probably 
mortal; Gabriel is a man; therefore, Gabriel is probably 
mortal. No objection can be urged against this argument. 
We did not even have to think of Gabriel, when we reached 
the probable induction. All men are probably mortal. The 
conclusion is even stronger than the major premise, for the 
chance of failure is less. 

In many cases, the major premise is not a probable induc- 
tion, but a demonstrated truth. Thus, it is proved by 
Geometry, that the square of the hypotenuse of a right 
triangle is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other 
sides. Now suppose I wish to know the length of the hy- 



ARISTOTLE 67 

potenuse, if the other sides are 3 and 4, respectively. Call- 
ing the required hypotenuse A, I reason thus: The square of 
the hypotenuse is equivalent to the sum of the squares of 
the other sides; but the other sides are 3 and 4 respectively, 
therefore /?2 = 3^ -f 4^ = 9 + 16 = ^5; therefore h = 5. 

Is there any begging of the question here? I did not 
have to know that this particular hypotenuse is 5, to know 
the major premise, which was demonstrated without any 
reference to this particular case. 

Again, the major premise may be established as a fact of 
observation. Thus, I stand on a hill, by the side of a lake, 
and see a boat about a mile from the shore, struggling with a 
violent storm; finally the boat is wrecked, and all on board 
are drowned; none reached the shore alive. The next day, 
I learn from the testimony of a friend, that he saw John 
Jones on board that boat when it left a neighboring port; 
suppose this fact, that John Jones was aboard, is confirmed 
by a passenger on another boat that met the boat that was 
wrecked a half -hour before Now I can say all on board a 
certain boat at a certain time, were drowned; John Jones 
was aboard that boat at that time; therefore, John Jones 
was drowned. 

I did not have to know that John Jones was drowned, to 
know that all on board were drowned; for I did not even 
know that John Jones was aboard. There is no begging of the 
question here. 

To vindicate Aristotle, it is necessary to prove the validity 
of the syllogism, that it involves no fallacy. 

Others say we learn nothing new by the syllogism; but the 
examples above given prove the falsity of this assertion. 
In fact, we repeatedly, make discoveries, that is, learn new 
facts, by deduction. One principle will often give an indefi- 
nite number of deductions, as in the case of finding the 
hypotenuse of a right triangle, when the other sides are 
given. Pythagoras should not be blamed for offering a 
hecatomb of oxen in view of his great discovery. 

Induction and deduction are complementary divisions of 
logic. It was glory enough for Aristotle that he perfected 
the theory of deduction. The theory of induction was left 
for the moderns, as Bacon, Galileo, Whewell and Mill; yet, 
Aristotle employed induction, though he did not perfect its 
theory. 



68 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Aristotle's distinction of causes as four, material, formal, 
efficient, and final, has exerted no little influence on the 
course of speculation. The material cause is the kind of 
matter or substance out of which a thing is formed; the 
formal cause, corresponding to the idea, form, or concept, is 
that combination of attributes in the thing which identifies 
it as belonging to a certain class; the efficient cause is the 
energy which produces an event; the final cause is the pur- 
pose or end for which a thing exists or was made. These 
are the main points in Aristotle's Metaphysics. 

The distinction of propositions as conditional and cate- 
gorical, and of categorical as universal and particular, affirma- 
tive and negative, and their opposition as contrary or con- 
tradictory, the laws of distribution of terms, the conversion 
of propositions, the dictum, the doctrine of figure and mood, 
the detection of fallacy are all valuable and permanent con- 
tributions made by Aristotle to the science of logic. 

The categories are those distinct predicates which may be 
affirmed of a subject. Aristotle named ten: substance, 
quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, 
position, possession. These are of no great importance, 
as the number may be increased by adding degree, necessity, 
actuality, probability, possibility and so on or diminished, 
as place and position run into one another. It is evident 
that the topics are heads of discourse, or commonplaces, 
more suitable for rhetoric than for logic. 

In Sophistical refutations, Aristotle exposes fallacy in 
such an exhaustive and thorough manner, that scarcely an 
example of unsound reasoning can be found that is not 
reducible to one of the specific classes. Aristotle calls eristic, 
arguing for victory; and sophistry, arguing for gain. 

In regard to Ethics, it is instructive to compare the views 
of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Socrates identified virtue 
with knowledge and held that as man seeks his own happiness, 
which can be secured only by doing right, therefore a man 
would always do right, if he only knew what is right. The 
objection to this view is that in many instances, persons 
knowing the right, refuse to do it; under the stress of appetite, 
passion or desire, they deliberately do what they know to be 
wrong. It is, however, true that the highest moral action 
must accord with moral insight; but there must also be 



ARISTOTLE 69 

a willingness to do the right, and the right must be carried 
out into conduct by executive act. Virtue requires knowl- 
edge, will and conduct, but accurate knowledge, a willingness 
to do right, and skill in execution are the elements of wisdom. 
If Socrates had identified virtue with wisdom, little objec- 
tion could be made to it; and this reminds us of the saying of 
Solomon: "Wisdom is the principal thing." To know the 
right, to will the right, and to do the right is to be virtuous, 
is to be wise. The intellectual virtue of clear insight is 
essential to the practical virtue of right conduct determined 
by right will. 

Plato's analysis of man as a three-fold being, sensitive, 
combative and rational, lead to his view that virtue, which 
he identified with the health and happiness of man, is best 
secured by placing the reins of government in the hands of 
reason. This view goes far in the identification of virtue with 
wisdom; but he did not, however, suflSciently recognize the 
function of the will, though his theory is a noble view of 
virtue as the perfection of moral excellence. 

Aristotle's theory of Ethics is not to be regarded as anta- 
gonistic to Plato's; it is an extension; he did not question 
the fact that reason ought to rule, but showed why it should 
rule. What is the chief good or ultimate end of man? Aris- 
totle unhesitatingly answers happiness. As the distinguish- 
ing characteristic of man is not life, which is possessed by a 
vegetable, nor sensation, which is felt by an animal, but 
reason which he alone possesses, his happiness, in its highest 
or characteristic form, must be rational satisfaction. Aris- 
totle says: "We may safely then define a happy man as one 
whose activity accords with perfect virtue, and who is ade- 
quately furnished with external goods, not for a casual period 
of time, but for a complete or perfect lifetime. " 

Aristotle attaches importance to the will as well as to the 
reason. Virtue requires that the will freely choose according 
to the light of reason; and in this choice, the mean is to be 
followed rather than either extreme. Thus true courage avoids 
the extremes, rashness on the one hand, and cowardice on 
the other; generosity is neither prodigal nor stingy; hence, 
Aristotle makes moderation or temperance the essence of all 
virtue. By moderation or temperance, Aristotle evidently 
means self-control, that rational will power by which a man 



%-^ 



10 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

keeps himself in the true path of duty. Aristotle insists on 
the practice of virtue. A child is without moral character; 
this is to be formed by a proper education; that is, he should 
be taught, not only to know, but be trained to do the right, 
and in this respect, Aristotle is again in agreement with 
Solomon; *' Train up a child in the way he should go." 
Training in the way he should go forms right habits and 
right habits crystallize into good character, and good charac- 
ter tends to permanence. 

As a man's chief good can not be attained by him in a 
state of isolation, but only in society, under a government, 
Aristotle passes from Ethics to Politics. He emphasizes 
the value of friendship and describes man as a political 
animal. In treating of politics, he first reviews what has 
already been done by other writers on this subject, and then 
proceeds to state his own views. 

The work, though unfinished, is full of interest, and throws 
great light on Grecian history. The book displays great 
knowledge of human nature; it gives to the individual and 
the family their due importance, and resists the tendency 
to communism found in Plato's Republic. . 

Aristotle wrongly upheld the institution of slavery, as 
based on nature, and narrowly denounced the taking of 
interest for the use of money. His ideal state, however, 
compares favorably with that of Plato. 

Aristotle wrote on Rhetoric and Poetry, and on the various 
branches of science. For the illustrations of his works on 
Natural History and other branches of science, the patronage 
of Alexander furnished him with ample means. 

After the death of Alexander, the Athenians accused 
Aristotle, of Macedonian tendencies and of Atheism. He 
retired to Chalcis in Euboea, which was under Macedonian 
rule, and there closed the life of the most learned and accurate 
scholar, the most profound and original philosopher of An- 
tiquity. 

After the death of Aristotle, the Peripatetic School was 
continued by Theophrastus, Strato, and others. 



CHAPTER IX 

The Epicurean and Stoic Schools 

1. Epicurus (342-270.) Epicurus was a native of Samos, 
and the son of Neocles, a teacher of grammar. 

When only thirteen years of age, on being told that all 
things arose out of Chaos, he asked: Whence came Chaos .^^ 
He was referred to philosophy for the answer. To the 
philosophy of Democritus he applied himself, but found 
nothing back of a chaos of atoms, and void spaces between 
the atoms; for here Democritus began. 

At the age of eighteen, he visited Athens, where he re- 
mained one year. Thence he went to Colophon, Mitylene, 
and Lampsacus, and finally returned to Athens, when he 
was thirty-six years of age, where he opened a school in a 
quiet garden, and remained there the rest of his life. 

The philosophy of Plato or of Aristotle was too deeply 
reasoned, too difficult to understand, to become popular, 
and a reaction was inevitable. Something more easily to be 
understood, something more practical was called for, which 
would serve as a comprehensible guide to life. 

The Epicurean School of philosophy, so-called from the 
name of its founder, may be regarded as an out-growth, 
modification, and improvement of the Cyrenaic School 
founded by Aristippus. It is a combination of the atomistic 
philosophy of Democritus with the Hedonic theory of Aris- 
tippus. Happiness was considered by Epicurus as the end 
of human pursuit. He did not, however, restrict happiness, 
as did Aristippus, to sensational pleasure, but extended it to 
the higher pleasures of the intellect and of friendship. He 
also taught that pleasure is to be enjoyed in moderation, 
since excess results in disaster. 

Epicurus was himself a temperate man. He was satisfied 
with plain fare, and with his trusted friends, he passed a 
peaceful and happy life. He taught the importance of 
banishing from the mind all care and worry, as the fear of 

71 



72 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

death or of the gods. He said when we are alive, death is 
absent, and when death comes, we no longer exist. Why 
fear the gods? They are too much taken up with their own 
affairs to trouble themselves with the affairs of mortals. 
Religion is resolvable into superstition. 

By happiness Epicurus meant freedom from pain, fear, 
anxiety or trouble, and not only so, but the positive enjoy- 
ment of intellectual, social or sensational pleasure. He con- 
sidered free will and prudential wisdom the essence of virtue. 
Thus, virtue leads one to avoid crime, to obey the laws, and 
comply with the accepted moral customs of society, for thus 
he would escape the danger of detection and punishment for 
crime, and gain the reward attending a good reputation, 
that is, one avoids crime only because of fear of detection 
and punishment. No estimate is made of the approval or 
condemnation of conscience. Then morality proceeds from 
a calculation of advantage. This is not high rational ethics; 
it is not even utilitarianism; it is hedonism, or the placing of 
happiness in sensational enjoyments. 

The Epicureans have fallen into bad repute, partly through 
their own fault, and partly through the misrepresentations of 
the rival schools. In fact, they are too much the devotees of 
pleasure, which is quite likely to degenerate into sensational 
pleasure of the lowest sort. The word Epicure has come to 
signify one given to the pleasures of the table. The Epicur- 
eans have been stigmatized by their opponents as sensualists. 
Epicurus himself, however, recommended the higher virtues, 
and lived a moral life. 

The truth is, the lower pleasures, as those of the table, 
may be innocently enjoyed, when lawful and restricted 
within reasonable limits; but the purer and higher enjoy- 
ments come from intellectual pursuits and a life of good will 
and righteous conduct. 

Epicurus was a voluminous writer, but his works, except 
fragments and quotations, have been lost, enough, however, 
can be gathered from the fragments to reveal his system. 
He regarded philosophy as the art of life, and not the Science 
of truth, as it was considered by Plato and Aristotle. The 
conception of Epicurus is that of practical life, that of Plato 
and Aristotle is the conception of theoretical philosophy. 
The thinking of Plato and Aristotle was on a much higher 
plane than that of Epicurus. 



THE EPICUREAN AND STOIC SCHOOLS 73 

In justice to Epicurus, it is to be said that he held that the 
true art of Ufe, put in practice, would secure, not simply the 
pleasures of the moment, but lasting, even life-long, satis- 
factions. This requires a knowledge of science and freedom 
from superstition and needless fears. Reason is required 
to know and will to do. Knowledge supplants ignorance, 
and the will carries into execution the decisions of reason. 
The agreeable is to be sought for, and the disagreeable is to 
be avoided, but not the momentarily agreeable, followed by 
lasting pain. The greatest good for the entire life is the ac- 
cepted motto for conduct; but common sense, which is, 
according to Epicurus, the best philosophy, is the guide in 
the practical affairs of life, and the surest means of finding 
the greatest possible amount of happiness. 

The Epicurean philosophy, notwithstanding its defects, had 
some truth, which appealing to common sense, gave it 
strength and increased its following, till its adherents were 
widely spread over the world. 

The most renowned advocate of Epicureanism was the 
Roman poet Lucretius, who in his great poem, De Rerum 
Natura, hailed the doctrine of Epicurus as the deliverance 
from superstitious fears. The atomistic explanation of the 
universe by Democritus would banish the gods from the 
world, and restore tranquillity to the mind of man. If to 
banish false gods is deliverance from fear, faith in the true 
God is the joy of hope. 

Epicureanism, as a theory, and as actual life, has had 
more votaries, counting all those in pursuit of pleasure, than 
any other system of philosophy the world has ever seen. 

£. Zeno (342-270). Zeno, a native of Citium in the 
island of Cyprus, was the founder of the Stoic school of 
philosophy, so called from o-roa the porch in Athens, where 
he taught. The Stoic school is an out-growth of the Cynic 
philosophy, a one-sided development of the Socratic doctrine. 

Zeno, who had been a merchant, having lost his goods by 
a shipwreck, became a disciple of Crates, a philosopher of 
the Cynic school. 

Becoming dissatisfied with Crates, he joined the school of 
Stilpo of Megara Not yet satisfied, he entered the Academy 
then conducted by Xenocrates and afterwards by Polemo, 
where the Platonic Philosophy was taught. 



n PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

After twenty years of laborious study, at these various 
schools, he opened a school of his own in the porch. His 
school was, at least in part, the product of the interaction of 
oriental speculation and Greek thought, which took place 
after the time of Alexander. 

The philosophy of the Academy and that of the Lyceum 
still existed, but these were eclipsed by the more intelligible 
doctrines of Epicurus and Zeno, as these were regarded the 
more practical. 

The school of the Stoics may be divided into three periods, 
the old stoa, developed and directed by Zeno, Cleanthes, and 
Chrysippus; the middle stoa, or the transition period, direct- 
ed by Diogenes of Seleucia, Boethius of Sidon, Posidonius, 
and Panaetius, who carried the doctrine to Rome; the later 
or Roman stoa of which the chief ornaments were Seneca, 
Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and the Emperor Marcus Aure- 
lius. 

Zeno began, as a Cynic, in discarding pleasure, avoiding 
all perturbation, and in making reason the guide of life. He 
declared a^a^/ii/ or indiflference to the joys or sorrows of life 
to be the proper state of mind for a philosopher. A sage is 
characterized by magnanimity, serenity and wisdom, in 
dealing with his fellow men, or with the ordinary affairs of 
life. In regard to pleasure or pain, wealth or poverty, honor 
or obscurity, or other accidental circumstances, he is to 
manifest the apathy of entire indifference. It is, however, 
true that the Stoics cultivated the friendship of those of their 
own persuasion; but for people in geneml, their attitude 
was neither that of sympathy nor antipathy, but apathy, 
the coldness of entire disregard. 

Why did the Stoics encourage suicide? Pain is not to be 
desired, but rather to be avoided; yet when unavoidable, it 
is to be borne without murmuring. Certain disabilities, as 
the loss of health or a limb, the Stoic considered as an indica- 
tion of providence that he is no longer on duty, and by the 
act of suicide, he proved that life itself was regarded with 
indifference. 

In common with the philosophers of other schools, the 
Stoics said: Live according to nature; but they held with 
Socrates that the characteristic nature of man is reason, not 
feeling; hence, a rational life, not a life of pleasure, is the 



THE EPICUREAN AND STOIC SCHOOLS 75 

true life of man. For the Stoics, the ideal end is virtue; for 
the Epicureans, pleasure. Both said: Follow nature; but in 
case of the Stoics, the true nature is reason, leading to a 
virtuous life; while in case of the Epicureans, the true nature 
is sensibility, leading to a life of pleasure. 

Both systems are one-sided. Man has both reason and 
sensibility; he can pursue virtue, or enjoy pleasure. Why 
ignore either part of man's nature? Evidently this should 
not be done, if the precept. Follow nature, is right. The 
question is, which shall have sway.^ Shall appetite, or pas- 
sion, or desire .f^ Man has sensibility in common with the 
brute; his reason is characteristic of himself, and as the higher 
attribute, as that which is distinctively human, it is entitled 
to control. It may, therefore, be concluded that under the 
guide of reason, man may properly enjoy the satisfaction 
that comes from the lawful gratification of his sensibility, or 
from the exercise of any of his powers. Banquets may be 
the means of dissipation; feasting may be carried to excess; 
but to take a modern illustration, what reasonable objection 
can be urged against a family Thanksgiving dinner, or to the 
Christmas turkey .^^ 

Zeno, though a one-sided philosopher, was highly esteemed 
by the Athenians, who entrusted him with the keys of their 
city, and on his monument they carved the inscription: 
His life was in accord with his teaching. 

3, Cleanthes of Assos in Troas, originally a boxer, first 
attended the lectures of Crates, the Cynic, and afterwards 
those of Zeno. Being poor, he worked at night that he 
might support himself while attending by day the lectures of 
Zeno. His apparent idleness awoke suspicion, and he was 
brought before the Areopagus, but the facts becoming known, 
he was oftered a present of ten minae, which he refused. He 
was slow to learn, but held fast what he acquired. He 
attended the lectures of Zeno nineteen years, but his per- 
severance and high moral qualities were amply rewarded; 
for on the death of Zeno, he was chosen to be the head of the 
Stoic School. 

His most original contribution to philosophy was the 
enunciation of the principle that the varying tension of the 
one substance, a purely physical fact, produced, by its stress, 
all the changes of the universe. This fertile principle was 



76 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

employed with effect by the Stoics. It may be identified 
with the ether of science, the one substance of Spinoza, the 
ultimate reality of Spencer, or by making it spiritual, with 
the God of Theism. 

Cleanthes believed that Jupiter had his throne in the sun. 
He wrote a sublime hymn to Zeus, from which it is usually 
said that Paul quoted in his speech at Athens, that we are 
the offspring of God. It was, no doubt, the sentiment of 
Cleanthes; but Paul quoted exactly from the poet Aratus: 
Tou yap kol yivos icrfiiv, 

^. phrysippus succeeded Cleanthes as the leader of the 
Stoic School. He elaborated and systematized the Stoic 
doctrine and fortified it, so as to make it secure, as he sup- 
posed, against all attacks. Zeno had declared that grammar 
and mathematics were useless; but Chrysippus saw that this 
narrow Cynic view would not do for a system which aspired 
to be a great school of philosophy, and, therefore, set himself 
to improve all branches of learning. He held, however, that 
the sciences were not to be cultivated for their own sake, 
nor to satisfy an idle curiosity, but because of their bearing 
on life, and that, therefore. Ethics is the crowning science. 
Logic and Physics were to be held as subordinate. 

Stoicism is dynamic materialism, and as matter is the 
only existence, according to the Stoics, it is monism or pan- 
theism. The Stoics do not call in question the fact of the 
soul, but assert that it is material. In asserting that all 
substance is corporal, the Stoics are in agreement with the 
Epicureans; but the idea that the tension of matter is the 
cause of the ceaseless change in nature is peculiar to stoicism. 
Matter is acted upon by matter, and as the Stoics held by 
matter only. 

Instead of the ten categories of Aristotle, the Stoics offered 
four: Substance, essence, mode, relation. They were adepts 
at analysis, and noted for their skill in hair-splitting. Along 
with logic, they cultivated Grammar, Rhetoric, and Dia- 
lectic, or the art of disputation. Many of their distinctions 
are still in vogue. 

The growing influence of skepticism awoke the Stoics to 
the importance of finding some criterion for truth, which 
would enable them to discern the difference between knowl- 
edge and opinion. They rejected the ideas of Plato, adopting 



THE EPICUREAN AND STOIC SCHOOLS 77 

with some modifications, the doctrine of forms, as taught by 
Aristotle, that our notions or concepts of things are derived 
from an examination and comparison of the objects of a class, 
by finding their essence or formal cause; and by this principle 
we are enabled to form objects into classes. 

The Stoics endeavored to answer the queries of the skeptics: 
How does the mind perceive? What is the relation between 
sense and the object? How do we know that the appearance 
corresponds to the reality? A square tower, at a distance, 
appears round, from which it appears that perception does 
not apprehend the object as it is, but that it gives a picture 
of our conception of the object. The Stoics insisted on 
clearness and distinctness, qualities which Descartes, long 
after, employed as tests of truth. 

The hypothesis of Empedocles that there are images de- 
tached from the objects, and representing them, through 
whose intervention the objects are seen, is not satisfactory 
for we might as well perceive the objects as their images; but 
if we perceive the images and not the objects, how do we 
known that the images fairly represent the objects? This 
we could not know, unless we have antecedent and separate 
knowledge of the objects, in which case the images are alto- 
gether superfluous. 

The theory that there are three kinds of opinions, the 
probable, the improbable, atid the neither probable nor 
improbable, proposed by the Stoics, gave no certain criteria 
by which to distinguish the true from the false. As no 
criterion sufficiently certain and of universal application, 
could be foimd, the Stoics fell back on common sense, as the 
best that could be done. 

Let us, at this convenient point, study the process of 
perception. Of course, perception begins as a psychical act, 
with sensation. If external objects did not, in some way, 
aflfect us, giving us sensations, we should not be aware of 
their existence; but before sensation, if perception be a fact, 
we must postulate the physical object to be known, and the 
subject which knows with its physiological sense organs and 
mental powers of perception. There must then be the 
synthesis of subject and object, not their identity, but a 
relation allowing the mechanical action of the object and 
the reaction of the organ, as when light^is radiated or reflected 



78 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

from the object to the eye, or when waves of air propagated 
by a vibrating body reach the ear, or an object in contact 
with the organ of touch, and so on for taste and smell. The 
excitement of the organ, caused by the object, is accom- 
panied by the sensation or feeling of which we are conscious. 
Reason now intervenes and apprehends the necessity of a 
foreign cause, since the soul is passive in sensation, a'so the 
necessity of the subject of the sensation, which it identifies 
with itself, the Ego or what one means when one says I. 
The judgment, then, guided by experience, infers what the 
particular cause is which produces the sensation; and now 
the imagination ideates or pictures the cause, according to 
the inferential judgment, and thus completes the act of 
perception. All this is done, so readily and spontaneously, 
from the habit of continual practice, that the complex act 
seems like immediate apprehension. 

The liability to mistake lies in the judgment as to the 
objective cause, which approaches certainty only in familiar 
cases, or when one sense re-enforces another, as the report of 
the eye is supported by that of touch. If there is a mistake 
in the judgment, the ideated picture is incorrect. 

The idea is not something perceived; it has no existence 
previous to the perception, but is the result of the act of 
perception, and is constructed by the imagination to embody 
our discoveries, knowledge, or belief respecting the object 
perceived; the idea is conceived rather than perceived; it is 
constructed as a mental picture representing what we know 
or believe we know. In the judgment, as to the cause of the 
sensation, is found, as before said, the element of uncertainty; 
for the judgment in general, gives only the more or less 
probable; but the probability varies between the limits 
impossibility and certainty, and the degree of probability is 
estimated by experience. Some images are known to be 
mere phantasms; others, as the appearance of well known 
objects, are held to be decisive as to the actual presence of 
the objects, as when we speak to a friend and receive a reply. 
The reply 'does not come from our idea, but is proof of the 
actual existence of the person addressed. 

Perception is to be taken for what it is worth; we have in 
it probability approaching impossibility on the one hand, or 
certainty on the other; but universal absolute skepticism 



THE EPICUREAN AND STOIC SCHOOLS 79 

can not be accepted by the human mind; for to accept it is 
to overthrow it, paradoxical as that may seem. If it is cer- 
tain that nothing is certain, one thing, at least, is certain, 
that nothing is certain; if it is really uncertain whether any 
thing is certain or not, then it is certain that it is uncertain 
whether anything is certain or not. Reality of some kind 
there must be, even if all is illusion, for then illusion is the 
reality; it is, therefore, certain that there must be reality of 
some kind. Then one thing, at least, is certain. 

It now remains for the human mind to ascertain what the 
reality is; and it must be admitted that great success has 
been attained, as in Geometry, Sextus Empiricus to the 
contrary notwithstanding. Neither the skepticism of Pyr- 
rho, nor that of Sextus has shaken the faith of mankind in 
the truth of mathematical theorems; but more of this here- 
after. 

Reason in man harmonizes with the reason displayed in 
nature, but whether man conforms to the universal law of 
reason depends upon himself and here the determinism of 
physics is confronted with the indeterminism of Ethics. 
We can not tell whether an entire stranger is honest or dis- 
honest; but knowing the character of a man, we can predict 
his conduct in certain circumstances. A thief will steal, if he 
has opportunity, and if he thinks he can probably escape 
detection; an honest man will respect the rights of his neigh- 
bor. We can, however, predict the consequences of conduct. 
Reason, not impulse, is the rightful guide, and wisdom, 
the union of theoretical knowledge, good will, and practical 
skill in executive conduct, is the crowning virtue. "Wisdom 
is the principal thing, therefore get wisdom." 

Irrational action is often willed and deliberately entered 
upon from free choice. Sometimes action from habit or 
sudden impulse takes place without reflection or deliberate 
decision. It is, however, the business of education to break 
up bad habits, and confirm those that are good; and the 
ethical education of self is, to learn to act, when circum- 
stances permit, from reflection instead of impulse. Sudden 
emergencies, however, may occur, when instantaneous, or 
impulsive action, alone is possible. 

To carry out the doctrine of the unity of the soul, the 
Stoics taught the necessity of suppressing the chronic ail- 



80 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

ments such as avarice and ambition, to avoid infirmities, 
to strengthen the weak powers, to correct erroneous opinions, 
and to cultivate the disposition to conform to nature, that 
is, to the Hght of reason. 

The perfection of man, according to the Stoics, is the inner 
perfection of the sovil. Make the soul right j and the life will 
be right. *'Out of the heart are the issues of life." Pleas- 
ures need not be sought. Virtue is its own reward. Future 
rewards and punishments, according to the Stoics, are moral 
bugbears. Virtue or right reason, and firmness of will, or 
the combination of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, 
is the only good for man, and vice, the opposite of these 
virtues, is the only evil. Other things are indifferent, though 
they may be classified according to a certain scale of values 
as health, wealth, social position and political preferment; 
yet if not attainable, the essential well-being of the soul is not 
disturbed. 

The Stoics were social, among themselves, and were desir- 
ous of forming a cosmopolitan citizenship, embracing all the 
good in one brotherhood of minds, actuated by the principles 
of the Stoic philosophy, regardless of nationality or race. 
In reality, such a society is a church fellowship, with Zeno 
as the founder, or high priest. The Greek mythic divinities, 
the Stoics explained allegorically, as personifications of the 
powers of nature. Divination and oracles afforded the 
means of communication between God and man. When 
the objection was urged that if all things are foreordained, 
divination is superfluous, Chrysippus replied that divination 
and our conduct under it were also foreordained. 

The middle Stoa was one of inaction, or at best of defensive 
action against the Skeptics, or a continuation of the discussion 
of psychological or cosmological problems, as the universal 
confligation and renewal of all things in an ever recurring 
cycle. 

Ordinary actions, according to r^ture, as eating and drink- 
ing, though not of themselves morally good, were yet the 
conditions of the good; for the end of the natural is the moral. 
The possessor of one virtue is the possessor of virtue in its 
completeness. A person morally lacking in one virtue is 
wanting in all ; that is, he is morally unsound, and can not, in 
any respect, be depended upon. He that offends in one 
point is guilty of all. 



THE EPICUREAN AND STOIC SCHOOLS 81 

Of the later, or Roman Stoa, Seneca undertook to vindicate 
the ways of God to man; he was the first writer on Theodicy. 
Musonius Rufus taught that virtue is the sole end, and that 
virtue may be gained, without theory, by habit and training, 
till the character is established. Epictetus taught that we 
should have no concern for things beyond our control, since 
we are not responsible for them, they would not affect our 
moral character; but for the things within our control, we 
should be careful, lest we go wrong. The Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius writes on the vanity of human life, and the duty 
of submission to the will of God. 

A comparison of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophy 
shows their contrasts, and sets each in a clearer light. An 
Epicurean would say: Pain is the only evil and pleasure the 
only good, and that virtue consists in such a life as gives the 
minimum of pain and the maximum of pleasure. A Stoic 
would say: Pain is no moral evil and pleasure is no moral 
good; that the only good is virtue, a life according to nature, 
guided by reason. 

A Stoic would say: Nothing can happen contrary to the 
will of a wise man; for a wise man's will assents to the will of 
God, and nothing can happen contrary to the will of God. 
An Epicurean would say: God cares nothing at all about the 
matter. The four schools, the Academy, the Lyceum, the 
Garden and the Porch, gave place to Eclecticism, Neo- 
Platonism and Skepticism. 



CHAPTER X 

Skepticism in Philosophy 

Ancient philosophic skepticism divides into two branches 
— Pyrrhonic and Academic; that is, into the skepticism of 
that school of which Pyrrho was the head, and the skepticism 
of the second and third Academies, whose heads were Arcesi- 
laus and Carneades. 

The chief philosophers of the Pyrrhonian School were 
Pyrrho, Timon, Aenesidemus, Agrippa, and Sextus Empiri- 
cus. 

1. Pyrrho. (circ. 360-270). Pyrrho of Elis had been in- 
structed in the doctrines of the Eleatic and Megaric Schools 
when he, with Anaxarchus of the Atomic School of Democri- 
tus, accompanied Alexander in his career of conquest; and 
returning home, he opened a school of his own in Elis, his 
native city; but as he left no written works, his doctrines are 
known only through the writings of others, especially those 
of Timon, Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus. 

Pyrrho criticized the dogmatic teaching of the other schools, 
and believing that nothing can be certainly known, he held 
that the proper course to take is to obey the laws, and to 
comply with the accepted customs of society and the rules of 
morality. He lived a long and peaceful life, highly respected 
by his fellow citizens. 

Pyrrho had some ground for his skepticism. Thales had 
taught that water was the principle of the universe; Anaxi- 
mander, indeterminate matter; Anaximenes, air; the Eleatics, 
being or permanence; Heraclitus, change or becoming, sym- 
bolized by fire; Pythagoras, number; Empedocles assumed 
for elements, earth, air, fire, water; Anaxagoras assumed 
vovs or reason; the Sophists taught that man, each man 
for himself, is the measure of the universe, that each was 
the judge of his own good, and that man is a bundle of sen- 
sations; Socrates taught that man is the measure of the 
universe, but that reason is the characteristic of man; Plato 

82 



SKEPTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 83 

and Aristotle, in this agreed with Socrates, but differed 
somewhat from him in other respects; the Epicureans pur- 
sued pleasure; the Stoics followed duty. 

Is it any wonder that Pyrrho was a skeptic in philosophy, 
and that he concluded that nothing could, with certainty, be 
known? Though these philosophers did not succeed in find- 
ing out the secret of nature, yet they all had a philosophic aim 
— to find the fundamental truth which would reduce the 
multiplicity of the universe to unity, or at least to harmony. 

2, Timon (circ 330-240). Timon of Phlius, a Sillograph, 
or Satirist, studied philosophy, first under Stilpo, the Megar- 
ian, then with Pyrrho. He was the author of numerous 
works in prose and poetry, and satirized all the philosophers 
except Xenophanes and Pyrrho. 

He said that to live happily from actual knowledge, we 
ought to know three things — the nature of things, how we are 
related to them, and what we can gain from them; but as 
the nature of things is unknown to us, also our relations to 
things, our right attitude is that of indifference towards 
things, maintaining good temper, cultivating virtue, and so 
find happiness in tranquillity. Live according to nature and 
custom. 

3, Aenesidemus of Cnossus, whose exact date is unknown, 
collected, about the beginning of the Christian era, the results 
of the teaching of Pyrrho and Timon, which together with 
his own speculations, he published in systematic form, as 
the ten tropes, or turns of thought, which led to ^ttoxi;, 
or suspension of judgment with respect to truth. He held 
that drapa^La^ or tranquillity followed tTrox^y, as a shadow 
follows a body. 

The Pyrrhonians did not deny sensations, or feelings, but 
with them every thing was phenomenal, and phenomena 
implied nothing with regard to their causes, which were 
wholly unknown. To attain to ^ttoxt/, or suspension 
of opinion, argument was placed in opposition to argument, 
phenomena to phenomena, argument to phenomena, and phe- 
nomena to argument, and the result was uncertainty, and 
hence followed the tranquillity of indifference. 

The ten tropes of Aenesidemus, which led to suspension of 
judgment, were based on the following considerations: The 
variety of animals; the difference in men; the difference in 



84 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

the constitution of the sense organs; circumstances; position, 
distance, place; mixtures; quantities and constitution of 
objects; relation; frequency or rarity of occurrence; systems, 
customs, laws, myths, dogmas. 

Aenesidemus also gave eight tropes on Aetiology, or theory 
of causation, founded on the denial that phenomena reveal 
their causes. The fundamental objection to the reasoning 
from effects to their causes is that the method is hypothetical, 
and that more than one cause may be offered to account for 
the same phenomenon; also that causes, apart from their 
effects, do not manifest themselves to any of the senses. 
Though denying any knowledge of cause, he accepted the 
fact of change, as manifest to the senses, and thus favored 
the doctrine of Heraclitus. 

4. Agrippa was later than Aenesidemus, though his exact 
date is not known. He is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, 
though not by Sextus Empiricus, as the originator of five 
tropes. They show an advance in logical power of the skep- 
tical school, and have the following bases : Discord ; regressus 
in infinitum, Relation, hypotheses; circulus in probando. 

5. Sextus Empiricus flourished about 200 A. D. He was 
a learned physician, a writer on the history of philosophy, and 
the head of the Pyrrhonean School, in his time, located prob- 
ably in Rome. Sextus was an agnostic. 

In his work entitled HvppwveioL {'TrorvTrwcreis, which may be 
translated Pyrrhonean expositions, Sextus sharply criticized 
the various dogmatic schools of philosophy, and held 
that the true attitude, the one of Pyrrhonism, of 
balancing arguments pro and con, was the only true one, 
since it led to ^Trox^y, the suspension of judgment, 
neither affirming nor denying, and that this resulted in 
arapa^ia, or repose of soul. Sextus also wrote a treatise 
entitled adversus matJiematicos, against the mathematicians. 

Sextus takes up the ten tropes and discusses them in order. 
We give the substance of what he says. 

(1) On the differences of animals, as to origin, their senses, 
their preferences for different food, Sextus says substantially : 
Some animals are carnivorous, some herbivorous; the sense of 
sight is keen in the greyhound, the sense of smell in the blood- 
hound; cows eat cabbage, pigs do not. Some animals live on 
land, some in water, and birds fly in the air. Some animals 



SKEPTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 85 

are gregarious, others solitary. Many animals, as the horse, 
seek the fresh grass for food; the vulture seeks carrion. Are 
things pleasant to one class of animals always pleasant to 
another .f^ Does nature appear the same to all classes of ani- 
mals. To which of them does it appear as it is? Have 
animals correct ideas of nature.^ Has man correct ideas of 
nature .f^ It is true that our sensations are as we experience 
them; our ideas are as we are conscious of them; but do they 
reveal the truth .^ As we can not prove that our ideas corres- 
pond to the reality, the only proper attitude is susf tension of 
judgment. 

The reply to the above is that sense knowledge is relative, 
and the different animals, as well as man, have relative 
truth. Objects are to us as they appear; that is, objects are 
such as affect us in certain ways. Man, however, differs 
from animals in that he seeks for causes of phenomena, while 
animals probably do not. 

Sextus raises the question: Have the so-called irrational 
animals reason .^^ In discussing this question, Sextus selects 
the dog for comparison with man, and reaches the conclusion 
from numerous illustrations, that the dog is equal, if not 
superior, to man in the accuracy of his perceptions, and 
facetiously remarks: 'Tt is for this reason, it appears to me, 
that some philosophers, (the Cynics) have honored them- 
selves with the name of this animal." Sextus concludes the 
comparison of man and animals with the statement: *T shall 
be able to say how each object appears to me, but in regard 
to what it is by nature, I shall be obliged to suspend my 
judgment." It is by nature such as to affect me in a certain 
manner. 

(2) In regard to the second trope founded upon the 
differences in men, Sextus says, substantially: There is no 
unanimity among men in regard to the characteristics of 
external objects. Men differ in body and mind, and delight 
in different things. The races of mankind have their pecul- 
iarities, and men of the same race differ in their preferences, 
in intellectual and moral endowments, in their philosophy 
in their religious beliefs. They place different values on the 
same things. What then is the truth concerning these 
things? A Platonist would say, agree with Plato; an 
Epicurean, agree with Epicurus; but Sextus says: Suspend 
judgment. 



m PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The answer to this trope is, men generally choose accord- 
ing to relative truth, what seems good to them. It is true, 
however, that things are not all of equal worth. Knowledge 
outweighs ignorance, wisdom folly; character, money. Those 
things are to be preferred that tend to the perfection of man 
as a physical, intellectual, and moral being, and satisfaction 
varies with perfection. 

(3) In regard to the third trope that different senses give 
different reports concerning the same object, Sextus says: 
*'To the different senses, an apple may appear smooth, 
fragrant, sweet, yellow. A painting appears to the eye with 
fields and trees, and buildings, and streams of water, with 
bridges, and cattle grazing in the fields, and a distant moun- 
tain range. To the touch, it is all one flat surface. Which 
is the lying sense? A person with a greater or less number of 
senses than we have, would have a different idea of the 
world. What then is the nature of the world .^^ * *The dogma- 
tists are conceited enough to think that they should be pre- 
ferred to other men in their judgment of things, we know 
that their claim is absurd, for they themselves form a part 
of the disagreement." Hence, suspension of judgment fol- 
lows in regard to external objects. 

In reply to this, it is evident that Sextus himself dogma- 
tized, when he said, we know that the claim of the dogmatists 
is absurd. He should have said : The claim of the dogmatists 
appears to us absurd. Does even the modified statement 
escape dogmatism? But let this pass. The answer is, each 
sense reports the quality related to it, so that we can say 
the apple has qualities which affect the touch, smell, taste and 
sight in certain ways These qualities do not conflict, and 
may all exist in the apple. The objective cause of the sensa- 
tion may be occult, as in the taste of salt or sugar, and we 
can only surmise that the sensation is due to the size of the 
molecules, to their forms, to their motions, or to their chemi- 
cal action on the organs of taste, yet we know positively that 
the peculiarity of the sensation is due to some cause in 
the object, since, the organ being the same, the taste of salt 
differs from that of sugar. Nature and man are so corre- 
lated that certain uniformities in results follow their inter- 
action, and we are enabled to predict, and this is the mark 
of science. 



SKEPTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 87 

(4) The fourth trope is based upon circumstances or 
conditions. In regard to this trope, Sextus says many 
useful things: The same sense reports differently in different 
persons, or in the same person in the different circumstances 
of health or sickness, youth or age, sleeping or waking, in 
hunger or satiety. Actions of others are reported according 
to our opinion of them. Our state of love or hatred, joy or 
sorrow, courage or fear, affect our opinions and our conduct. 
Our subjective states which modify our judgments, whether 
produced by physical or mental conditions, are continually 
changing. Disease such as jaundice or the mumps affects 
our relish for food. Children have their toys, and love them, 
as the hoop or cross-bow for boys, and dolls for girls. Men 
and women have their toys, and love them too, and in their 
pursuit of baubles, miss the true riches of a moral character 
and a righteous hfe. He who prefers one thing to another, 
does so by some criterion, test or proof; but the criterion 
itself needs a criterion, the test needs to be tested, the proof 
needs to be proved. Hence, again, the result, suspension of 
opinion. 

All this should have due weight, and Sextus is entitled to 
thanks for such an ample expose of the dangers which beset 
our opinions; but these liabilities to error apply only to sense 
knowledge or inferences from phenomena. A rational intui- 
tion, such as, Every event must have a cause, or a logical 
demonstration, as found in Geometry, is not effected. 
Moral truth is not affected, as: It is right to seek the highest 
good for all within our influence. 

(5) As to the fifth trope based upon position, distance 
and place, Sextus says: The same ship appears small and 
motionless at a distance, but large and in motion when near, 
and the same tower appears round from a distance but square 
when we are near to it. The oar seems straight in the air, 
but bent, when thrust obliquely into the water. The color 
of the feathers on a dove's neck changes its shade as it walks 
by us. A portrait can be so painted that the eyes will follow 
us as we walk round the room. Here also we should suspend 
judgment as to the objective facts. 

The true answer to this trope is. Observe caution, and cor- 
rect your judgments; but the skeptic will reply. Is there 
not still liability to error .^ Yes, that is true; but the error 



88 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

can be reduced, if not avoided altogether. The tower ap- 
parently round at a distance is found to be square. Will the 
skeptic say it is not square, or that it is not known to be 
square .f^ Inferences from facts are liable to error. We hear 
a noise; the rational intuition that the noise has a cause is 
not error; but the inference, what the particular cause is 
may be wide of the mark. This leads us to observe that 
errors of perception arise from the judgment, or inference 
from the sensation. We are not mistaken as to the fact of 
sensation; we are not mistaken as to the necessity of a cause 
of the sensation, nor as to the necessity of a subject or ego 
that experiences the sensation; we may be mistaken as to the 
special cause of the sensation; we ideate or picture the object 
according to our judgment as to the caiise; the idea or picture 
will be correct or incorrect, according as the judgment is true 
or false. Our ordinary perceptions, tested as they have so 
often been by experience, are in general correct, and can be 
relied on; but whatever be the errors in perception, rational 
knowledge is not affected. A wolf at a distance may be 
mistaken for a dog, but that does not affect the demonstra- 
tions of Geometry. 

(6) As to the sixth trope based on mixtures, Sextus says, 
These mixtures are either outward, as in the air, or inward 
as in the organs. The air may be transparent or filled with 
fog, the eye is affected by jaundice, the taste by mumps. 
Hearing and smell are both affected by catarrh. The senses, 
in such cases, report falsely; hence trust them not; suspend 
judgment. 

The proper thing to do, is to ascertain the presence of 
these mixtures, allow for them, and be on our guard against 
deception, and be cautious in entertaining opinions, but in 
all such cases, rational knowledge is not disturbed. 

(7) The seventh trope is based on quantity and composi- 
tion; and says Sextus, our perceptions are changed with 
the quantity and composition. A few grains of salt may be 
tasted with pleasure, but a spoonful put into the mouth is 
too much of a good thing. The seasoning put into food 
affects our relish for it, and we judge of it accordingly. The 
color of the liquid seen in a vase in a show window of a drug 
store looks dark when seen through the large part, but as 
the vase runs down to a slender stem, the liquid looks light, 
or like water slightly tinged. Food taken in different quanti- 



SKEPTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 89 

ties produces different effects, as when the amount is due, 
or deficient, or superabundant. A certain combination of 
elements produces a useful medicine; a change in the ratio of 
the same elements may produce a poison. Our judgments 
of external objects are thus often unreliable; hence suspend 
judgment. 

The answer is, try by experiment, judge from facts properly 
tested, be cautious, and act accordingly. 

(8) The eighth trope is based on relation; but as Sextus 
says, every thing is related to something else, as a species 
to its genus, or as an individual to its species. Things are 
related as cause and effect, as the condition and the conditioned, 
as antecedent and consequent, as the premises to the 
conclusion, as the present generation to the past or future 
generations. The relationship of kindred affects the con- 
duct of people toward each other. A woman gives to her 
own son, sugar, to her step-son, a cuff. A man thinks his 
own horses better than those of his neighbors. Political 
partisans find nothing but good in their own party, and 
nothing but corruption in the party of the opposition. 

These are warnings that we ought to heed, thanks to 
Sextus. So keep a level head, be not biased by self-interest, 
prejudice, or affection, judge not wholly from appearances, 
but judge righteous judgment. 

(9) The ninth trope relates to the frequency or rarity 
of events, to their regularity or irregularity. Sextus says, 
we are more astonished at a comet than at the sun, which 
is a much more magnificent object; the rise and fall of the 
tides, on account of their regularity, are regarded as a matter 
of course. A great flood, on account of its rarity, is not 
anticipated but when it occurs, is talked about for a month. 
A cyclone or an earthquake causes terror. To barbarians, 
an eclipse is a harbinger of a dire calamity; to an enlightened 
mind, it is a phenomenon of unusual interest. How are we 
to regard wars, and famines, and pestilences .^^ Sextus says, 
suspend judgment, or have no opinion in regard to these 
things. 

The right thing to do is to search for the truth, to make 
thorough investigations, and to decide according to the light 
of reason, or according to the greatest probability, when 
certainty is out of the question. Look not for infallibility 
in such cases. 



90 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

(10) The tenth trope relates to Laws, opinions, belief, 
customs, which influence our judgments with regard to other 
nations, or classes of men. Sextus proceeds to invalidate 
any opinion with regard to these things by opposing law to 
law, custom to custom, belief to belief, opinion to opinion, 
or law to custom, belief to law, and so on. Some tribes 
tattoo their children to add to their beauty; we consider that 
the practice disfigures them. The Egyptians were allowed 
to marry their sisters; we forbid the practice. The standard 
of opinions and practice in one nation, party, church, or 
society, is opposed to those of another nation, party, church 
or society. The morals on one side of a range of mountains 
are opposed to those on the other side. One church permits 
its members to dance or play cards, another church forbids 
such practices. What is true and right is uncertain; hence, 
suspend judgment. 

Suspend judgment till you can form a judgment that is 
at least probably true, and leave it open to correction; but be 
not hasty in forming an opinion or in modifying an opinion 
once formed. 

The tenth trope tends to broaden our views and give us 
charity; but it does not show that all laws are equally bene- 
ficial, or that one custom may not be preferable to another. 
These things are tested, in the long run, by their consequences, 
and we can judge of them accordingly. We have now 
reached a period in the world's history when action and re- 
action are powerful, and the probability is that in the course 
of time, all nations and people will accept the best form of 
government, enact the most beneficial laws, adopt the most 
useful customs, and comply with the highest standards of 
morality. 

The eight tropes of Aetiology formulated by Aenesidemus 
against the theory of causality are chronologically anterior 
to the five tropes of Agrippa, though Sextus reverses the 
order and treats the five tropes first, and then returns to the 
eight. 

The five tropes of Agrippa are of a higher order than the 
ten of Aenesidemus, and show a logical advance in the skepti- 
cal school. The relation of the ten tropes to the five is that 
of the empirical to the rational; the ten are derived from 
objective relativity, the five from subjective logical principles. 



SKEPTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 91 

The originality of Agrippa, in regard to the five tropes, 
relates to their formulation and use for skeptical purpose, 
and not in regard to their substance. 

Of the five tropes based on contradiction, on the regressus 
in infinitum^ on relation, on the hypothetical, on the circulus 
in probando; the first and third are in the list of the ten already 
discussed, then only the (2, (4) and (5) need be considered 
in the present discussion. 

In regard to the regressus in infinitum, Sextus says: The 
proof brought forward for the thing set before us calls for 
another proof, and that for another and so on to infinity, 
so that not having anything from which to begin the reason- 
ing, suspension of judgment follows. 

The answer to this is that in tracing the reasoning in a 
regress order, we ultimately reach axioms, or self-evident 
propositions that need no proof. The consensus of opinion 
of the best minds of the world establishes the fact that 
demonstration is not only possible but actual, as in Geometry, 
and this overthrows the hypothesis that reasoning runs back 
in an infinite series, and establishes the fact of ultimate 
axiomistic bases for the reasoning, which are Ihe starting points 
in the direct order. 

(4) In regard to the fourth trope, based on the hypotheti- 
cal, Sextus asserts that we can escape the regressus in infini- 
turn, only by the hypothetical, but in this case, other hy- 
potheses are possible, and we are thrown into a state of doubt, 
as to which hypothesis is the true one, and suspension of 
judgment follows. 

In regard to this it may be said that though several hy- 
potheses may be possible, they are not all equally tenable. 
In fact, hypotheses sometimes admit of verification or refuta- 
tion. For example, Kepler made eighteen hypotheses in 
regard to the connection of the distances of the planets 
from the sun, with the time of their revolution, before he 
found the true one, admitting of verification, that the squares 
of the periodic times are proportional to the cubes of their 
mean distances from the sun. The other hypotheses were 
refuted by the facts. 

Sextus held that to prove the hypothesis is to go back to 
the regressus in infinitum. The regressus in infinitum is a 
hug-hear, as we have already shown, Kepler verified his hy- 
pothesis, and did not go back to infinity either. 



92 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

(5) The circulus in probanda, or reasoning in a circle, 
Sextus correctly says, arises when the thing which ought 
to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustained by the 
thing sought for, and ^s we are unable to take the one for 
the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard to 
both. 

Reasoning in a circle is a fallacy which ought to be avoided, 
and is avoided by all sound logicians. It is a favorite objec- 
tion to the syllogism, and hence to all deductive reasoning, 
which always can be reduced to the syllogistic form. 

Even so good a logician as John Stuart Mill maintained 
that the syllogism involves the fallacy of begging the question, 
that is, reasoning in a circle, that to know the major premise, 
we must first know the truth of the conclusion; but the fact 
is, the major premise can be established, without any refer- 
ence to the conclusion. 

Suppose I wish to know how many diagonals can be 
drawn in a chiliagon, or a polygon of a thousand sides, I first 
establiish the formula, which is the major premise, giving 
the number of diagonals that can be drawn in a polygon of 
n sides. 

From any one vertex, a diagonal can be drawn to all the 
vertices except three — ^the vertex itself and the two adjacent 
vertices, and since there are n vertices, I can draw, from any 
vertex, n-3 diagonals; hence from the n vertices I can draw 
n(n-3) diagonals; but this by going round the polygon, 
counts each diagonal twice, that is, from the two ends; hence, 
the whole number of diagonals in a polygon of n sides is 
}/2 ^ C^-^)? which is the major premise. In a chiliagon, 
n =1000; then Jx^ti =500, and n-S =997; ... in a chiliagon, 
I can draw 500 x 997 = 498,500 diagonals. I did not have to 
know this number to know the major premise. Hence, also 
the syllogism reveals truth before unknown, without begging 
the question. 

Sextus held that the five tropes includes all cases, whether 
of sense, or of the understanding, or of both. Protagoras 
and Epicurus say that only things of sense are true; Plato 
says that only things of thought, or ideas; Aristotle and the 
Stoics say that both are true, so that, in any case, discord 
arises, and the proof must rest on hypothesis, or run into the 
regressus in infinitum, or involve the circulus in probanda. 
Hence, these five tropes lead to a suspension of judgment, 



SKEPTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 93 

that is, to the uncertainty whether anything is proved or 
not. Now, if Sextus has proved that nothing can be proved, 
he has, at least, proved one thing — that nothing can he proved; 
if he has only proved the uncertainty of proof of anything, 
then he has proved that uncertainty. 

Skepticism runs into dogmatism, and in spite of itself, eats 
itself up; but this dogmatism, Sextus failed to see. Give 
skepticism rope enough, and it will always commit suicide. 

An attempt was made to reduce the tropes to two, due to 
Menodotus. Everything that is comprehended is com- 
prehended either through itself or through something else. 
That nothing can be understood through itself is evident, 
Sextus says, through the disagreement of physicists in 
regard to it; it is evident, moreover, that a thing is not the 
cause of itself. It can not be understood through anything 
else; for that something else would need to be accounted for, 
and so on, which throws us into the regressus in infinitum or 
the cir cuius in probanda. 

These objections, we have already answered. 

At this point of the discussion, Sextus returns to the eight 
tropes of Aetiology, formulated by Aenesidemus, and directed 
against the theory of causes. These tropes are based, as 
Photius says, on the fact that : There are no visible signs of 
the unknown, and those who believe in their existence delude 
themselves, and are the victims of a vain illusion. 

Sextus states these eight tropes separately, and concludes 
by saying: Perhaps the five tropes of cttox^; are sufficient 
to refute aetiology. " He also says, ''that one who accepts the 
theory of cause will be thrown into the regressus in infinitum 
or the circulus in probanda. 

The ablest skeptic of Modern times was Hume, who held 
that we have no warrant for inferring the relation of cause 
and effect, in the sense that the cause is efficient in produc- 
ing the effect; hence the relation of cause and effect is resolv- 
able into that of antecedence and consequence. Hume 
showed that, according to Locke's philosophy which he 
accepted, we can not have the idea of cause, as efficiency 
but we do have this idea; hence Locke's Philosophy is defect- 
ive. If a cause is a mere antecedent, having no influence in 
producing the event, it might as well be absent; but when 
absent, the event does not take place; hence a cause has 
influence, or is efficient, and not a mere antecedent. 



94 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

We get the idea of cause as energy or eflSciency by experi- 
ence, whenever we make an effort, as in raising a weight; we 
know that every event requires a cause by rational intuition; 
for an event has no existence before it occurs, and non-entity 
can not jump into existence. 

11. The skepticism of the Academy, having its seed in 
Plato himself, arose under Arcesilaus, the leader of the 
Second or Middle Academy, and was further developed 
under Carneades, the leader of the third or New Academy. 

1. Arcesilaus (316-241). Arcesilaus of Pitane in Aeolia, 
received careful training under Autolychus, the mathematic- 
ian. He then studied under Theophrastus of the Peripatetic 
School, but was gained over to the Academy by Grantor for 
whom he had a strong friendship. He also studied with 
Polemo and with Crates whom he succeeded as leader of the 
Academy. 

Arcesilaus changed the method of teaching from lectures 
to discussions, returning, as he claimed, to the Socratic 
niethod of conversation. 

His doctrine was skeptical; he reached the conclusion that 
he could not know anything, not even his own ignorance; 
but this is dogmatic; for it amounts to saying that he knew 
that he could not know anything, not even his own ignorance; 
that is, he knew one thing, he knew that he could not know. 

But to go back for a moment, Sextus says : the Academic 
formulae rest on a dogmatic basis, but the skeptical formulae 
do not, as they refute themselves, and are like cathartic 
medicines which carry themselves off with the humors they 
purge; but when Sextus says, he is uncertain with regard to 
everything, he includes this uncertainty, so that he is either 
certain of this uncertainty, which gives one certainty, or he is 
uncertain whether he is uncertain or not, which is a new 
uncertainty, and in like manner he is uncertain with regard 
to this new uncertainty, and so on, ad infinitum. Ah! 
Sextus, if you reject all certainty, you yourself are thrown 
into the regressus in infinitum, into which you were so fond of 
throwing the dogmatist, and you can escape it only by the 
hypothetic, or by the circulus in probanda, both of which you 
have amply shown are fallacies of which the dogmatists are 
so often guilty. 



SKEPTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 95 

2. Carneades (213-129.) Carneades of Cyrene studied 
first with the Stoic School, and is reported to have said: "If 
Chrysippus had not been, I had not been either. " Finally he 
became the head of the Academy, and so carried out his 
principles, both negatively and positively, with such skill and 
power, that he is justly called the founder of the New Acad- 
emy. 

An interesting incident in his life occurred when he was 
sent on an embassy to Rome. He gave an eloquent oration 
eulogizing virtue, which greatly charmed the Roman youth; 
the next day he astonished them by refuting his arguments 
of the preceding day. No wonder that the wrath of the 
stern old Cato was so roused that he moved that the Greek 
philosophers be expelled from Rome, lest they corrupt the 
Roman youth. 

The negative side of the philosophy of Carneades is a 
polemic against the Stoic theory of knowledge. He held 
that it is impossible to distinguish between the false and the 
true. There is no criterion of truth. The positive side of 
his doctrine resembles that of Arcesilaus. Knowledge being 
impossible, a wise man will suspend judgment; but the 
statement: knowledge is impossible is a dogma which can 
not be considered certain, unless it is itself axiomatic, or can 
be traced back till it is found to rest on an axiom from which 
it may be logically derived; for otherwise it will run into the 
regressus in infinitum, or the cir cuius in probanda. 

Carneades criticized the doctrines of Final cause and of 
Providence, by showing their inconsistency with the evil in 
the world, but this criticism reveals his ignorances and 
finally he called in question the existence of God, by pointing 
out the inconsistency of infinity with personality. He has 
not proved that infinity is inconsistent with personality. 
He taught that virtue consists in directing the activities 
towards the satisfaction of the natural impulses. In truth, 
virtue consists in directing the activities towards the lawful 
satisfaction of all our desires and to the good of others, giving 
the intellectual and moral powers their due supremacy and 
control. This dogma will stand fire. 



CHAPTER XI 

Eclecticism, Neo-Pldtonism, Gnosticism 

A thorough-going skepticism is impossible to the human 
mind; it is contrary both to psychological laws and to the 
laws of language. 

In saying that he affirmed nothing, Sextus affirmed that 
he affirmed nothing; he dogmatized in condemning dogma- 
tism. In saying that everything is uncertain, Sextus included 
this statement itself; then it is uncertain that everything is 
uncertain, which is a new uncertainty; then this new uncer- 
tainty is uncertain, and so on, ad infinitum; hence, the 
regressus in infinitum, which Sextus used with such destruct- 
ive effect against the dogmatists, becomes a boomerang 
against himself. 

Another view can be taken: Sextus had no business to say: 
everything is uncertain, unless he held that it is certain that 
everything is uncertain; but as he said, this statement, that 
everything is uncertain, includes itself; then it is uncertain 
that everything is uncertain; hence the contradiction: It is 
certain that everything is uncertain; and it is uncertain that 
everything is uncertain. This contradiction justifies the 
statement of Aenesidemus, which Sextus condemns, that 
skepticism led to the philosophy of Heraclitus, that contrary 
predicates are applicable to the same object. It is true that 
diverse attributes may belong to the same object, as the 
same body may be both spherical and red, but contrary 
attributes can not belong at the same time to the same 
object, as a body can not, at the same instant, be both spheri- 
cal and cubical. 

In destroying dogmatism, skepticism, whether Pyrrhonean 
or Academic, destroys itself. The human mind cannot 
rest in negations; after criticism, comes reconstruction. The 
progressive order of human thought, as shown by the facts of 
history, seems to be: Construction, criticism, reconstruction, 
and the same repeated. 

96 



ECLECTICISM, NEO-PLATONISM, GNOSTICISM 9^ 

1, Eclecticism, The first step towards reconstruction is 
eclecticism. It was found that the various schools, notwith- 
standing their divergencies, had many points of agreement. 
The Academy, the Lyceum, the Porch and the Garden, all 
sought happiness; in this they agreed, though they did not 
agree in what happiness consists. Even Pyrrhonism had a 
theory of happiness, that it consisted in peace, quietude, con- 
tent, or as they called it dtrapa^ta, the absence of per- 
turbation, and with them this was the only reasonable atti- 
tude, since knowledge was denied them. The Stoics found 
happiness in virtue; the Epicureans in pleasure; the Peri- 
patetics in knowledge, together with favorable circumstances; 
the Academics in reason; the Pyrrhoneans in peace. All 
made happiness, in some form, the end of their efforts; and 
happiness, in some form, high or low, is the aim of every one. 

This common agreement, to which great weight must be 
assigned, points unmistakably to the fact that happiness is 
the ultimate object of human pursuit; but this happiness is 
not necessarily sensational pleasure. As man is character- 
istically rational and moral, his happiness, his good, must be 
the satisfaction that springs from his rational and moral 
nature. Other agreements, such as the precept, follow 
nature, were found in all the schools of philosophy. 

The successful attacks of Carneades on the distinctive 
doctrines of the schools, led philosophers to those common 
convictions about which men were generally agreed. Eclec- 
ticism, beginning with the Stoic School, found its way into the 
Academic and Peripatetic Schools. The Stoics allowed devia- 
tions from their doctrines. Panaetius was an admirer of 
both Plato and Aristotle, and Posidonius was not only an 
admirer of Plato but followed him in the psychology of the 
passions. 

The Academy itself became the chief seat of Eclecticism, 
and the Academicians abandoned the teaching of Carneades, 
that things are absolutely unknowable, and admitted that it 
was a self-contradiction to prove that nothing can be proved. 
Where then is truth? Antiochus, the Academic, answers: 
"In those things about which all important philosophers are 
agreed." He maintained that the Academic, Peripatetic 
and Stoic systems differed in unimportant points rather than 
in essentials. Admitting with the Stoics that virtue is suflS- 



98 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

cient for happiness, yet for the highest degree of happiness, 
bodily pleasures and external goods are also requisite, which 
is the doctrine of Aristotle. 

The discovery and publication by Andronicus of the genuine 
works of Aristotle gave an impulse to the earnest study of 
his works; but the Peripatetic School yielded to the eclectic 
tendency of the times, though to a less degree than the 
Academic, and admitted foreign elements into the body of 
its teaching. 

Cicero is good historical authority for the fact of the pre- 
vailing eclecticism. Though he opposed the Epicurean 
theory of morality, he admired the Stoic view, and practically 
adopted the Academic-Peripatetic doctrines. 

In the early centuries of the Christian era, the various 
schools of philosophy continued their separate organizations, 
which were stimulated by the renewed activity in the study 
of the works of Plato and Aristotle, and maintained by the 
endowment of chairs of philosophy for the four principal 
schools at Athens, made by the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. 
There were also revivals of Pythagoreanism and Cynicism, 
called out and justified by the corruption of the times. 
Though maintaining their separate existence, the various 
schools, by interchange of thought, approximated towards 
mutual understanding, and the inculcation of common views, 
especially in regard to practical matters and ethical conduct. 

The precursors of Neo-Platonism present several items of 
historic interest. Jewish religion and Greek philosophy have 
several important points of contact — the being of God, his 
relations to the world, the belief in revelation and prophecy, 
the doctrine of angels and demons. There is also a resem- 
blance between the Essenes and the Pythagoreans, in their 
seclusion, mythical doctrines and purity of life. 

The city of Alexandria was a suitable place for the inter- 
mingling of the streams of Jewish and Greek thought; and 
this was aided by the Septuagint translation into Greek of 
the Hebrew sacred scriptures. 

Philo {SO B. C.-50 A. p.). Philo, of Alexandria, while 
holding Moses and the scriptures in the highest veneration, 
was also an admirer of the great Greek philosophers, Par- 
menides, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Zeno and Cleanthes. 
The truth held by these in common, he believed is found, in 
its purity, only in the Hebrew scriptures. 



ECLECTICISM, NEO-PLATONISM, GNOSTICISM 99 

The idea of God is the point of departure in the philosophy 
of Philo. The problem was to find the relation of God, the 
high, the holy, the perfect, the infinite, the ineffable being, 
to the world of finite beings, and to the material universe, 
so infinitely inferior. Philo assumed intermediate beings, 
Svva/x€ts, powers, described, on the one hand, as ideas 
or thoughts of God, and on the other, as beings, angels, or 
messengers of God, sent forth to do his will. To identify 
the ideas of God with personal beings was difficult, if not 
impossible; yet Philo made the attempt in his doctrine of 
the Logos, the embodiment of reason, the collective wisdom 
of God, the power comprising all powers, the viceroy of God, 
the highest of the angels, the image of the invisible God, by 
whom all things were created, and by whom all things con- 
sist. How nearly identical is the Logos of Philo with the 
Logos of the Apostle John, or with the Son of God of the 
Apostle Paul, may be seen by referring to the first chapters 
of John's gospel and to the Epistle to the Colossians. 

Is the Logos of Philo, a personal being distinct from God, 
or an impersonal manifestation of divine power, wisdom and 
goodness .f^ However this may be answered, Philo held that 
by the mediation of the Logos, God, who is infinitely above 
nature, formed the world out of the chaotic mixture. 

Philo held to the doctrine of the fall of souls, the incorporeal 
life of purified souls after death, the transmigration of those 
needing purification, the kinship of the human spirit with 
the divine, the freedom of the will, the tendency to sin while 
the soul inhabits the body, and hence the need of extirpating 
the passions by the help of God, who alone works all good 
in us through our trust in Him. 

We attain to the highest good when we pass the intermedi- 
ate stages of consciousness iiito that of ecstacy, and receive 
the higher illumination into ourselves, and see God in his 
unity, and in the ineffable perfections of his being. 

2, Neo-Platonism. The names distinguished in this 
school of philosophy are Ammonius, Plotinus, Porphyry, 
Jamblicus and Proclus. 

1. Ammonius ( 241). Ammonius was surnamed Sac- 

cas, because in early life he supported himself as a porter, in 
carrying sacks in the market place of the city of Alexandria. 
According to Porphyry, he was originally a Christian. 



100 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

After long study, he opened a school of philosophy in 
Alexandria where he taught many years. Among his pupils 
were some who afterwards became distinguished, as Long- 
inus, the rhetorician and philosophical critic, and Plotinus, 
the most celebrated of the Neo-Platonic philosophers. 

Ammonius wrote nothing, keeping his doctrines secret, 
after the example of Pythagoras. As we learn from notes of 
Hierocles, preserved by Photius, his method was eclectic, 
combining the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. 

He claimed that a system of philosophy, higher than either 
that of Plato or of Aristotle, might be deduced from doctrines 
common to them, thus reconciling their views, and putting an 
end to the controversies between the Academic and Peripa- 
tetic Schools. 

As Ammonius left no writings, his peculiar doctrines can 
be known only through the works of his successors, chiefly 
Plotinus and Proclus, and they added many new elements. 
The chief interest in Ammonius centers in the fact that he 
was the originator of the mystical doctrines of the Neo- 
Platonic School. 

2, Plotinus (205-270). Plotinus, a native of Lycopolis 
in Egypt, having been directed to Ammonius, when in search 
of a teacher, said: "This is the man I was seeking. " 

He remained with Ammonius eleven years, and then he 
joined the army of the Emperor Gordianus in its march 
against Persia. When about forty years of age, Plotinus 
went to Rome, and opened a school of philosophy, in which 
he taught by conversation, rather than by lectures. By his 
disciples, and it is said also by the oracle of Apollo, he was 
called "good and gentle, and benignant, in a very high degree, 
and pleasant in his intercourse." 

Neither the contentions of the schools, the criticisms of 
Pyrrhonism, nor Eclectic Syncretism satisfied the demands 
of the times. Another system seemed called for, another 
method was inevitable. 

Plotinus began to write when about fifty years of age. 
He left fifty-four treatises, which were afterwards arranged 
by his disciple Porphyry in six Enneads, each consisting of 
nine books. 

Neo-Platonism is dialectic, so far as it follows the method 



ECLECTICISM, NEO-PLATONISM, GNOSTICISM 101 

of Plato; it is mystic in its methods of apprehending God; it 
is pantheistic in its results. It has two divisions, the theoret- 
ical and practical. 

The theoretical part begins with God the transcendent 
One from whom came forth, by emanation, the Nov?, the 
\6yoL or inferior gods, and the universe. The soul is 
an emanation from the Novs; hence its high origin; and in its 
fall, or lapse into sin, it is associated with the body, and is in 
a state of departure from God. 

The practical part points out the way by which the soul 
may return to God, the eternal source of all blessedness. 
The steps are perception, reasoning, and mystical intuitions. 
Through perception, we see in the order and harmony of the 
world, an indication of its divine origin; reasoning brings us 
to the threshold of mystic intuition by which the soul in 
divine contemplation and ecstatic emotion, experiences the 
ineffable One with whom, for the time, its own identity seems 
to be lost. 

Plotinus raises the questions : What is evil? Whence comes 
it.f^ Is it positive, the doing of wrong, or is it negative, the 
failure to do right .^^ Is it in matter or in the soul? Is there 
an archetypical evil? What is the real conflict of life? What 
is victory? What is final defeat? 

Plotinus gives us his thoughts about these things, and an 
insight into his earnest struggles with evil, rather than dog- 
matic answers, and this is far more satisfactory. The fall 
of the soul is found in its subjection to the body, yet the 
tendency to fall is found, not in the body, but in the soul 
itself, perhaps in its desire for pleasure. 

The order of the world is perfect, divine, eternal; and the 
great movements of nature, which are a terror to the ignor- 
ant, bring joy to the enlightened mind. Evil is discord, good 
is harmony. 

Plotinus besought the Emperor Gallienus, with whom 
he was on terms of intimacy, to rebuild a city in Campania, 
a former resort of philosophers, to be called Platonopolis 
and to permit its citizens to be governed by the laws of Plato, 
but the plan was frustrated by the envy of the courtiers. 

The labors of Ammonius and Plotinus carried Neo-Platon- 
ism through its first period. 

S, Porphijry (233-303.) Porphyry, a native of Tyre, 



10^ PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

studied philosophy for five years under Plotinus at Rome. 
He spent two years in Sicily where he wrote against Chris- 
tianity. Returning to Rome he engaged in teaching; he also 
edited the works of Plotinus, and wrote several treatises of 
his own. 

He was a fine writer, and had a great talent for literary 
research. He critically studied the Christian writings, and 
was a bitter opponent of the Christian religion. 

The system of Porphyry was more popular, practical and 
religious than that of Plotinus, though his religion was a 
refined Polytheism. 

The origin of evil and the guilt of sin are, according to 
Porphyry, not found in the body, but in the desires of the 
soul for pleasure. The aim of philosophy is the salvation 
of the soul; and to accomplish this salvation, not only philoso- 
phy, but the strictest morality is required. 

He did not share in the gross popular views of Polytheism, 
3^et he advocated the pure worship of the many gods, and 
made Neo-Platonism entirely subservient to Polytheism, 
which he defended against the vigorous assaults of the 
Christian Theologians. His writings are lost except the 
quotations from his works found in the books of Christian 
authors. 

-4. Jamblichus ( -332.) Jamblichus, a native of Chal- 

cis in Caele-Syria, studied under Porphyry. He opened a 
school in Chalcis, and drew a large number of disciples from 
various nations. 

He wrote commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, and a 
treatise on Chaldean Theology, and another on Pythagorean 
philosophy, most of which are lost. Books on Egyptian 
mysteries, originating in his school, were ascribed to him, 
though there is doubt of its truth, on account of difference 
in style. He was much esteemed, and was often called the 
divine. The Emperor Julian esteemed him not inferior to 
Plato, and said he would give all the gold in Lydia for one 
epistle of Jamblichus. 

The speculative character of Neo-Platonism was settled by 
Plotinus, but Jamblichus carried it out in more minute sub- 
divisions, assimilating more Mystic and Oriental elements, 
giving it more of a Polytheistic and even magical character, 
till in his hands philosophy degenerated into superstitious 
theurgy. 



ECLECTICISM, NEO-PLATONISM, GNOSTICISM 103 

At the head of his system, Plotinus placed God, the trans- 
cendent One, from whom emanated the No{?s, or intellect, 
the first begotten of God; from the Novs emanated ^i^x^* 
the soul, which, in turn, gave birth to <^i;o-ts, or nature; 
but immediately after the absolute One, Jamblichus placed a 
second super-existent unity, the producer of intellect, between 
the Absolute and the many, and made intellect, soul and 
nature, undergo various modifications, as intellectual, super- 
mundane and mundane gods, which were divided and sub- 
divided in triads and hebdomads, till lost in the minute sub- 
divisions, we marvel and repudiate the superstition. 

Jamblichus never attained to that ecstatic communion 
with the Deity which Plotinus enjoyed four times, and 
Porphyry once. In recognizing God, the deepest truth, by 
mystic intuition, rather than by rational intuition, that is, 
by the intuition of the heart rather than that of the head, 
the Neo-Platonists made feeling a deeper element in human 
nature than reason, and more intimately related to self. 

5. Proclus (410-485.) Proclus was born in Constanti- 
nople and died in Athens. What Chrysippus was to the 
Stoics, Proclus was to the Neo-Platonists. By his industry, 
learning and logical power, he brought the Neo-Platonic 
philosophy to its formal completeness and conclusion. From 
his knowledge of the history of the school, and by his great 
ability, he reduced the system to a cohering mass, supplying 
defects and reconciling contradictions. 

With others of his school, he was a religious enthusiast, 
sharing in their faith, in their superstition, in their love for 
Orphic poems and Chaldean oracles. Seeking perfection 
led to high ethics; despising facts, to low science. 

His system is constructed according to the laws of triadic 
development. The effect is like the cause; for since the 
cause goes into the effect, the thing produced is like that 
which produced it; and the thing produced is also unlike the 
thing which produced it, since the derived is different from 
the original, not identical with it. 

As the effect is like the cause, it returns to it, that is imitates 
it on a lower scale, and produces something both like and 
unlike itself, and so on, in an endless series. A thing then 
exists in its cause, departs from it, and returns to it by imita- 



104 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

tion by producing something else both like and unlike itself, 
and by the repetition of these three movements, everything 
is produced. 

Between the Original One and the intelligible, Proelus 
interposes, with Jamblichus, an intermediary unity. Then 
we have avToreXeTs and the cvaSes, which are the highest Gods, 
and after them the voOs, the jA^x^* ^^d the <^vo-t9, that is 
reason, soul and nature. Proelus divides the province of 
the vov^ into three spheres, vorqrov the intelligible, the 
intellectual-intelligible, and the voepov the intellectual; 
that is, into being, life, and thought. Of the three spheres, 
the first and second are divided into three triads, and each 
triad into seven hebdomads, which are the gods of the 
nations. The yp^x^ or soul comprises three classes of souls, 
divine, demoniac and human, and these again are sub- 
divided, according to the same law, and so on. 

Plotinus supposed matter to be created by the soul, Proelus 
derives it from the unlimited, the aireLpov of Anaximander. 

His system of Ethics requires the ascent through the five 
virtues to the supersensible, leading to the mystic union 
with the Divine, and this turns his ethics into theology, and 
morals into religion 

With Proelus Neo-Platonism was finished, and no further 
development seemed possible. The method throughout is 
deductive, beginning with the highest abstraction, and so 
descending, giving at every step, room for imagination, wild 
conjecture and superstition. Can the gods and demons of 
Mythology be verified by appealing to facts? Such a system, 
which can scarcely be understood by superior minds, was 
doomed to inevitable defeat in contending with Christianity 
which brought salvation to the masses. 

The Emperor Justinian did well, when forty-four years 
after the death of Proelus, he ordered the Neo-Platonic 
School at Athens to be closed. 

3, Gnosticism, The term Gnosticism, from yvwct?, 
knowledge, yvcoo-ri/cds, one who knows, applies to the 
system of a philosophic school that claimed to know the 
truth by combining Oriental speculations with Greek philoso- 
phy and Christian doctrine. 

The Gnostics were the originators of systematic investi- 
gations in Rational Theology and Comparative Religion, 



ECLECTICISM, NEO-PLATONISM, GNOSTICISM 105 

and may, therefore, be called religious philosophers. Gnos- 
ticism is not strictly a heresy, as the Gnostics were outside 
of the church, yet it was Christian doctrine that gave it 
impulse and life. 

The Gnostics were divided into many sects, or branches 
of a common system, to which the title Ophites, from ophis, 
a serpent, is appropriately applied, as the serpent was a 
common symbol with them all of a redeeming power. The 
evil characters of the Old Testament, with Cain at the head, 
were accounted true spiritual heroes, and Judas Iscariot of 
the New Testament is represented as alone knowing the truth 
and therefore betrayed the Savior that his good work of 
redemption might be completed. These extravagances, 
however, applied only to the earlier stages of the system in 
which evil was put for good. 

Early in the second century, the Gnostics established three 
main centers at Antioch, at Alexandria, and at Pontus in 
Asia Minor. The school at Antioch was founded by Menan- 
der, who was supposed to be a disciple of Simon Magus. 

The school at Alexandria was represented by Basilides and 
Valentinus, who were men of learning and ability. The 
school at Pontus was especially represented by Marcion, the 
son of a Christian bishop, by whom he was excommunicated. 

The questions considered by the Gnostics were those which, 
in all ages, have awakened inquiry and baffled speculation — 
the beginning of life, the origin of evil, how a world so full of 
evil, could spring from an all-wise and holy being. 

The essential corruption of matter is a fundamental princi- 
ple of Gnosticism; hence all Gnostics agree in holding that 
this world did not spring immediately from the Supreme 
Being; hence they maintained that the world and God are 
separated by a vast gulf which they attempted to bridge in 
various ways, but chiefly by a series of emanations of spirits 
or aeons from the Supreme Being, and to these Spirits they 
attributed the work of creation. 

The Gnostic philosophy exerted a powerful influence on 
Christian thought, chiefly in compelling Christian thinkers 
to face the great problems common to Philosophy and Theo- 
logy. It taught men like Irenaeus, Clement and Origen to 
understand that the doctrines of Christianity could not 
safely be left to win their way by authority, but must be 



106 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

vindicated by reason, at least must be shown not to be 
unreasonable. Gnostic philosophy thus stimulated the 
development of Christian Theology. Antioch and Alexandria, 
the chief seats of Gnosticism, became the first centers of 
Christian Theologic Schools. As the name Sophist, primarily 
signifying a wise man, gave way to that of philosopher, denot- 
ing a lover of wisdom, so the name Gnostic, signifying one 
who knows, has given way to that of Agnostic, meaning one 
who does not know, thus indicating that the attempt to 
solve the mystery of the universe, by speculation, has at 
least by these philosophers, been given up as hopeless. 
Truly the world by wisdom knows not God. 

The Philosophy of Philo, the Jewish section of the Alexan- 
drian School, Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism are related in 
the fact that they all are mystical. They differ in their 
affinities; the philosophy of Philo consisted of a Jewish 
nucleus with an envelope of oriental mysticism and Greek 
thought; the Neo-Platonic philosophy was more purely 
Greek, though tinged with Oriental mysticism; the Gnostic 
philosophy was a combination of mysticism with Christian 
doctrine. 



CHAPTER XII 

Patristic Philosophy 

By Patristic Philosophy we are to understand the Christian 
Philosophy of the Church Fathers of the period between the 
times of the Apostles and the rise of Scholasticism. 

By the attacks, especially of Neo-Platonism, the Christian 
Theologians were put on the defensive; they must justify 
theology in the light of reason, or show, at least, that it is 
not unreasonable. 

As Gnosticism was somewhat hostile to the church, or at 
least an outside matter for which the church was not responsi- 
ble, the Christian Theologians could not accept the Gnostic 
solution of theological problems, but must solve them from a 
Christian point of view, in harmony with the principles of 
reason. 

If any principle can be accepted as fundamental, and held 
to be valid, because at once apprehended as true by rational 
intuition, it is the principle that all truths exist in harmony. 
No truth can conflict with another truth; and by this we 
mean that no truth can involve the falsity of another truth. 
If two truths conflict, thai is, if the truth of each involves 
the falsity of the other, then we shall have both true by 
hypothesis, and both false, as the logical consequence of the 
truth of the other, then each would be both true and false 
at the same time, and taken in the same sense, which is 
self -destructive, absurd and therefore impossible. 

No authority, however great, can compel reason to accept 
absurdities. Hence Philosophy has a right to demand that 
Theological doctrines be kept free from contradictions, 
which are, in fact, absurdities, since it is absurd to suppose 
that one truth can contradic. another truth, though it does 
not object to mysteries, if supported by evidence, even if it 
does not accept them. It simply demands that the contra- 
dictory, the absurd, the irrational, be eliminated from the 
body of received doctrine; and in making this demand, 
philosophy does, for theology, a very great service, by re- 
moving the insuperable objections of rational minds. 

107 



108 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Theology, as the theory of rehgion, is for the sake of reU- 
gion, which is the thing most sacred and precious to the 
human heart As the deepest necessity of man's nature, 
reUgion is in the world to stay; and it is the high caUing of 
theology to harmonize it with the fundamental principles of 
reason, set forth and vindicated by the deepest philosophical 
thought, thus removing all discord between the affections 
and the reason of humanity. 

There is no necessity for any one declaring, as did Jacobi : 
"With the head I am a heathen, but with the heart a chris- 
tian." Religion should not be irrational and philosophy 
should not be irreverent. Philosophy is able to show that 
faith in God is not in conflict with any philosophical principle 
that reason affirms to be true. 

Theology is, however, under no obligation to reconcile its 
doctrines with every new phase of Philosophy. This would 
be a needless task, if not endless; for, as it has been true in 
the past, and is likely to be true in the future, a system of 
philosophy may flourish for a time, then give way to another 
system. What system can be regarded as both true and 
complete? Is it that of Plato, or Aristotle, or Zeno, or 
Epicurus, or Pyrrho, or Philo, or Plotinus, or Valentinus, or 
Bacon, or Descartes, or Spinoza, or Leibnitz, or Locke, or 
Berkley, or Hume or Kant, or Reid, or Hamilton, or Ficte, 
or Hegel, or Schleiermacher, or Schopenhauer, or Hart- 
mann, or Lotze, or Mill, or Spencer? 

No doubt all these systems have more or less truth. A 
true Eclecticism, seizing on the central truth, as a funda- 
mental, vital, organizing principle, might collect and arrange 
the various truths scattered through the different systems, 
and organize them into a symmetrical system, practically 
complete. Till this is done, so that the principles of philoso- 
phy are generally accepted, theology need not make haste 
to adjust itself to philosophy, nor endeavor so long as it 
keeps its doctrines free from absurdities, to harmonize them 
with the passing novelties of the successive systems of philoso- 
phy. 

To require that faith should accept only what reason has 
demonstrated, is to demand that faith be no longer faith, 
but that it be transformed into knowledge. Faith, however, 
requires a basis of knowledge; but when the veracity of the 



PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY 109 

authority which claims our faith has been proved in all 
verifiable cases, it is unreasonable to withhold our assent, for 
instances not yet verified. But a doctrine is not to be ac- 
cepted by faith simply because not self -contradictory; for 
many things not true are not self -contradictory, but because 
it has for its basis an authority that has given satisfactory 
proof of its veracity; that is, there must be positive and 
suflScient grounds for faith, in addition to the negative 
condition that the doctrine does not conflict with any known 
truth. The ground may be revelation, or nature, or history, 
or the instincts of the soul, or the testimony of reliable wit- 
nesses. 

Has philosophy in the past shown by its history that it 
has exerted any influence on the doctrines of theology.? 
We believe it has. 

The early defenders of Christianity were styled Apologists, 
and their works Apologies, The aim of these writers was 
conciliatory, to remove misapprehensions from the minds of 
their opponents, and to place the doctrines of Christianity 
in a favorable light before the eye of reason. 

1, Justin (103-167). Justin Martyr, so-called because 
he suffered martyrdom for his religion, was instructed in the 
philosophy of the Stoic and Platonic Schools. Impressed 
with the steadfastness of the Christians under persecution, 
and distrusting the reliability of human reason, he embraced 
Christianity and defended it against heretics, Jews and pagans. 

His principal works are his two Apologies addressed to 
the Emperors Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius, and 
his dialogue with Typho the Jew. Justin held that Christ 
was the Logos incarnate, in whom the entire human race 
has an interest, and that all who have lived in communion 
with him are Christians, as Heraclitus and Socrates. He 
believed that the early Greek philosophers, as Plato and 
Aristotle, were acquainted with the writings of Moses, but of 
this there is no evidence. The later Greek philosophers, as 
the Neo-Platonists, had access to the sacred writings. 

The Apologies of Justin were written in defence of Chris- 
tians who were denounced as atheists, rebels and evil-doers. 
Justin admitted that the Christians were Atheists, if it 
made them atheists, not to worship the heathen gods; but he 
maintained that they were no atheists, since they worship 



110 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

the God of truth and righteousness. To acknowledge Christ 
as their spiritual King did not prevent them from being 
loyal to the Emperor, their temporal prince; he maintained 
that they were law-abiding citizens. 

In his dialogue with Typho, Justin shows, from the Old 
Testament scriptures, that Jesus is the Christ, the promised 
Messiah. Though the norm of moral and religious life 
existed under the form of law, yet the ceremonial law was 
abolished in Christ, who substituted the moral law in its place. 

In his writings Justin employs philosophy to enforce his 
views. 

2. Irenaeus (160-202). Irenaeus, a pupil of Polycarp, the 
disciple of St. John, defends the Christian doctrines against 
the theories of the Gnostics. He also wrote against the 
antinomian doctrine, as tending to immorality. He held 
that God is identical with the Creator of the world; that 
the Logos or Son, and the Holy Spirit are one with the Father; 
that the Mosaic law was a preparation for the Gospel; and 
that the moral law applies to the intentions as well as to works, 
or outward conduct. Men freely decide for or against the 
Divine law, and for their decision and life are rewarded or 
punished in the future life. 

Among the Apologists of Christianity, in the second 
century, perhaps a little earlier than Irenaeus, may be 
mentioned Tatianus, the Assyrian, Theophilus of Antioch, 
and Athenagoras of Athens. Tatianus over-estimated the 
value o Oriental ideas, despised Hellenic culture, and tended 
toward ascetic practices. Theophilus discussed the subject- 
ive conditions of faith, and the dependence of religious ex- 
perience on purity of heart, Athenagoras combines Chris- 
tian thought with Attic elegance of expression. We see in 
these three writers the eddies in the current of Christian 
thought. 

3. Tertullian (160-220). Tertullian, a presbyter of Car- 
thage, was opposed to Gnosticism, and in fact, to all specula- 
tion. He considered philosophy the mother of heresies, and 
went so far in opposition to it as to say : Credo quia ahsurdum. 
He stands for the reaction against philosophy; but an absurd- 
ity is no groimd for faith; it cannot be accepted by reason. 

Jf. Clement { -217). Clement of Alexandria, a presby- 
ter, a man of great learning, and especially well acquainted 



PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY 111 

with Greek literature and philosophy, did not hesitate to 
draw, from all sources, arguments and illustrations of Chris- 
tian doctrine. The Greek philosophy was accounted by 
him a preparation for Christianity. Christ, the Divine Logos, 
was the manifestation of the ineffable Father. Faith is 
based on knowledge; but as knowledge is imperfect, faith, 
when well founded, may go beyond knowledge, and in simple 
obedience, may do many things without knowing the reason 
why, only that God commands them. Faith leads from fear, 
the chief motive under the old dispensation, to love, the 
attractive power in the new. A Christian must needs re- 
nounce evil, and advance towards perfection, and this up- 
ward movement is to continue, not only in this world, but 
in that which is to come. 

5. Origen (185-254). Origen, a pupil of Clement, and 
probably also of Ammonias Saccas, the founder of the Neo- 
Platonic School, is chiefly distinguished by his method of 
interpreting Scripture, and by his answer to Celsus, an able 
and bitter opponent of Christianity. 

In addition to the historical and moral interpretation of 
Scripture, Origen resorted to the speculative or allegorical 
interpretation; but this led to fanciful conjectures, or to any 
meaning the imagination might invent. His work against 
Celsus displays great learning and ability. In fact the 
nature of the criticisms of Celsus are now known only through 
the works of Origen. He regards the genesis of the Son as 
eternal, and the Holy Spirit as raised far above all creatures. 
He teaches the existence of many other worlds previous to 
the present; but this view logically leads to an infinity of 
worlds before the present; for granting one world before the 
present, which must have come to an end to make way for the 
present, there would be needed for the same reason, whatever 
that might be, another world before that, and so on, ad 
infinitum. This may do as a speculation, like the pre-exist- 
ence of the soul, but we have no knowledge of its truth. 

6, Arius ( 330). Arius, a presbyter of the Church of 

Alexandria, is noted for his doctrine of the relation of the 
Father and Son, and for his controversies with his bishop, 
Alexander, and with Athanasius, the Theologian. 

His views can be best understood from two of his letters, 
one addressed to Eusebius, the church historian, and the 
other to Bishop Alexander. 



n PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

He writes to Eusebius: "What do we maintain? That 
the Son is not unoriginate, nor a part of the Unoriginate, nor 
made of any previously existing substance, but that by the 
will and purpose of God. He was in being with the perfect 
God before time, the only begotten; that before this genera- 
tion, he was not." 

In a letter to Alexander, Arius says: '*We believe in one 
God alone without birth, alone everlasting, alone unoriginate 
. . . We believe that this God gave birth to the only 
begotten Son, before eternal periods, through whom he made 
these periods, and all things else . . so that while there 
are three persons, yet God is alone the cause of all things, 
and unoriginate. The son is originate, begotten by the 
Father. God is before all things, as single and the principle 
of all, and therefore before Christ also." 

The doctrines of Arius have had various fortunes, and at 
one time they were considered orthodox by the eastern 
church, though never accepted by the western. At the 
present day, they are the central principles of the Unitarian 
creed. 

7. Eusebius (265-340). Eusebius, a friend of Constan- 
tine, and a writer of Ecclesiastic History, befriended Arius in 
his controversies with Alexander and Athanasius. He was 
neither an Arian nor an Athanasian, but occupied an inter- 
mediate position in the Arian controversy. He did not 
hold with Arius, that there was a time when the Son was 
not, neither did he say that he was co-eternal with the Father. 
The relation of the Father to the Son he likened to that of a 
flower to its perfume. 

8. Athanasius (298-373). Athanasius became Bishop of 
Alexandria when thirty years of age. He was five times sent 
into exile, and altogether, was separated twenty years from 
his diocese. He labored with zeal and success both as a 
Bishop and as an author. He formulated the Trinitarian 
creed. 

In opposition to Arius, Athanasius formulated the doc- 
trine of the Trinity which has been practically accepted by 
the various branches of orthodox Christianity. The doctrine 
of the Trinity, as a part of the Nicene creed, was formally 
adopted by the Council of Nice, A. D. 325. 

Athanasius refuted the doctrine that an intermediate 
must be assumed between the eternal God and temporal 



PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY 113 

things, by the following argument : ' 'If this intermediate were 
temporal, another intermediate being would be needed be- 
tween him and God; if eternal, another between him and 
finite things, and so on." 

9. Hilarius (—368). Hilarius, Bishop of Poitiers, 
sometimes called Malleus Arianorum, and the Athanasius of 
the west, defended, by means of speculative philosophy, 
the doctrine of the Trinity against that of the Arians. He 
was banished to Phrygia by the Emperor Constantius, but 
was restored to his diocese after four years of exile. In his 
discussions he used the Latin language instead of the more 
flexible Greek. 

10. Pelagius, supposed to be of British birth, came to 
Rome about 400 A. D. He was struck with the low tone of 
morals prevalent in the Church, the members seeming to 
rely on a profession of Christianity and the efficacy of the 
sacraments. 

As his remonstrances were met by the plea of human 
weakness, he replied: ''If I ought, I can." Obligation implies 
the power to meet that obligation. He stoutly maintained 
the freedom of the will, and the possibility of living without 
sin. His doctrines, though meeting with some encourage- 
ment, were finally condemned as heretical. 

11. Jerome (341-420). St. Jerome, a man of great learn- 
ing, made a critical revision of the old Latin translation of 
the Scriptures. This translation is known as the Latin 
Vulgate. Jerome, however, was not noted for his speculative 
ability. 

12. Ambrose (340-397). St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, 
a princely ecclesiastical statesman, endeavored to advance 
religious life and worship in congregations. To this end he 
composed hymns and prepared a ritual for the clergy. To 
him directly Augustine owes his conversion. 

13. Augustine (354-440). Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, 
had a heathen father and a Christian mother. He was 
brought up in the Christian faith, but became skeptical and 
dissolute. He was won back to the Christian faith, chiefly 
through the influence of Ambrose. He was well educated, 
and had prepared himself as a teacher of rhetoric; but after 
his conversion, he devoted himself to the interests of the 
church, and became her ablest theologian and defender. 



114 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Augustine was a philosopher as well as a theologian, and 
anticipated certain so-called modern discoveries in psycholo- 
gy. He took, as the immovable foundation of all knowledge, 
the fact of the consciousness of thoughts, feelings, and 
volitions, then consciousness is real, and thoughts, feelings, 
and volitions are real. To be conscious of sensation or of any 
other mental fact, is proof of the existence, not only of that 
fact, but of the one who is conscious. This reminds us of 
Descartes' Cogito, ergo sum. The fact of our existence is 
involved in the fact of the consciousness of phenomena, and 
can be known in no other way. Reality, therefore, is, and 
truth is, since we know reality, and God is who is truth itself. 
Thorough-going skepticism, as that of Pyrrho, is thus refuted. 

Augustine combatted the Manichaean heresy, a system of 
doctrine which explained the mysteries of the world by means 
of two original principles, the one good and the other evil, 
ever in conflict. He was the better prepared to do this, 
because, at one time, he had been enthralled by this doctrine, 
and understood it perfectly. 

Accepting the doctrine of total depravity, confirmed, as 
he believed by his own experience in his vain attempts to 
reform, Augustine inferred the inability of man to save him- 
self from sin, and concluded that salvation is solely by the 
grace of God. Since only a part of the human race are 
saved, God elects those who are saved to eternal life, and 
consequently the rest are reprobated; but Augustine dwells 
lightly on this feature, though it logically follows, since they 
cannot by any possibility save themselves. As salvation is 
solely by the sovereign grace of God, and as he is able to save 
whom he will, it would seem that benevolence requires that 
God should save all. This would glorify him in the light of 
reason. 

If it is said that the reprobate are sinners and deserve 
their fate, it may be replied that the elect are also sinners, 
and why should they be saved in preference to the others .^^ 
The answer would be God is sovereign and can do as he 
pleases, and does no injustice. Let us see. The reprobate 
are totally depraved, according to Augustine, and cannot do 
right, and are, therefore, not responsible for doing wrong. 
To punish them for what is unavoidable is certainly not 
justice; and will not the judge of all the earth do right? 



PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY 115 

Ah, it is replied, they sinned in Adam. They had no con- 
scious existence in Adam; hence their sin in Adam is a fiction, 
though it may be admitted that they inherited from Adam 
a tendency to sin. 

The question will be asked, shall we then go back to Pela- 
gianism? Not altogether. The natural man is assisted by 
the grace of God, which should not be left out, in this discus- 
sion. ''The grace of God which bringeth salvation hath 
appeared to all men," and with this grace, that is, by God's 
help, any one can be saved; and if any one is lost, it is be- 
cause he would not come unto God that he might have life. 
But, says one, is not the will determined by motives? No; 
motives are not causes, but reasons, and the will or volition, 
is determined by the ego itself, in view of reasons. The 
determining power is within and not without; it is the man 
himself. The will, as volition, is produced, is an effect, and 
not free; it is the ego that is free; the freedom is not in the 
effect, but in the cause, that is in the person. Conscience 
testifies to the same thing. The sinner has a sense of guilt 
and condemnation, which he could not have, if he believed 
that he acted under necessity; hence he does not believe 
that he acted under necessity, but that he acted freely, and 
therefore conscience condemns him. Conscience is no anom- 
aly in human nature; it does not bear false witness, telling 
the man that he is guilty, when he is not guilty; it is the 
honest truthful witness, bearing testimony of guilt, which 
could not be guilt unless the man is free. The sinner's 
deepest convictions condemn him as guilty. 

Augustine rejects the theory of a succession of worlds, 
which have been created and destroyed; he held that the 
present universe is the only one, and that it had a beginning, 
and that with the universe time began. With Plato he held 
that time does not exist apart from movement, and that it 
measures motion, reversing the true relation that motion 
measures time. Duration is eternal, and movement is in 
duration. 

What was before time? Augustine answers : "Eternity and 
God;" and since there was no movement in eternity or in 
God before the act of creation, there was no time. In reply, 
we ask: Was God asleep in eternity? Do the changes that 
take place constitute time? If so, what changes? The sum 



116 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

total of the changes, or some particular change? It cannot 
be some particular change; for if that particular change 
did not take place, other changes might occur, but these 
changes require time, and time would still be. Strike out 
change after change, till but one change is left, still there 
would be time. Does that change constitute time? No, for 
it might have been struck out before some other change, and 
still there would be time. What then is time? It is the 
blank possibility of events, or that in which things might 
persist or succession take place. Eternity is infinite time. 

Augustine held that there was no time before the act of 
creation. Did God come into existence with the act of 
creation? No; for non-entity cannot spring into existence. 
God then is eternal; he was neither dead nor asleep before 
the creation of the world. The Logos, the Word, the Rea- 
son, the Wisdom of God existed with God before the founda- 
tion of the world. God was not idle nor asleep. 

Augustine held that space has no existence apart from 
bodies and their relation; but space is the room for bodies, 
the blank possibility of bodies and motion; it is that in which 
bodies may exist or motion take place. Space is eternal, and 
the present time omnipresent; but they have no power, and 
are not rivals of God. But does not time work change? 
No; that language is poetic, not philosophic. Forces work 
changes in time. Philosophers may learn of mathematicians 
in regard to space and time. The most important of the 
works of x\ugustine is: On the Trinity, in which he regards 
the Son as the Word, the Reason, the Wisdom of God. 



CHAPTER XIII 

Scholastic Philosophy — First Period 

Scholasticism is the system elaborated by the theologians 
of the middle ages. 

Seven liberal arts and sciences — the trivium and thequad- 
rivium were taught. The trivium embraced Grammar, 
Rhetoric, and Logic; the quadrivium, Arithmetic, Geometry, 
Astronomy and Music. 

What is the relation of philosophy to theology? The 
only possible answers to this question are the following: 

(1) They are co-extensive, like two equal coincident circles. 

(2) They are mutually exclusive having no common 
subject-matter. 

(3) Philosophy is subordinate to theology. 

(4) Theology is subordinate to Philosophy. 

(5) Philosophy intersects theology. 

The (5) is the true relation; for they have common matter, 
and each matter peculiar to itself. Both agreement and 
difference relate to their subject-matter. 

Have Philosophy and Theology any common subject- 
matter? Yes; for both consider the fundamental problems 
relating to the origin of nature, the destiny of the universe 
and of man, and their dependence on God, the ultimate real- 
ity, represented by the common part of the circles. 

Theology is the theory of religion, or the philosophy of the 
relations of man to God. Its doctrines concerning sin, 
repentance, pardon, regeneration, justification, and final 
salvation, are peculiar to itself, and are not held in common 
with philosophy. Scholasticism made Philosophia Ancilla 
Theologiae, 

Philosophy is the theory of fundamental truth, which, if 
relating to God, may be represented by the common part of 
two intersecting circles; if relating to the necessary truth of 
the sciences, by the part of the circle Philosophy without the 
circle Theology. 

Hence, the relation of intersection, which excludes the 
others, is the true relation of Philosophy to Theology. 

117 



118 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Though philosophy is wiUing to aid the church in the 
development of her theology, yet philosophy is not ancilla 
ecclesiae the hand-maid of the church, since it deals with 
necessary truth, not only that relating to theology, but that 
not so related. When theology strives to show that certain 
doctrines are rational, or at least not irrational, she calls for 
the aid of philosophy, which is cheerfully rendered; but 
Theology accepts certain dogmas by faith, which philosophy 
investigates by reason; their methods are different. 

Let us now consider the work of the scholastic theologians : 

1, Erigena (cir. 805-877). Johannes Scotus Erigena, prob- 
ably a native of Ireland, was a fine scholar, familiar with the 
writings of Aristotle, the Neo-Platonists, and the early church 
fathers. He was invited to France by Charles, the Bald, and 
placed at the head of the court school. 

Erigena is the transition to scholastic philosophy rather 
than its accepted exponent. He was perhaps more of a 
Neo-Platonist than a scholastic. With him reason was the 
supreme arbiter, and not the authority of Plato, or of Aristotle 
or of the Scriptures or of the church; but he held that reason 
by its own insight, evolves a system in harmony with revela- 
tion. 

Erigena considered the eucharist symbolical and com- 
memorative. He defended the doctrine of the freedom of 
the will against the extreme predestinationism of Gottschalk. 

In his treatise on Divine predestination, Erigena argues 
entirely from the speculative point of view. He asserts 
that true religion and true philosophy are fundamentally 
the same. They are, however, not the same, as true religion 
is practical — a life of faith in God, reverence for his character, 
and obedience to his laws; philosophy, on the other hand, is 
speculative and takes reason for its instrument and its author- 
ity. If Scotus had said that theology and philosophy occupy 
the same ground, it would have been nearer the truth, yet not 
exactly the truth; for we have showed above that they hold 
in part common ground, and each ground not held by the 
other. 

At the request of the King, Erigena translated Dionysius, 
the Areopagite, and published it without submitting it to 
the church for approval, for which he incurred the displeasure 
of Pope Nicholas I. 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— FIRST PERIOD 119 

The great work of Erigena, entitled De Divisione Naturae^ 
is a reasoned out dialogue after the manner of Plato. Na- 
ture, the universe, containing both being and non-being, 
consists of four divisions: (1) That which creates but is not 
created. (2) That which is created and creates. (3) That 
which is created but does not create. (4) That which 
neither is created nor creates. 

The first is God the origin of all things; the last is God 
the goal of all things. The second and third constitute the 
universe, the manifestation of God in time. God alone, the 
uncreated Creator, has true being, and is a trinity, the Father 
as Being, the Son as Wisdom, the Spirit as Life. Wisdom 
the first emanation the Son of the Father, corresponds to the 
Platonic realm of ideas. Goodness, the highest idea, partici- 
pates in being. Essence participates in goodness, and hence 
in being, and life is a species of essence, and wisdom a species 
of life. God is, therefore, the trinity. Being, Wisdom, Life. 
Man created in the image of God is also a trinity. Will, Intel- 
led, Sensibility, 

As God was never without Wisdom, or eternal ideas mov- 
ing under the influence of the living Spirit, so God has eter- 
nally manifested his creative power, and creation is, there- 
fore, eternal. This seems to conflict with the (4) that which 
neither is created nor creates, and rules it out as actual, and 
leaves it only as a possible conception; for if all things return 
to God, who, though uncreated, does no longer create, his 
Wisdom and Life, having no sphere of activity, would virtual- 
ly cease to be, and we should have left simply being without 
Wisdom or life; that is, God would become non-being. As 
God is eternal, so the universe, the manifestation of Being, 
Wisdom, and Life, or of the triune God, is also eternal; it 
never had a beginning, and it will never have an end; there- 
fore, time is eternal, and is identical with eternity. Move- 
ment never ceases; for creation never began, nor will it ever 
end. 

Sin results from the will of the individual who falsely 
represents evil as good and pursues it; wickedness is hell, 
which is not a local place, but is simply in the soul of the 
sinner. The result of punishment is the final purification 
and salvation of the sinner; even the devils are to be purified 
and saved. 



120 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Erigena is a remarkably interesting philosopher; he was 
not held by theological shackles. With him reason was 
ultimate authority, and philosophy superior to theology. 
He did not accept the dogmas of the church as ultimate and 
com^plete, and then endeavor only to elucidate them by 
logical exposition and defend them by argument, but he 
philosophized to discover the truth by his own reason, and 
thorough original investigation, and the result was a system 
of rational Theology, which is philosophically better than 
dogmatic Theology. 

(^.) Roscellinus, who flourished the latter half of the 
eleventh century, was the first to give definite expression 
to the doctrines of Nominalism in opposition to those of 
Realism. Conceptualism, a later theory, was devised as a 
compromise between the two older theories. It is important 
to have a clear view of these theories. 

Realism is the doctrine that the universal, a genus or a 
species, has a real objective existence, independent both of 
the individual objects of a class, and of the act of conception; 
and that it is the perfect pattern according to which the 
individuals are fashioned, and in comparison with which 
they must forever remain imperfect and inferior. This is 
the doctrine of ideas as taught by Plato. The formula for 
realism is: Universalia ante rem. Universals, however, may be 
regarded as God's ideas, and not as absolutely independent. 

Nominalism is the doctrine that only individuals have a 
real existence; that all our ideas are particular; and that 
universals are only names of resembling individuals. The 
formula for nominalism is : Universalia post rem. 

Conceptualism is the theory that a universal has an existence 
in the mind of the thinking subject, as a pure concept em- 
bracing those elements only which correspond to the qualities 
found in all the individuals of the class; that it is found by 
comparing resembling individuals, disregarding their peculi- 
arities, noting, abstracting and combining their common 
qualities; and that, in passing from individual to individual 
of the same class, the peculiarities of the individuals are 
dropped, while the common qualities are retained, the notion 
corresponding to these common qualities constitutes the 
concept. 

The formula for conceptualism is: Universalia in re. 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— FIRST PERIOD 121 

The following considerations will throw light on these 
theories : 

The individual is perceived; the universal is conceived. 
The universal is not an independent substantial existence 
but is simply what Aristotle calls a formal cause, or that 
combination of qualities found in every individual of a class, 
and which entitles it to be ranked as a member of that class; 
it cannot be cognized by the senses, nor represented by the 
imagination purely as a picture; but it is understood by the 
intellect as belonging to each individual of the class, and 
corresponds to the mental product called a concept. In- 
dividual peculiarities are real, and distinguish one individual 
from another. 

Individuals are real, and so are peculiarities; classes are 
real, and so are common qualities; but neither peculiarities 
nor common qualities exist apart from the individuals, yet 
they can be understood as abstracts, though not imagined. 

Individuals can be represented by the imagination, so can 
classes as collections of individuals; but neither common 
qualities alone, nor peculiar qualities alone can be imagined, 
but only together with their objects, yet as abstracts they 
can be understood. 

The name is not the only universal, and extreme nominal- 
ism is not true, for the common qualities are universe 1. The 
universal, as a combination of the common qualities of a 
class, has no substantial existence out of the individuals 0£ 
the class, and extreme realism is false. The concept has 
mental existence as the counterpart of the universal; it a 
real to thought, though not an image constructed by this 
imagination. It is only when the universal and the particulae 
are combined that an object can be represented by thr 
imagination so as to be understood. By the universal we 
form the class; by the particular we identify the individual 

To return to Roscellinus : he applied the nominalistic doc-, 
trine, that there is nothing real but individuals, to the Trinity, 
and denied that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit constituted 
one God, in which case, said he, the Father and the Holy 
Spirit must have been incarnate with the Son; but, did usage 
permit, we ought to speak of three Gods. This statement, 
of course, gave great offence to the orthodox party. 



122 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

3. Anselm (1033-1108). Anselm, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, so far from endorsing the tritheistic theory, as 
RoseeUinus supposed, composed his treatise, D^A'd^ Trinitatis^ 
in refutation. He accepted the sacred dogmas, as they were 
given by the authority of the church, and by philosophy 
endeavored to make them appear reasonable^ and this is the 
keynote of Scholasticism. His motto was: Credo ui inielli- 
gam. He endeavored to give philosophic demonstration, 
not only of the existence of God, but also of the trinity and 
the incarnation. 

His demonstration of the existence of God was both a 
posteriori and a priori. The a posteriori proof is found in 
the Monologium. From truth in knowing and in willing, and 
in things, he rises to God, the absolute truth, the ultimate 
principle of things and thought. The a priori proof, found in 
the proslogium, is ontological. God is the greatest being con- 
ceivable. Now if God has no objective existence, but is 
only a conception of the human mind, he would not be abso- 
lutely the greatest, for real objective existence would render 
him greater; hence God, the greatest being has objective 
existence. Descartes' demonstration of the existence of 
God the most perfect being is similar; but conception does not 
involve objective existence. 

From the existence of God, the greatest being, Anselm 
proceeds to adduce the rational grounds for the Christian 
doctrines of Creation and the Trinity. 

In his great work: Cur Deus homo, he undertakes to demon- 
strate the necessity of the atonement. Sin, the transgression 
of God's law, wounds the infinite honor of God, and requires 
infinite satisfaction, which man, a finite being, cannot render. 
Assuming the form of man, the sinless son, as God-Man, 
rendered this satisfaction, by paying the penalty, so that 
mercy can be extended to man, while the law is vindicated. 
The wages of sin is death. The death of Christ showed the 
claims of justice, though it did not satisfy them. The con- 
test between goodness and justice is thus settled in a legal 
rather than in an ethical way. With it should be considered 
the free will of man, his duty of repentance and life of obedi- 
ence. 

4 William of Champeaux (1070-1121). William held in 
succession two diflferent opinions in regard to realism. From 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— FIRST PERIOD US 

his first or extreme opinion, he was dislodged by Abelard, his 
former pupil. The extreme opinion was to this effect: 
All the individuals of the same class were essentially the same, 
differing only in accidents; or more definitely he taught that 
the substance of a class existed, in its entirety, in each in- 
dividual of that class. The criticism of Abelard forced him 
to modify this position: If the essence homo is wholly and 
essentially present in Socrates, that is, wholly absorbed in 
Socrates, it cannot be where Socrates is not, and hence is not 
in Plato. 

In his modification of his realism, William retracted the 
view that the universal is numerically the same, that is, 
identical, in all the individuals of the class, and asserted its 
essential sameness, that is, its similarity. To this view 
there is no reasonable objection, since there is something 
similar in all the individuals of the class, otherwise there 
would be nothing which would entitle them to be classed 
together. William held that the humanity of Peter is similar 
to that in Paul, yet not identical; but the Divinity in the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit is one and identical. They are 
distinguished by their manifestations. 

This combination of common or similar qualities is the 
characteristic of the class, and the notion of this combination 
of qualities is the concept of the class, and has only a mental 
existence, not in the imagination, but in the understanding 
of the subject who thinks of the class. The characteristic of a 
species is that which distinguishes the species from other 
species of a genus, and is used in the definition of the species. 
When we say Plato is a man, we mean that Plato is an in- 
dividual of the class man, having the combination of attri- 
butes similar to that found in every man; he also has individual 
attributes peculiar to himself which distinguish him from 
other men, as from Ari totle, who also has his peculiarities. 

The theory of indifference naturally followed the modifica- 
tion of that of William's; it may be thus stated: The universal 
consists of the attributes in any individual of the class similar 
to those in the other individuals of the same class, the in- 
dividuals alone having a substantial existence. Restricting 
attention to these similar attributes, throwing the elements 
peculiar to the individual out of account, the individual 
becomes the genus or the species. This became a favorite 



124 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

theory of the Realistic camp, after the criticism of Abelard; 
but this gives up the substantial existence of the universal, 
which is the core of Realism, and reduces it to a bundle of 
similar attributes in all the individuals of the class. This is a 
correct view except in this: This bundle of attributes is not the 
genus or the species, though it was so regarded, but is the 
characteristic of the class, and its mental counterpart is the 
concept. The genus or species is the class itself, which is a 
better view. 

5. Gilbert de la Porree (1075-1154^). Gilbert distinguishes 
between the manner of existence of individuals and of genera 
or species. By genera or species, he did not mean the class 
but the combination of attributes, essentially though not 
numerically, the same in all of the individuals of the class. 
The universal is thus a native form, essentially the same, 
inherent in every individual of a class. The particular is 
what is peculiar to the individual and distinguishes him 
from the other individuals and gives him his special value. 
The individual is the universal plus the particular. 

Gilbert held that universals exist in God as the perfect 
archetypes or patterns after which they exist as more or 
less imperfect copies, in the individuals of a class. Gilbert 
was thus at once both a Platonist and Aristotelian. 

The categories of Aristotle were divided by Gilbert into 
two classes — formae inhaerentes, as substance, quantity, qual- 
ity, and potential relation, and formae assistantes, as action, 
passion, place, time, position, belonging to objects only in 
relation to other objects. This distinction was adopted by 
all the schools, and held its place about four hundred years. 

6. Abelard (1079-1142). We have seen how Abelard 
refuted extreme realism, but he did not go over to extreme 
nominalism. Laying down the principle: Res de re non 
predicatur, he inferred that genera and species, which are 
admitted to be pr dicated, cannot be things or substances. 
He also saw, that by separating the universal substance from 
the form which makes it individual, renders it indifferent to 
these forms, and identifies all beings in one universal sub- 
stance. The theory of indifference, which recognizes a generic 
substance as the core of the individual, is cond mned by the 
view that only the individual exists by its own right The 
universal, however, is not a substantial core of the individual; 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— FIRST PERIOD 125 

it is that combination of qualities similar in one individual 
of a class to that found in any other individual of the same 
class. The notion of this combination of qualities is the 
concept. 

What then are genera and species? They are classes, not 
universals. When we say Plato is a man, we do not mean 
Plato is man, or Plato is humanity, though we can say Plato 
is human. When we say Plato is a man, we mean that 
Plato is a certain individual of the class man. The subject 
and predicate are identical; for a certain man is Plato. Say- 
ing Plato is a man, puts him in the class man without fully 
identifying him or discriminating him from other individuals 
of the class. Here we predicate Plato of himself, since a cer- 
tain one of the class man is Plato; but the proposition Plato 
is a man means more than Plato is Plato; it also classifies 
him as a man. 

In the definition, Plato is the man who founded the Academ- 
ic School of Philosophy, we have not only classed Plato, but 
identified him and distinguished him from other individuals 
of the class man. It is the particular in Plato that identifies 
him and gives him importance. 

The subject and predicate are identical, not in form, but 
in fact, only what is implicit in the subject is explicit in the 
predicate. The peculiar qualities not only define the man 
but give him his value. 

Abelard employed reason in testing dogma. He said: 
"A doctrine is believed not because God has said it, but 
because we are convinced by reason that it is so." 

Though he combatted the Tritheism of Roscellinus, his 
own doctrine of the Trinity was condemned by the councils 
at Soissons and at Sens. 

Abelard is regarded as the originator of the theory called 
Conceptualism, 

7. Hugo of St. Victor (1097-1141). Hugo declared that 
uncorrupted truth cannot be discovered by reasoning; yet 
he attempted to give, in his Summa Sententiarum, a rational 
presentation of the Christian doctrines. He was the first 
of the Summists, or those giving abridged views of theology. 

8. John of Salisbury ( 1180) . John in his Metalogicus 

defends logic against those who despised scholastic training; 
yet he adds that dialectic is like the sword of Hercules in a 



126 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

pigmy's hand, unless there be added a knowledge of the 
Sciences; and that love, not logic, is the fulfillment of the 
law. In his Polycraticus, he gave an inventory of what the 
scholastics had accomplished up to his own time. His works 
are valuable, giving, as they do, an account of the schools, 
and the logical discussions of the period. He wrote elegant 
Latin, was a great admirer of Cicero, and considered himself 
an Academician; but with him the first period of Scholasticism 
or the supremacy of Plato, comes to an end. 



CHAPTER XIV 

Scholastic Philosophy — Second Period 

1, Arabic Philosophy, In order to understand the second 
period of Scholastic philosophy, it is necessary to consider 
Arabic philosophy, and the revival of Aristotle. 

Arabic philosophy is Greek thought, with modifications and 
additions, expressed in the Arabic language, and shaped by 
oriental speculation. The Mahometan theologians inquired 
how the absolute unity of God is consistent with his mani- 
fold attributes, and how the sovereignty of God consists with 
free will in man. They regarded space as pervaded by 
inextended atoms, and time as divided into infinitesimal 
instants. Each change in the atoms is, according to them, 
owing to the direct act of God, and the same is true of human 
conduct. God is the sole cause in the universe, if the Arabic 
theory is true. 

(1) Alkendi, a native of Bosra, who flourished in the 
ninth century, and variously styled, the excellent one of his 
century, the only one of his age, the philosopher of the Ara- 
bians, was the author of more than two hundred books of 
which about thirty are on philosophy. He gave great at- 
tention to logic, and regarded mathematics as the foundation 

of all science. His works were highly esteemed by Roger ^ 
Bacon. Alkendi was also an astrologer. 

(2) Alfarabi ( 950). Alfarabi wrote on logic, in 

which he followed Alkendi; he wrote on many other sub- 
jects, part of the books were commentaries on Aristotle. 
The Christian Aristotelians often quote him and referred 
to his commentaries on Aristotle as De demonstratione; the 
influence exerted by them was very great. 

(3) Avicenna (980-1037). Avicenna, a native of Bokhara', 
was regarded as the greatest of the Oriental philosophers. 
His treatise on Oriental philosophy was known to Roger 
Bacon, and was highly prized by him. Avicenna was con- 
sidered as somewhat pantheistic by the more orthodox 
Averroes. 

127 



m 



128 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Only a portion of his works is extant — that treating of 
the five universals of Porphyry; it seems to settle the dispute 
about universals, thus: Universalia ante multitudinem, as 
in the divine understanding; this is realism. Universalia 
in multitudine; the name is common to the individuals; this 
is nominalism, Universalia post multitudinem, as concepts; 
this is conceptualism. Thus in a certain sense, all parties 
to the dispute are right; they are wrong only in their extreme 
views. 

(4) Algazel ( 1111). Algazel drew crowds, as a popu- 
lar lecturer on philosophy, at Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus 
and Alexandria; but believing that philosophy resulted in an 
indifference to religion, he wrote two works: Tendencies of the 
philosophers, and Destruction of the philosophers. In the 
first he gave the state of the speculative sciences, and in the 
second he pointed out their errors and contradictions, and 
their divergencies from the Moslem faith. He had strong 
tendencies towards Mysticism; he died in seclusion as a 
monk. 

(5) Averroes (1126-1198). Averroes was born at Cordova 
in Spain. His early life was spent in study, under the best 
teachers of the age. He made great progress in mathematics, 
astronomy, theology, medicine and jurisprudence^ 

The times were stormy; the Saracens in Spain were some- 
what divided, and were closely pressed by the Christian 
armies on the north, but with the influx of fresh tribes from 
the desert, they rallied and defeated the forces of their ene- 
mies, and established the sway of Moslem in greater splendor. 
Schools and colleges abounded under the patronage of liberal 
rulers. 

Averroes was made Kadi of Seville, and held a like oflSce 
at Cordova, but through court intrigues, he was banished, 
and suffered insults from the ignorant multitude who imag- 
ined that philosophy was dangerous to the true faith. He 
was, however, restored to honor, which he enjoyed the rest 
of his life. 

The historic fame of Averroes has come chiefly through 
the Christian schoolmen, who from his writings, acquired 
a more complete knowledge of the philosophy of Aristotle, 
who at that time was held in the highest honor. 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— SECOND PERIOD 129 

Averroes interpreted Aristotle as a truth-seeker, and not 
in the interests of theology; he also objected to the allegorical 
interpretations of the Koran, and maintained that a return 
should be made to the plain teachings of the prophet. In 
matters of this world, Averroes held to the point of view of 
science, but in religion, he accepted a personal power distinct 
from the truth of science, though not in conflict with it. In 
other words, science, which can be understood only by the 
intelligent few, he cultivated like a Greek philosopher; but 
religion, which is a common life for all, he enjoyed as 
a personal experience. The mixture of science and religion, 
or of philosophy and theology, awakened popular hostility 
to philosophy, and was a source of corruption to theology; 
but this position was the reverse of that of the Christian 
schoolmen, who employed philosophy to make clear the 
doctrines of theology to the eye of reason. 

Rejected by his Mahometan co-religionists, Averroes 
found a hearing from the Jews, and his writings became text- 
books in their schools. 

The theory of Averroes, that the intellect is one and con- 
tinuous in all individuals, and is their life and joy according 
to their degree of illumination, was interpreted as one soul 
common to all mankind, and thus conflicted with personal 
immortality. This theory of the unity of intellect in all 
men was made a matter of special investigation by both 
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. 

At Paris Averroes came to be regarded as standing for 
science against theology, and found eager followers in the 
members of a skeptical society; but at Oxford he had become 
an authority as an expounder of the works of Aristotle. 
Roger Bacon recommended the study of Arabic as the only 
means of acquiring a correct knowledge of Aristotle, the great 
philosopher. 

At the university of Padua, Aristotle was studied in 
Greek which led to a neglect of the works of Averroes. 
Thus is illustrated the fact that in order to maintain itself 
with the course of time, philosophy must keep pace with 
the continual advancement of science, and the general 
progress of the human race. 

2. Let us now return to the Christian Scholastics of 
which we shall treat of only the principal : 



130 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

(1) Albertus Magnus (1193-1280). Albert was called the 
Great, on account of his extensive learning and his great 
ability as a teacher. He was a native of Lauingen in Swabia, 
and was educated at Padua and Paris. 

He reproduced, in Systematic order, the whole of the 
philosophy of Aristotle, and adapted it to the requirements 
of ecclesiastical dogmas. The Latin translations of Aristotle 
from the Arabic, as well as some translations from the Greek, 
were accessible to him. Platonism and Neo-Platonism were 
not without influence, but Aristotle was his great authority. 

To Albert as to Avicenna, the universal existed in a 
threefold form: as universale ante rem, in the mind of God, 
according to Plato and Plotinus; as universale in re, the 
collection of common qualities found in every individual of 
a class, according to Aristotle; as universale post rem, in the 
mind of man as a concept, having its counterpart, or com- 
bination of qualities, in every individual of the class, accord- 
ing to Abelard and the conceptualists generally. Hence and 
finally, the universale post rem is a subjective concept formed 
a posteriori, corresponding to the universale in re, the collec- 
tion of the common qualities of all the individuals of the 
class, and an imperfect copy of the universale ante rem, 
formed a priori in the mind of God, as the divine pattern 
after which the individuals of the class were created. 

Albert defines logic as the science which teaches how to 
deduce the unknown from the known; and in his interpreta- 
tion of Aristotle he follows Avicenna rather than Averroes 
whom he frequently combats, though occasionally quotes 
with approval. 

The ethics of Albert rests, very properly, on the freedom 
of the will, and the virtues he enjoins consist of the cardinal 
virtues of the ancients combined with the Christian virtues 
of equal rank. 

In psychology, he taught that the lower faculties were 
united with the spirit, the bodily organs being necessary 
only in the present life. 

In theology, Albert separated the dogmas of the church 
from philosophical speculations. The doctrines of creation, 
incarnation, redemption, forgiveness of sin, and immortality 
he accepted on the authority of revelation apart from philoso- 
phy, though he sought for rational arguments in support of 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— SECOND PERIOD 131 

these doctrines, for the confirmation of beUevers, the in- 
struction of the ignorant, and the refutation of unbelievers, 
holding that these articles of faith are illustrated, but not 
discovered by the light of reason. Albert was perhaps the 
most learned man of his time as well as the most widely 
read. Almost the last act of his life was the defence of the 
orthodoxy of his friend and former pupil, Thomas Aquinas. 

(2) St, Thomas of Aquino (l^'^5-l'^74f) . Thomas Aquinas 
was of a noble family and allied to several of the monarchs 
of Europe. He was the Son of Landulf, Count of Aquino, 
in the territory of Naples. 

He received his elementary education at the monastery of 
Monte Cassino, after which he spent six years at the Univer- 
sity of Naples. He joined the order of the Dominicans, 
against the will of his family. He then studied under Alber- 
tus Magnus at Cologne and at Paris. Receiving his degree, 
he engaged in the controversy between the Begging Friars and 
the University, concerning the liberty of teaching, and taking 
sides against the University, he won his case. 

He did active service for his order and for the church, 
writing, lecturing, and frequently taking long journeys. He 
was appointed to the Chair of Theology, in the University 
of Naples, where he was actively engaged in writing and in 
giving instruction. He refused the archbishopric of Naples, 
and the Abbacy Monte Cassino. 

He was summoned by Pope Gregory X to attend the 
Council at Lyons, to aid in adjusting the controversies be- 
tween the Greek and Latin Churches. 

Though suffering from illness, he at once set out for the 
Council, but his strength failing him on the way, he was 
carried to the Cistercian monastery of Fossa Nuova, where 
he died, after a lingering sickness. 

Thomas wrote many books, the greatest of which is the 
Summa Theologiae. His other books were preparatory 
to this which was intended to give a summary of all knowl- 
edge, especially the doctrines of the church, arranged in a 
systematic form, and explained according to the logic of 
Aristotle. 

According to Thomas, there are two distinct sources of 
knowledge. Revelation and Reason, of which Revelation is 
the superior. Revelation, the divine source of knowledge. 



132 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

has two channels — Scripture and the Church. Reason, the 
fountain of natural knowledge, has for its channels the 
various systems of philosophy, especially those of Plato and 
Aristotle — Plato for thought, Aristotle for method. Modern 
natural science makes observation the chief if not the sole 
foundation for knowledge. 

Thomas divided the virtues into natural and theological; 
the natural into intellectual and moral; the intellectual or 
speculative, dealing with the right use of reason; and the 
practical, moral or ethical, dealing with others, as justice, 
or with ourselves, as prudence, temperance, and fortitude. 
The theological virtues are faith, hope and love. Free will, 
the condition of duty, is supplemented by Divine Grace. 
As to universals Thomas was in agreement with Albert. 

The Summa Theologiae is divided into three parts, treat- 
ing, respectively of God, of Man, and of the God-Man; the 
first and second parts were the work of Thomas himself, the 
last was finished by other hands, according to his plan, as 
he died before it was completed. It is not possible to follow 
this work in all its details, suflSce it to say that it was elabor- 
ated with great logical skill, and pains-taking thoroughness. 
Let those who sneer at the ignorance of the schoolmen read 
this great work of St. Thomas. 

With Thomas, Scholasticism culminated. 

(3) Duns ScotMS ( -1308). The place and date of the 
birth of Duns Scotus are both uncertain. He showed marked 
ability as a boy, and in early life joined the Francis- 
can Order. He studied at Merton College, Oxford, of which 
he was made a fellow. In mathematics and philosophy, he 
was especially proficient, and when Varron vacated the 
chair of philosophy, he was appointed his successor. His 
lectures on philosophy attracted crowds of students. He 
went to the University of Paris from which he received his 
doctor's, degree, and was shortly after appointed regent of 
the Theological School. He gained great reputation, as a 
controversialist, by his able defence of the doctrine of the 
Immaculate Conception, refuting two hundred objections 
against the doctrine by the Dominicans, and establishing 
it by a cloud of arguments; and such was his dialectical 
skill that he won the title of Doctor Subtilis, 

Scotus was sent by the general of his order to Cologne to 
assist in founding a University, and to engage in a contro- 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— SECOND PERIOD 133 

versy with the Beghards and Beguines, companies of men 
and women who devoted themselves to a reUgious Kfe and 
the care of the sick, without binding themselves by strict 
vows not to return to secular life. He was received with 
great ceremony by the city officials, but after a short residence 
died of apoplexy. 

The opinions of Scotus were influenced by the fact that 
he was a Franciscan and Thomas a Dominican, and that 
antagonism existed between the Franciscans and the Dom- 
inicans; hence his system is an elaborate criticism of that of 
Thomas, and hence also of his partisans. 

Thomas and Scotus differed in their views regarding the 
relation of philosophy to theology. With Thomas philosophy 
must ever be found in agreement with theology, when both 
are understood, as both are expressions of the same truths, 
while with Scotus the dogmas of the church were absolute 
truths from which philosophy sometimes diverged, theology 
also revealing truth not accessible to philosophy, as the 
creation of the world, the immortality of the human soul, and 
the existence of God, the Almighty, the Divine cause of the 
universe. He admits that philosophy can demonstrate the 
existence of an ultimate cause of the universe, but not that 
this cause is almighty and Divine, which attributes are 
revealed by theology. He based the doctrines of Christianity 
and the rules of morality on the arbitrary will of God. It 
is, however, more reasonable to believe that the laws of God 
accord with infinite wisdom, and that they were established 
for the highest welfare of the universe, though the specific 
design cannot always be discovered by human reason. 

Scotus agreed with Albert and Thomas in regard to the 
three-fold existence of universals, though he differed from 
them with reference to individuation, holding that the uni- 
versal essence and the individualizing determinations do not 
correspond to form and matter, but that individual charac- 
teristics are form as well as the universal essence. The truth 
is, the genus has attributes universal for the genus; the 
species adds to the universal of the genus, the peculiar 
characteristic of the species, which is universal for the species 
but not for the genus, so that the content, or common quali- 
ties of the species = the content of the genus + the charac- 
teristic of the species; the individual adds to the contents of 



134 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

the species its own peculiarities, so that the content of the 
individual = the content of the genus + the characteristic 
of the species -f the peculiarities of the individual. Dis- 
tinction, however, should be made between the permanent 
peculiarities of the individual, and the accidents, as a wart 
on the hand, which may come and go. 

In regard to the will, Scotus held to its freedom in a more 
absolute sense than did Thomas. 

Scotus was the author of numerous works, among the most 
important of which are those commenting on the writings of 
Aristotle. 

In showing the divergence between philosophy and theolo- 
gy, Scotus took the first step in causing opposition between 
them, which led to the decline of Scholasticism. 

{Ji) William oj Occam ( 1347). William was born in 

the village of Ockham in the county of Surrey, and educated 
at the Merton College, Oxford, and at Paris where he was 
first the pupil, then the rival of Duns Scotus. He was the 
provincial of England at the assembly of the Franciscan 
Order at Perugia, and headed the revolt of that order against 
Pope John XXIL He was tried for heresy before the 
bishops of Ferrara and Bologna, and imprisoned four months 
in the dungeon of the papal palace at Avignon. Managing to 
escape with his companions, Michael of Cesena, general of the 
order, and Bonogratia, they found their way to Munich to 
the Court of Louis, who had been legally elected Emperor 
of Germany, and whose election, the Pope refused to ratify. 
The proposal he made to Louis was: "Defend me with the 
sword, and I will defend you with the pen." The proposal 
accepted, he sent forth pamphlets in refutation of the 
extravagant claims of the Pope, showing that the oflBce of 
King was independent of that of the Pope, and no less of 
divine authority. 

From his logical ability, William was called the Invincible 
Doctor, In regard to universals, he strongly objected to 
the hypostetizing of abstractions. He took the extreme 
view of Nominalism, that the name is the only universal, 
and though he added nothing new to the doctrine, he made 
it more intelligible by showing that words in speech were 
used like figures in Arithmetic or letters in Algebra, as when 
we let X stand for the unknown quantity required, or when 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— SECOND PERIOD 135 

we use the word triangle for the thought of any one of the 
infinite number of individual objects to which it may be 
applied. As words stand for thoughts, and thoughts for 
things, each being inadequate, there is a double inadequacy, 
and the outcome is skepticism. 

He contended that everything that really exists is individ- 
ual, that to seek the cause of individuality is to seek the 
cause of the individual, and that it is not the individual that 
needs explanation, but the universal. For his extreme 
nominalism, he claimed the authority of Aristotle, though 
strictly not justly. Thus he held that the universal is not 
any really existing thing, but is merely a term or predicable 
made universal by its application to any individual of the 
class, and hence a common noun. 

It is of course true that the universal is no real thing 
existing by itself apart from the class; apart from the pattern 
in the Divine mind, after which the objects of the class were 
formed ; apart also from the concept of the class in the human 
mind, which are the errors of Realism; but the universal 
does really exist, as a combination of qualities in any in- 
dividual of a class, similar to that in any other individual 
of the class. The name is of course universal, as the name 
elephant is applicable to every elephant, and why? because 
they all have certain qualities which entitle them to be 
classed together and called by the common name elephant. 
We call a certain class of animals vertebrate, not because one 
identical skeleton will do for all, but that the skeleton of 
one, in its essential features, is similar to that of any other 
animal of the class. 

William more completely severed philosophy from theology 
than did Scotus, and this meant the dissolution of Scholastic- 
ism, which consisted in their union. With Occam, theology is 
related to practical religion, philosophy to speculative 
thought; theology is based on revelation and accepted by 
faith, philosophy deals with universal truth apprehended by 
reason. The rules of morality are expressions of the arbi- 
trary will of God, according to Occam and are not based on 
rational principles. God's commands we may, however, 
believe to be reasonable, though the human mind may some- 
times fail to discover their reasons, or God's design in re- 
quiring obedience. 



136 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

3, Mysticism is a compound of thought and feeUng, of 
philosophy and religion. On its philosophic side, it is an 
attempt to apprehend the ultimate reality of things by 
immediate intuition, and on its religious side, it is an effort 
to grasp the Divine essence, and to enjoy the blessedness of 
actual communion with the most high God. Its seed miay 
be found in Plato's doctrine of innate ideas, which ger- 
minated in Philo, developed in Gnosticism, expanded in full 
bloom in Neo-Platonism, and bore fruit in the period of 
Scholasticism. It is rather a phase of religious philosophy, 
than a system, and finds a possibility of development along 
with various schools. 

Mysticism is based on feeling rather than on intellectual 
intuition and as a movement, both in the philosophic and 
in the religious direction, is not altogether without justifica- 
tion. The human mind has the faculty of rational intuition 
which immediately apprehends the necessity of the conditions 
of phenomena; and the system of philosophy which ignores 
this fact is without a rational basis. For example, it is 
intuitively certain that there is a cause for every event, that 
succession implies time, that body and motion imply space, 
as the conditions of their possibility, that the universe im- 
plies an ultimate reality, without beginning, and hence 
eternal. But rational intuition must be kept within its 
proper bounds; while it declares a priori that every event 
must have a cause, it does not tell us the cause of any particu- 
lar event; that must be determined, if determined at all 
a posteriori, by investigation guided by experience. While, 
rational intuition apprehends the necessity of an ultimate 
reality, the eternal cause of the universe, the character of 
that cause, must be determined, if ever known, by the 
nature of the universe, or be made known by revelation. 

On its religious side, Mysticism is justified by the fact of 
Christian experience. The Spirit itself, through the feeling 
of love, beareth witness with our spirits that we are the 
children of God; and this is done by the love of God shed 
abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given unto 
us. Mysticism rightly held to this religious experience. 

Mysticism does not hold with Pantheism that we are 
naturally at one with God, but that we are in a state of 
alienation, and must be brought back, by the new birth, to 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— SECOND PERIOD 137 

a state of union with the Divine Being, as the goal of reUgious 
attainment. This sufficiently differentiates Mysticism from 
formal or ritualistic Christianity. It is distinguished from the 
evangelical systems by the intensity with which it claims to 
realize, by the feeling of love, the divine presence. So vivid 
is the realization that the tendency of the Mystic is to lose 
himself in the excess of feeling. His personality becomes 
weakened, and all other realities seem unreal. Reason 
should be cultivated while love is enjoyed. 

The Mystic's ideal of life is not that of ethical energy doing 
good by promoting the welfare of the human race, nor that 
of dialectical disputation, but in meditation, and in the 
enjoyment of love by devout communion with God. 

The error of Mysticism consists in exaggerating feeling an 
essential element, by making it overshadow rational theory 
and practical duties. Its opponents, by their opposition, 
have drifted farther into formal religion, and ritualistic 
observance, having the form, but denying the power of 
Godliness. Evangelical Christians are benefitted by en- 
deavoring to observe a happy mean between these extremes, 
by enjoying a religious experience, while understanding its 
theory and in discharging the duties of life. It is the spiritual 
birth-right of every Christian to enjoy the love of God in the 
heart; and at the same time, it is his duty, as far as he is able, 
to understand his religion, to assist his neighbor, and to labor 
for the well-being of the human race. 

We have said that the Mystics have some grounds for 
their belief ; they claim to know the absolute cause; it is not 
so much the knowledge that is at fault, but the way they 
reach that knowledge; they claim to reach it by immediate 
intuition in the form of feeling, irrespective of the universe, 
the effect of that cause. The absolute cannot be reached in 
that way. Rational intuition does not begin, a priori 
with the absolute, with cause, with time, with space, and 
then deduce the universe, events, succession, body, and 
motion; it reverses this order, and begins, a posteriori, 
with the known facts of experience, as it has a right, and by 
its innate power, not innate knowledge, it apprehends the 
absolute, cause, time and space, as the necessary conditions 
of the facts known by experience — a procedure at once 
logically sound and fruitful of consequences. To begin with 



138 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

conditions instead of the conditioned, and to hold that 
conditions can be known apart from the condition, leads, on 
the one hand, to the wild hypotheses of a pre-existing state, or 
to the present empirical intuition of the absolute and of cause 
in general, which opens the way for extravagant claims and 
wild fanaticism. Ideas, as universals, are not apprehended 
a priori, apart from objects, as Plato taught. Aristotle's 
doctrine of form is much more correct. Certain qualities, 
essentially similar, are found in every object of a class;, but 
this combination does not exist by itself apart from the 
objects, but the idea or notion of this combination has a 
mental existence in the human mind, but formed a posteriori, 
by examination, generalization, and induction. There is, 
however, no objection to the view that the pattern of the 
universal existed in the Divine mind before the existence 
of the objects of the class, and that the objects of the class 
were formed according to this pattern. 

It is easy to show how we reach the condition from the 
conditioned: Since body and motion are facts of experience, 
there must be space in which bodies exist and move; since 
there is succession of phenomena, there must be time or 
duration in which succession takes place; since there are 
events there must be cause, for non-entity cannot jump 
into being; since the universe is, there must be the eternal 
reality we call God, as the condition on which the universe 
depends. 

We shall best understand Mysticism by knowing what the 
Mystics actually taught which we shall find in a review of 
their doctrines. 

(1) Erigena laid down what may be called the principle 
of Mysticism: Out of the eternal incomprehensible essence, 
the world of ideas is eternally created, constituting the 
Word or Son of God, in whom all things exist. All existence 
is a Theophany. God is the beginning of all things, and all 
things return to God, and in Oneness with God, we realize 
our highest blessedness. The Mystic assumed to have such 
an intimate union with the Divine Being, both in thought 
and in affection, that he can apprehend God by reason, or 
realize Him by the deeper intuitions of love. In this is 
found the first principle of Mysticism, whatever may be its 
special outward form or manifestation. 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— SECOND PERIOD 139 

(2) Bernard of Clariveaux (1091-115S) , Bernard was an 
eloquent divine, and exerted great influence in the church. 
He condemned Abelard's distinctions as externalizing the 
doctrines of the faith, maintaining that reUgion related to 
the inner experiences of the soul. 

He held that reason has three stages, and through these 
the mind rises to the contemplation of the Divine Being. 
Still more exalted is the ecstatic vision sometimes 'granted to 
those who are dead to the world and alive unto God, such as 
St. Paul had when he was caught up to the third heavens. 
This state can be reached only by those who practice ex- 
treme self-denial, and who merge their love of self in the love 
of God; for God can be all in all only when all selfishness is 
extirpated from the soul. 

(3) The Victorines, Hugo, Richard and Walter, of the 
monastery of St. Victor, near Paris, further developed Mys- 
ticism by publishing popular books calculated to awaken 
piety and to inspire devotion. These books explained the 
conditions necessary to be observed in order to reach a state 
of ecstacy in communion with God. 

(4) Bonaventura (1221-1274). John of Fidanza was 
born at Bagnarea in the Papal states, and was destined by 
his mother for the church. He received the cognomen of 
Bonaventura from St. Francis of Assisi, who is said to have 
performed on him a miraculous cure. Distinguished for the 
brilliancy of his intellect and the purity of his character he 
was elected general of the Franciscan Order. He introduced 
stricter discipline into his Society, and advocated asceticism 
as a means of Grace. By his order, Roger Bacon was inter- 
dicted from lecturing at Oxford. He threw the weight of his 
influence in favor of the election of Gregory X to the Papal 
chair. For this he was rewarded by the Pope, who con- 
ferred on him the titles of Cardinal and Bishop of Abano. 
He received the degree of Doctor in 1255, and on account of 
the purity of his life, he was styled Doctor Seraphicus. He 
died at the great council of Lyons of which he was a member. 

In cultivating mystical piety, Bonaventura differed widely 
from Roger Bacon, who was a pioneer in Natural Science, and 
from St. Thomas, who brought the Aristotelian Scholasticism 
to the height of perfection. 

Bonaventura accepted realism, the theory that universal 
ideas do not exist in the objects of a class, but in the Divine 



140 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

mind as the patterns after which these objects were formed, 
which may be accepted as true; but if universals do not exist 
in the objects of a class, as ideas^ they do exist in these 
objects as combinations of similar attributes; and a nation 
of this combination of attributes is a concept in the human 
mind. 

Bonaventura held to three steps in knowledge — the senses 
giving empirical knowledge, reason which examines the 
soul itself the image of God, and that transcendent mystic act 
which grasps the Divine Being and enjoys his love. 

Reason can discover certain moral truths as basal principles; 
but other truths, as the attributes of God, it can apprehend 
only by divine illumination, for which the proper means must 
be employed, as fasting, prayer, meditation, and the strict 
practice of every virtue. By these means, the soul can 
rise to an ecstatic union with God. There is a great truth 
here which may be accepted, if the depth of feeling is guarded 
from excess, and the danger of running into extravagance 
be avoided by sobriety of judgment. 

(5) Meister Eckhart (1260-1329). Eckhart's mysticism 
was more of a theoretical character than that of the Scholas- 
tic mystics in general. He evolved a philosophy of mystic- 
ism freely from pure reason, without basing it upon the 
dogmas of the church; but through his system, these dogmas, 
often acquired a new meaning. 

In the fusion of feeling and knowing, the mystics generally 
left the control with the feeling. Not so with Eckhart; for 
with him reason was the controlling element, and the specula- 
tive view, the matter of peculiar interest. 

Eckhart considered the Absolute to be the primal indeter- 
minate essence, the potentiality of all things, the Godhead, 
whose nature is to come, by a triadic process, to consciousness, 
as the triune God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. 
How can man know God? To be dead to self is to be alive 
to God. The renunciation of selfhood, Eckhart called 
decease, and when that is completely effected, God reveals 
his Son in us, and we become one with God, which is recog- 
nized by a rational act called Funklein or flash of light. 

(6) Other distinguished mystics may be mentioned: 
Heinrich Suso (1295-1266) was distinguished for his austerity, 
poetic fancy, and fervency of feeling. John Tauter of Stras- 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY— SECOND PERIOD 141 

burg (1300-61) was more practical than Eckhart, and less 
emotional than Suso. He was a distinguished preacher, and 
withal a benevolent man. When the plague visited Strasburg 
he remained at his post, and encouraged his terror-stricken 
people. His theology is the purest type of mysticism, in- 
sisting on purity of morals, personal relationship to God, 
and freedom from bondage to ecclesiastical shackles. John 
Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) was the leading mystic in the Nether- 
lands. He discriminated between truth and error, and 
dwelt on the means by which the mystical union with God is 
to be attained. 

John Boehme (1575-1624) claimed to have a direct illumi- 
nation, so that he could see the root of all things, the Un- 
grund of events, the origin of all things, the being of God 
By looking into the heart of things, nature became unveiled 
to reason, to mystic feeling, and all mysteries became clear. 
Of course, such extravagant claims can not be justified. 

Other pious writers of mystic tendencies may be noted: 
Thomas a Kempis, Madam Guyon, Henry More, George 
Fox, William Law, St. Martin. 



CHAPTER XV 

Transition to Modern Philosophy 

1, Cardanus (1501-76). Cardanus explained nature by 
two principles: matter, the passive principle, and the world 
soul, the active principle which by pervading matter, and 
bringing it into order causes light and heat. Attraction and 
repulsion, the causes of motion, become in higher beings, 
love and hatred. The masses, it is true, should accept the 
teaching of the church, but the thinker should engage in the 
pursuit of truth. Cardanus was a good mathematician; he 
discovered a formula, known as Cardanus' formula for the 
solution of cubic equations. He was the author of interesting 
works on mathematics, physics, astrology; and he wrote an 
autobiography. His independence, as a thinker, is to be 
noted, as indicating the current of thought. 

^. Telesius (1508-88). Telesius explained nature in much 
the same way as Cardanus — passive matter, heat of which 
the sun is the source, the cause of repulsion, and cold from 
the earth, the cause of attraction, and on these all change 
and life depend. He maintained that Aristotle's doctrines 
must be replaced by facts derived from an empirical examina- 
tion of nature itself, and that all knowledge begins with 
sensuous experience. He admits, however, the spirituality 
and immortality of the soul. The different virtues he re- 
garded as the manifestation of the instinct of self-preservation. 
He revived the doctrine taught by Democritus, that all the 
senses are modifications of the sense of touch. It is true, 
that they all involve contact — in case of sight, light from an 
object in contact with the eye, and in case of hearing, waves 
of air in contact with the ear. 

3. Bruno (1548-1600). Giordano Bruno was born at 
Nola, a village in Italy near Naples, where he was educated. 
While yet a young man he became a member of the Domini- 
can Order, but he shortly withdrew from the society, as 
intolerable to his headstrong disposition. Accused of im- 

142 



TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 143 

piety, he wandered to different cities, intent on knowing for 
himself the mysteries of the universe, free from the shackles 
of authority. He was greatly influenced by the scientific 
movement of his time, and accepted the heliocentric theory 
of Copernicus, regarding the earth as one of the planets of 
the solar system, and the universe as a greater system of 
solar systems. 

The eternal God he beUeved to be immanent in the uni- 
verse, as its infinite cause, its substance and soul, its up- 
holder and life. He distinguished between the universe 
and the world. The universe is the manifestation of God, 
the eternal being, without beginning or end, omnipotent and 
omnipresent; the world of beings, the creation, had a be- 
ginning, and will have an end. The human soul, the highest 
form of cosmic life, has its origin in the infinite soul of the 
universe. 

Bruno was well received in Paris, where he delivered 
lectures. He spent two years in England, and though de- 
lighted with Queen Elizabeth, he was disgusted with the 
brutality of the English masses. He engaged as a disputant 
at Oxford on the comparative merits of the Copernican and 
the Aristotelian theories of the heavens, and gained an easy 
victory. 

Bruno regarded Aristotle with antipathy, much preferring 
the older philosophers, as HeracKtus and Democritus, and 
in this respect he was like Telesius and Bacon. 

Bruno was the author of several important works: On 
the Copernican theory, on metaphysics, and a dialogue on 
morals. He attacked the established religion, jeered at the 
monks as pedants, and placed the Jewish records on the 
same level as the myths of Greece. He sought for unity, 
and found it in Sod, the eternal source and substance of the 
universe. 

He accepted an invitation to visit Venice. He was arrested 
and brought to Rome and thrown into prison. After a con- 
finement of seven years, he was excommunicated and burnt 
at the stake. 

Jf. Campanella (1568-1639). Tommaso Campanella was 
born in Calabria and died at Paris. He held to two sources 
of knowledge — ^perception and reasoning. Perception is 
through the senses; but what is it that we immediately know? 



144 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

It is the sensation, a mere modification of self, that we per- 
ceive or better say, we are conscious of. How then can I 
prove that objects exist apart from myself? Campanella 
replies, by reason. The inner sense reveals to me both my 
existence and my limitations; and since I am limited, there 
is an objective world that limits me. Something is gained 
by establishing the fact of a non-ego, the existence of exter- 
nal things; but do the senses report them correctly .^^ They 
report relative truth. The objects are of such a nature as 
to affect us in a certain manner, and this answers the purpose 
of human knowledge; if not complete, it is at least relatively 
true. We judge from the sensations what the objects are, 
then picture them. 

Let us look at the fact of knowledge in a somewhat differ- 
ent light: Strictly we do not perceive sensation; for to perceive 
means to take through. We do not take sensation through 
anything, but are immediately conscious of it; but we do 
perceive the external objects through the senses by means of 
the sensations they cause in us. We judge what kind of an 
object it is which gives us certain sensations, and ideate the 
judgment, that is, picture the object by the imagination, in 
conformity with the judgment. 

The questions again arise, how do we know that there is 
an external object, and that it corresponds to our mental 
picture .f^ If the object is wholly internal, it is incredible 
that several persons should perceive the same thing. The 
common perception can be explained otily by a common 
external object, giving the spectators like sensations leading 
to the perception of the same object. But do we perceive 
the object as it is? It is more likely that we perceive it 
approximately as it is, than that we perceive it as it is not. 
Our perceptions are tested by the several senses converging on 
the same object, and by long experience, so that, except in 
rare cases, we can rely on them as giving us, if not complete 
truth, at least reliable relative truth. We call our friends by 
name, and they respond, signifying that our perceptions were 
correct; but it is well to remember that our judgments from 
sensation may sometimes be incorrect, and lead us into 
error. 

5. Bacon (1561-1626). Francis Bacon was the youngest 
son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, a celebrated lawyer who for 



TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 145 

twenty years was Lord Keeper of the Seals in Queen Eliza- 
beth's reign. His mother, a cultiired woman, was a daughter 
of Sir Anthony Cooke, tutor of Edward VI. 

Of Bacon's eventful life, only the leading points can here 
be. given. As a boy, he showed an acute intellect, and the 
Queen, pleased with his ready answers to her questions, called 
him her young Lord Keeper and Lord Keeper he afterwards, 
in reality, became. When twelve^ years of age, he entered 
Trinity College, Cambridge, and graduated in three years. 
He was not satisfied with the state of the sciences, and de- 
spised the Aristotelian philosophy, though he professed a 
veneration for Aristotle. 

In company with the English embassador, he visited France 
where he remained two years, either in Paris or in traveling 
through the provinces. At the death of his father, he was 
obliged to return to England, and found that he had not been 
provided for, as his father had intended. 

To provide for his own support, he entered upon the 
study of law; but having been brought up in affluence, and 
not having learned the lesson of economy, he acquired the 
habit of borrowing money, and was ever afterwards embar- 
rassed with debt. 

He rose rapidly in his profession, as a lawyer, and was 
shortly elected a member of Parliament for Middlesex, and 
finally became counsellor to the Queen, though he was dis- 
appointed in not obtaining a salaried office, which he hoped 
to secure through the influence of his uncle. Lord Burghley, 
the Prime Minister. 

Under King James, he first obtained the appointment to 
the office of solicitor, afterwards that of Lord Keeper of the 
Seals, then he attained to a seat in the Chancery Court, and 
finally became Lord Chancellor, atid was created Baron 
Verulam, and Viscount of St. Alban. He was now the first 
officer of the Crown, and the ablest man in the State. But 
his downfall was near at hand. Accused of taking bribes, 
he was convicted, deprived of his office, fined and imprisoned ; 
and though his fine was remitted, and he was released from 
prison by order of the King, he never returned to public 
life, but spent his time in literary and scientific labors, in 
which he delighted, and which had occupied his time and 
thoughts, more or less, for many years of his life. 



146 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Bacon planned to cover, in his works, the whole range of 
science and philosophy. He made an outline sketch of the 
entire field, but completed only a small portion of his pro- 
jected work. His Essays are his most popular productions; 
they have been very generally read and greatly admired, 
and are well worthy of the perusal of every thoughtful mind. 
Take this sentence from his essays: '* Reading maketh a 
full man; conference, a ready man; writing, an exact man." 
We see, at once, how concise is his style. 

The Novum Organum, the New Organ, as the name signifies, 
was an attempt to unfold a new method of discovering truth, 
especially in science, by the process of induction, and thus 
it stands opposed to the Organon of Aristotle, which in the 
hands of the schooln^en, had become chiefly a deductive 
method of reaching conclusions, and as Bacon averred, from 
barren general principles, not sufficiently established. In- 
stauratio magna, the great renovation, was the name given by 
Bacon to his entire system. 

In his theory of induction. Bacon distinguished between 
anticipation and interpretation. By anticipation, he meant 
hasty induction, such as passing from an examination of a 
few individuals of a species to a general principle applied to 
the genus embracing that species together with other species; 
whereas we should first, by interpretation of prerogative 
instances, carefully establish the principle for the species in 
question, then for another species of the genus, and so on for 
all the species of the genus, or at least for a considerable 
number of them, and thus legitimately establish the principle 
for the genus. Anticipation, however, jumps, from the few 
individuals of one species, over the other species to the 
genus, instead of ascending legitimately through the other 
species; it then by deduction reasons illegitimately down 
to other species of the genus. To illustrate: Having before 
us several rectangles, we find that the area of each is equal 
to the product of two adjacent sides. Now suppose we pass 
to the parallelogram, the genus of which the rectangle is a 
species, and say the area of every parallelogram is the pro- 
duct of two adjacent sides; but this is a hasty, and in fact, 
an incorrect induction by anticipation. Suppose then we 
descend to the rhombus, a species of parallelogram, by the 
deductive syllogism, and say: The area of every parallelo- 



TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 147 

gram is the product of two adjacent sides; but the rhombus 
is a parallelogram; therefore, the area of the rhombus is the 
product of two adjacent sides. The major premise is an 
unwarranted induction, and is, in fact, false; the conclusion 
is not only unwarranted, but false. 

Bacon calls the chief sources of error idola, idols, cherished 
false opinions : idola tribus, idola specus, idola fori, idola 
theatri. 

(1) Idola tribus, idols of the tribe, tendencies to error 
inherent in human nature, as the assumption that nature 
corresponds to our ideas of order or perfection. Thus, as the 
circle is the most perfect curve, it was assumed that the 
planets moved in circles. There is tendency to hasty general- 
ization, to believe in myths, omens, signs, and charms, to 
note the agreement of facts with proverbs, and overlook 
exceptions. Thus, you will have good or bad luck in a month 
according as you see the new moon first over your right 
or left shoulder, which seems to be always verified, as we 
have both good and bad luck every month. We notice the 
fulfillment and overlook the exceptions. 

(2) Idola specus, idols of the den, the pecuHar nature of 
ourselves, our companions, or our environment. The special 
bent of a mind, inherited or acquired, aflFects its opinions, 
and may disqualify it from passing sound judgments on 
matters concerning which it has received a bias. Some minds 
readily perceive resemblances; others quickly detect differ- 
ences. The first are likely to make hasty generalizations; 
the others are apt to make needless distinctions. Some 
people are conservative, and cling to the past; others are 
progressive, and seek for radical changes, as they see little 
or no good in the present. Some delight in abstract specula- 
tions, or great generalizations; others are interested in con- 
crete facts, and take no satisfaction in comprehensive theories. 

(3) Idola fori, idols of the forum, the errors incident to 
the use of language, or to the meaning attributed to certain 
words, epithets, shiboleths, mottoes, party catch-words, and 
the like. People often wrangle because they attach different 
shades of meaning to the same word. Thus, to the word 
will, one attaches the meaning of volition, or decision; an- 
other the meaning of the power of choice. One uses the 
word mind in the sense of intellect; another in the sense of 
soul or spirit, including intellect, sensibility, and will. 



148 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

(4) Idola theatri, idols of the theater, or errors springing 
from current opinion, or imperfect philosophical theories. 
Thus, various philosophers, especially the ancient, have 
found the principle of things in water, or air, or fire, in being 
or becoming, in number or in the vov^. Some philosophers 
held to the certainty of knowledge; others to the impossibility 
of knowing anything whatever. Some hold that the senses 
are wholly unreliable; others that they are the only sources 
of knowledge. Some hold that universals exist only in the 
mind of God; others that they exist only in the human mind; 
some that they exist apart from any mind or from any object; 
others that they exist only in objects; and still others that 
they are merely names. Some hold deduction to be the 
true type of reasoning; others discount deduction, and 
assign the chief value to induction. 

Bacon laid down the following rules for induction : 

(1) Study the phenomena to be explained, in all their 
varieties and combinations, not only by simple observation, 
but also by experiment, when practicable. This gives the 
natural history of the facts. 

(2) Seek for the conditions of the phenomena, whether 
mere antecedents, or causes producing changes, or forms 
giving permanent qualities. The forms include latent 
processes, resulting in slow changes of structure, or latent 
properties, supporting the permanent structure. 

(3) Exclude things not found to be conditions of the 
phenomena. 

(4) Negative instances, or the absence of the property 
to be explained, from certain objects of the class, are to be 
noted, and, if possible, accounted for. 

Bacon called attention to the importance of examining 
solitary instances, as when the same feature exists in two 
objects otherwise different, or when a certain feature differs 
in two objects otherwise the same; also to the case of a vary- 
ing property, either increasing or decreasing; to the condi- 
tions of the highest perfection of an organ or faculty; to 
parallel or analogous instances in different objects; to qualities 
accompanying and varying directly or inversely with one 
another; to the search for crucial instances in deciding be- 
tween competing explanations of the same phenomenon. 



TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 149 

Bacon placed a light estimate upon all that had hitherto 
been done in Philosophy or Science, whether by Empirics 
or Dogmatists. He said: ''The Empirics are like the ant, 
they only bring together and use; the Rationalists are like 
spiders, which spin webs out of their own bowels; but the 
bee (the true philosopher like Bacon) follows a middle course, 
for she draws her materials from the flowers of the garden 
and field, and yet changes and digests them by a power of her 
own." 

Macaulay says: "Two words form the key of the Baconian 
doctrine, Utility and Progress, ... It was not by fur- 
nishing philsophers with rules for performing the inductive 
process well, but by furnishing them with a motive for per- 
forming it well, that he conferred so vast a benefit on society. " 

In Ethics, Bacon insisted on four things; the secularization 
of Ethics, or the separation of morals from religion; the 
disuse of metaphysical presuppositions, and the search for 
the motives of conduct; the exaltation of the welfare of 
society, over that of the individual; and the identification 
of the good with the useful, the moral with the beneficial. 

Bacon attached only a slight value, entirely too slight, to 
the ethical speculations of the ancient philosophers. It 
would have been well had he given more attention to his own 
ethical practice. 

In logic, he habitually exalts induction and disparages 
deduction, the two branches of logic now regarded as co- 
ordinate and of equal importance. 

He attempts to belittle Aristotle especially, and to some 
extent Plato, the most illustrious of the Greek philosophers, 
who in powers of mind, and in intellectual achievement, 
were not inferior to Bacon himself. 

Bacon did a good work in exposing the barrenness of deduc- 
tion when separated from the complementary method of 
induction, and by insisting on the importance of interrogat- 
ing nature, and rising, by cautious inductions, step by step, 
through intermediate principles, to the highest and broadest 
generalizations, thus supplying principles for safe and innum- 
erable deductions. His oft repeated advice, "Interrogate 
nature," has been fruitful in good results. The rapid 
advance in science, since Bacon's time, is the result very 
largely, of the incentive he gave to thorough research. 



150 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The value of Bacon's doctrine does not consist in the 
details of his method, which were somewhat cumbrous, 
but in its aim and tendency; yet it is worthy of remark that 
the explanation he gave of heat is the one accepted at the 
present day. For many years after Bacon's time, heat was 
attributed to a special substance called phlogiston; but two 
and one-half centuries after Bacon's time, Prof. Tyndall, 
by a series of brilliant experiments, proved Bacon's theory 
to be correct that "heat is a mode of motion. " 

Bacon did scant justice to the Greek sages, whether called 
philosophers or sophists. He says "the sophists were va- 
grant and mercenary, perambulating the different states, 
parading their wisdom, and exacting a price for it, while the 
philosophers were more staid and liberal, in that they had 
fixed residences, and opened schools and taught philosophy 
for nothing." 

Bacon quotes from Dionysius, an obscure writer: "The 
dialogues of Plato are words of idle old men to inexperienced 
youth." Does that do justice to Plato? He quotes from 
an Egyptian priest: "The Greeks were always children, and 
possessed neither antiquity of knowledge nor knowledge of 
antiquity." The fact is, however, the world has not pro- 
duced a poet superior to Homer, an orator superior to Demos- 
thenes, a sculptor superior to Phidias, a prose writer superior 
to Plato, a thinker superior to Aristotle, an architect superior 
to the builder of the Parthenon. What has Egypt to show 
against these? The ruins of temples, gloomy even in their 
best days; pyramids massive in magnitude, but rude and 
clumsy in structure; mummies of old pharaohs; a succession of 
dynasties of despotic sovereigns; but nothing that will re- 
deem Egypt from the opprobrium of being "the basest of 
Kingdoms. " 

Bacon pretended to honor Aristotle, while he never lost 
an opportunity of giving him a thrust. Yet Bacon did the 
world a very great service; he incited the best minds to study 
nature, to investigate facts; he turned the attention of ingen- 
ious men to the investigation of machines for the alleviation 
of human labor; and if he could witness the vast results that 
have followed, especially in the nineteenth century, no one 
would be more astonished than himself. 



TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 151 

Bacon stands as the pioneer in modern science. To show 
the difference between mediaeval and modern thought, take, 
for example, the pumping of water: The schoolmen would 
say. Nature abhors a vacuum, therefore when the air is 
exhausted in the pump-stock, above the surface of the water, 
the water rushes up to fill the vacuum which nature abhors; 
but modern science declares, the pressure of the atmosphere 
on the water outside of the pump forces the water up within 
the pump, where the pressure is removed. 

Bacon said, first study the natural history of objects, then 
their natural philosophy, or physics, and after that their 
metaphysics; he taught that physics deals with their material 
and efficient causes, and metaphysics with their formal and 
final causes; but the distinction of these four causes, Bacon 
borrowed from Aristotle. 

Bacon's theories are more directly related to science than 
to philosophy, and on science they have produced the greater 
effect; yet they have not been without effect on philosophy, 
as can be seen in Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Hartley and Mill. 

Science begins with facts, which it carefully observes, 
analyzes, classifies, and determines their conditions, causes, 
laws and consequences. Within its own sphere, science is 
supreme; but science is not all of knowledge; it leaves many 
things unexplained. Philosophy is deeper than science. 
It seeks for the root of the matter, and though sometimes 
baffled, yet it often succeeds in finding fundamental truths, 
far reaching in their consequences, that give unity and har- 
mony to knowledge. 

(6) Hohhes (1588-1679). Thomas Hobbes was the son of 
the vicar of Charlton and Westport. He had good prepara- 
tory training, and was sent to Oxford at the age of fifteen. 
He remained five years at the University, but pursued his 
studies in pretty much his own way, taking more interest 
in the discoveries of Drake, and in the wonders of the heavens 
than in the logic and metaphysics of the schools. 

After leaving the University, he became tutor to the son 
of William Cavendish, Baron of Hardwick. The tutor and 
pupil soon became very much attached to each other, and 
were sent abroad together in a tour through France, Ger- 
many and Italy. Wherever he went, he heard the scholastic 
philosophy spoken of with scorn, and found that the little 



152 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

learning he had acquired at the University was of no avail 
to give him standing in comparison with such men of science 
as Bruno and Galileo, or with a man of the world like Mon- 
taigne. He fell back on the Latin and Greek, upon which 
he bestowed years of labor. He wrote a translation of the 
Greek Historian Thucydides, which he afterwards published. 
He wrote in Latin and read the best Latin authors, till he 
acquired a good Latin style. 

Through his relation with Young Cavendish, an important 
social and political figure, he became acquainted with the 
noted literary men of the day, as Bacon, Lord Herbert, and 
Ben Jonson. He did not accept Herbert's intuitional prin- 
ciples in philosophy, but like him, he was an independent, 
original thinker. He was somewhat intimate with Bacon. 
They frequently walked together, and he made notes of 
some of Bacon's apt sayings. Bacon employed him to make 
Latin translations of some of his essays. From these facts, 
he has been called a disciple of the great philosopher; but the 
fact is, Hobbs was an independent thinker. He disagreed 
with Bacon in assigning a greater value to deduction from 
general propositions and in his estimate of the value of 
Mathematics; and in both these respects, Hobbes was right, 
while Bacon was wrong. 

His friend and patron, the Earl of Devonshire, suddenly 
dying, Hobbes became tutor to the son of Sir Gervase Clif- 
ton, and took with him a journey to the continent, but spent 
the time chiefly at Paris, where he directed his attention 
principally to mathematics, which he had neglected in his 
University course. 

In 1631, he was recalled to England to take charge of the 
education of the young Earl of Devonshire, and in 1634, he 
went abroad with his pupil for a companion. He was now 
much interested in searching out the secrets of the physical 
world. He visited Galileo, then quite aged, and conversed 
with the members of the scientific circle in Paris, and was 
accounted one of the philosophers. 

Hobbes held that all philosophical truth could be treated 
under three heads — Body, Man and State, which he proposed 
to work out in three separate treatises, entitled, respectively, 
De Corpore, De Homines De Cive, The interactions of body 
were to be explained in terms of motion, by means of mathe- 



TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 153 

matics, giving rise to the science of mechanics. Change in 
motion, however, requires cause; therefore, cause not motion 
is original. The principles of mechanics were to be applied 
to the phenomena, in the individual man, of sensation and 
knowledge, and to the affections, the desires and the pas- 
sions, and thence extended to embrace political action and 
to the phenomena of society, by showing on what principles 
these were to be regulated, in order to preserve the existence, 
and to promote the welfare of the human race. 

On account of the disturbed political condition of England, 
Hobbes again left for the continent, spending most of his 
time at Paris. He did not return to England for eleven 
years. In the meantime, he finished his work De Give, It 
was immediately printed, but was, for a time, withheld from 
publication, and only a few copies were circulated among his 
friends, who received it with applause; and it was even 
praised by Descartes with whom he before had a controversy 
on certain points in the *' Meditations." 

The civil war in England turning against the royalists, 
many of them fled to Paris, among them the young Charles, 
the Prince of Wales, to whom Hobbes became mathematical 
tutor. These events induced Hobbes to write a book on 
Civil Government that might prove a check on what he 
regarded the tendency of the people, urged by their anti- 
social passions, to relapse into the original state of anarchy 
in which every man's hand was against the hand of every 
other man, rendering both property and life unsafe. He 
conceived the state as a great monster, a Leviathan, created 
by a compact of the people to secure themselves against the 
hazard to life and property, and in fact against their exter- 
mination. The government thus constituted, by the agree- 
ment of the people, had the rightful power of control, and 
as the legitimate authority, established the standard in all 
matters of conduct, whether civil, social, moral, or religious. 
Hobbes called his book The Leviathan, in agreement with his 
conception of the state. If a law seemed unjust to an indi- 
vidual, he was yet bound to obey it, and was not responsible 
for the injustice. 

Hobbes was drawn into controversy with Bishop Bramhall 
of Londonderry on the subject of Liberty and Necessity, The 
Bishop was a stanch Arminian, and Hobbes was a powerful 



154 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

advocate of determinism, or philosophical necessity. Hobbes 
answered the objection to punishment, that if free will be 
not a fact, then punishment is unjust to the criminal, by 
saying that punishment is justified by its good consequences 
in preventing the criminal from repeating his crime, and in 
the wholesome restraint it lays upon those who might be 
inclined to lawless conduct. This answer has weight in 
regard to the utility of punishment in checking crime, but 
it does not answer the charge of injustice to the criminal, if 
he acted under necessity. It is true, as Hobbes showed, that 
neither desires nor aversions are free, since they are caused 
by motives, nor is volition, choice or decision free, as an act 
or product, since it is caused by the ego, which alone is free; 
and though it acts in view of motives as reasons, it is not 
compelled thus to act by motives, which though causes of 
desires and aversions are not causes coercing the ego to 
decide. All events have causes; but the ego is a person, 
not an event, and as a person, it is free. The energy that 
makes the choice is the ego itself which, though causing the 
volition, is not caused to cause it. The ego is an original 
source of a train of consequences. 

It is sometimes asserted that if determinism be not true, 
ethics cannot be a science; for if the will is lawless, it is im- 
possible to predict what course a person will take. Can a 
determinist predict infallibly what course a person will take? 
Let him try it, and he will find that he will fail as often as 
one who holds to the fact of freedom. The power of pre- 
vision is not destroyed by freedom. A person is not neces- 
sarily lawless because free. Knowing the character of a 
person, the relative strength of his reason and passions, and 
his environment, a prediction, that will probably hold good, 
can be made in regard to his course of action In given circum- 
stances. A thief will steal if he has opportunity, and if he 
believes that he can escape detection; an honest man will 
not steal. Again, though we may not always be able to 
predict what course a given individual will take yet we can 
predict, with approximate certainty, what will be the con- 
sequences of a right or a wrong course of conduct. It 
therefore, does not follow that freedom excludes the power of 
prevision and subverts ethical science; it is necessity that 
subverts ethical science, since it renders merit or demerit 
impossible. 



TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 155 

Hobbes contended that true freedom consisted in the 
Uberty to carry out one's decisions; but this is evidently the 
Uberty of execution; that is, it is freedom from restraint or 
constraint in doing as one has decided to do, and not freedom 
to decide. Freedom to carry out the decision of the will, in 
external or executive act, is not freedom to will but freedom 
to do. It is not best to say the will is free; for the word will 
is ambiguous, and may mean the choice itself or the power of 
choice; the choice is an act or product, and is caused, and 
therefore not free; the will, as a power, is employed by the 
ego in choosing, and is, therefore, not free, but is the servant 
of the ego as much as is the hand; but the ego itself, and that 
alone is free, since though it may act, as it usually does, in 
view of motives, as reasons, it is not forced to act as it does 
by compelling causes. In fact, to act from compelling 
causes is not to act at all, but to be moved, to be passive as 
a foot-ball, making the ego altogether inert, which is wide 
of the mark. The energy, the dynamic of the act, is in the 
ego itself. 

The view that freedom consists in liberty to do as one 
pleases, in realizing the choice in external action, was advo- 
cated afterwards by Edwards, who also undertook to show 
that the person does not cause his own volitions; for to cause 
his own volitions, says Edwards, he must act in order to 
cause them, and act in order to cause that act, and again 
act in order to cause that previous act, and so on, which 
involves an infinite series of acts, an impossibility in finite 
time; therefore, a person does not cause his volitions. The 
same reasoning will show that a person must act in order to 
perform any act whatever, even an external act, and act to 
perform that previous act, and so on, which involves an 
infinite series of acts, an impossibility in finite time; there- 
fore, a person can not act at all, even in an external way. in 
executing his volitions, which both Hobbes and Edwards 
allow, in the liberty he has of doing as he pleases. Edward's 
argument, in proving too much, proves nothing at all. The 
fact is, a person does not have first to act in order to decide, 
he simply decides; and having decided to act, he does not have 
to act in order to act, he simply acts. 

Hobbes was much interested in mathematical studies. He 
attempted to square the circle, and actually boasted that he 



156 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

had performed that extraordinary feat. This drew him into 
a controversy with Ward, the astronomer, and WaUis, the 
celebrated mathematician, in which contest, Hobbes got 
the worst of it, though he displayed originality and vigor of 
thought. This ought to be a warning to all circle squarers, 
a tribe which seems not likely to become extinct. 

From the phenomena of perception, Hobbes inferred that 
change of motion is the cause of all things. Though motion 
is just as natural to body as rest, yet change of motion is an 
event that requires a cause, which, though not visible, is 
apprehended by rational intuition a>s force or energy. 

Hobbes adopted the narrow view in philosophy, that all 
our knowledge is derived from sensation and reasoning; but 
reason, or rational intuition, not reasoning, adds original 
elements of its own; it apprehends, for example, that every 
event must have a cause, since non-entity cannot spring into 
being. 

The natural state of man, according to Hobbes, is that of 
war, which on account of the selfishness of men, if not re- 
strained, would result in extermination. To prevent this 
catastrophe, men entered into a compact, and formed a 
government, which checked violence and preserved life. 
In the present moral condition of mankind, anarchy, the 
absence of government, would result in violence, disorder, 
robbery and murder; it would be permissible only if mankind 
were morally perfect. 

As government is preferable to anarchy, so is a strong 
government preferable to a weak one; hence according to 
Hobbes, monarchy is the best form of government, and 
absolute monarchy the best form of monarchy. The state, 
therefore, as represented by the sovereign, is absolute in all 
matters pertaining to law, morals, or religion; yet Hobbes 
accepted the golden rule as the immutable law of nature, 
which he stated in the negative form : do not to others as you 
would not have them do to you; but this conflicts with the view 
hat the will of the monarch is the standard of right and 
wrong, as the arbitrary will of the monarch might conflict 
with the golden rule, as in fact, it often has done, still it is 
duty to obey, and the responsibility does not rest upon the 
individual. 



TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 157 

Every idea we can form is, according to Hobbes, limited 
and relates to the iSnite, and knowledge of the injBnite is, 
therefore excluded. We may expect absurdities, he declares, 
whenever we hear the words eternal and inj5nite; yet he 
holds that if we go back far enough, along the line of cause 
and effect, we shall reach an eternal cause that in turn did 
not have a cause. Does the word eternal here imply an 
absurdity .f^ 

Whatever may be said of his doctrine, Hobbes was a clear, 
strong writer, and a master of English style. His great work, 
the Leviathan, is well worth the reading. 



CHAPTER XVI 

Modern Philosophy — Cartesian 

1. Descartes (1596-1650). Rene Descartes was born at 
La Haye in Touraine, France, and died at Stockholm, Sweden. 

Rene having an inquiring mind, his father called him his 
* 'little philosopher." At the age of eight, he was sent to the 
Jesuit College at La Fleche in Angou, where he remained 
eight years. 

His feeble health, while in college, excused him from the 
morning duties, and he thus acquired the habit of late rising, 
and of thinking while in bed, and this he kept up till he was 
called to Sweden, when he was summoned at five in the 
morning to give lessons to the Queen. 

Even while in College, he began to distrust the scholastic 
philosophy, and finally he was led to begin his investigations, 
by not accepting anything in philosophy, as true, which it 
was possible for him to doubt. 

The year after his graduation, he spent in Paris, and 
enjoyed the pleasures of the Capital with gay companions, 
and acquired a passion for gaming. He renewed his ac- 
quaintance with Mersenne, a former fellow student, who 
proved a faithful friend through life. He also formed the 
acquaintance of Mydorge, one of the ablest mathematicians 
of France. 

Descartes now thought it best to abandon his frivolous 
life and devote himself to serious study. Accordingly he 
withdrew to a secluded part of the city, and for two years 
devoted himself to a profound study of Geometry, by which 
he developed a method which finally led to the fruitful 
science of Analytic Geometry. 

His retreat being discovered, he was drawn out again into 
society. He escaped from these frivolities by taking service 
in the army of Prince Maurice of Orange, a general of great 
ability. 

Walking through a street of Breda, his attention was 
drawn to a placard in the Dutch language, which he did not 

158 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN 159 

understand. The writing was a difficult problem posted, as 
a challenge to any one to solve, if he was able. Descartes 
asked a stranger standing by to translate it for him either 
into French or Latin. The stranger, who happened to be 
Isaac Beekman, the head of the College of Dort, oflFered to 
turn it into Latin if Descartes would bring him a solution 
the next day. Descartes promised to do so, and fulfilled 
his promise. A friendship sprang up between them, which 
was afterwards broken, because Beekman published, as his 
own, an original essay on Music which Descartes had en- 
trusted to him. 

After spending two years in Holland, Descartes enlisted 
as a soldier in the Bohemian army, and went to upper Ger- 
many. The winter of 1619 he sp.ent in comfortable quarters, 
and began his meditations, which led to his discourse on 
Method. He concluded that a system formed by one thinker 
would be more consistent than that formed by many. In- 
stead, therefore, of studying truth found in many books, and 
combining the results into a conglomerate system, he resolved 
to form a system of his own, original and self-consistent, 
evolved from his own thoughts; but he saw the importance 
of getting rid of all prejudices and of admitting nothing 
doubtful, and beginning anew, on a sure foundation. He 
did not, however, apply the principle of doubt to religion 
or to politics, but separated them entirely from science and 
philosophy. While, therefore, he was a strict conservative 
in religion and politics, yet in science and philosophy, he 
was a radical reformer. 

Hearing of a secret order called Rosicrucians, self-styled 
invisibles, who were supposed to be possessed of certain 
secrets in science, Descartes sought for them, but in vain, 
though he was afterwards suspected of being one of their 
number. 

Descartes found that logic, though useful in proving propo- 
sitions, and in communicating knowledge, was of little 
account in the discovery of truth. He laid down four logical 
rules: To admit as true only what is so perfectly clear and 
distinct as to admit of no doubt; to divide complex difficul- 
ties into simpler parts; to pass from the easy to the difficult; 
to omit nothing essential. 

He returned to Paris, and with his old friends, Mersenne and 



160 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Mydorge, engaged deeply in the study of Optics, especially 
the theory of lenses, and their proper preparation, though he 
did not lose sight of his ultimate object, the renovation of phi- 
losophy. 

He was discovered by one of his old comrades, and to avoid 
them, he returned forthwith to Holland, where he lived the 
greater part of the time, till he was fifty years of age. He 
made a brief visit to England, and again visited France 
twice on business. The second time, he was awarded a 
pension from the royal bounty, which was obtained by the 
Cardinal de BeruUe, in consideration of his services to man- 
kind. 

A royal order summoned him again to Paris for new 
honors and an additional pension. Arrived at Paris, he 
found the country distracted by civil war. He paid for his 
royal parchment, but receiving no additional pension, he 
left immediately for his home in Holland. He changed his 
abode twenty-four times, while in Holland, chiefly to avoid 
the intrusion of visitors, or for the sake of pleasant surround- 
ings, or to be in the neighborhood of some University. 

Descartes kept up a correspondence, for many years, with 
the Princess Elizabeth, daughter of the ejected Elector 
Palatine, and to her he dedicated his "Principles of Philoso- 

His favorite science was physics in all its branches, especi- 
ally in its relation to physiology, in which he made original 
investigations. A friend asking to see his library, Descartes 
opened the door into his dissecting room and pointing to 
animal bodies partly dissected, said: "These are my books." 
He supposed he had found the secret of a long life, and 
boasted that he expected to live to be a hundred years of 
age. 

Descartes compared science to a tree of which physics is 
the trunk, metaphysics the root, and mechanics, medicine 
and morals, the chief branches; but he made mathematics 
the baisis of mechanics. In fact, one of the greatest services 
rendered by Descartes to mankind was the invention of 
Analytic Geometry, the application of Algebra, especially 
the indeterminate equation, in which the unknown quantities 
are variable, to Geometrical investigations. This fruitful 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN 161 

invention prepared the way for that most powerful method 
of investigation, the Differential and Integral Calculus dis- 
covered by Leibniz and Newton. 

When about to publish a new treatise, Descartes was 
accustomed to send through his friend Mersenne, advanced 
sheets to the best thinkers, and thus obtain their criticisms, 
which he answered, and had printed in the appendix of his 
book. This led to some lively discussions, and caused his 
doctrines to be well known throughout Europe. In fact, 
Descartes' greatest service to mankind was in stirring up 
thought. 

Descartes held that animals were mere automata, moved 
by impulse, and hence without feeling, thought or will; and 
on this account, he believed he could practise vivisection 
without cruelty, and in this way increase his knowledge of 
physiology. The cry of the animal undergoing the operation, 
he thought, did not indicate a feeling of pain. 

Through the zeal of two of his disciples, Renery and Regius, 
who were professors in the University, Descartes was drawn 
into controversy with Voet, a distinguished theologian, who 
issued, in the name of Schoeck, one of his pupils, a pamphlet 
charging the doctrines of Descartes with Atheism. Des- 
cartes replied in a vigorous letter, yet he was summoned 
before the magistrates of Utrech to answer to the charge. 
Descartes appealed to the French embassador and to the 
Prince of Orange, who afforded him ample protection. 

Receiving an urgent invitation, Descartes went to Stock- 
holm in 1649, to be tutor to Queen Christina, who took an 
ardent interest in his doctrines, and desired him to be her 
personal instructor. He was summoned at five o'clock in the 
morning to give his lessons, which from the severity of the 
climate, and the unusual hour, and his watching with his 
sick friend, Chanut, proved too much for his strength. He 
died of an inflammation of the lungs, February 11, 1650. 

The four great works of Descartes were Discourse of Method^ 
Meditations on the First Philosophy, Principia Philosophiae, 
and Analytic Geometry, In addition to these great works, 
he wrote many minor books and innumerable letters. 

Descartes held that knowledge implies clearness and 
distinctness, excluding all doubt; that objects of knowledge 
fall into groups having a central element with which the 



162 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

investigation should begin; that investigation should pass 
from the simple to the complex; and that all the objects of a 
group should be known in their interconnections. 

It follows, therefore, that whatever it is possible to doubt 
cannot be called knowledge. Descartes, consequently, began 
by doubting every thing it was possible for him to doubt; but 
he did not doubt for the sake of doubting. He was not 
essentially a skeptic, but an investigator. His object was to 
remove everything doubtful, in order to find a firm founda- 
tion of truth; but he found one thing he could not doubt — 
the fact that he doubted; but to doubt is to think, and to 
think is to be, which fact he thus expressed : Cogito^ ergo sum, 
I think, therefore I am. Descartes did not mean, as he 
explained, that sum, I am, is to be understood as a deduction 
from cogito, I think, as the word ergo, therefore, would seem 
to imply. Since ego understood, the subject of sum, or I, 
the subject of am, is already assumed as the subject under- 
stood of cogito, or as I, the subject of think. What Descartes 
meant was that the fact of his existence was revealed to himself, 
through his consciousness of thinking, which is indubitable. 
He might just as well have said Volo, ergo sum, or sentio, ergo 
sum; but with Descartes, all mental action was thought. 

Descartes was, therefore, certain of one thing — the fact of 
his own existence. The next step was to find a warrant for 
passing from the knowledge of his own existence to a knowl- 
edge of a world without, and this warrant he found in the 
existence of God. He says: '*When the mind reviews the 
different ideas that are in it, it discovers what is by far the 
chief among them — that of a Being omniscient, all powerful, 
and absolutely perfect; and it observes that, in this idea, 
there is contained not only possible and contingent existence, 
as in the ideas of all other things it clearly perceives, but 
existence absolutely necessary and external. . . So from 
its perceiving necessary and external existence to be com- 
prised in the idea it has of an all perfect Being, it ought 
manifestly to conclude that this all perfect Being exists." 

Of course existence is necessary to an all perfect being; 
as there can be no all perfect being without existence; but is 
it true that whatever we imagine, has an objective existence .f^ 
Because we have an idea of an all perfect being, does it follow 
that an all perfect being exists .^^ 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN 163 

Descartes met this objection by saying that the idea of 
an all perfect being is too great for us to form, and therefore 
it must have been formed in us by the all perfect being him- 
self; and hence that God, the all perfect being exists. This 
helped the matter somewhat. 

Can we not, however, form the idea of a more perfect being 
than ourselves? Is there any limit to the perfection of the 
idea we can form.^ Descartes' proof of the existence of God 
is scarcely satisfactory. A satisfactory proof of the existence 
of God follows from the truth that something is eternal; for if 
ever there was a time when there was absolutely nothing, 
there never would have been anything, since ex nihil nihil fit, 
from nothing nothing comes, a principle to which Descartes 
himself assented. The eternal existence, the adequate cause 
of everything else, must contain within himself all actual 
perfections. 

The fact being established of the existence of God, the 
Infinite and Perfect, Descartes would be authorized to say, 
as he did : 

"'God would, without question, deserve to be regarded as 
a deceiver, if He directly and of Himself presented to our 
mind the idea of this extended matter, or merely caused it 
to be presented to us by some object which possessed neither 
extension, figure nor motion. . . But since God cannot 
deceive us, — for this is repugnant to his nature, as has al- 
ready been remarked, we must unhesitatingly conclude that 
there exist certain objects, extended in length, breadth, and 
thickness, and possessing all those properties which are 
clearly apprehended to belong to what is extended, and this 
extended substance we call matter or body." 

What did Descartes mean by matter or body? He main- 
tained that the sole essential property of body is extension, 
involving form, divisibility, and motion; but the extent of a 
body, as Descartes conceived it, is not a void; for he held that 
a vacuum is impossible; hence if the extent of a body is not a 
void, it must be filled with something extended which is not 
extension itself, extension, and that which fills the extent is 
called matter or body. It is better to say that body has. 
What then is matter? Whether it is continuous, as Descartes 
seemed to hold, or composed of atoms, with void spaces be- 
tween them, as maintained by Democritus, it is certainly more 



164 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

than the extension itself; it is, at least, energy which manifests 
certain attributes. Descartes objected to atoms, as a body, 
however small, is divisible in thought, in infinitum; but an 
atom may be simply energy located at a mathematical point. 

Descartes speaks of the reciprocal action between the soul 
and body; but how is such action possible, if body is simply 
extension without dynamic powers, and mind is simply 
thought? The idea of cause finds no place in such a system. 

The place of meeting for the soul and body, in the pineal 
gland, as Descartes held, does not explain their reciprocal 
action. If sensation is really caused by the action of the 
body upon the soul, and voluntary motion by the action of 
the soul upon the body, then the body can both exert and 
receive energy, in which case, it has dynamic powers, and 
is something more than mere extension; it is extended sub- 
stance, but if it be true, as Descartes believed, that the 
apparent action of the body upon the soul, in sensation, is 
not real, nor the apparent action of the soul upon the body,, 
in voluntary motion, then it was not proper for him to speak 
of the reciprocal action between the soul and body. 

Hearing that Galileo, who had asserted the motion of the 
earth, was compelled to retract, Descartes, desirous of 
keeping on good terms with the church of which he was a 
loyal member, though accepting the Copernican hypothesis, 
maintained that the earth is at rest with respect to the 
vortex of ether that sweeps round the sun, just as a passenger, 
sitting on the deck of a ship, is at rest with respect to that 
ship, as it sails over the sea. This, however, does not prove 
that the earth is at rest; for just as the passenger moves 
with the ship, so the earth moves with the whirling ether. 
Descartes' theory of vortices was superseded by Newton's 
law of gravitation; but Newton's law does not account for 
the force of gravity, it only gives the law of its action, while 
Descartes' vortex may lead to an explanation of the force 
itself. 

The three realities, then, whose existence Descartes con- 
sidered certain, are God, the infinite substance, self-dependent 
and on which everything else depends, the soul the subject 
of psychical phenomena of which we are conscious, and 
the external world. The soul not only feels sensations, but 
thinks, is active and free. Body is more than extension; it 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN 165 

is something extended; it is not a vacuum, as Descartes 
admitted it is not, in denying the possibihty of a vacuum, 
and in allowing motion. 

In what respect is Descartes the founder of Modern 
Philosophy? In taking for its foundation the facts of con- 
sciousness. By the facts of consciousness, we are assured 
of our thinking and hence of our own existence. Though 
Descartes' demonstration of the existence of God is not 
beyond question, yet the existence of God, as the ultimate 
reality, the first cause, is certainly known. Admitting the 
being of God, and the fact that he gave us our faculties, yet 
if this does not guarantee the truth of all we think we know, 
it gives us confidence to believe that, under proper conditions, 
by the due observance of logical laws, and especially by 
verifying our conclusions, we may arrive at valid certainty, 
or actual knowledge. 

Bacon did a good work for science in insisting on the 
importance of the discovery of facts by interrogating nature. 
Descartes found the true foundation for philosophy in the 
facts of consciousness. Bacon's , method was too cumbrous 
to follow, though he was right in searching for facts. Des- 
cartes was right in the value he placed upon deduction, and 
in the importance he attached to mathematical investigation. 

Both Bacon and Descartes were great men, and did inesti- 
mable service to mankind by exciting thought in the great 
minds of the world. Bacon's literary style is masterful, as 
seen in his essays; and Descartes was matchless in the trans- 
parent clearness of his style, as revealed in his meditations. 

The philosophy of Descartes asserted the rights of reason, 
and maintained its authority; but in carrying out its views, 
it encountered great difficulties. What is the relation of 
mind to matter, of the soul to the body, and of the soul to 
God.f^ It seems evident, from experience, that sensation is 
the effect of the action of the body upon the soul, and volun- 
tary motion the effect of the action of the soul upon the 
body; but if the mind is nothing but thought, and the body 
nothing but extension, how can there be any interaction 
between them? 

The difficulty can be avoided by admitting that the mind 
is more than thought, and matter more than extension. 
Mind is a thinking substance; it is that which thinks and 



166 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

feels and wills. Thinking may be inextended; but it is not 
self-supporting; thinking doesn't think any more than running 
runs. The mind thinks, the boy runs; and though thinking 
may be inextended, the mind or soul, for all we know, may be 
extended; at all events, it has energy, or is dynamic. Matter 
is more than extension, it is an extended substance. There 
is no absurdity in supposing interaction between mind, a 
thinking substance, and matter an extended substance; both 
have dynamic powers. But we shall see how the successors 
of Descartes met the difficulties of his system. 

2, Geulincx (1623-1669). Geulincx was a student at 
Lyons where he was afterwards a professor. Being aCarte- 
sian, he was lightly regarded, and finally was driven from his 
position. He went to Ley den and became a Protestant. 
His life was not prosperous, though he continued zealously 
to teach philosophy when he had opportunity. He was 
finally appointed a professor in the University at Pesth, but 
he died shortly after his appointment. 

Geulincx held that self-examination taught him, that only 
his thoughts and his will were his own, but not his body, 
which is a part of the material world. The mind, he thought, 
cannot act on the body. A person might just as well believe 
that he wrote the lUiad, or placed the sun in the heavens, 
as that he could raise his own hand; but on the occasion, when 
he wills to raise his hand, God intervenes and raises his hand 
for him. Neither can the body, nor any material object, 
act on the mind; but on the occasion, when an object is 
present, God gives him a sensation, to attract his attention, 
and presents the idea of the object. This doctrine is called 
Occasionalism. 

S. Malehranche (1638-1715). Malebranche, who was the 
son of a high official at Paris, entered the Oratory at the age 
of twenty-two. He was so charmed with the writings of 
Descartes that he resolved to devote his life to philosophy. 
He accepted Geulincx's theory of Occasionalism, which he 
further developed. 

The following is Malebranche's theory of perception: A 
material object acts on some organ of sense; this is followed 
b^ the excitement, reaction or response of the organ; sensa- 
tion accompanies the excitement; the judgment concerning 
the object follows the sensation. This is the most complete 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN 161 

analysis of perception we have so far found; but Malebranche 
omitted the rational intuition of the necessity of the object, 
or cause of the sensation, also of the necessity of the ego, as 
the subject of the sensation, and he also omitted the ideation, 
or the construction of the mental picture of the object by the 
human mind. He called the object an idea presented by the act 
of God. But a complete analysis of perception will reveal the 
following elements: In general, an object to be perceived, a 
subject, or ego, to perceive; the synthesis of subject and 
object more specifically, the object or physical cause of 
the sensation; the subject with its physiological organs and 
powers of perception; the mechanical action of the object 
on the organs; the excitement of the organs; the sensation 
accompanying the excitement; the rational intuition of the 
necessity of the object and subject; the inferential judgment 
as to the cause of the sensation; the ideation of the judgment, 
or the picturing of the cause. 

In allowing the action of the object on the organ, and the 
reaction of the organ, Malebranche could not deny that matter 
was dynamic; but he did not admit that matter could act on 
mind, and so he held that when the object excited the organ, 
God intervened and caused a sensation and p esented his 
idea of the object which was what the mind perceived, so 
that our spirits perceive all things in God, who is the place 
of spirits. The fact is, the ideas are not God's ideas which 
we perceive, but our own ideas which we construct. Do our 
ideas correctly represent the objects? Not always. Our 
ideas are formed according to the judgment, and are correct 
or incorrect, according as our judgments concerning the 
objects are true or false; they embody, as images, or pictures, 
our knowledge, or beliefs, or our mistakes, in regard to the 
objects. The liability to error is found in the element of the 
judgment, or inference. In ordinary cases, the perceptions 
are reliable, as is verified when we address a person by name, 
and he confirms the correctness of our perception; but in 
unusual cases, we are liable to mistakes in our perceptions, 
which indicates that Malebranche's theory, that the ideas 
are God's ideas, is false; for God's ideas would be correct, 
yet the mistake may possibly be in our perception of God's 
ideas. 

4' Glanvill (1636-1680). Joseph Glanvill was educated 
at Oxford; and discarding the scholastic philosophy, he was 



168 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

greatly influenced by the systems of Bacon and Descartes. 
He wrote a treatise which he called Scepsis Scientifica, scientific 
doubt, or as he meant it to be understood, Scientific inquiry y 
and dedicated it to the Royal Society. He maintained the 
right of unrestricted freedom in thought. 

Nature was to him a great automaton, operated by mechan- 
ical action. Holding that out knowledge must always re- 
main imperfect, he maintained that our hypotheses should be 
held subject to modification as we obtain new light from 
experience and research. 

His views in regard to causation are worthy of considera- 
tion. He says We know causes, not by immediate intuition, 
but by their effects only. If we infer that one thing is the 
cause of another, we are only depending on the fact that the 
former always accompanies the latter; for causality itself is 
unsensible; but the inference from accompaniment to a causal 
relation is not necessary. " 

In saying that causality itself is "unsensible," and that the 
inference from accompaniment o a causal relation is not 
necessary, Glanvill meant that cause is not perceptible through 
the senses; that it is something more than an accompaniment 
or an antecedent, though immediate or invariable; and that 
an event is an effect, or more than an accompaniment or a 
consequent. To illustrate, suppose a stone supported at an 
elevation of fifty feet above the ground. Removing the 
support, the stone falls; but we do not regard the removal 
of the support the cause of the fall of the stone, but only as 
the non-dynamic condition; the real cause is gravitation, 
whatever that may be. Day follows night, but we do not 
regard night as the cause of day, but day follows the rising 
of the sun, and here we recognize a causal connection. A 
hunter takes his boy with him and goes out in quest of game. 
Whatever be the windings of the father, his son follows him; 
but the course taken by the father is the reason^ not the 
cause, of the course taken by the son. The law of accom- 
paniment here is that of reason and consequent, not that of 
cause and effect. When we lift a heavy weight, we discover 
that cause is energy, or something more than a mere antece- 
dent. Cause then is energy, or active power, that is it is 
force. 

5. Pascal (1623-1662). Blaise Pascal was the son of 
Etienne Pascal, president of the Court of Aids at Clermont. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN 169 

The family had, for several generations, held posts of honor 
in the civil service, and 3\ad been ennobled by Louis XI 

When Blaise was seven years old, his father removed to 
Paris for the better education of his children, and for the 
opportunity of enjoying scientific society. 

Blaise was early taught Latin and Greek, but was kept 
from mathematical studies; but being present when certain 
scientific friends were visiting his father, and hearing some 
remarks about Geometry, he took up the study by himself, 
without books, and made considerable progress before his 
father discovered what he was about. He was then per- 
mitted to have access to mathematical books, and encouraged 
in their study. He became famous as a mathematician, and 
especially noted for his originality and depth of thought. 

He was also distinguished for his scientific attainments. 
He proved that a barometric column was sustained to the 
height of thirty inches, not as it was said, by nature's abhor- 
rence of a vacuum, but by the pressure of the air, by showing 
that the column of mercury would gradually fall as the 
instrument was carried up to the summit of a mountain. 

Pascal turned his attention to religion which he valued 
chiefly for the heart experiences it confers, and in this respect 
he was a mystic, though he kept the power of clear thought. 
He supported the Jansenists in their controversy with the 
Jesuits. His eighteen Provincial Letters, so-called, are re- 
markable for their penetrating thought, and for the clearness 
and beauty of their style. 

His Pensees, which are scattered fragments of Theological 
and philosophical speculations, never completed, show by 
their remarkable depth, what he could have done had his 
life and health been spared a few years longer. 

The value of Pascal to philosophy is not to be estimated by 
any finished work, but by the stimulus he gave to philosophi- 
cal speculation. His influence was widely felt, and powerful 
in its effect. 

The Port Royal Logic, a popular work of great merit, pre- 
pared jointly by Arnauld and Nicole, was based on specula- 
tions found in the writings of Pascal. 

6. Gassendi (159^-1655) . Pierre Gassendi showed remark- 
able intellectual powers at an early age. He was sent to 
College at Digne, and made rapid progress in his studies. 



170 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

especially in mathematics and languages. He studied 
philosophy at Aix, under Fesaye. Four years later, he 
received the degree of Doctor of Theology at Avignon, and 
took orders as a priest. In the same year, 1617, he was 
called to the chair of philosophy at Aix, where he lectured on 
the philosophy of Aristotle. 

While occupying the chair of philosophy at Aix, he con- 
tinued his favorite studies of physics and astronomy, by 
which he became dissatisfied, more and more, with Aristotle's 
philosophy, against which he published the first book and a 
part of the second of a treatise designed to be complete in 
seven books, but the remaining part of the treatise he never 
completed. The first book against Aristotle is in essential 
agreement with Vives, Ramus, and Bruno, but it contained 
little or nothing new. The second book, a review of Aris- 
totle's logic, does not materially differ from the work of 
Ramus. 

He visited Holland where he wrote an examination of the 
mystical philosophy of Robert Fleed, also an essay on the 
transit of Mercury, He published his objections to the 
fundamental propositions of Descartes, in which he shows 
his acceptance of the empirical philosophy, the principle of 
which is: ''There is nothing in the intellect which has not 
been in the senses." 

He was more in harmony with Epicurus than with any 
other ancient philosopher, and published a work on the 
system of Epicurus styled Syntagma Philosophiae Epicuri, 
which had considerable influence on the thinking of the time. 

The most important of Gassendi's works, the Syntagma 
Philosophicum, is an eclectic conglomerate of irreconcilable 
dogmas from the empirical and rational schools of thought. 
It is divided into logic, physics, and ethics. 

The logic, besides a brief history of the science, contains 
the theory of right apprehension, the theory of right judgment, 
the theory of right inference, and the theory of right method. 
While holding that the evidence of the senses is the only 
convincing evidence, yet he inconsistently maintains that 
the evidence of reason is absolutely satisfactory. The senses 
give us knowledge of individual things, and yet only the 
qualities of things; that we reach the idea of thing or substance 
by induction; and that induction rests on a general proposi- 
tion not proved by induction. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN 171 

The second part of the syntagma, the physics, though a work 
of merit, is not altogether self-consistent. He approves the 
Epicurean physics, yet holds that the soul is immaterial, free 
and immortal. 

In the third part, the ethics, he maintains that happiness, 
which he considers to be the harmony of the soul and body, 
is the aim of life, and that if it is not attainable in this life, 
it may be in the life to come. 

Gassendi, though possessing great critical ability, had not 
the constructive talent of a system maker. As an empirical 
philosopher, he is to be classed with Hobbes. 



CHAPTER XVII 

Modern Philosophy — Metaphysical 

1. Spinoza (1632-1677). Baruch Spinoza, as he was 
named by his parents, or Benedictus Spinoza, as he called 
himself, was born at Amsterdam, of Jewish parents, who 
had fled from Portugal to escape persecution. 

Being a bright boy, his education was entrusted to the 
chief Rabbi, Saul Levi Morteira, who was requested to 
train him for the Synagogue service. He made great progress 
in his studies, and soon began to ask questions which troubled 
his teacher to answer. He was expected to accept, on author- 
ity, the doctrines taught him; but this he refused to do, and 
demanded the reasons for the faith required of him. 

Knowing his talents and dreading his influence, the rulers 
of the Synagogue offered him a pension of a thousand florins, 
if he would conform to their order and assist in their cere- 
monies; but this he indignantly refused to do, regarding the 
offered pension as a bribe. He was accordingly excom- 
municated, and an attempt was even made against his life 
by an assassin, who aimed at him a deadly blow with a 
gleaming dagger, as he was returning home from the theater. 

Spinoza learned Latin and acquired a taste for Natural 
Science from a free-thinking physician. Dr. Van den Ende. 
His philosophy he learned chiefly from Descartes, but he 
was also influencd by Maimonides, Hobbes and Bruno, 
and was affected, to some extent, by the scholastic philosophy, 
though as an original thinker, he cut loose from all predeces- 
sors. 

According to a prudent Jewish custom, he had learned a 
trade, in his case, the polishing of glasses for optical instru- 
ments, and this gave him the means of support, with the 
assistance of friends, while he pursued his investigations. 

After his reputation, as a thinker, had become established, 
he was offered the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg by Karl 
Ludwig, the Elector Palatine; but this flattering offer he 

172 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL 173 

declined, though the position was a lucrative one; for he 
loved to be independent, and feared that he would not be 
free in his teaching, though this he was promised, and that it 
would not interfere with his own studies. 

His principal works, written at the Hague, between the 
years 1660 and 1677, were entitled: Renati Descartes princi- 
piorum philosophiaey Pars I et II y more geometrico demo- 
stratae; Tractatus theologico-politicus; and Ethica more geomet- 
rico demonstrata. The Ethica is his chief work, and on it his 
fame, as a philosopher, especially depends. He wrote several 
other works of less importance, and numerous letters. Some 
of these works were published after his death, under the 
supervision of his friend, Ludwig Meyer. One of his works, 
Tractatus de Deo, homine, ejusque felicitate, was unknown to 
the world until the year 1852. 

Descartes postulated two substances, matter, or exten- 
sion, and mind, or thought, and supposed them so radically 
distinct that neither could act on the other. Their apparent 
interaction, which to Descartes was inexplicable, was ac- 
counted for by Geulincx and Malebranche by the hypothesis 
of occasionalism^ or the intervention of God, who on the 
occasion of the presence of an object, excited a sensation to 
awaken attention, and presented the idea of the object. 

Spinoza went back of the two substances, extension and 
thought, postulated by Descartes, and considered them 
attributes of one substance, the sole fundamental reality, 
which he called deus sive natura, God or Nature, infinite, 
absolute, self-existing by the necessity of its own nature. 
Extension and thought, the two known attributes of God, 
were the two forms expressive of his essence. Finite objects 
with their movements and interactions, also special thoughts, 
or mental acts, he called modes, respectively of extension and 
thought. 

Causal relations apparently exist between the objects of 
one series, whether matter or mind, with those of the other; 
but this correspondence between the two series, Spinoza 
explained by going back to God, as the sole substance, whose 
acts have two phases, extension and thought, which always 
accompany each other, being, in fact, the same thing or act 
of God, differing only phenomenally ,|so^that the order^ and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection 
of things. 



174 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

At this point, an interesting question arises: Did Spinoza 
regard extension and thought, as having to the human mind, 
an objective existence in God, or did he regard them simply 
as conceptions the human mind made in its endeavor 
to grasp reahty? This question has been the occasion of 
some dissension. Kuno Fischer, and some others, held 
that Spinoza meant by attributes the real properties or 
essences which the one substance, God or Nature, possesses, 
apart from the observer. On the other hand, Hegel and 
Erdmann understood Spinoza to mean that these attributes 
were to be taken in the subjective sense, as the way in which 
the human mind conceives God; that substance itself is 
neither extended nor cognitive, but merely appears so to the 
understanding as the modes of its cognitions. 

No doubt Spinoza held that the human mind conceived 
the infinite sole substance under the forms of extension and 
thought, though not as wholly subjective. He says, defini- 
tion IV: "By attribute I understand that which the intellect 
perceives concerning substance, as constituting its essence." 
He also says. Book II, proposition 7: "The order and con- 
nection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of 
things." Hence every relation of true subjective thought 
corresponds to a relation in objective existence, and this 
correspondence constitutes its truth. 

Finite things are the modes of the attributes, extension 
and thought of the infinite substance; that is, they are vari- 
able manifestations of God. They are nothing of them- 
selves, since nothing exists out of God, and if God should 
withdraw from them his support, they would fall into non- 
existence. 

The modes of extension are finite bodies with their magni- 
tude and form, motion and rest, and their interactions. 
The modes of consciousness are the special cognitions, feel- 
ings, and volitions, with all their relations. These modes, 
whether of extension or of consciousness, are all transitory. 

God, or the infinite substance, Spinoza called natura 
natiirans; but the sum of the manifested modes, he called 
natura naturata, Natura naturans is God acting, or God 
manifesting his infinite perfections and omnipotentjenergy; 
natura naturata includes all the variable manifestations of 
God in nature and in the world of m?inkin4? Tb^ modes. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL 175 

whether modifications of extension or of consciousness, run 
out into infinite series of things connected by the law of 
cause and effect. 

Spinoza has been accused of Atheism, but this accusation 
is evidently false. He was no atheist, but he was a pantheist. 
Everything phenomenal is the manifestation of God, the 
causa causans, Spinoza defined substance, attribute, mode, 
and God, thus: Substance is that which is in itself, and is 
conceived through itself; that is, the conception of which does 
not need the conception of another thing from which it must 
be formed. Attribute is that which the intellect perceives 
of substance, as if constituting its essence. Mode is the 
affections of substance, or that which is in another thing, 
through which also it is conceived. God is Being absolutely 
infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attri- 
butes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. 

Let us examine the pantheism of Spinoza: He held that all 
finite things are only modes of the two attributes of God — 
extension and thought, thus giving to attributes a higher 
dignity than to modes. God is the general essence of all 
finite things; he exists in them, or is manifested in the sum 
of these things; and conversely, all finite things exist only in 
God, their essence and source; hence the significance of 
Spinoza's expression, Deus sive Natura. God is the sum of 
all his attributes, that is Deus = omnia ejus attributa; or to be 
more explicit, God is the sum of all his attributes with all 
their modes. 

Substance, however, is to be distinguished from its attri- 
butes. Is body extension? It has extension; a body is 
extended, else it would not be body. But is the body the 
space it occupies? Move the body, the space it occupied 
remains. Is the ego identical with its thought? It may 
cease to think, and begin to feel. Is the ego identical with 
its feeling? It may cease to feel and begin to will. Is the 
ego identical with its willing? To these questions, we must 
answer no. But mxay not the ego be identical with the sum 
of these phenomena? It may, for all we know to the con- 
trary, be sometimes quiescent, as in dreamless sleep. But 
again, may not the ego = intellect + sensibility + will? 
No. The ego has intellect, and sensibility and will, and as a 
substance, it must be distinguished from these attributes ; or 



176 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

to employ Spinoza's terms, as an attribute, called conscious- 
ness, it is to be distinguished from its modes, or its special 
thoughts, feelings, or volitions. The ego has the power to 
think, feel or will. 

The application to God is evident. He is not to be identi- 
fied with extension, though he can manifest his energy at 
any point in infinite space; he is not to be identified with 
thought, though he is an infinite thinker. If God is not to be 
identified with the attributes, extension and thought, much 
less is he to be identified with what is inferior to these attri- 
butes — their modes, the infinitely various forms and move- 
ments of bodies with their interactions, or with the countless 
number and innumerable variety of thoughts, feelings and 
volitions, with all their possible relations. A finite body, 
or a single state of consciousness, is a finite mode; but all 
bodies and minds, with their infinitude of relations, con- 
stitute an infinite mode. 

According to Descartes, Geulincx and Malebranche, God 
is the free Creator of all things; according to Spinoza he is 
the essence which necessarily manifested itself as the sum 
of the facts of nature, or God is the essence and manifesta- 
tion of Nature, and every fact of matter or spirit is a mode 
of one of his attributes — extension or consciousness. 

Constructing his work, more geometrico, Spinoza begins 
with definitions and axioms; he enunciates theorems, giving 
their demonstrations; he then deduces corollaries, and ap- 
pends scholiums, by way of affording additional light, or of 
avoiding misapprehension, or obviating objections. 

Spinoza says: ''Self -cause is that whose nature involves 
existence; or that whose nature can not be conceived as not 
existing." Self -cause either existed before it caused itself 
or it did not exist. If it existed before it caused itself, it 
would not need to cause itself; if it had no existence before 
it caused itself, it could not cause itself. Spinoza probably 
meant by causa sui, or cause of itself, necessary existencey 
which implies eternal existence which is not caused at all, 
such as the geometric forms in space; also space itself and 
time itself . 

Spinoza calls the following an axiom: ''The knowledge of 
an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of its 
cause." This is true if knowledge signifies complete under- 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL 177 

standing; but we know many effects, as facts, without know- 
ing their causes; we know that any effect has a cause without 
knowing the cause; yet it is true that the knowledge of the 
relations of an effect involves the knowledge of its cause. 

Spinoza also gives, as an axiom: "A true idea must agree 
with that of which it is an idea." This is an axiom, if we 
first give the definition: A true idea is an idea which agrees 
with that of which it is an idea; for then to be a true idea, it 
must agree with that of which it is an idea. 

Spinoza says: *' Eternity is existence itself, so far as it is 
conceived necessarily to follow from the definition of an 
eternal thing." Eternity is the infinite duration in which 
an eternal thing exists. It would still be infinite duration, 
or infinite time, if the eternal thing did not exist. 

"Proposition I. Substance is, by nature, prior to its affec- 
tions. This follows from the definitions of substance and 
mode. " In the logical order of dependence this is true; that 
is, substance is the condition of its attributes, and hence of 
its modes, which are special states, or modifications, that is, 
affections, of its attributes; but in the order of knowledge, we 
know modes, or affections, and hence attributes, first, and 
that by experience; and knowing attributes, reason appre- 
hends substance as their ground, or source, as that without 
which the attributes would be impossible. In the order of 
existence, however, neither can be prior to the other; for 
a substance must have attributes of some kind, otherwise 
it would be nothing; if it exists, it must exist in some state 
or condition, that is, in some mode or modification of its 
attributes, otherwise it could not exist at all. 

"Proposition VII, It pertains to the nature of substance 
to exist. There is nothing by which a substance can be 
produced. It will, therefore, be the cause of itself; that is to 
say, its essence necessarily involves existence, or in other 
words, it pertains to its nature to exist." 

The essence, if it be given, of course, involves the existence 
of the substance, as its condition or logical antecedent; like- 
wise the substance, if given, involves its essence as its logical 
consequent; but the existence of essence, by itself, as attri- 
bute, is not known rationally, but empirically, as a fact which 
might not have been. Grant essence, then substance is its 
necessary antecedent, not in time, but as its logical condition; 



178 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

grant substance, then essence is its logical consequent; but 
neither substance nor essence is known by reason as absolutely 
necessary, and so far as we know, neither might have been. 
The universe being given, God is conditionally necessary as 
its explanation; he may be absolutely necessary, for all we 
know to the contrary; but of the a;bsolute necessity of God, 
reason does not inform us. 

"Proposition XL God, or substance, consisting of infinite 
attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite 
essence, necessarily exists. If this be denied, conceive, if it be 
possible, that God does not exist. Then it follows that his 
essence does not involve existence; but this is absurd. There- 
fore God necessarily exists. " 

If God did not exist, he would have no essence; that is, 
there would be no essence from which to infer his existence, 
which is not the absurdity, as Spinoza supposes of admitting 
essence and denying substance. We do not even know 
God's essence as a first fact. We know the universe, and 
hence infer the First Cause; and this first cause must be 
adequate to the production of the universe; that is, the 
first cause must be endowed with power and wisdom sufficient 
for its production. 

In Part II, Propositions I and II, Spinoza declares : 
"Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking being. 
Existence is an attribute of God, or God is an extended 
being." 

Then when as in Proposition XI, Spinoza speaks of the 
infinite attributes of God, he means his thought is infinite 
and his extension is infinite. Thought and extension are the 
known attributes of God; but if he has other attributes, and 
he may have, for all we know, an infinite number of attributes, 
they are all infinite. 

In making extension an attribute of God, Spinoza did not 
mean extension itself, abstractly considered as pure space, 
but the infinite extension of the substance of God. Finite 
bodies are modes of the infinitely extended substance. In 
making thought an attribute of God, he considered individual 
thoughts, as those of men, to be modes of the thought of 
God. 

By the power of God, Spinoza understands the energizing 
of the active essence of God, natura naturans. The modes or 
manifestations of God are natura naturata. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL 179 

The only idea of space found in Spinoza's system is that 
of substance infinitely extended; but reason apprehends space 
as infinite extension itself, the room, without limit, for body 
and motion, and for the universe itself, but which would exist 
were there no body, no motion, no universe. 

The universe being given, God, the First Cause, must be, 
whether regarded as transient or immanent, and as the 
first cause, he must be eternal, otherwise there never would 
have been anything, save time and space. 

In the appendix to Part I, Spinoza denies all purpose, 
or final cause, with respect to God, holding that men believe 
that God acts in view of ends, because they themselves are 
conscious of thus acting. He holds that the thoughts of 
God are totally unlike those of men except in name. Then 
why call them thoughts, and what meaning can we attach 
to the expression, the thought of God? 

God, therefore, according to Spinoza, is a necessary sub- 
stance, infinite in extent and eternal in duration, free from 
constraint or restraint, by anything external, as there is 
nothing external, as the things called external are the modes 
of his own being, and acting, without purpose, according to 
the necessity of his own nature. Such a being might excite 
admiration, but could it inspire love.f^ An infinite machine 
running, as a perpetual motion, by the necessity of its own 
mechanism, would be an infinite wonder, but is as impossible 
as the perpetual motion contrived by a human crank. Not a 
machine, but the living God, is running the universe. 

We give, as a specimen of Spinoza's method of reasoning, 
'' Proposifion XL. If we imagine that we are hated by another, 
without having given him a cause for it, we shall hate him in 
return. 

Demonstration, If we imagine that another person is 
affected with hatred, on that account we shall also be affected 
with it; that is to say, we shall be affected with sorrow, 
accompanied with the idea of an external cause. But, by 
hypothesis, we imagine no cause for this sorrow excepting 
the person himself who hates us, and therefore, because we 
imagine ourselves hated by another, we shall be affected with 
sorrow, accompanied with the idea of him who hates us; 
that is to say, we shall hate him. " 



180 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Suppose one had reached that high state of grace of loving 
his enemies, would he hate another, who he imagined hated 
him? 

A critical examination of Spinoza's system is a good disc'p- 
hne for the mind, and Spinoza has displayed a constructive 
intellect of a very high order. Only recently, many great 
thinkers have gone back to Spinoza's system, as the only 
true one. 

2, Leibniz (1646-1716). Leibniz was born at Leipsic 
where his father was professor of Ethics at the university. 
His mother was the daughter of a distinguished jurist, and 
thus the young Leibniz was favored by heredity. His 
father died when his son was six years of age, and so his 
education was the care of his excellent mother. Leibniz 
enjoyed the aid of the superior library left by his father, and 
all the advantages of a University education of which he 
availed himself to the utmost. He studied for the doctor's 
degree which, for some misunderstanding, was refused him 
at Leipsic, but was conferred on him by the University at 
Altdorf . He was an adept in languages, and in the scholastic 
philosophy; and visiting Paris, he studied the higher mathe- 
matics with the celebrated Huygens. He also visited Eng- 
land, and became acquainted with many of the distinguished 
scholars of that country. 

His mind was wonderful in the universality of its grasp, 
exceeding, in this respect, that of any other mind since 
Aristotle. He was, at once, a philologist, a historian, a 
jurist, a physicist, a mathematician, a philosopher; and in 
all these respects he was an adept and made important 
investigations, and adorned whatever he touched. Equally 
with Sir Isaac Newton, he was the discoverer of the Differ- 
ential Calculus, and devised a notation more flexible than 
that of Newton's, even the one used at the present day. 

He was the friend and counsellor of Kings, and was honored 
by the great. Financially he was well to do, so that his 
career may well be the envy of many a poverty-stricken 
man of letters. 

So numerous were the subjects that engaged his attention, 
so wide the field of his investigations, that time failed him for 
writing many exhaustive treatises; but perhaps the work 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL 181 

nearest his heart was his Theodicy, or the vindication of the 
ways of God to man; his heart also was set on uniting the 
discordant churches of divided Christendom. 

The philosophy of Leibniz, though influenced, more or 
less, by the systems of the past, especially by those of Plato 
and Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza, was strikingly original 
and profound. The ultimate reality is God, a monad, the 
creation of an infinitude of monads. 

The created monads of Leibniz are to be distinguished 
from the atoms of Democritus, which were regarded as 
infinitesimal solids, inert and without qualitative differences, 
while the essential monads were conceived to be metaphysical 
points, infinite in number — little worlds of activity and intelli- 
gence, each thoroughly individual, differing from all the 
others, the whole varying without break, according to the 
law of continuity, from the lowest to the highest, each pic- 
turing the universe, according to its degree of intelligence, 
not by passive impressions, but by active reflection and 
representation. Above these is God, the creator of all, the 
monad of monads, purus actus, the absolute energy, the 
infinite intelligence. 

There is no gap in the continuity of the intelligence and 
activity of the monads, from the lowest to the highest of the 
created monads, and though, according to Leibniz's principle 
of the identity of indiscernibles, the difference between those 
nearest alike may be indiscernible, yet each one forever 
maintains its identical individuality. The only break in the 
law of continuity is between the highest created monad and 
God, the absolute monad, the monad of monads, the infinite 
intelligence, the pure activity. 

The monads of Leibniz differ from the one substance of 
Spinoza which, as pure being, excludes all positive deter- 
minations save extension and thought, while the monads, as 
active energy, constitute the essence of substance, making 
all reality dynamic. 

Instead, therefore, of the one substance, there is an infinite 
number of individual monads, graded according to the law 
of continuity, each forever maintaining its own identity; 
and the sum total of these monads constitutes the universe. 
Each living being is a ruling monad environed by a multitude 
of subordinate monads acting together according to the 
law of pre-established harmony. 



182 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The world of matter is the imperfect conception which 
individual minds have of the universe of monads, the con- 
ceptions becoming more clear and ideal as the minds advance 
in degree of intelligence. 

The hypothesis of pre-established harmony naturally fol- 
lowed from that of monads. In the hierarchy of monads, 
the higher, or more active, give law to the lower or more 
passive or imperfectly active, as in the soul and body in 
their corresponding states. The lower monads representing 
the universe in a confused way, may be regarded as material, 
so far as passive; but the higher monads, actively represent- 
ing the universe in a clear way, are to be regarded as spirits. 

The doctrine of pre-established harmony is, therefore, 
opposed to that of Descartes in regard to matter and mind 
as two substances so unlike that neither can act on the other, 
leading to the theory of occasionalism, or miraculous inter- 
vention, proposed by Geulincx and Malebranche. 

Leibniz did not hold that there was a world of matter 
distinct from the universe of monads, the two worlds so 
arranged, by a pre-established law, as to run in harmony, 
but tha.t the monads, according to their degree of perfection, 
represented by their intelligence, the facts of the other mon- 
ads, the law governing the lower corresponding with the 
representations of the higher. God, by his continued action, 
moved the lower monads, or world of matter, and incited 
corresponding activities in the higher monads, or world of 
mind. 

Hence, each monad represented correctly, yet not through 
sensations caused by passive impressions, but by the law 
of its own activity, the facts relating to the lower monads, 
but only imperfectly, so far as it is material or passive, the 
facts pertaining to the higher. God, the purus actus, repre- 
sents, in perfection, the state of the entire universe of monads. 
The monads all represent the same universe, but with differ- 
ent degrees of perfection, according to their activity, the 
monads of the inorganic world representing, as in a confused 
dream, the representations rising in degree of distinctness, 
through the vegetable and animal kingdoms, through man, 
and higher beings, up to God whose representations are per- 
fect, for he alone, as the absolute monad, as purus actus, 
gives law to the whole infinite series of activities. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL 183 

The combination of the passive and the active principles 
of the material and spiritual in the monads is somewhat 
analagous to the one substance, Deus sive natura of Spinoza, 
with its two properties of extension and thought; but with 
Leibniz, the passive or material principle is wanting in God, 
the absolute monad, who is wholly spirit, or pure activity, 
the creator of nature. Al the lower monads, whose sum 
constitutes nature, combining both passive and active ele- 
ments, the passive or m^aterial predominating in the lower, 
the active or spiritual in the higher, are the creatures of God, 
subject to order, and mutually adjusted according to the 
law of pre-established harmony. 

The logic of Leibniz is based on two fundamental principles 
— the principle of contradiction and that of sufficient reason. 
The principle of contradiction may be thus stated: That 
which is self -contradictory or which contradicts an established 
truth is false, and if false its contradictory is true. The 
principle may otherwise be stated thus: All truths exist in 
harmony. The principle is employed in Geometry in the 
indirect demonstrations, called also the reductio ad absurdum. 
The principle or sufficient reason may be thus expressed: 
To established contingent truths, that is, the truth of facts, 
a sufficient reason must be found. 

The Theodicy of Leibniz, an attempt to vindicate the 
government of God, was perhaps of all his works the one 
nearest his heart. The question how can God, the infinitely 
good and holy Creator and governor of the world, permit 
evil in the universe which he has created and governs? What 
is the. origin of sin, and what is its signification? These 
questions have perplexed manj^ thoughtful minds. The 
solution of Leibniz is optimistic, and is essentially to this 
effect. That the existing universe is the best possible; for God, 
infinite in power, wisdom and goodness, would create the 
best possible world. But what then can be said of the evil 
so abounding in the world? Leibniz declares that the evil 
is rather apparent than real; but all partial evil is universal 
good, and whatever is, is right. All things are of necessity. 
Every event takes place according to pre-established law. 
Even events apparently contingent are the necessary result 
of remote and intervening causes, and could not be different 
from what they are found to be. This view is virtually the 



184 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

denial of sin, or moral evil. A being acting under necessity 
cannot be guilty of moral wrong, and a sense of guilt, or 
remorse of conscience, is a feeling of blame where blame does 
not exist. This is certainly not existing harmony. The 
fact is, man is free; and though a person causes his acts, 
which, as caused, are not free, yet the person is free to cause 
or not to cause certain acts, and as free, it is possible for him 
to do wrong, in which case, conscience rightly asserts his 
guilt; he is guilty for doing wrong, when he was free to do 
right. The fact of remorse is in harmony with the fact of 
guilt which implies freedom, but is inconsistent with the 
doctrine of necessity. Man is not a machine run by forces 
over which he has no control, according to pre-established 
laws, but he is a free moral being. A universe of moral 
beings is more worthy of God than a universe of machines, 
however perfectly the machines work by necessity under 
the control of forces running them according to invariable 
law; yet in a moral universe sin is possible, and is actual in the 
present world as found by sad experience. Leibniz, however, 
held that the necessity of a person's conduct was subjective, 
due to his nature and not to an external cause. 

The Theodicy of Leibniz was a polemic directed especially 
against the skepticism of Bayle, who maintained that reason 
and theology were in irreconcilable conflict, yet as he ironi- 
cally declared, both are to be accepted. Bayle held that 
the presence of evil in the world is inconsistent with the 
existence of God as infinitely powerful and holy. Bayle's 
argument is essentially the following: God is neither able 
nor willing to prevent evil, or he is able but not willing, or 
he is willing but not able, or is both able and willing. The 
supposition that God is both able and willing to prevent evil 
is the only one consistent with the being of God, as omni- 
potent and holy; but evil does exist; therefore God is not 
both able and willing to prevent it, otherwise it would not 
exist. If he is willing to prevent evil, but not able, though 
he may be holy, he is not omnipotent; if he is able but not 
willing though he may be omnipotent, he is not holy; if he 
is neither able nor willing, he is neither omnipotent nor holy. 
In any case, the fact of evil conflicts with the existence of 
God as omnipotent and holy; and hence the affirmations of 
reason are contrary to theological conceptions; that is, there 
is no God. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL 185 

Leibniz's Doctrine of optimism, virtually denying the 
existence of evil, or making it only apparent, or necessary to 
the good of the universe, is not a satisfactory reply to Bayle's 
argument. If man acts under necessity, he is not morally 
blame-worthy; but his conscience convicts him of sin, and 
his reason justifies his conscience. Sin or moral evil is, 
therefore, a fact which cannot be gainsaid, and of this fact, 
mendacity, dishonesty, cruelty, and every species of crime 
and immorality are crying witnesses whose voices cannot be 
silenced. 

The theory of monads and of pre-established harmony, 
together with his desire to vindicate the character of God, 
compelled Leibniz to minimize evil, or virtually to deny it alto- 
gether, and to devise the theory optimism, that the present 
universe is the best possible. Granting the existing of 
evil, the hypothesis of a universe of monads, whose activities, 
whether thoughts, feelings, volitions, or external conduct, 
are all necessitated according to pre-established law, throws 
the responsibility of evil on God himself, who ordained the 
law, and renders the vindication of his character altogether 
impossible. But a universe of free moral agents with power 
to do right and not under compulsion to do wrong, so superior 
to a universe of machines, vindicates the character of God, 
in the eye of reason, from all responsibility for the actuality 
of evil, throwing on him only the responsibility for its pos- 
sibility. For the sake of the multitudes of high and holy 
beings, the possibility of evil, or the risk of its actuality, was 
admitted, and the responsibility of sin is thrown, where it 
belongs, upon the sinner, who had power to do right, and was 
not compelled to do wrong. This view both justifies the 
ways of God, and accords with the facts of human nature. 

The universe, according to Leibniz, was created and 
organized so as to embody the divine plan, all the monads 
acting in conformity to law, accomplish their pre-ordained 
work without subsequent intervention on the part of God. 
Every emergency was foreseen and provided for in the origi- 
nal plan, the foreknowledge of God guiding in the adjust- 
ment of forces working according to law pre-ordained by 
infinite wisdom, rendered further intervention of providence 
entirely unnecessary, thus displaying in the highest degree, 
the perfect wisdom of the Divine Creator. This view may 



186 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

suffice for a mechanical universe; but it is not unreasonable 
to suppose that a world of free beings would better accom- 
plish the divine purpose by the kind guidance of the Moral 
Governor. The continual moral government of God accords 
with the fact of moral law and true religion, while the scheme 
of necessity conflicts with rational views of morality, religion 
and responsibility. 

Leibniz applied his own philosophical principles to a 
criticism of the system of Locke, especially in regard to the 
origin of knowledge, and to his polemic against the theory of 
innate ideas. 

Locke taught that all our knowledge comes through sen- 
sation and reflection, and consequently that we have no 
innate ideas. He accepted the statement: Nihil est, in 
intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu. This statment Leibniz 
also accepted, with this addition: nisi ipse intelledus, 

Leibniz held that there are ideas innate, or originated by 
the mind itself. Locke held that if the mind has innate 
ideas, it must be conscious of them; for to deny consciousness 
of them is virtually to affirm that they are not in the mind, 
and hence not innate. As a matter of fact, however, neither 
children nor savages are conscious of certain principles called 
innate. What do they know about axioms, or the principle 
of causality, or that of contradiction.^ Locke admits that 
the mind is capable of knowing first principles when pre- 
sented, or of understanding demonstrable truth when proved, 
but not before. He admits that the mind has innate powers, 
or powers born with us. 

What is really born with us is innate powers; and in regard 
to this, the two philosophers were perhaps in agreement. 
The addition nisi ipse intellectus, made by Leibniz, is not an 
idea, innate or produced by the intellect, but the capability 
of the intellect to produce the idea; yet Leibniz was correct 
in his contention that fundamental principles are supplied by 
reason, and not acquired through the senses, though they 
may be called out to give the conditions of knowledge thus 
acquired, since rational truth is the possibility of contingent 
facts. 

Leibniz distinguished space, from extension, and time 
from duration, maintaining that extension is the largeness 
of an object, and is measured by the space it occupies, and 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL 187 

that duration is the persistence of an event, and is measured 
by the time it continues. But space is the room giving the 
possibiUty of the extension or motion of objects, and time the 
duration giving the possibihty of the continuance or suc- 
cession of events. As conditions, that is to say, of bodies 
and their motion, and of events and their succession, space 
and time are absolute and eternal realities. 

Leibniz, however, calls space and time innate ideas; but as 
the earth existed and revolved around the sun, and the geolo- 
gic periods continued and succeeded one another long before 
the human race existed upon the earth, we must distinguish 
between space and time themselves and our ideas of them. 

The writings of Leibniz may be briefly mentioned, as 
Letters, of which there is a multiphcity on almost every con- 
ceivable variety of subjects; Essais de Theodicee; Meditationes; 
Nouveaux Essais; La monadologie; Principes de la nature et de 
la grace; and Mathematical correspondence, 

Leibniz was, without doubt, the most versatile genius that 
has appeared in the world since Aristotle. 

3. Wolff (1679-1754). Christian Wolff was born at Bres- 
lau and died at Halle, where he was professor of mathematics, 
though he lectured chiefly on philosophy. 

In his philosophic opinions, he was influenced by both 
Descartes and Spinoza but especially by Leibniz. He culled 
the thoughts of Leibniz from his numerous writings, and 
published them in a systematic form so that they could be 
used by students of philosophy, and in fact they became the 
prevailing standards in the German universities, till after the 
time of Kant. 

Leibniz had established two principles — the principle of 
identity, and that of sufficient reason, Wolff attempted to 
deduce the principle of sufficient reason from that of identity, 
or of contradiction, as it may be called, and thus place all 
philosophy and even theology, on a rational basis. He held 
that God could, by a miraculous intervention, change any 
fact, but not a necessary principle, as the ratio of the cir- 
cumference of a circle to its diameter. In Ethics, both 
Leibniz and Wolff taught the wholesome doctrine of a pro- 
gressive perfectionism. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

Modern Philosophy — English 

1. Cudworth (1617-1688). A reaction against the extreme 
sensationalism of Hobbes was inevitable, and the representa- 
tives of this reaction were Cudworth, More and Cumberland. 

Ralph Cudworth was carefully instructed in his preparatory 
studies by his step-father, Dr. Stoughton, and entered as a 
pensioner in Emmanuel College, Cambridge, of which his 
father had been a fellow. After receiving his M. A. degree 
he was elected a fellow, and became a tutor, in which capacity 
he distinguished himself, and was accounted one of the most 
learned men of the University. 

He received the degree B. D. and was chosen to the rector- 
ate of several churches, and preached before the House of 
Commons. He was elected professor of Hebrew, and shortly 
after was appointed to the mastership of Christ's College. 

He was a voluminous writer, the author of the following 
works: True Nature of the Lord's Supper; Union of Christ 
and the Church; True Intellectual System of the Universe, 
a ponderous work in three parts — On Atheism, on Eternal 
Immutable Morality, and a Discourse on Liberty and 
Necessity, A fourth part, on Free Will, was left in Ms., but 
published in 1838, and other Mss. were left which have not 
been published. 

The part of the "Intellectual System," against Atheism, 
deals heavy blows. His first proof of the existence of God 
is, with some modification, that of Anselm and Descartes, 
founded on the idea of an absolutely perfect being, showing 
that this idea involves no contradiction and is in accord 
with reason. Instead, however, of inferring existence from 
the idea of perfection, he infers in his second proof, the exist- 
ence of an eternal and absolute or perfect being from the 
fact of the existence of the universe. 

In the part on ''Liberty and Necessity,'' Cudworth men- 
tions three kinds of fatalism — the first materialistic, which 
suppresses not only the idea of liberty, but also the idea of 

188 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 189 

God and spirituality, and reduces all changes to mechanical 
action; the second is a Theological fatalism, which makes good 
and evil, right and wrong depend on the will of God; the third 
is a Stoical necessity, which affirms that all that happens is 
determined by unavoidable necessity. 

To the first of these forms of fatalism, Cudworth opposes 
the existence of God and a spiritual world; to the second, the 
immutable distinctions between right and wrong; to the third, 
the freedom and responsibility of man. He elaborates his 
arguments, at great length in support of his views. 

Knowledge, according to Cudworth, does not begin with 
the individual object, but with the universal, and in this he 
agrees with Plato and Leibniz, that the individual is known, 
by bringing it under the universal; he disagrees with Bacon, 
that the universal is collected from a multitude of individuals. 
He held that these universals underlying all knowledge, have 
existed eternally in the Divine mind. 

The treatise on ''Eternal and Immutable Morality,'' 
opposes the second form of fatalism that moral good or evil 
is such by the arbitrary will of God. We often know, by our 
own reason, that a certain act is right or wrong; yet even in 
case we can not know this by our own reason, but only from 
the revelation of the will of God, we still believe that an 
act is right, not because God wills it, but that He wills it 
because it is right; and knowing his will, we know that the 
act is right. God's will is not arbitrary, but is founded upon 
his wisdom. 

An act morally indifferent, if enjoined by law, civil or 
divine, becomes obligatory, because not to obey would intro- 
duce diversity of practice, and involve discord in society, 
which is an evil, and therefore to obey is right. Consequences 
whether good or bad, determine the quality of conduct, 
whther right or wrong, and the character of the consequences 
is apprehended by reason, human or Divine. 

2. More (1614-1687). Henry More took his preparatory 
course at Eton, and his University course at Christ's College, 
Cambridge. His parents were rigid Calvinists, but their 
son said he ''could never swallow that hard doctrine." 

He was a Platonist in philosophy and was especially en- 
chanted with Neo-Platonism, and consequently somewhat 
of a mystic. He was a prolific writer, and threw into his 
productions the charms of a poetic imagination. 



190 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

His Opera Theologica and Opera Philosophica contain his 
theological and philosophical speculations. He also pub- 
lished a collection of philosophical poems. In his Manual 
of Metaphysics, he discusses the views of Jacob Bcehme and 
Spinoza; but his Divine Dialogues mark the culmination of 
his intellectual efforts. 

In his work on Ethics called ''Enchiridion Ethicurn' More 
answers the question, why should one conform to an ethical 
principle when he believes that in so doing he acts contrary 
to his own interest.^ by saying that the obligation to do right 
is apprehended by reason, and that the sweetness and flavor 
of right conduct and of the resulting good are appreciated 
by the boniform faculty, that is, by conscience; that in this 
sweetness is found the motive to virtuous conduct; and that 
Ethics is the art of living happily, since true happiness con- 
sists in the satisfaction from the consciousness of virtue. 
Hence to do right is to act in accordance with our highest 
interests. He also adds some practical principles: things 
differ in quality as well as in quantity and duration. Future 
good or evil, if certain, or even probable, is to be regarded as 
well as present good or evil. The amount of good varies as 
the number receiving the same benefit. Hobbes and More 
agree in making happiness the aim of virtue; but right con- 
duct, according to Hobbes is known through law, but accord- 
ing to More, by reason. Cudworth did not make happiness 
the aim of right conduct, but the fulfillment of the obligation 
to conform to the immutable principles of reason; but evident- 
ly to satisfy the claims of reason gives the very highest and 
purest enjoyment, and not to do so would disquiet our con- 
science, and render us dissatisfied with ourselves. 

3, Cumberland (1632-1718). Richard Cumberland was 
educated at St. Paul's school and at Magdalene College, 
Cambridge, where he received his degrees and obtained a 
fellowship. 

He studied medicine, but did not actively engage in its 
practice. He turned his attention to Theology and Philoso- 
phy, and to some extent to Science and Philology. 

He had several influential friends, and to them, in connec- 
tion with his industry, he owed his success in life. His first 
preferment was the rectory of Brampton, and he was also 
appointed one of the twelve preachers to the University. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 191 

While zealously engaged in performing the duties of his 
office, he still found time for the abstruse studies which were 
his delight. He was advanced to a more important position, 
the rectory of Allhollows, and into this work he entered with 
his usual energy. He gave one lecture each week, besides 
preaching two sermons, and still found time to pursue his 
favorite studies of Theology and Philosophy. 

At the age of forty, he published his earliest and greatest 
work, entitled De Legihus Naturae, The merit of this work 
is found in the matter rather than in its style, which is prolix 
and destitute of strength and perspicuity. 

One day entering into a coffee-house to read the papers, 
as was his custom, he was greatly surprised to see the item : 
"The King has nominated Dr. Cumberland to the Bishopric of 
Peterborough." He accepted this appointment, with some 
hesitation, and applied himself to the duties of this new 
office with his usual zeal. 

He prepared several other works, besides that on the laws 
of nature, among which was one on Jeicish Weights and 
Measures, and he undertook the study of the Coptic language 
when eighty-three years of age. 

Cumberland's greatest work, however, was De Legihus 
Naturae, in which are found his philosophical theories. He 
says: ''The laws of nature are immutably true propositions, 
regulative of voluntary actions as to the choice of good and 
the avoidance of evil, and which carry with them an obliga- 
tion to outward acts of obedience, even apart from civil 
laws, and from any considerations of compact constituting 
governments." 

The above definition, by its prolixity and range, shows his 
defects, both in style and thought. A proposition is a state- 
ment in some form of language. How then can a law of 
nature be a proposition.^ Again, his definition can apply 
only to a moral law. Cumberland said it w^ould be accepted 
by all parties, forgetting that it is the very thing that would 
not be accepted by Hobbes, agahist whom he was contending. 

In the discovery of the laws of nature, Cumberland does not 
have recourse to innate ideas, or employ the intuitions of 
reason, but he rises by induction from nature to nature's 
God, and thence descends to universal laws. All the laws 
of morals, Cumberland reduces to the law of benevolence, 



192 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

which he thus states: ''The common good is the supreme 
law," and again: ''The greatest possible benevolence of every 
rational agent towards all the rest constitutes the happiest 
state of each and all so far as depends on their own power, 
and is necessarily required for their happiness." Again: 
"No action can be called morally good which does not, in its 
own nature, contribute to the happiness of men." These 
statements are propositions expressing moral law, and do not 
include physical laws. Cumberland, however, did well to 
give benevolence its high rank among the virtues. An act 
which contributes to the comfort of a brute is a benevolent 
act, though it has no reference to the happiness of men, 
except to the pleasure of the doer. The last quotation from 
Cumberland shows that he was not a critical thinker, and 
his defects in style and thought hindered the general useful- 
ness of his work. 

4. Locke (1623-1704). John Locke enjoyed the advan- 
tages of a good education, afforded by the wisdom of his 
father, a liberal Puritan, and a lawyer of Pensf ord, Somerset 
county, England. His home training was thorough, and 
continued till he was fourteen years of age, when he was sent, 
for six years, to the Westminster School, which under Puritan 
control, was a center of political agitation. From Westmin- 
ster he went to Oxford, and was placed in the charge of John 
Owen of Christ Church College. 

Locke was not pleased with the intolerance and fanaticism 
he saw manifested at Oxford, and became a firm believer in 
religious liberty and freedom of thought, and these sentiments 
he maintained all his life. He received the bachelor's degree 
in 1656, and the master's degree in 1658. In 1660, he was 
made tutor, and lectured on Greek, Rhetoric and Philosophy. 

Locke was acquainted with the writings of Descartes and 
Hobbes, and especially admired the clearness of the style of 
Descartes, though he differed from him on many points; 
but his general philosophical point of view, not the ethical 
or political, was more nearly in agreement with that of 
Hobbes. 

The natural sciences, especially physics, chemistry and 
meteorology, engaged his attention. He studied medicine, 
and though he did not take the degree, nor engage systematic- 
ally in the practice, he acquired some reputation for his 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 193 

knowledge. As secretary of William Swan, minister to the 
court of Berlin, he spent a year in that city, and returning 
to Oxford, was introduced to Ashley Cooper, afterwards 
Earl of Shaftesbury, and gave him medical advice greatly to 
the benefit of his health, and they became fast friends for 
life. His relations with Shaftesbury brought him into con- 
tact with public men, and thus broadened his views of the 
world. He became acquainted with Lord Halifax, the Duke 
of Buckingham, the Earl of Northumberland, whom he 
accompanied to France. Having gone to Montpelier for his 
health, he made the acquaintance of Lord Herbert, Earl of 
Pembroke, and to him he afterwards dedicated his great 
work on Human Understanding, 

The papers left by Locke, in his Oxford period, throw light 
on his mental development. They relate to the following 
subjects: Roman Commonwealth, Sacerdotal Christianity, In- 
fallibility in the Interpretation of Scripture, Utilitarian Ethics, 

Locke shared in the political fortunes of Shaftesbury and 
accompanied him to Holland, when he was forced to leave 
England. Influenced by the Court party, Charles II signed 
a warrant which struck Locke's name from the list of names 
of the members of the University of Oxford; but for this he 
was more than compensated by his gaining the friendship of 
William of Orange, whom he accompanied to England, which 
had chosen him and his wife, Mary, joint sovereigns of the 
realm. 

Locke spent the last years of his life in the home of Sir 
Francis Masham at Oates, in the vicinity of London. Lady 
Masham, a highly gifted woman, was the daughter of Cud- 
worth, the distinguished philosopher of Cambridge. Tender- 
ly cared for by this kind family, the great philosopher quietly 
passed to his rest. 

While at Oxford, Locke was in the habit of meeting with a 
few select friends for the purpose of discussing important 
subjects. He thus gives the origin of his greatest work: 
''Five or six friends meeting in my chamber, and discoursing 
on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly 
at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. . . . 
It came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and 
that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature 
it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what 



194 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal 
with. ... It was agreed that this should be our first 
inquiry. . . . When I put pen to paper, I thought all 
I should have to say on this matter would have been in one 
sheet of paper; but the farther I went, the larger prospect 
I had; new discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensi- 
bly to the bulk it now appears in." 

The writing continued, with many interruptions, for 
a period of twenty years, when the great work appeared with 
the title: An Essay concerning Human Understanding. The 
* 'Essay" consists of four books: In the first, Locke criticizes 
the doctrine of innate ideas; in the second, he attempts to 
show that all knowledge is gained from experience, through 
sensation and reflection; in the third, he treats of the bearing 
of language on thought, and considers the nature of generic 
concepts; in the fourth, he distinguishes between the differ- 
ent kinds of knowledge, and discusses the limits of knowledge. 
It is, however, probable that the fourth and second books 
were written first, and that the order was changed in the 
final make up of the treatise. 

Locke says: "First, I shall inquire into the original of those 
ideas, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man 
observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and 
the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished 
with them. 

Secondly, I shall endeavor to show what knowledge the 
understanding hath by those ideas, and the certainty, evi- 
dence, and extent of it. 

Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature of 
faith or opinion, . . . and shall have occasion to examine 
the reason and degrees of assent''' 

Locke means by the word idea, ''whatsoever is the object of 
the understanding when a man thinks; . . . whatever is 
meant by phantasm, notion, species.'" Two things need to be 
considered: The nature of ideas, and their origin. It would 
seem to be necessary first to inquire into the nature of ideas, 
and then ascertain their origin, otherwise we should raise 
inquiries as to the origin of that of which we have no clear 
conception. 

Locke, however, first inquires how ideas come into the 
mind. His contention is that there are no innate ideas, no 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 195 

innate principles. In this Locke is certainly right; for neither 
ideas nor principles are born with us, and this Locke shows 
by abundant argument and illustrations. Though ideas are 
not innate, yet it is true that powers, susceptibilities, or faculties 
are innate, that they assert themselves under proper condi- 
tions, and this Locke did not deny. We have no innate ideas, 
but we have innate powers, though at first undeveloped. 

Locke lays down the proposition that all our ideas come 
from sensation or reflection, **Let us then suppose the mind 
to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without 
any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? . . . To this 
I answer, in one word, from experience,'' This experience 
relates either to external objects or to the internal operations 
of our minds. 

''First, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible 
objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions 
of things, . . and thus we come by those ideas we have 
of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, , . 
This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending 
wholly upon the senses, . . I call Sensation,'' 

''Secondly, The other fountain from which experience 
furnisheth the understanding with ideas is the perception 
of the operations of our own mind. . . and such are per- 
ception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, 
willing. . . . This source of ideas every man has in him- 
self, . . . and might properly enough be called internal 
sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this Reflec- 
tion," 

As Locke lays down a thesis: All ideas come from sensation 
or reflection, which he then attempts to prove, his method is 
rather that of an advocate or controversialist, than that of an 
investigator. He thus ignores rational intuition, or reason, 
not reasoning. But Locke says: ''He would be thought 
void of common sense, who, asked, on the one side, or on the 
other side, went to give a reason, why it is impossible for the 
same thing to be and not to be. It carries its own light and 
evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that under- 
stands the terms assents to it for its own sake, or else nothing 
will be ever able to prevail with him to do it." Did Locke 
know that by sensation? Did he know it by reflection? 
He knew it by reason, or rational intuition, yet he ignored 
that method of knowledge. 



1&6 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Though the principle, '^It is impossible for the same thing to 
be and not to be,'' is not innate, yet the reason, which appre- 
hends this impossibihty, is innate, and the apprehension 
occurs as soon as the mind understands the significance of 
the proposition. Experience may tell us that this or that 
event has a cause, but not that every event must have a 
cause. 

Locke's views in regard to space are not altogether con- 
sistent. He says: "We get the idea of space both from 
sight and touch." Can we see space? Can we touch it? 
We see bodies and touch them, but not space itself. A body 
is contained in space and moves in space; yet the body is not 
the space which contains it, and in which it moves. This 
Locke himself admits. He says: *'I appeal to every man's 
own thought whether the idea of space be not as distinct 
from that of solidity, as it is from the idea of scarlet color. 

. . . Motion is not space nor space motion; space can 
exist without motion; but motion can not be without space." 

In fact, space is the necessary condition of body and of 
motion; it is that in which bodies are situated and motion 
takes place; it is the infinite room for the entire universe; 
it is that in which the sun and its attendant planets speed on 
their course; that in which the stars, with their accompanying 
worlds, pursue their ceaseless journeys. The annihilation 
of the universe would not be the annihilation of space. Ether, 
so far as we know, may fill all space, leaving no void, but 
ether is not the space it fills, and were there no ether, space 
would still remain. It is not the object of power, and it 
implies no limitation of God's power to say that, as necessary 
and eternal, it was not created, neither can it be destroyed; 
but our idea of space might be destroyed. 

It implies no contradiction to suppose any body or all 
bodies non-existent; body is contingent, and the idea of 
body is gained by experience; but body being known, space 
is apprehended by reason as a necessary existence, not only 
necessary to the existence of body, but absolutely necessary. 
In the order of acquisition, the idea of body is chronologically 
the antecedent of the idea of space; but in the order of depend- 
ence, space is the logical antecedent of body, that is, if there 
were no space, there could be no body. We get the idea of 
body through the senses, but we do not get the idea of space 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 197 

through any of the senses, nor by reflecting on the ideas we 
acquire through the senses, but we apprehend space by 
reason, as that without which body could not be, as the 
necessary condition of body. Locke's thesis that all our 
ideas come from sensation or reflection is therefore not true. 
The idea of space is, however, not innate, but reason itself 
is innate, and it apprehends space when the proper condi- 
tions are met, though not before. 

Let a point move in a straight line, with the velocity of 
light, for a million years, and let this line revolve about its 
origin, in the same plane, it will generate an immense circle 
and let the generated circle revolve about any diameter, the 
immense sphere generated by the revolving circle is to the 
outlying space as one to infinity. Experience is no witness, 
the senses fail, even the imagination cannot picture the 
immensity, yet reason apprehends the sublime reality of the 
infinity of space. 

In regard to time Locke says: "Men derive their ideas of 
duration from their reflection on their trains of ideas they 
observe succeed one another in their own understandings. 
The constant and regular succession of ideas is the measure 
and standard of all other succession." This is well enough; 
men get their notion of succession from their experience of 
phenomena appearing then disappearing, followed by other 
phenomena, and so on in continued series. 

But Locke goes on to say: *'Time is duration set out by 
measures. . . This consideration of duration, as set out 
by certain periods, and marked by certain measures of epochs 
is that, I think, which we most properly call time." 

The consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, 
may give the idea of time, but is not time itself. Succession 
requires time, but is not time itself. The idea of time, how- 
ever, is not innate, ready in the mind to account for succes- 
sion, but time is apprehended by reason as the necessary 
condition of succession; it is that in which things persist and 
succession takes place. In the chronological order succession 
is experience before time is apprehended, and without this 
experience, there would be no call for the apprehension of 
time; but succession requires time for its possibility; but 
time being apprehended, it is known to be an eternal reality. 



198 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The function of reason, or rational intuition, is to give the 
fundamental conditions of phenomenal reality; but reason 
Locke ignored. 

Locke identifies time with succession. Time, however, is 
the condition of succession; it is that without which succession 
could not take place; it is not cause, the dynamical condition 
of succession; but it is the blank continuance, the non-dynam- 
ical condition of succession, the room, to draw a figure of 
speech from space, in which succession takes place. A con- 
sciousness of succession is the condition of our apprehension 
of the reality of time, though time itself does not cease to be 
when we are asleep and are no longer conscious of succession. 
Time, not in its Theological acceptance, but in its Metaphysi- 
cal, is infinite, and is identical with eternity. 

Without the idea of succession, we never would have had 
that of time. In the order of acquisition, the idea of suc- 
cession is before that of time, but in the logical order, the 
order of dependence, time itself is the antecedent of succession, 
and without time, succession would be impossible. In 
Locke's system, however, these obvious distinctions are con- 
fused. 

The ideas of body, of succession, external or internal, of 
motion, and, in general, of the phenomenal, are acquired 
through the senses or by consciousness, but the ideas of space, 
or time, of the infinite, are apprehended by reason, whenever 
we have the ideas of the phenomenal, of the finite. The 
phenomenal, the finite, is known empirically, through the 
senses or by consciousness; but the necessary, the infinite, 
is apprehended rationally; yet the idea of the infinite is no 
less clear and positive than that of the finite. Obscure the 
infinite may be to the senses or to the imagination, but it is 
clear and positive to the reason. 

Locke calls the idea of the infinite, negative. Of course, 
the infinite is the negative of the finite, and so is the finite 
the negative of the infinite; the ideas of the finite and infinite 
are equally negative, and also equally positive. 

Locke says number affords the clearest idea of infinity; 
but every specified number is definite and finite, however 
great it may be. The succession of numbers, however far 
it may be carried, gives the indefinite, a much vaguer idea 
than that of the infinite. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 199 

As to personal identity, Locke begins well by saying: *'We 
must consider what person stands for, which I think is a 
thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and 
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places, which it does only by that consciousness 
which Is inseparable from thinking and, as it seems to me, 
essential to it. . . For since consciousness always accompanies 
thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what 
he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, that 
is, the sameness of a rational being; and as far as consciousness 
can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, 
so far reaches the identity of that person, it is the same 
self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this 
present one that now reflects on it that that action was 
done." 

In saying: '*In this (consciousness) alone consists personal 
identity and as far as this consciousness can be extended 
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the 
identity of that person', Locke seems to identify the person 
with his consciousness, and assumes that consciousness can 
be extended backwards; but the fact is, personal identity is 
the essential sameness of the ego or self, and continues while 
the ego is unconscious in sleep, while consciousness is a 
phenomenon of the ego; nor can consciousness, which is a 
present psychical phenomenon, but not the ego itself, be 
extended backwards at all. Locke probably meant memory; 
but memory, though affording the evidence of personal identi- 
ty, does not constitute it. If personal identity, the essential 
sameness of the ego, were not a fact, memory itself would be 
impossible; for a person losing his identity, and turning into 
another person, would, as this second person, have no knowl- 
edge of the experience of the first; but since he remembers his 
former experience, he must be the same person that had that 
experience, otherwise he could not remember it. Memory, 
though the proof of personal identity, is not personal identity 
itself. Consciousness, though not the ego, is the recognition 
of the activity of the ego. 

In regard to substance, Locke says: "I confess there is 
another idea, which would be of general use for mankind to 
have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it, and that is the 



200 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

idea of substance, which we neither have nor can have by 
sensation or reflection.'' If we neither have nor can have 
the idea of substance by sensation or by reflection, then it is 
plain, that, according to Locke's theory, we can not have the 
idea of substance at all, since he derives all our ideas through 
sensation or reflection. 

The fact, however, that the word substance is in common 
use, is evidence that we attach some meaning to it, and what 
that meaning is may be inferred from the etymology of the 
word. Substance, from sub and sto, signifies an underlying 
support of attributes, qualities, activities, operations, acci- 
dents, such as form, hardness, elasticity, etc., of material 
bodies, known as external phenomenon by perception through 
the senses, or the source of cognitions, feeling, volitions, 
known as internal phenomena through consciousness. But 
attributes, qualities, activities, are not self-supporting; they 
are not attributes of nothing, but of something capable of 
supporting them; they require substance as their ground or 
source. Thus, hardness is the attribute of a solid body; so 
also thinking implies a thinker, A vacuum is not hard; 
neither can a vacuum think, nor feel, nor will. Thinking, 
as an act, is not the act of nothing, but of an actor capable 
of thinking. 

Again we have, says Locke, "no clear ideas of substance in 
general." Of course not if we attempt to obtain this idea 
through sensation or reflection, neither of which can give 
us this idea. The idea of substance is rationally apprehended 
as the necessary condition or support of attributes; it is the 
fact of substance that is clear to the eye of reason, not its 
essence or the mystery of its existence. 

Locke says: "Substance and attributes are of little use in 
philosophy;" but the fact is, the modes of acquiring a knowl- 
edge of attributes and of substance, reveals to man the 
nature of his intellect as both empirical and rational; facts, 
phenomena, are acquired by experience through sensation 
or consciousness; substance, the source of the facts, is appre- 
hended by reason as their condition, as that without which, 
the facts would be impossible. 

Again says Locke: "All our ideas of the several sorts of 
substances, are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with a 
supposition of something to which they belong, and in which 
they subsist, though of this supposed something, we have 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 201 

no clear or distinct idea at all." Not clear empirically, 
it is true, but clear when rationally apprehended. Locke's 
doctrine naturally led to the skepticism of Hume, who denied 
the substantial existence of mind, though allowing a string of 
ideas belonging to nobody. Concerning cai^5^, Locke says: 
*'A cause is that which makes any other thing, either simple 
idea, substance or mode, begin to be; and an effect is that 
which had its beginning from some other things." Again: 
"We may observe that the notion of cause and effect has its 
rise from ideas received from sensation or reflection." Also: 
"We call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in 
wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect." Locke distin- 
guishes properly between creation, generation, making, altera- 
tion, all of which are effects of causes, though different kinds 
of effects. 

The senses, indeed, give us succession, vicissitude, but 
evidently do not give the efficiency, the energy which produces 
succession; neither does reflection on sensation give us efficien- 
cy, but only an expectation of like consequences in similar 
cases. The relation of cause and effect is more than that of 
antecedence and consequence. The cause is efficient in pro- 
ducing the effect; for if it had no influence in bringing the 
effect into existence, if it has no efficiency, it might as well 
be absent; but if not present, the effect does not occur; it is, 
therefore, efficient in producing the effects. 

The energy, the efficiency, the nature of cause is indeed 
revealed to us by our own efforts in producing results. Thus 
in raising a heavy weighty I first will to raise it, and then put 
forth the effort to execute the decision of the will. The 
effort taxes my strength, and reveals to me the nature of 
cause as force, energy, efficiency, or power, called into action. 
Thus having acquired the idea of cause, we rationally appre- 
hend that every event proves the necessity of a cause; for 
an event, before its occurrence, is a non-entity; and non- 
entity, having no existence, has no power to turn itself into 
entity. We acquire the knowledge of events and the nature of 
cause, empirically, and without this empirical knowledge, 
reason would have no occasion for affirming cause; but events 
being given empirically, also the nature of cause, reason 
apprehends the necessity of cause as the condition of events, 
and affirms the law of causality — that every event must have a 
cause. 



202 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

In regard to morals, Locke says: "Good and evil are 
nothing but pleasure and pain, or that which occasions or 
procures pleasure or pain to us." Again: 'Things are good 
or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain." In Ethics, 
Locke was a utilitarian; but "good'' should signify not only 
sensational pleasure, but happiness, the rational satisfaction 
of a clear conscience. 

Locke considers three kinds of law: '*Divine law, the 
measure of sin and duty; civil law, the measure of crime and 
innocence; and philosophic law, the measure of virtue and 
Vice. 

With respect to the divine law, Locke says: '*God has 
given a rule whereby men should govern themselves; . . . 
and he has power to enforce the law by rewards and punish- 
ments of infinite weight and duration in another life. . . . 
This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude." 

As to the civil law, Locke says: ''The civil law is another 
rule to which men refer their actions to judge whether they 
be criminal or no." The commonwealth protects the obedi- 
ent, and punishes the disobedient. 

In regard to the philosophic law, the law of opinion or 
reputation, Locke says: "Virtue and vice are names pre- 
tended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in 
their own nature, right and wrong; and as far as they really 
are so applied, they are so far coincident with the divine 
law. . . . These names, virtue and vice, in the particu- 
lar instances of their application, through the several notions 
and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed 
only to such actions, as in each country and society are in 
reputation or discredit; but everywhere virtue and praise, 
vice and blame go together." The accepted standards may 
differ in different nations. 

Locke is not quite clear as to the essence of virtue or 
the foundation of moral obligation. An act is not right be- 
cause it is rewarded; neither is it wrong because it is punished. 
It is rewarded because it is considered right, and punished 
because it is considered wrong. An act is indeed right or 
wrong according as it obeys or disobeys a righteous law. 
But what makes a law righteous.^ Is it because it is enacted 
by an authority able to reward obedience and to punish 
disobedience .f^ No, a law is righteous because obedience to 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 203 

it results in good and disobedience in evil. The good or the 
evil is not chiefly the reward or the punishment, externally, 
artificially, or arbitrarily annexed to obedience or to disobedi- 
ence, though it is true that these may properly be considered. 
The good secured by obedience to righteous law is threefold 
— the ennobling and satisfying effect upon self, the good confer- 
red upon others by sympathy, justice, or benevolence, and the 
external reward. The evil following disobedience is likewise 
threefold — the degradation and the consequent dissatisfac- 
tion, the wrong to others through antipathy, injustice, or 
malevolence, and the external punishment. Why is a certain 
action right or wrong .^ To say that it is right because it is 
right, or wrong because it is wrong, or that right and wrong 
are ultimate, right finding its justification in itself, and like- 
wise, that in itself, wrong finds its condemnation, however 
well meant, is altogether a mistake. Right finds its basis 
in good and wrong in evil, in general prosperity, or adversity. 
Subjective good or the evil is not chiefly pleasure or pain, but 
the satisfaction of conscience bestowed on distinterested 
conduct or noble achievement, or the remorse of conscience 
from unjust conduct or degrading vice. 

Locke's treatment of the association of ideas, his discussion 
of language, and proof of the existence of God, are of great 
value, and certainly are well worthy of careful study. 

Locke was a man of great ability, honest and candid, and 
he expressed his thoughts in such language as can be under- 
stood by people of average intelligence. 

5. Dr, Samuel Clarke (1765-1729). Samuel Clarke was 
the son of Edward Clarke, an alderman of Norwich, who, 
for several years, represented that city as member of the 
House of Commons. 

Having completed his preparatory course at Norwich, 
Clarke entered Caius College, Cambridge, where he soon 
made himself felt by the manifestation of superior ability. 

Clarke may be regarded as the leader of the reaction 
against the extreme empiricism of Locke, as will be apparent 
from a consideration of his works. Descartes' system, then 
dominant at the University, was mastered by Clarke, as also 
were the new doctrines of Newton, and the Physics of Ro- 
hault of which Clarke gave an accurate translation, adding 
explanatory notes. 



204 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Whiston, a celebrated mathematician and divine, meeting 
Clarke, at a coffee house, and entering into conversation with 
him, was surprised to find a young man so well informed 
in regard to the researches of Descartes, Rohault and Newton, 
which were generally unknown except to a few leading 
mathematicians. 

Clarke turned his attention to Theology, and taking 
holy orders, he became chaplain to Bishop Moore, of Norwich. 
In 1699, he published two essays — one on practical religion, 
and the other a defence of some of Milton's writings; and 
in 1701, he published a paraphrase of Matthew's gospel, 
which was followed by like paraphrases of the other gospels. 
About this time. Bishop Moore gave him the rectory of 
Draton, and secured for him a parish in the city. 

In 1704, having been appointed to the Boyle lectureship, 
he took for his subject, " The Being and Attributes of God, the 
Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty 
of Christianity'' He wrote, in 1706, a refutation of some 
opinions of Dr. Dodwell on immortality, which led to a con- 
troversy with Collins. About this time, he wrote a Latin 
translation of Newton's Optics, for which Newton presented 
him with £500. 

He was appointed by Queen Anne, as one of her chaplains, 
and in 1709 was made rector of St. James', Westminster. 
With this elevation, he received the Degree of Doctor of 
Divinity, defending, as his thesis, the two propositions: 
^^No article of Christian Faith, delivered in the Holy Scriptures, 
is repugnant to right reason;" and ''Without the liberty of 
human action, there can be no true religion," Also, in the 
same year, he revised Whiston's translation of the Apostolic 
Constitutions. 

In 171^, Clarke published an annotated and illustrated 
edition of Caesar's Commentaries, also a treatise on the 
Trinity which called forth a lively discussion. In 1715-16, 
he was engaged in a discussion with Leibniz, and in 1724, 
he published a volume of sermons. 

On the death of Newton in 1727, he was offered the master- 
ship of the mint, worth £1500 a year; but this offer he de- 
clined, which self-denying act, Whiston regarded as one of 
the most glorious actions of his life. 

By royal command, he published, in 1729, an edition, 
in quarto form, of the first twelve books of Homer's Ihad, 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 205 

which task he performed in such a manner as to be worthy 
of the perusal of the young prince for whose use it was in- 
tended. 

Sunday morning, May 17, 1729, on going out to preach 
before the judges, he was suddenly taken with sickness which 
caused his death on the following Saturday. 

An exposition of the church catechism, which he had, for 
some months, been giving as lectures, Thursday mornings, at 
St. James' church and ten volumes of his sermons were 
published soon after his death. Truly it can be said that 
Dr. Clarke lived a strenuous life. 

Clarke had a cheerful disposition and was a man of fine 
social qualities, and if he is not to be regarded as of the first 
rank in philosophy, he had great ability as a philologist, 
mathematician and logician, as shown in his controversy 
with Collins and Leibniz. 

Clarke's standing, as a philosopher, rests chiefly upon his 
demonstration of the existence of God and his theory of 
morals. 

In his Theistic argument, Clarke maintained the following 
propositions: That something is eternal; that there has ex- 
isted from eternity some one immutable and independent 
being; that the eternal being is self -existent; that the sub- 
stance or essence of the self -existing being is incomprehensible; 
that many of the attributes of that being are demonstrable 
as well as his existence; that the self -existent being is infinite 
and omnipresent; that he is one; that he is intelligent; that 
he has liberty; that he has infinite power; that he is infinitely 
wise and good. 

To establish the proposition that God is eternal and omni- 
present, Clarke contended that time and space are not sub- 
stances, but that they are attributes of God. Of course, 
they are not substances; they have no dynamic power; they 
did not create the universe. Are time and space attributes 
of God, in the sense that they exist only in him, and that if 
God did not exist, time and space would not be realities .^^ 
It is true that reason affirms the eternity of God and does not 
deny his omnipresence; but the eternity and omnipresence 
of God, no more imply that time and space are not inde- 
pendent realities, and that they can have no existence, save 
as attributes of God, than that the time of a man's life, or 



206 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

the space his body occupied, at a particular time, can have 
no existence save as attributes of that man. The actual time 
of a man's life and the space his body occupied, at any time, 
are realities that would have been if tlie man had never 
existed; and the same is true in regard to any other man, or 
in regard to all human beings, or to any being whatever. 

If God did not exist, time and space would still remain; 
they can not be annihilated. Should it be said that God is a 
necessary existence, and that, therefore, it is absurd to 
suppose his non-existence, the reply is, it is true that God is 
the necessary condition of the universe, and since the universe 
is, God must be; that is, God is conditionally necessary. 
Reason affirms, not the absolute necessity of God, but his 
conditional necessity, just as reason affirms the necessity of 
cause, if an event takes place; but reason does not affirm 
the absolute existence of cause, that is, of cause, if there is 
no event to be accounted for; neither does reason affirm the 
absolute necessity of God, but only his conditional necessity, 
from the fact of the existence of the universe. Time and 
space might have been eternal blanks, nothing else existing, 
so far as reason declares the contrary. 

Clarke based his theory of morals on the eternal fitness of 
things; but the eternal fitness of things can exist only between 
eternal things, and if things were not eternal they would 
have no eternal fitness; and herein morals differ from mathe- 
matics. The truths of Geometry, relating, as they do, to the 
forms of space, would still be eternal, were there nothing 
existing save time and space. 

The fitness of things, in their relations to one another, 
within the moral sphere, affords reasons for the moral laws, as 
divine commandments, and renders conformity thereto 
reasonable and obligatory. The moral laws, therefore, have 
relation to the will, and should regulate its decisions when- 
ever moral principle is involved; and though a human being 
can violate these laws, he is under moral obligation to render 
them cheerful obedience. Virtue is the voluntary conformity 
of conduct to the fitness of things in the moral realm. As 
secondary reasons for right conduct, reward follows obedience 
to moral law, and punishment follows disobedience. These 
are prudential reasons for obeying the law. 



MODERN PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH 207 

Clarke insisted on reason or rational intuition, as having 
great value in philosophy, and herein he differs from Locke, 
who theoretically ignores reason, as a primitive source of 
knowledge, yet he uses rational intuition in his reasonings, 
as seen in his demonstration of the existence of God, which 
does not differ materially from that of Clarke's. 



CHAPTER XIX 

Berkeley and Hume 

i: Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753). George Berkeley, son 
of William Berkeley, was born in a cottage attached to the 
castle of Dysert in the county of Kilkenny, Ireland. He 
received his primary education at the Kilkenny School, from 
which he passed to Trinity College, Dublin. 

The incidents of his life at Trinity are revealed chiefly 
through his Commonplace Book. The head of the college 
was Browne, a controversialist, and the antagonist of the 
free thinker Tolland. At that time, William King, the 
Archbishop of Dublin, the author of a treatise on the Origin 
of Evil, and well worthy of his reputation as a speculative 
thinker, was an important factor in promoting the philosophi- 
cal activity, then the prevailing influence at Trinity College. 

The works of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes and Locke, to- 
gether with the Physics of Boyle, the Principia of Newton, 
and his method of Fluxions, the Calculus of Leibniz, and his 
controversies and philosophic speculations, were all well 
known at the college and were subjected to careful, critical 
study. A philosophical society was formed by Berkeley and 
a few of his friends for the purpose of discussing the doctrines 
of these great thinkers, chiefly those of Boyle and Newton 
in Physics, and Locke in Metaphysics. This was a good 
atmosphere to develop the philosophic genius of such a mind 
as Berkeley's. 

The Master's degree was conferred on Lerkeley in 1707, 
and in the same year he was made tutor in the College and 
admitted to a Junior Fellowship. About this time, he pub- 
lished some mathematical tracts, which show his familiarity 
with the works of Descartes, Newton and Leibniz. In 1709, 
he received Deacon's orders. 

In Berkeley's Commonplace Book are found such records 
as the following: "I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any 
great man. I act not out of prejudice or prepossession. . . 
The chief thing I do, or pretend to do, is only to remove the 

208 



BERKELEY AND HUME 209 

mist and veil of words. This it is that has occasioned ignor- 
ance and confusion. . . If men would lay aside words 
in thinking, 'tis impossible they should ever mistake, save 
only in matters of fact. . . The philosophers talk much 
of a distinction between absolute and relative things, that is, 
things considered in their own nature, and the same things 
considered in respect to us. I know not what they mean by 
things considered in themselves. This is nonsense — jargon. 
Thing and idea are words of much about the same extent 
and meaning. By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable 
thing. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. Existence 
is not conceivable without perception and volition. I only 
declare the meaning of the word, as far as I can comprehend 
it. Existence is perceiving and willing, or else being per- 
ceived and willed. Existence is not intelligible without 
perception and volition — not distinguishable therefrom. All 
things are ideas. " This is idealism outright, pure and simple. 

A thing, of course, is neither perceivable nor intelligible 
without mental action, but that does not prove that it may 
not he without mental action. 

The word idea, as employed by Locke, was not restricted 
to the usage of Plato, signifying the archetype after which the 
thing was made, nor was it restricted to a mental picture, as 
in the prevailing more modern usage, but as signifying what- 
ever is apprehended whether a mental fact or an external 
appearance. Things, it is true, can be realized by our con- 
sciousness, only as phenomena, internal or external; but there 
may be an objective factor, so far as shown to the contrary, 
unrealized until brought within synthetic relation to our 
senses, when it is then followed by sensation caused by the 
action and reaction of object and subject. The sensation is 
interpreted by the judgment and ideated by the imagination, 
which is the process called perception. The word phenomenon, 
as a synonym of idea, may therefore be applied to whatever 
we are conscious of, whether a mental state or an external 
appearance. 

Locke regarded the secondary qualities of matter, the 
smell, taste, color, as subjective affections, or possibly as the 
occult qualities of things which cause these affections; but 
the primary qualities, as objective, he considered as really 
existing in things, and corresponding to our notions of them. 



210 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Berkeley regarded the so-called material objects, with all 
their qualities, primary and secondary, as ideas. He held 
that things objective to ourselves are ideas of the Divine 
mind, which, as objects of our perceptions, are mistaken for 
material bodies. 

Berkeley's career as a philosopher finds its origin especially 
in Locke's treatise on the Human Understanding, and natur- 
ally divides into three periods: The first at Trinity College; 
the second in England, France and America; the third, again 
in Ireland. 

In the first period, he published his Essay towards a New 
Theory of Vision. He maintained that the so-called material 
things are merely phenomenal; that they are ideas truly 
objective, existing in the mind of God, or that it is God 
that causes the ideas we see. 

The genesis of Berkeley's Idealism is revealed by the 
theories of perception made by Descartes, Malebranche, and 
Locke. Descartes held that the essence of matter is exten- 
sion, that it has no dynamic properties, and that the percep- 
tion of matter is a miracle. Malebranche though admitting 
that matter might act on the sense organs, denied that it 
could act on mind, but that, on the occasion of the excitation 
of an organ of sense by an external object, God intervenes, 
and causes a sensation to incite attention to the idea which 
he then presents and which is the thing actually perceived. 
Locke says: ''The mind knows not things immediately, but 
only by the intervention of ideas it has of them. Our knowledge 
is therefore real only so far as there is a conformity between 
our ideas and the relation of things." But what shall be 
the criterion, how shall the mind, when it perceives nothing 
but its own ideas, know that they agree with the things 
themselves .f^ It is evident that the mind can not know this 
agreement, unless it knows the things independently of the 
ideas; but then the ideas would not be necessary to a knowl- 
edge of the things. Either the ideas or the things are super- 
fluous; but as we certainly knows the idea, Berkeley rejected 
the material thing as an incumbrance and altogether useless, 
and denied its existence, maintaining that the idea is the 
thing and the thing the idea. We quote from his Principles 
of Human Knowledge: "But, say you, though the ideas them- 
selves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things 



BERKELEY AND HUME 211 

like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which 
things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. 
I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea, a color or 
figure can be like nothing but another color or figure. . . . 
But, say you, there is nothing easier than for me to imagine 
trees, for instance in a park, or books existing in a closet, and 
nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may do so, 
there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, 
than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books 
and trees, and omitting to frame the idea of any one that may 
perceive them. But do you not yourself perceive or think 
of them all the while? . . A little attention will discover 
to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and 
inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to 
do anything, or strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything. 
. . . It remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an 
incorporeal active substance or spirit . . I find I can ex- 
cite ideas in my mind at pleasure and vary and shift the 
scene as oft as I think fit. . . But whatever power I may 
have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually per- 
ceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will. When 
in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to 
choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particu - 
lar objects shall present themselves to my view; and so like- 
wise as to the hearing and the other senses, the ideas im- 
printed on them are not creatures of my will. There is, 
therefore, some other Will or Spirit that produces them. 
Now the set of rules, or established methods wherein the 
Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are 
called the laws of Nature. . . . The ideas imprinted on 
the senses by the Author of nature are called real things; and 
those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid and 
constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things. 
I do not argue against the existence of any thing that we 
can apprehend either by sense or by reflection. That the 
things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands, really 
exist, I make not the lea«t question. The only thing whose 
existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter 
or Corporeal substance, . . . But after all, you say, it 
sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are 
clothed wdth ideas. I acknowledge it does so — the word idea 



212 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

not being used in common discourse to signify the several 
combinations of sensible qualities which are called things." 

In calling the ideas imprinted on our senses, by the Author 
of nature, the real things, Berkeley is more nearly in agree- 
ment with the popular view than is commonly supposed; 
for the people generally regard the appearances of what they 
see, as fields, trees, houses, cattle grazing on the hills, the 
clouds, birds flying in the air, as the things themselves; he 
is in disagreement with the philosophers, who suppose, what 
Berkeley denied, a substance or underlying substratum, not 
visible, nor manifest to any of the senses, but as the cause 
exhibiting the phenomena. We do not see the energy of the 
thing which acts on our senses. 

Berkeley differed from the people in this, that they hold 
that things would remain though no mind were present to 
behold them, or that no mind anywhere imagined their ex- 
istence, while he, identifying the idea with the thing, main- 
tained that the thing, as idea, ceases to be when no longer 
present to any mind; for to suppose otherwise is to call that 
an appearance, which does not appear, which is a contradic- 
tion. True, but the energy of the thing does not cease to be 
when the idea of the thing vanishes from a human mind. 

There is, however, in perception, something more than an 
idea imprinted on the senses — that which imprints the idea, 
an energy, a cause; and this energy, this cause, is not the 
idea itself; for this idea, as Berkeley himself shows, is not 
active but passive or inert, and though we may admit with 
Berkeley that the idea he calls the thing no longer exists 
when not in any mind, this energy, this cause remains, as we 
may verify by placing ourselves in the proper relation within 
the reach of its influence. Berkeley declares this energy to 
be manifested by the Author of nature, whose presence per- 
vades every object of the universe, and whose will is the 
cause of their manifestations. This cause Berkeley holds 
is not a dead material substratum, but is a living, intelligent, 
active spirit. Objects thus constituted would remain, 
though no human being were present to behold them, or 
though no one, any where represented them as pictures in 
his imagination. Their esse is not percipi; but their esse is 
the energy which would make them percipi, were a mind 
present to perceive them. It may be said that, on this 



BERKELEY AND HUME 213 

supposition, their being is present to the mind of God, and 
that it is still true that their esse is percipi by the mind of 
God; true, still they do not vanish into non-entity, when no 
longer ideas of any human mind. It is well to keep in mind 
that God has given to human beings such a degree of liberty 
and independence that they often act contrary to God's will. 
This sinful volition is the man's own act, not God's. A 
human being would not be annihilated, if no other human 
being thought of him; the same would hold true of an animal, 
or a plant, or a crystal, or of any inanimate object; each has 
the energy of its nature, which causes it to be what it is, and 
this energy is not annihilated, when separated from the 
thought of any human being. 

Suppose some one should say to an egoistic idealist of the 
extreme subjective type: "You are nothing but an idea of 
mine, and if I should cease to think of you, at that moment, 
you would drop out of existence." The idealist would, no 
doubt, retort: "Your doctrine is all right, in principle, but 
you have made a mistake in its application. I am conscious 
of my existence, which is, therefore, a fact, and would be a 
fact, whether you thought of me or not; but nothing exists 
except myself and my ideas. It is then yourself that would 
vanish into non-entity were I to cease to think of you." 

This colloquial contest would be a drawn game. In fact no 
idealist has the temerity to contend, as he ought to, if con- 
sistent, that he and his ideas are the only realities. Berke- 
ley had the good sense to admit the existence of objective 
realities: "I assert as well as you, that since we are affected 
from without, we must allow powers to be without in a being 
distinct from ourselves. . . From the effects I see pro- 
duced, I conclude, there are actions; and because actions, 
volitions; and because there are volitions, there must be a will. 
Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or 
their archetypes, out of my mind; but being ideas, neither they 
nor their archetypes, can exist otherwise than in an under- 
standing. There is therefore an Understanding. But Will 
and Understanding constitute in its strictest sense, Mind or 
Spirit." Granting all this, it does not follow, that the spirit 
affecting us is always God, the inJBnite Spirit; human spirits 
affect us, so do animals, with their lower minds; and so do 
objects of the vegetable kingdom, and so may, since the 



214 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

contrary can not be proved, objects of the so-called inorganic 
world. A molecule is a commonwealth of atoms, or monads, 
as Leibniz held, each of which is an inextended point of 
energy, and who can tell whether it may not be a spirit, 
having intellect, sensibility and will? 

To explain perception: External things, the objects of 
knowledge, have the power to act upon and to excite the 
sense-organs of the ego or subject, of knowledge, this mechan- 
ical action, attended with the physiological excitement of the 
organ, is followed by a sensation, which is a psychical phe- 
nomenon. Reason then apprehends the conditional necessity 
of an objective cause of the sensation, and of the ego or 
subject of the sensation. The judgment, by the light of 
experience, infers what the cause is, as a real thing. The 
imagination then pictures this inference, or constructs the 
subjective idea, which is, therefore, not the objective reality 
perceived, but the mental construction of which we are con- 
scious, embodying our discoveries and inferences in regard 
to the object, and representing it, so far as it is possible for a 
mental picture to represent an objective reality. The idea 
is not the objective reality, any more than the image of 
yourself, seen behind a mirror, is yourself who stands before 
the glass. We do not perceive ideas, but construct them and 
are conscious of them. Our ideas embody our judgments 
concerning the objective causes of our sensations. 

In his Theory of Vision, Berkeley maintains that, at first, 
the sense of sight gives only colors, which may appear to 
have 07itness to one another in a mental picture, but not with 
respect to the eye itself; and that originally outness from 
the spectator is not revealed through the sense of sight, 
which instructed by the tutorship of touch and muscular 
movement, finally infers distance and magnitude with 
approximate correctness, by the interpretation of signs 
whose significance is gradually correctly learned by experi- 
ence. Likewise, by experience, the sensations gained through 
all the other senses, are interpreted, and the whole com- 
bined into the connected appearances of what is called ex- 
ternal nature, a knowledge of whose phenomena and laws 
constitute Natural Science. Partial phenomena may indeed 
be referred to finite spirits, but the universal order must be 
referred to God the Infinite Spirit. 



BERKELEY AND HUME ^15 

Berkeley's principal works are, New Theory of Vision, 
Principles of Human Understanding ^ Discourse on Passive 
Obedience, Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain, 
Dialogues, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, and The 
Analyst, a series of mathematical speculation, and his Common- 
place Booh, containing with many other things, an attack 
on the fundamental conceptions of the fluxional and infinites- 
imal calculus. 

2, Hume {\1\\-\11Q), David Hume was born at Edin- 
burgh of good family, both on his father's and mother's side. 
He passed, with credit, his educational career, but not being 
the eldest son, he received but a slender inheritance, which 
rendered it necessary that some means of support be found. 
His family supposed Law to be the proper profession for 
him, but he soon found it not to accord with his tastes. 

He says: "I found an unsurmountable aversion to every- 
thing but the pursuit of philosophy and general learning." 
Necessity, however, drove him to more active measures for 
his own support, and he resolved to become a merchant, but 
found himself unsuited to that business. 

He went to France, and spent three years very pleasantly 
in study and in composing his Treatise on Human Nature, 
which was published in 1737, in London, when he was only 
twenty-six years old. Of this publication, Hume says: 
*' Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my 
Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press, 
without such distinction as even to excite a murmur among 
the zealots." Naturally cheerful and sanguine, he soon 
recovered from the disappointment, and in 1742, published 
the first part of his Essays, which was favorably received. 

On the invitation of the Marquis of Annandale, Hume 
spent a year with him in England, and as a tutor to the 
family of the Marquis, he received such remuneration as 
materially increased his fortune. 

Accepting an invitation from Gen. St Clair to attend him, 
as secretary, in his expedition against Canada, but which 
ended as an incursion on the coast of France, he was thrown 
into military circles, and in the uniform of an aide-de-camp 
to the general, associated with officers of high rank. The 
next year, he attended the general to the courts of Vienna 
and Turin. 



216 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

At Turin, he recast the first part of his Treatise of Human 
Nature, and named it Inquiry concerning Human Under- 
standing, which met with but Httle success. 

In 1749, he went to the home of his family, where he 
composed the second part of his essay, calHng it Political 
Discussions, and he also wrote his Inquiry concerning the 
Principles of Morals, another part of his Treatise of Human 
Nature, cast anew. 

In the mean time, answers and criticisms of his works 
began to come in, of which he says : "These symptoms of a 
rising reputation gave me encouragement, as I was ever 
more disposed to see the favorable than the unfavorable 
side of things, a turn of mind which it is more happy to 
possess than to be born to an estate of ten thousand a year. " 
In 1752, his Political Discourses were published in Edin- 
burgh where he then resided, and these Discourses were 
successful on their first publication. In the same year, 
having been chosen librarian for the Faculty of Advocates, 
and enjoying the command of a large library, he formed the 
plan of writing the History of England, but appalled by the 
magnitude of the undertaking, he began with the accession 
of the house of Stuart. The work was received with a general 
howl of indignation, and then seemed to be altogether for- 
gotten. 

In his disappointment, Hume thought of retiring into 
France, changing his name, and never more to set foot in 
his native country; but war breaking out between England 
and France, he was prevented from executing his intention. 
In the next two years, he published his Natural History of 
Religion, and in 1756, the second volume of his History of 
England, continuing the narrative from the execution of 
Charles, the first, to the revolution which placed William 
and Mary on the throne. This volume of the History gave 
less oflFense than the first, but was only moderately success- 
ful. 

In 1759, Hume published his History of the House of Tudor, 
but this volume, especially the part treating of the reign of 
Elizabeth, was generally unpopular. He finally completed his 
History, going back, in the reverse order, to the beginning. 

Accepting, in 1763, an invitation from the Earl of Hert- 
ford to attend him, as secretary, in his embassy to Paris, he 
found the association with the Earl to be agreeable, and he 



BERKELEY AND HUME 217 

was highly pleased with the civiKties and consideration he 
received from the highest Kterary and social circles of Paris. 
He had now become a famous man. 

Returning to Edinburgh, Hume engaged again in philo- 
sophical labors, but in 1767, he was secretary to Gen. Conway, 
brother of the Earl of Hertford. In 1769, he returned to 
Edinburgh, enjoying, as the fruit of his arduous labors, an 
income of one thousand pounds a year. 

Hume makes the following final statement in regard to his 
own life: *'My friends never had occasion to vindicate one 
circumstance of my character and conduct. . . I cannot 
say there is no vanity in making this funeral ovation of my- 
self, and I hope it is not a misplaced one." Hume died in 
1776. 

What is the relation of Hume to Locke's philosophy.? As 
it was with Berkeley, so it was with Hume. Berkeley ac- 
cepting Locke's fundamental principle, that all our knowledge 
is derived from sensation and reflection, logically denied the 
substance of matter, and resolved the objects of perception 
into ideas; but inconsistently he held that, * 'since we are 
affected from without, there must be powers without in a 
being distinct from ourselves." How did Berkeley know 
these powers or this powerful Being.? Not from sensation, 
but perhaps he smuggled it in under the head of reflection. 
Reflection on sensation, however, does not give us the idea 
of power, which is given only by reason, or rational intuition; 
but this adds reason, as a source of knowledge, to sensation 
and reflection, which Locke held to be the only sources. 

In like manner, Hume accepting Locke's principles, re- 
jected mind as the source of the psychical phenomena of 
cognition, feeling, and volition. He says: "For my part, 
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or 
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never 
can catch myself, at any time, without a perception, and 
never can observe anything but the perception. . . If 
any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he 
has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason 
no longer with him. . . He may, perhaps, perceive some- 
thing simple and continued, which he calls himself, though I 
am certain there is no such principle in me." Was Hume 
certain of this? 



218 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

It is true that we are conscious only of phenomena; but 
perception is not the only phenomenon of which we are 
conscious. We have sensations, emotions, affections, desires, 
conceptions, judgments, reasonings, volitions, all of which are 
phenomena, and of all of which we are conscious. But are 
these phenomena self-supporting? Does thinking think? 
Thinking implies a thinker who thinks. 

When Hume said: "I always stumble on some perception 
or other," what did he mean by I? Did he mean percep- 
tion? Does perception stumble on itself? The / which 
stumbles on the perception is different from the perception 
on which it stumbles. Does the I change with the percep- 
tion? Memory, the evidence of personal identity, is proof 
that / who have a certain perception am the same I who had 
a different perception yesterday. We are conscious of the 
perception. The /, as the subject of the perception, we 
know by rational intuition, not as a fact of experience, but 
as the necessary condition of the perception — as the one 
that perceives. The same I that perceives, has sensations, 
instincts, appetites, emotions, affections, desires, volitions; 
he loves and hates, does right or wrong, and has the approba- 
tion or remorse of conscience. Perception is not the only 
mental act. 

Hume admits that his reasoning could destroy the belief 
neither in an external world of matter nor in an internal 
world of mind. The belief is natural and unayoidable, and 
is based on experience. 

To trace the connection of Locke's views of causation and 
Hume's : Locke, in calling a sensation or an idea the product 
of power, presupposes substance as truly as in calling it a 
sensible quality; but he regarded quality as inhering in the 
substance, but power he conceived to be a cause producing 
an effect, a sensation in us, not found in the substance; for 
"whatever is considered by us to operate to the producing 
of any particular simple idea which did not before exist, hath 
thereby in our minds the relation of cause." Here the idea 
has an objective factor in the thing; it has also a subjective 
factor in the mind which interprets the sensation caused by 
the thing, and ideates, pictures, or represents the cause. 
The idea following a sensation implies the presence of a 
thing acting on an organ of sense; but the idea called up in 



BERKELEY AND HUME 219 

the absence of the thing is a pure creation of the imagination, 
not caused by a sensation, yet if vivid, it may, by reflex 
action, produce a sensation, which, except in extraordinary 
cases, is much fainter than the sensation caused by the 
object. The idea of pain, following the imaginary thrust 
of the hand into the fire, is faint compared with the real pain 
attending the actual thrust, and lacks the fearful effect on the 
hand. 

The relation of cause and effect is, according to Locke, not 
contained in the thing itself, but is extraneous, and arises 
from the notice our senses take of the vicissitudes of things, 
that which produces an idea we call cause, and that which 
is produced the effect. Science assumes that, in the order of 
nature, cause signifies that which accounts for change. 

Now let us pass to Hume's theory of causation. He says: 
'T find, in the first place, that whatever objects are considered 
as causes or effects are contiguous, and that nothing can 
operate in a time or place which is ever so little removed 
from those of its existence. Though distant objects may 
sometimes seem productive of each other, they are commonly 
found, upon examination, to be linked by a chain of causes 
which are continuous among themselves and to the distant 
objects, and when we can not discover the connection, we 
still presume it to exist. We may, therefore, consider the 
relation of contiguity as essential to that of cause." 

The second relation between cause and effect, Hume de- 
clares to be that of priority, in time, in the cause before 
the effect;" that is, the cause is the antecedent, and the effect 
the consequent. This may, in general, be allowed, as when 
heat melts ice. Suppose, however, that we have the equa- 
tion: y =f(x) ; that is, ^ is a function of x, or that, if x changes, 
y changes, so as always to be equal to f{x). It is proper to 
say the change in x is logically followed by a change in y; 
but, chronologically, the change in y is simultaneous with a 
change in x, otherwise y would not always be equal to f{x) . 
Here there is no priority in time in the cause. 

The third relation between cause and effect is, according 
to Hume, that of necessary connection, which he considers of 
greater importance than the others before mentioned; but 
says he: *'When I cast my eyes on the known qualities of 
objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause 



220 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES . 

and effect depends not in the least on them. When I con- 
sider their relations, I can find none but those of contiguity 
and succession, which I have already recorded as imperfect 
and unsatisfactory." 

Hume then asks: ''First, for what reason we pronounce it 
necessary that everything whose existence has a beginning 
should have a cause? Secondly, why we conclude that 
such particular causes must necessarily have such particular 
effects; and what is the nature of that inference we draw from 
the one to the belief we repose in it?" 

Hume then examines the first question. Why do we pro- 
nounce a cause to be necessary to account for everything 
whose existence has a beginning? He says: " 'Tis a general 
maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist must 
have a cause." The truth of this maxim, Hume denies. 
He says: **A11 certainty arises from the comparison of ideas, 
and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable, 
so long as the ideas continue the same. These relations are 
resemblance, proportion in quantity and number, degrees of 
any quality, and contrariety, none of which are implied in 
this proposition, whatever has a beginning has also a cause of 
existence. That proposition is therefore not intuitively 
certain." Hume reaches this conclusion by consistently 
applying Locke's principle; All our knowledge is derived from 
sensation and reflection. Locke saved the principle of causali- 
ty, by lugging in, contrary to his principle, the necessity of 
cause, given by rational intuition, to account for the occur- 
rence of an event. Locke says. Book IV, Chap. 10, Sec. 2: 
'Tn the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, 
that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than 
that it can be equal to two right angles. . . If, therefore, 
we know there is some real being, and that non-entity cannot 
produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that 
from eternity there has been something, since what was not 
from eternity, had a beginning, and what had a beginning 
must be produced by Something else." Locke here reached 
the truth by his inconsistency to his principle; and by Hume's 
consistency with this principle, which he accepts, he mifeises 
the truth. 

But let Hume explain himself. He says: ''We can never 
demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, 



BERKELEY AND HUME 221 

or new modification of existence, without showing, at the 
same time, the impo^sibihty there is that anything can ever 
begin to exist without some productive principle; and where 
the latter proposition cannot be proved, we must despair of 
ever being able to prove the former. ... As these ideas 
of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be easy for 
us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, 
and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct 
idea of a cause or productive principle. The separation, 
therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of 
existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and is 
therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from 
mere ideas, without which it is impossible to demonstrate 
the necessity of a cause." 

The imagination can indeed picture an event without a 
cause, but what has the reason to say.^^ To suppose an event 
to happen, or a being begin to be without a cause is to sup- 
pose non-entity to jump into being; but non-entity is nothing, 
cannot, therefore, jump into being; to jump is to act, and to 
act implies that it already is, and that it is, therefore, not 
non-entity. We have here no event without a cause. Even 
Hume's imaginary object was caused by an act of his imagi- 
nation. If cause is not necessary to an event, an event with- 
out a cause should be found, which has never been the case. 
But Hume goes on with his objections to the necessity of 
cause. He says: "Everything, 'tis said, must have a cause; 
for if anything wanted a cause, it would produce itself; that 
is, exist before it existed, which is impossible. But this 
reasoning is plainly inconclusive; because it supposes, that in 
our denial of a cause, we still grant what we expressly deny, 
viz.y that there must be a cause, which, therefore, is taken to 
be the object itself, and that, no doubt, is an evident contra- 
diction." Here Hume displays his subtle power of reason- 
ing. The argument criticized does not assume that there must 
be a cause, but asserts that, according to Hume's view, non- 
entity jumps into entity, without any cause for its jumping, 
which is impossible, and from this impossibility, it infers, 
not assumes, a cause; but the idea of this extraordinary 
feat of non-entity jumping into being, was caused by the 
brilliant imagination of Hume himself. 

Again, Hume says: '"Tis exactly the same case with the 



222 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

third argument, which has been employed to demonstrate 
the necessity of a cause, whatever is produced without any 
cause is produced by nothing, or in other words has nothing 
for its cause. . . 'Tis sufficient only to observe, that when 
we exclude ail causes we really do exclude them, and neither 
suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the 
existence." Hume's answer is a just criticism on the use 
of the word produced; for produced means to be caused. 
Instead, therefore, of saying, whatever is produced without 
any cause is produced by nothing, or has nothing for its 
cause, let us say that the denial of the cause of any event is 
the affirmation that the event was not produced, but came of 
itself from non-entity into being, which is the assumption 
of an absolute commencement. Let any one accept this 
who will. If an existing thing could not have come of itself 
from non-entity into being, it must have been produced or 
caused. 

Hume next raises the question, "How experience gives 
rise to such a principle?" But this question he sinks into the 
following: **Why we concliide that such particular causes 
must necessarily have such particular effects, and why we 
form an inference from one to the other?" 

In answer to this question, Hume says: '*A11 our arguments 
concerning causes and effects consist both of an impression 
of the memory or senses, and of the idea of that existence 
which produces the object of the impression, or is produced 
by it. Here, therefore, we have three things to explain, viz., 
First, the original impression. Secondly, the transition to the 
idea of the connected cause and effect. Thirdly, the nature 
and qualities of that idea." As to the first question, he says: 
** 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty whether 
they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by 
the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the 
author of our being." 

Hume holds that "the vividness of the impressions on the 
senses and memory alone distinguishes them from the imagi- 
nation. . . 'Tis therefore by experience only that we can 
infer the existence of one object from that of another. . . 
Thus in advancing, we have insensibly discovered a new 
relation betwixt cause and effect, where we least expected 
it, and were entirely employed on another subject. This 



BERKELEY AND HUME 223 

relation is their constant conjunction. Contiguity and suc- 
cession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two 
objects to be cause and effect unless we perceive that these 
two relations are preserved in several instances." 

From the constant conjunction, Hume attempts to explain 
our belief in the necessary connection between cause and 
effect. He inquires: ''Whether experience produces the 
idea by means of the understanding or imagination; whether 
we are determined by reason to make the transition, or by a 
certain association and relation of perceptions. If reason 
determined us, it would proceed on the principle, that the 
course of nature continues always uniformly the same. . . 
There can be no demonstrative arguments to prove that 
those instances of which we have had no experience resemble 
those of which we have had experience. . . It shall there- 
fore be allowed for a moment that the production of one 
object by another, in any one instance, implies a power, and 
that this powder is connected with this effect. But it having 
been already proved that the power lies not in the sensible 
qualities of the cause, and there being nothing but the sensi- 
ble qualities present to us, I ask why, in other instances, 
you presume that the same power still exists merely upon 
the appearance of these qualities.^. . . Thus not only our 
reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connection of 
causes and effects, but even after experience has informed us 
of their constant conjunction, 'tis impossible for us to satisfy 
ourselves by our reason why we should extend that experience 
beyond those particular instances which have fallen under 
our observation." 

Again: *'When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea 
or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, 
it is not determined by reason, but by certain principles 
which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite 
them in the imagination." 

The relation of cause and effect is, therefore, resolved by 
Hume, into that of the association of ideas induced by habit 
or customs. But is it not strange that Hume, who attached 
so great importance to experience, should overlook the ex- 
perience of the effort we make in producing effects on material 
objects that surround ns? To lift a chair, we exert an effort. 
This experience reveals to us that the relation of cause and 



224 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

effect is more than that of contiguity, or antecedence and 
consequence, or a necessary association of ideas, or a con- 
stant conjunction; it proves, and that too by experience, that 
the very nature, the very essence of cause is efficiency, energy 
force, the exertion of power. The real essential element of 
cause, the theory of Hume leaves out; but in this he was con- 
sistent with his acceptance of Locke's theory of knowledge — 
that all knowledge is derived from sensation and reflection. 

Cause is, doubtless, an immediate and invariable ante- 
cedent; but why? Because it is efficient in producing the 
effect. If it exerts no influence on the effect, it might as 
well be absent; its presence or absence would make no differ- 
ence; but when absent, the effect does not appear; it, there- 
fore, exerts an influence, or is efficient; and this would be 
true, though cause and effect were subjective ideas; but in 
this case the cause requires explanation and the cause of that 
cause, and so on. 

Hume's argument against miracles, found in his Essays, 
is loosely connected with his system of philosophy. If 
reality is found only in ideas and their relations, and if the 
necessity of causation is simply subjective, the necessary 
connection of ideas, induced by constant association of one 
idea with another, the imagination is at liberty to pass from 
the command of a powerful being to any conceivable conse- 
quence, however wonderful. It is only by giving objective 
reality to nature and to the laws of nature, and by assuming 
that a miracle is a violation or suspension of these laws, that 
Hume's argument has any force. 

Hume says: *Tt is experience only which gives authority 
to human testimony, and it is the same experience which 
assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two 
kinds of experiences are contrary, we have nothing to do but 
to subt«^act the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, 
either on one side or the other, with that assurance which 
arises from the remainder. But, according to the principle 
here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular 
religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore 
we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony 
can have such a force as to prove a miracle, and to make it 
a just foundation for any such system of religion." 

The weighty objection to miracles entertained by scientific 



BERKELEY AND HUME 225 

minds, is that they are violations of the laws of nature, which 
such minds hold to be inviolable. But is a miracle a viola- 
tion or a suspension of a law of nature? Cannot God, by a 
special intervention, without violating any law, produce a 
marvelous event which would not otherwise occur? When 
I lift a weight, against the force of gravity, do I suspend the 
law of gravity? If I can do such things, much more can 
God, without violating any law, perform wonders, which 
would not take place, without his intervention. A miracle, 
then being possible, can be proved by testimony properly 
sifted, and though testimony is sometimes false, it may be 
employed to establish the fact of miracles, as under proper 
conditions, it is employed to prove many other facts. Neither 
Hume nor any other man, is authorized in saying that a 
miracle is contrary to all experience, or that miracles have 
never been wrought. 

Hume's dialogues on Natural Religion are interesting and 
will well repay the reading, as will all his writings. 

If the series of causes and effects goes back to infinity, or 
has no beginning, where each event is accounted for by its 
antecedent cause, which cause is an event accounted for by 
its cause, have we really accounted for anything? The 
last cause considered is still not accounted for? In his ad- 
mirable colloquy between Philo, Demea and Cleanthes, 
Hume makes Cleanthes answer the question thus: **In 
such a chain or succession of objects, each object, each part 
is caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which 
succeeds it. Where then is the dilBSculty? But you say the 
v)hole wants a cause. I answer that the uniting of these 
parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct counties 
into one body is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the 
mind, and has no influence on the nature of things. Did I 
show you the particular cause of each individual in a collec- 
tion of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very 
unreasonable should you afterwards ask me what is the 
cause of the whole twenty. This is suflSciently explained by 
explaining the cause of the parts." 

The question, however, is not fairly answered. Let the 
particles be in a serial order. Suppose the first explains the 
second, the second the third, the third the fourth, and so on, 
to the twentieth. All are explained except the first which 



226 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

is left without explanation. Is the explanation satisfactory? 

So in an infinite series of causes and events, however far 
back we go, there is always something unexplained. The 
infinite series, therefore, can never satisfy the human mind; 
and hence must be rejected as unsatisfactory. But if we go 
back to the eternal first cause, we have the cause of the entire 
universe. The skeptic, however, will say, you have not 
accounted for the first cause. The first cause, as eternal, 
was not caused, and does not need to be accounted for. 
Something must be eternal, or there would never have been 
anything. The eternal First Cause is a necessary affirma- 
tion of the human reason; it is eternal being and not an event, 
and therefore requires no cause. 

Hume was a sharp critic; and it may be true, as Hamilton 
says, that he was a skeptic and while holding that his con- 
clusions were the legitimate outcome of the prevailing philos- 
ophy, yet that he was not a dogmatist, and had no faith in 
the truth of those conclusions. He says: "After the most 
accurate and exact of my reasoning, I can give no reason why 
I should assent to it." 

Hume has had an immense influence on all subsequent 
philosophy; he was an epoch maker, and awoke Kant from 
his dogmatic slumbers. 



CHAPTER XX 

Kant 

Kant (1724-1804). Immanuel Kant was born in Konigs- 
berg, where he was educated, and where he thought, and 
taught and wrote, and died. 

He was of Scotch descent, a fact not without interest in 
regard to the relation of his philosophy to that of Hume. 
His father was an industrious saddler, and his mother an 
intelligent woman, who taught her son to be a lover of nature, 
by walking with him in the open fields, calling his attention 
to the plants and animals they met with on their way, re- 
minding him they were the works of God. He always spoke 
with reverence of his parents, and valued the moral training 
they had given him. 

There were ten children in the family besides Immanuel — 
three sons and seven daughters. Two of the sons and four 
of the daughters died early. His remaining brother, John 
Henry, was eleven years younger than Immanuel. He 
turned out well, graduated from the university and became 
a useful minister. 

The social, intellectual, and religious character of the 
people of Konigsberg exerted a favorable influence on 
Kant's development, as some of the citizens were enterprising 
business men, or officers in the army, or professors in the 
university. Kant repaid the good he received from his 
fellow citizens by the fame he gave to his native city, entitling 
Konigsberg to be called the city of pure reason. 

The pastor of the family, Dr. Schulz, noticed the early 
indications of ability displayed by Immanuel, which he had 
favorable opportunities of doing, as he was at the head of the 
gymnasium where the young Kant received his preparation 
for the University, and accordingly advised his parents to 
give him a good education. 

At home, in the gymnasium, the university, or the church, 
he was under the influence of the pietistic party, and in this 

227 



228 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

pure atmosphere he grew up to manhood with uncontaminated 
morals, though he did not fully accept the pietistic theology. 

Heydenreich, his teacher of Latin in the gymnasium, 
inspired in him such a love for that language, that he with 
his conrades, Ruhnken and Cunde, formed a little club for 
the purpose of reading Latin authors, not in the course of 
study, and this proved a great advantage in giving him a 
broader culture. The poem of Lucretius, De Rerum, Natura 
was his especial favorite, and probably gave him a distaste 
for theology. 

Kant remained eight years at the gymnasium, and entered 
the university at the age of sixteen. While at the gymna- 
sium, Kant's tastes were for the classics, and Ruhnken's for 
philosophy; but their after lives reversed this preference, 
Kant becoming the renowned philosopher, Ruhnken a dis- 
tinguished linguist. Cunde became a very superior teacher 
of Latin. 

In the university, the lectures of Professor Knutzen, 
extending over a variety of subjects — ^physics, metaphysics, 
ethics and mathematics, gave him great satisfaction, and 
these were Kant's specialties for a time after he had finished 
his course, though he did not at first make prominent the 
study of metaphysics. For several years after his graduation 
he directed his efforts chiefly to physics and mathematics. 

Kant had free access to the library of Knutzen, and was 
encouraged to converse freely with him on the intricacies of 
his studies. He was also greatly profited by the lectures of 
Professor Tecker, and enjoyed his friendship and instructive 
conversation. The influence of these advantages is shown in 
Kant's career as a philosopher. 

Though Kant matriculated in the University, as a theologi- 
cal student, he did not choose the ministry as his calling, yet 
he attended the lectures of Dr. Schulz on theology, and was 
greatly profited by the thorough discussions and broad views 
which Schulz never failed to present. 

Kant's first book treated of Kinetics. Its chief value 
now is historic, showing that the bent of Kant's mind at that 
time was towards physics and mathematics. 

Kant was a family tutor for nine years, first in the family 
of a preacher near home, then in the family of Von Hiillesen, 
about sixty miles from Konigsberg, the greatest distance 



KANT 229 

from his native city he ever reached. Later he was tutor in 
the family of Count Kayserhng, whose residence was near 
Konigsberg. This position was of great advantage to him, 
since here he met, on friendly terms, persons of distinction, 
and learned the usages of good society, and these refining 
influences were seen in Kant's life by his ease of manner and 
the versatility it gave to his mind. The training he gained in 
his tutorship was valuable in cultivating the ability to make 
his points clear in his university lectures. 

In 1754-5, Kant published discussions of the subjects: 
Has the earth been subject to any change in its revolution on its 
axis? General Natural History, or Theory of the Heavens. 
In the last of these, Kant anticipated the Nebular Hypothesis 
of La Place. These books were prepared while he was tutor. 

To entitle one to a nomination to a professorship in the 
University, it was necessary for him to prepare and defend in 
Latin three dissertations. Kant's first dissertation was On 
Fire; his second, A New Explanation of the First Principles 
of Metaphysical Knowledge; his third. The Advantages to 
Natural Philosophy of a Metaphysic connected with Geometry. 
All were in the line of his specialties. The difficulties in the 
way of obtaining a professorship in a German University is a 
spur to efforts and to a thorough preparation. 

In 1755, Kant was graduated as doctor, and was appointed 
Privatdocent, which subordinate position he held for fifteen 
years, with a gradually increasing popularity, as well as 
increasing knowledge, and a development of his ability. 
For his first course of lectures, Kant chose for his subjects, 
Mathematics and Physics — subjects on which he was sure of 
success. 

As it was customary for professors to use compends as a 
basis for his lectures, Kant chose Wolff's for Mathematics, 
and Eberhard's for Physics. In a short time he added Logic 
and Metaphysics to his subjects, choosing for Logic the 
compend of Meyer, and for Metaphysics those of Baumister 
and Baumgarten. He made thorough preparation for his 
lectures, and delivered from three to four each day, taking 
great care to make his points clear to the students, aiming 
to show the practical signification and application of his 
theories. 

In 1770, Kant gained the object of his ambition by his 
appointment to the chair of logic and metaphysics. The 



230 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

subject of his inaugural address was : De Mundi Sensibilis et 
Intelligihilis Forma et Principiis. Eleven years later, ap- 
peared his great work, Kritih of Pure Reason., which we shall 
now proceed to examine, dropping for the present further 
details respecting his life, and taking, as the acceptable and 
reliable text, the English translation by F. Max Miiller. 

The forerunners of Kant, of the English, were Bacon, 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume, Of the continental, Descartes, 
Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff. All Kant's previous study was a 
preparation for his great work; he was twelve years in plan- 
ning it 'and thinking it out, but only five months in writing 
it. 

On the first page of the Introduction, Kant says: *' Experi- 
ence tells us what is, but not that it must be necessarily as it 
is, and not otherwise. It, therefore, never gives us any really 
general truths, and our reason which is particularly anxious 
for that class of knowledge, is roused by it rather than satis- 
fied. General truths, which at the same time bear the 
character of an inward necessity, must be independent of 
experience, — clear and certain by themselves. " Calling that 
a condition which must be in order that something else may be, 
necessary truths are the conditions of the facts of experience, 
but they are not apprehended apart from experience. Rea- 
son would never affirm that every event must have a cause, 
if no knowledge of an event had ever been acquired by ex- 
perience. Knowledge of necessary truth, Kant calls knowl- 
edge a priori, while the knowledge of contingent facts, he 
calls knowledge a posteriori. But knowledge a priori, is not 
knowledge already existing in the mind, though latent, as 
innate ideas, as Kant seems to teach, but ready for use when 
called for; yet reason has the power to apprehend the neces- 
sity of the conditions of facts known by experience; it is not 
a priori knowledge, but the a priori power of reason to know 
though the power gives the knowledge only after the experi- 
ence of the facts. 

Again, Kant says: ''If we remove from experience every- 
thing that belongs to the senses, there remain, nevertheless, 
certain original concepts, and certain judgments derived from 
them, which must have had their origin entirely a priori, and 
independent of all experience, because it is owing to them 
that we are able, or imagine that we are able, to predicate 



KANT ^31 

more of the objects of our senses than can be learnt from mere 
experience, and that our propositions contain real generality 
and strict necessity, such as mere empirical knowledge 
can never supply. " Are there original concepts and certain 
judgments independent of all experience? No; we have the 
experience first of certain facts, facts not self-supporting, facts 
that require certain conditions; and when these facts are given 
by experience, reason wakes up and apprehends the necessity 
of the conditions of these facts, by seeing that without 
these conditions, the facts themselves would be impossible. 
The reason, as a faculty, is a "priori, not the knowledge of the 
conditions of the facts, but the power to know the necessity 
of the conditions which render the facts possible. Chrono- 
logically the knowledge of the facts is antecedent to the 
knowledge of the conditions of the facts, but both the condi- 
tions and the power to know the conditions are antecedent 
to the knowledge of the facts, and give to these facts a rational 
explanation. The knowledge of the conditions has not its 
origin entirely a priori, and independent of all experience, as 
Kant asserts; were it not for the facts, we should never know 
the conditions. 

Kant points out the tendency to enlarge the sphere of our 
judgments beyond the limits of experience, and states that, 
first of all, *'we should ask the question, how the mere under- 
standing could arrive at all this knowledge a priori, and 
what extent, what truth, what value, it could possess. The 
brilliant example of mathematics gives ground for encourage- 
ment; but mathematics deals with objects only so far as they 
can be represented by intuition; and though a dove finds the 
air a resistance to its flight, yet it can make no progress 
through empty space." Certain facts, however, being 
given, reason does apprehend the necessity of their conditions, 
but not without the facts. 

"Reason finds legitimate employment, even a large part 
of its work, in the analysis of our concepts, and if this does 
not give us knowledge strictly new, yet it renders the obscure 
clear, and the confused distinct; yet reason should avoid 
adding, as it sometimes does, without being aware, other 
concepts totally different in character, and thus deducing 
new judgments void of all validity." Reason may legiti- 
mately assert the necessity of the conditions of the phenom- 
enal. 



232 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Kant then proceeds to make the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgments, in their aflBrmative form. 
An analytic judgment is one in which the conception of the 
predicate is involved in that of the subject; as A body is ex- 
tended, A synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate 
adds something not involved in the conception of the subject; 
as A body is heavy. Analytic judgments render the knowledge 
of the subject clear; synthetic judgments add something 
foreign to the subject. 

Synthetic judgments a posteriori present no difficulty, 
since the relation of the subject and predicate is known by 
experience; but how are synthetic judgments a priori possi- 
ble? How do I know, for example, that every event must have 
a cause? This is Kant's great question, and we shall see, as 
we proceed, how he answers it. In the meantime, to state 
our own position, we do not hesitate to declare that valid 
synthetic judgments, strictly a priori, that is, apart from all 
experience, are altogether impossible. To be able to affirm 
that every event must have a cause, I must first have, by 
experience, knowledge of events; body and motion being 
given by experience, reason apprehends space as their neces- 
sary condition; persistence and succession require time; the 
universe, or any existing concrete thing demands as its ulti- 
mate condition, the eternal existence of the first cause. The 
non-existence of an eternal existence involves the non-exist- 
ence of all realities save space and time. Psychical phenom- 
ena require an ego as their necessary condition. Kant 
calls his treatment a critique of pure reason, not a doctrine; 
declaring that it is meant, not to extend our knowledge, but 
to rectify it, and to become the test of the value of all a priori 
knowledge. It must contain both the doctrine of elements, 
and the doctrine of method of pure reason, with their sub- 
divisions. 

The effect produced in the sensibility by an object is a 
sensation followed by an empirical intuition of the object 
whose appearance is called a phenomenon. That in the 
phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, Kant calls the 
matter; but that which causes the matter to be perceived in 
a certain order, he calls its form. The matter is known a 
posteriori; but as it cannot be sensation which arranges sen- 
sation in certain forms, Kant holds that their form must be 



KANT 233 

ready for them in the mind a priori, and can therefore be con- 
sidered as separate from all sensation. It is, however, evi- 
dent that the form as a conception of a necessary reality, 
does not exist in the mind before the sensation, but the reason 
exists as a power to arrange the form required by the sensa- 
tions, in conformity with their necessary condition, without 
which reality, the sensations themselves would be impossible. 
The forms are not innate; they are not known till called for 
by the facts of experience, as the rational explanation of 
these facets. It suffices, if they are ready when needed. The 
science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, Kant calls 
Transcendental Aesthetic. 

Separating from the sensibility everything added by the 
understanding, and from the remainder, whatever belongs 
to sensation, Kant finds two pure forms of sensuous intui- 
tion — space and time. He then inquires: *'What then are 
space and time? Are they real beings? Or, if not that, are 
they determinations or relations of things, but such as would 
belong to them even if they were not perceived? Or lastly, 
are they determinations and relations which are inherent in 
the forms of intuition only, and therefore in the subjective 
nature of our mind, without which such predicates as space 
and time would never be ascribed to anything?" 

1. As to space, Kant holds that it is not an empirical 
concept derived from external experience. That if certain 
sensations be referred to things outside of myself, or as side 
by side, the representation of space must be already there; 
nor is it borrowed through experience from relations of exter- 
nal phenomena, which become possible only by means of the 
representations of space. Hence, "space is a necessary 
representation a priori, forming the very foundation of all 
external intuitions. " The truth is, space is not a representa- 
tion at all though we may represent it. Reason apprehends 
space when it is needed, not before. Space is that in which 
bodies exist and motion takes place. The power to represent 
space, not the representation, is a priori. 

Is space a representation, or is it an external reality? Let 
us first inquire whether there is any distinction between the 
idea of a thing and the thing itself. Is the idea the thing, and 
the thing the idea? Is it true that esse est per dpi? It is, 
however, true that we have no knowledge of a thing in itself; 



^34 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

for knowledge relates a thing to a mind. But who can prove 
that nothing exists wholly unknown, or that existence is 
impossible without an idea of that existence? Kant had 
the good sense not to deny the existence of a thing in itself. 
Berkeley's statement has not been refuted, that since we 
are affected from without, there are powers without capable 
of affecting us. Berkeley was right in affirming external 
powers, but mistaken in what they are. Two persons are 
talking with one another. If one should go away and lose 
all thought of the other, that would not annihilate the other, 
as he would testify still to his own existence. Neither would 
the separation of one's thought from anything, a dog, a tree 
or what not, annihilate that thing; and if the separation of 
any particular thought from any thing would not annihilate 
that thing, the separation of all thought from it would not 
strike it out of existence. We notice the planet Jupiter rising 
about sunset, and watch its movement night after night, with 
respect to the stars in nearly the same range. For a month 
or so, Jupiter appears to retrograde, or go westward, with 
respect to the stars, then it becomes stationary, and finally 
its motion is direct, or eastward. All this is explained by 
the supposition that both the Earth and Jupiter, are real 
bodies and revolve eastward round the sun, the earth being 
nearer, revolves more rapidly, throwing the range of Jupiter 
westward, as the earth sweeps by, but otherwise the phenom- 
ena are inexplicable. If Jupiter is a real objective body, 
moving round the sun, then space is an objective reality, and 
not a mere representation. Space is not dynamic, it is not 
substance, either matter or spirit; it is the condition of body 
and motion, but indifferent to either, and is one whole, in- 
finite in extent, and eternal in duration. As an absolute 
existence, space is a reality, and must be, whether any thing 
else exists or not. It is apprehended by reason as the possi- 
bility of body or motion, which call for its representation. 
Phenomena are pictures representing the real, as a photo- 
graph the original. 

Reason apprehends space as soon as it is needed, as a 
logical antecedent, to account, not simply for the representa- 
tion of body and motion, but for the facts of body and motion, 
but not before; it was no more known before the experience 
of these facts, than was cause before the experience of an 
event, though it is true that it existed before. Here we have 



KANT 235 

a reality existing before it was known. Did not the earth 
move before any human being knew of its motion? Would 
the denial of this motion arrest the progress of the earth as it 
sweeps in its annual course around the sun? Did not the 
planet Neptune cause perturbations in the motion of Uranus, 
before Neptune was discovered, or even before its existence 
was suspected? Is not the whole universe contained in 
space extending infinitely in all directions? Would the 
annihilation of the universe annihilate space? 

"Taste and color," as Kant says, "are sensations of which 
no one can have an idea, a priori; but space refers to a pure 
form of intuition, and involves no sensation;" yet there are 
appearances which require space for their explanation. 
"Objects by themselves are not known to us at all, and what 
we call external objects are nothing but representations of 
our senses, the form of which is space, and the true corre- 
lative of which, that is, the thing by itself, is not known, 
nor can be known by these representations, nor do we care to 
know anything about it in our daily experience." 

Of course, objects by themselves are not known to us at 
all; for to be known by us, they must be brought in relation 
to us, and would no longer be by themselves. The appear- 
ances of external objects in space are pictures constructed 
by our imagination, as representations, according to our 
judgment of the external realities which cause our sensations, 
and thus embody our knowledge, or discoveries, or belief, 
in regard to these objects. As pictured knowledge or belief, 
they represent external objects, no doubt, more or less imper- 
fectly; but it is the best we can do, and we must be content. 
To deny the existence of external objects, as some idealists 
do, is illogical. On them falls the burden of proof, which 
they artfully attempt to shift upon their opponents. 

2, Of timey Kant says: "Time is not an empirical concept 
deduced from any experience, for neither co-existence nor 
succession would enter into our perception, if the representa- 
tion of time were not given a priori. Only then can we 
imagine that certain things happen at the same time or at 
different times." The representation of time is not given 
a priori, that is, the idea of time is not innate; but the instant 
we experience succession, time is rationally apprehended as 
the condition of succession. Reason apprehends time as 
that without which there could be no succession. 



236 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

"We cannot take time away from phenomena, though we 
can take phenomena away from time. In time alone is the 
reaUty of phenomena possible. Time has one dimension 
only. Different times are not simultaneous, but successive, 
while different spaces are never successive, but simultaneous." 
Experience gives facts, but reason gives us the necessity of the 
conditions of the facts. Before the experience of succession, 
the rational apprehension of time, as the condition of succes- 
sion, was impossible. We experience succession before 
rationally apprehending the necessity of time; but before 
man existed, and hence before the intuition of time, did not 
the earth exist and undergo geological changes .f* Time, 
therefore, of which the geological periods are parts, existed 
long ages before its representation by the human mind. 
Hence, it is not true, as Kant says: "Time is nothing but the 
form of the internal sense." Time existed before the inter- 
nal sense; it is not substance, either matter or spirit. It is 
that in which things persist or succession takes place. It is 
neither persistence nor succession, but their necessary condi- 
tion, and would exist were there no persistence nor succession. 

Again, Kant says: "Time has objective validity, with 
reference to phenomena only, but time is no longer objective, 
if we remove the sensuous character of our intuition, that 
is to say, that mode of representation which is peculiar to 
ourselves, and speaks of things in general. Time is therefore 
simply a subjective condition of our intuition, but by itself, 
apart from the subject, nothing." Events, independent of 
our knowledge or representation, took place and were succes- 
sive long before man existed, and time was, therefore, a 
reality then as it is now. 

Kant was aware that intelligent men would object to his 
theory of time, and reject it; he said, therefore, "what they 
object to is this: Changes, they say, are real; this is proved 
by the change of our own representations, even if all external 
phenomena and their changes be denied. Changes, how- 
ever, are possible in time only, and therefore time must be 
something real. 

The answer is easy enough. I grant the whole argument. 
Time is certainly something real, the real form of our inter- 
nal intuition. Time, therefore, has subjective reality with 
respect to internal experience; that is, I really have the 



KANT 237 

representations of time and of my determinations in it. . . 
There remains, therefore, the empirical reaUty of time, only 
as the condition of experience, while absolute reality cannot, 
according to what has been shown, be conceded to it. Time 
is nothing but the form of our own internal intuition. " The 
geologic periods were not real and successive before man ex- 
isted, and were not therefore the forms of our internal intuition. 
Time is not an innate a priori representation, since it is 
apprehended by reason only as the necessary condition of 
the co-existence and succession of events, whether subjective 
or objective. It is the necessary reality without which per- 
sistence, co-existence, or succession would be impossible. 

Again, Kant says: "Motion presupposes the perception of 
something moving;" but a body might move without such 
perception. The perception of motion, however, does pre- 
suppose a moving body, and also both time and space. Nep- 
tune moved before its motion was perceived. If motion is 
actual, that is, if anything moves, space is not ideal, but real. 
If succession is actual, that is, if one event follows another, 
time is not ideal, but real. Neither body, nor succession, 
nor motion can be proved to be simply subjective, though our 
ideas of them are subjective with an objective factor. Reason 
apprehends, at least my reason does, that both space and 
time are absolute realities, infinite, eternal. They are not 
substance, either matter or spirit; they are not dynamic, 
and therefore not rivals of God, but they afford him infinite 
possibilities for the display of his matchless perfections, in 
the magnificent universe which his power and wisdom have 
called into being. 

Kant sums up his doctrine of sensuous perception by say- 
ing: "All intuition is nothing but the representation of phe- 
nomena. " Mental phenomena are facts of mind known by 
consciousness; representations of external objects are the 
phenomena of perception. Facts, whether internal or exter- 
nal, are contingent, and are known by experience, and the 
intuitions relating to these facts are empirical; but the intui- 
tions relating to the necessary conditions of these facts are 
rational — the apprehension of fundamental truth. Rational 
intuitions are not representations of phenomena, but are 
apprehensions of the necessity of the conditions of phenom- 
ena. 



238 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Again, says Kant: "The things which we see are not, by 
themselves, what we see." Of course not; we see the ap- 
pearances of things, that is phenomena, or our representa- 
tions of things. The things represented are not by them- 
selves, but in relation to ourselves, otherwise we could not see 
them; but seeing is judging what kind of objects those are 
which cause in us certain sensations, and embody our judg- 
ments in mental pictures, which represent, more or less cor- 
rectly, so far as it is possible for a picture to represent objects, 
our discoveries or opinions regarding those objects. 

"If we drop our subject, or the subjective form of our 
senses, all qualities, all relations of objects in space and 
time, nay space and time themselves would vanish. " If we 
drop the subject, all qualities, even space and time them- 
selves, would vanish with respect to that subject, for the 
subject then is nothing, or no longer subject, and could know 
nothing. Dropping the actual subjective form of our senses, 
though giving them another form, the appearances having 
still a subjective, as well as an objective factor, would of course, 
change, just as the color of objects appears to change, as we 
view them through different colored glasses; but space and 
time are not seen by the sense of sight, but are rationally 
apprehended, and would be held to be the same by all ration- 
al beings who have perceptions of body and motion, of per- 
sistence or succession. It may be asked then, why did not 
Kant so regard space and time? He did say: "Space, as 
the very condition of external objects, is essential to their 
appearance or intuition," and "changes are possible in time 
only, and therefore time must be something real." But 
Kant was carried away by his theory which makes space and 
time merely subjective forms of thought. Not only is the 
representation of space necessary to the representation of 
objects, but space is necessary to the objects themselves. 

To deny the objective reality of space and time is to render 
all clearness of thought impossible, and to introduce the utter 
confusion of reducing the universe to a point, and all events 
of history to a moment of time. That is not clear thinking; 
it is utter confusion. 

The understanding Kant calls a non-sensuous faculty of 
knowledge, not intuitive, but discursive, by means of con- 
cepts, and holds that all knowledge is either intuitive or dis- 



KANT 239 

cursive; and this is well, if we divide intuitions into empirical 
and rational — empirical, when sensuous or known by experi- 
ence, and rational, when apprehended by reason as the neces- 
sary conditions of the phenomenal, as space, time and cause. 
We cannot even imagine body or motion without space, or 
succession without time; and though we can imagine an 
event without a cause, yet we know, by reason, that an 
event without a cause, is impossible, since that would re- 
quire non-entity to act, or to come into being of itself, which 
is impossible, since it is nothing, it cannot act. 

Concepts are our ideas of the combinations of the common 
elements of resembling phenomena, thus giving unity to 
separate acts of cognition and harmony to thought. Leaving 
out matter, considering form alone, Kant gives as pure con- 
cepts or categories of the understanding, quantity, quality, 
relation and modality; under quantity he gives universal, 
particular, individual; under quality, affirmative, negative, 
indefinite; under relation, categorical, hypothetical, disjunc- 
tive; under modality, problematic, assertatory, apodictic. 
Pure concepts are recognized as a priori conditions of possible 
experiences, whether|of sense, intuition or thought. The 
concepts are not strictly a priori, but are formed to account 
for experiences. 

Judgment is the decision that a certain relation exists be- 
tween two objects of thought. The elements of a judgment, 
the subject and predicate, are derived from sense, or imagi- 
nation, or rational intuition, called also apperception. 

The stream of phenomena, always changing, the immediate 
object of consciousness, does not constitute the ego, or per- 
manent subject of all these changes. The necessity of the 
ego, as the subject of psychical phenomena, is apprehended 
by rational intuition, as the identical subject, the necessary 
condition of these manifold experiences, otherwise memory 
would be impossible. 

Cause is the dynamical condition of an event. How do we 
arrive at the judgment that every event must have a cause? 
It is true we can imagine an event without a cause, yet reason 
declares that it is no more possible for an event to happen 
without a cause, though it be thus pictured, than for a body 
to exist without space, or for succession without time, neither 
of which can be represented by the imagination. Reason 



240 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

gives the causal judgment that every event must have a 
cause, by apprehending the impossibihty of non-entity 
springing into being. The causal judgment is not based on 
the impotence of the imagination to picture an absolute 
commencement, but on the potency of the reason to apprehend 
the impossibility of nothing turning itself into something. 
The relation between cause and effect is that of reciprocity. 
Whatever the cause gives to the effect is taken from itself. 
An event is always an effect. 

How does Kant account for the judgment that a cause is 
the necessary condition of an event.^^ He says: "Our con- 
ception of the relation of all knowledge to its object contains 
something of necessity, the object being looked upon as that 
which prevents our knowledge from being determined at 
haphazard. . . It is clear also that, as we can only deal 
with the manifold in our representations, and as the Xy (the 
object), corresponding to them, if it is something different 
from all our representations, is really nothing to us, it is 
clear, I say, that the unity, necessitated by an object, cannot 
be anything but the formal unity of our consciousness in the 
synthesis of the manifold in our representations." That is 
the very thing that is not clear. It is truly wonderful that 
the object corresponding to our representations can have no 
interest to a philosopher. Ten thousand people witness the 
same thing, say the ascent of a balloon. Can the unity of 
each spectator's representations, or the common agreement, 
as to the object seen, be accounted for by the unity of a single 
consciousness or of their collective consciousness .^^ It is 
evidently explained by the one object at which they are all 
gazing. The appearance has a double cause, for any specta- 
tor — first, the object which reflects light to his eye, causing 
a sensation; secondly the representation of the cause of the 
sensation as pictured by the imagination of the spectator. 
The appearance, essentially the same to all the spectators, 
is accepted by them, as the object itself, as known to sight; 
but really, it is a picture of what they infer to be true of the 
object. 

Idealism holds good for the picture but not for the objec- 
tive cause. Cause is something more than the formal unity 
of our consciousness; it is dynamic; its very essence is energy; 
it is the necessary condition of every event; it is not explained 



KANT 241 

by the synthesis of the manifold in consciousness, or by the 
uniformity of antecedent and consequent, as for example 
in the succession of day and night, or of the phases of the 
moon, or of the change of seasons. It is supplied to thought 
by reason, which sees the impossibility of nothing springing 
into being. 

The laws of nature are something more than the laws of 
man's understanding; but Kant says: ** However exaggerated 
therefore and absurd it may sound that the understanding is 
in itself the source of the laws of nature, and of its formal 
unity, such a statement is nevertheless correct and in accord- 
ance with experience." Were not the planets kept in their 
orbits, according to the laws of nature, before the existence 
of man on the earth? 

We have impressions or sensations, not produced but 
known by experience, not produced by ourselves, for we are 
passive in sensation, which are consequently excited in us 
by foreign causes. The nature of these causes we interpret 
and represent as phenomena, which are, therefore, pictures 
of what we know or believe respecting external objects. 
These objects are not absolutely unknown, but are known 
more or less perfectly by their pictures — the phenomena. 
The conceptions of space and time are the necessary forms of 
phenomena; but space and time themselves are not concep- 
tions but necessary conditions of the objects represented 
by the phenomena. The conception of cause is necessary 
to our understanding of an event; but cause itself is the 
necessary condition of the event. Kant asks: "How are 
synthetic judgments, a priori, possible?" The answer is, 
reason apprehends the impossibility of facts without condi- 
tions, that is, the necessity of conditions as the ground of 
the facts. That the conceptions of space and time are mere 
forms of sensuous thought in which phenomena are arranged 
is certainly true; but antecedent to the phenomena, we have 
sensations, the raw material out of which the phenomena 
are constructed; these sensations have causes, the causes are 
not non-entities but real things, and real prior to their acts 
on us. Now to say that these causes are not real things, at 
least not real till they act on us, that they do not exist in 
space and time, is to dogmatize, not to philosophize. This 
cause of sensation, Kant himself was constrained to postulate, 



242 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

calling it the thing in itself y or the noumenon, in distinction 
from the phenomenal appearance, designating it by x, as the 
unknown, saying, "if it is something different from all our 
representations, it is really nothing to us." But is not this 
the thing of interest in philosophy, the real object of our quest, 
the object of which the phenomenon is a representation, 
though doubtless a partial and imperfect picture. The phe- 
nomena of sight are, therefore, the pictured knowledge of the 
objects, and phenomena of the senses in general are related 
to the objects as their representatives, adequate only to a 
certain degree. Likewise the ego is the noumenon, or the a:, 
the essential condition of subjective phenomena. 

It will not be necessary to follow, in all its details, the 
Critique, the great work of Kant, which is eminently worthy of 
the most careful consideration of every thinker in philosophy; 
but we shall content ourselves, by calling attention to his 
so-called antinomies of the pure reason, and his criticisms of 
the theoretical proofs of the existence of God, the freedom of 
the will, and the immortality of the soul. In regard to the 
antinomies, that is, that two contradictory propositions 
may both be proved true by reasoning, as Kant maintains, 
may be shown to be false. Let us take two truths, both true 
by hypothesis, that is, both true in fact, and suppose them 
to conflict, which means that the truth of either involves 
the falsity of the other; then eack is both true and false at 
the same time, and taking in the same sense, which is self- 
destructive and impossible. It therefore follows that all 
truths exist in harmony. This is an intuition of reason. 
Furthermore it may be said that no two demonstrations can 
clash, that is, be mutually destructive, for a demonstration 
is the logical proof of a proposition from true premises. 
Kant claims to prove both of the following propositions: 

i- The world has a beginning in time and is limited in 
space. 

2, The world has no beginning in time and no limit in 
space. 

Evidently, these propositions cannot both be proved trtie, 
and there must be some flaw in Kant's demonstration. Logi- 
cal reasoning from true premises cannot involve error, that 
is, if the premises are true and the reasoning logical, the 
conclusion must be true. Thus we may know the unsound- 



KANT US 

ness of Kant's reasoning without examining his argument. 

What Kant intended to teach by these antinomies was, 
not that two conflictive propositions could both be proved 
true in any legitimate application of reason in the field of 
experience, but that these contradictories would result 
whenever we ventured with speculative reason beyond the 
limits of experience; and that though God, freedom and 
immortality could not be theoretically proved, neither can 
they be theoretically disproved, yet he vindicated these 
great objects of belief within the sphere of practical reason, 
which shows, not what we must accept as a matter of demon- 
stration, but what we ought to believe as helpful guides to a 
moral life. It is, however, questionable whether Kant has 
shown the impossibility of proving these great doctrines by 
speculative reasoning. We shall see. 

The usual proofs of the existence of God may be classified 
as the Ontological, the Cosmological, the Physico-TheologicaL 

Kant's criticism of the Ontological proof as formulated by 
Descartes, may be regarded as conclusive. The mere fact 
that we have a conception of a perfect being, together with 
the fact that existence is necessary to perfection, is no proof 
that such a being exists. Descartes himself seemed to have 
a doubt of its validity, as we infer from the fact that he 
attempted to strengthen the argument, by saying that the 
idea of a perfect being is too great for us to form, and hence 
that it must have been formed within us by this perfect 
being himself, and that, therefore, this perfect being actually 
exists. We certainly can form the idea of a more perfect 
being than ourselves, and what is the limit to the degree of 
perfection of the idea which we can form? Granting the 
existence of an unconditioned being, still the necessity of our 
idea of that being is not unconditioned. The fact of the 
necessity of the existence of the three angles of a triangle, 
and that their sum is equal to two right angles, is not abso- 
lute, but conditioned on the existence of the triangle. To 
accept the triangle and to reject the three angles is contra- 
dictory, but to reject the triangle as well as the angles is not 
contradictory, but is simply error* 

The same thing applies to the concept of an absolutely 
necessary being. Remove his existence, or rather, if his 
existence be not assumed, his perfection is not implied as 



244 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

necessary. The only way to evade this is to say that the 
absolute being cannot be removed; but this is what Kant 
calls in question, saying it is the very thing to be proved, 
rightly declaring that the so-called Ontological proof is no 
demonstration of the existence of God. 

Kant now takes up the Cosmologic proof of the existence 
of God, and attempts to show its fallacy. He states the 
argument thus: "If there exists anything, there must exist 
an absolutely necessary being. Now I, at least, exist; there- 
fore there exists an absolutely necessary Being." With 
regard to this, Kant says: ''This proof therefore begins with 
experience, and is not entirely a priori, or ontological; and as 
the object of all possible experience is called the world, this 
proof is called the cosmological proof. As it takes no account 
of any peculiar property of the objects of experience, by 
which this world of ours may differ from any other possible 
world, it is distinguished in its name. It also is distinguished 
from the physico-theological proof, which employs as argu- 
ments, observations of the peculiar property of this our 
world of sense." 

"In order to have a secure foundation, this proof takes its 
stand on experience, and pretends to be different from the 
ontological proof, which places its whole confidence in pure 
concepts a priori only. The cosmological proof, however, 
uses that experience only in order to make one step, namely, 
to the existence of a necessary Being in general. What prop- 
erties that Being may have, can never be learnt from the 
empirical argument, and for that purpose, reason takes 
leave of it altogether, and tries to find out, from among con- 
cepts only, what properties an absolutely necessary Being 
ought to possess, i. e., which among all possible things con- 
tains in itself, the requisite conditions of absolute necessity. 
This requisite is believed by reason to exist in the concept 
of an ens realissimum only, and reason concludes, at once, 
that this must be the absolutely necessary Being. In this 
conclusion it is simply assumed that a concept of a being of 
the highest reality is perfectly adequate to the concept of 
absolute necessity in existence; so that the former might be 
concluded from the latter. This is the same proposition as 
that maintained in the ontological argument, and is simply 
taken over into the cosmological proof, nay made its founda- 
tion, although the intention was to avoid it. " 



KANT 245 

The cosmological proof claims more than is warranted 
when it says that the existence of the universe is proof of the 
absolute necessity of an eternal cause. The cause is con- 
ditionally necessary; that is, necessary as the condition of 
the universe; it is not known to be absolutely necessary; for, 
we can conceive of its non-existence, then the universe would 
be non-existent; but the universe exists; therefore, the cause 
of the universe is actual, and this cause is either the first 
cause or the effect of preceding causes. These causes cannot 
go back in an infinite series, which would never end; nor in 
the direct order could it ever reach the present. The series, 
traced back, must therefore reach an end or first cause. 
Now this first cause must be eternal, otherwise there never 
would have been anything, for non-entity can not jump into 
being. The first cause is, therefore, conditionally necessary 
and actual, and is adequate to the production of the universe, 
and is called God, the actuality of whose existence we know, 
its mystery is beyond our reach. But the actuality of the 
first cause and its adequacy to the production of the universe 
sufficeth for reason; it is open to faith to believe the first 
cause absolute. 

We are, therefore, warranted in inferring that the present 
state of the universe is proof of a series of past events 
connected by the law of causality, indefinite, though not 
infinite, in extent, terminating in a head or first cause, who 
is unconditioned and eternal. Why is not the series 
infinite in extent.^ There are two reasons why: First, though 
every event seems to be explained by the preceding cause, 
there is always left one thing unexplained, however far back 
we may trace the series — the cause of the last event; ex- 
plained — hence the whole series is without explanation. 
Secondly, the end of an infinite series can never be reached, 
eternity itself would not suffice; for it has not end. Then as 
the reverse order, or order backward, would never cease, 
the direct order, or order f orward,could never reach the present. 
The series, therefore, has an end, or in the direct order, a 
beginning. Now this end in the reverse order, or the be- 
ginning in the direct order, is rationally apprehended, not 
empirically known, for then it would require explanation. 
As not dependent on any thing antecedent, it is unconditioned; 
it is eternal, else it jumped from non-entity into being, 



246 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

which is impossible. This first cause is therefore condition- 
ally necessary, that is, necessary on the assumption that the 
universe is, which we know to be a fact. We go beyond our 
warrant when we say that the first cause is absolutely neces- 
sary; for we do not know that, and we can even conceive 
of its non-existence; but then if that were true, the universe 
would be non-existent, which is not the case; therefore, the 
first cause is actual. As the first cause, it is adequate to 
the production of the universe, that is, contains, within 
itself, everything of power, wisdom and goodness requisite 
for the execution of the mighty work of creation. How God 
can be, whether he is absolutely necessary or not, reason 
does not inform us; but that God, the first cause, transcend- 
ent in power, wisdom and goodness, jactuklly exists, we may 
know with the full Assurance of certainty; and that is suffi- 
cient. The cosmological proof, however, does not den\ any 
perfection to God. 

Space will not allow us to follow, in the details of his crit- 
icisms of the physico-theologico proof of the existence of 
God, but refer our readers to the Critique itself, quoting, how- 
ever, three sentences: *'The utmost, therefore, that could be 
established by such a proof, would be an architect oj the worlds 
always very much hampered by the material with which he 
has to work, not a creator to whose idea everything is subject. 

. . . Those who adopt the physico-theological argu- 
ment have no reason to be so very coy towards the trans- 
cendental mode of argument, and with the conceit of en- 
lightened observers of nature, to look down upon such argu- 
ments as the cobwebs of dark speculators. . . The physico- 
theological proof rests on the cosmological and the cosmo- 
logical on the ontological proof of the existence of one original 
Being as the Supreme Being.'' Though Kant denies the 
validity of the theoretical argument, yet he grants that 
practically we may act upon the conclusions as true. The 
cosmological argument, however, and the physico-theological 
based upon it, hold good for all that is required, but render 
themselves open to criticism, by claiming, according to the 
presupposed necessities of preconceived opinions, more than 
the premises logically support. 

As to the freedom of the will, Kant accepts the fact, 
though denying the validity of its theoretical proof. It may 



KANT 247 

be said, however, that we are conscious of activity in volition, 
not of passive determination. The motives are reasons on 
account of which we act, and that without constraint, yet 
not without soHcitation. The voUtions, as events, are 
caused; but the mind which causes them is not an event, 
but a being existing at the moment of vohtion, not then 
requiring a cause. If it is inquired what made the mind 
make the vohtion, the reply is, it was not made to make it, 
but made it freely, in view of motives as reasons, yet not 
compelled by them as causes. We believe ourselves free, 
and not compelled by irresistible influences, and hence the 
explanation of the phenomena of conscience, approving the 
right and condemning the wrong. The consciousness of 
effort in volition proves that we are not passive but active 
in willing. 

Likewise Kant admits the fact of immortality, though 
denying the validity of its proof. As our thoughts cannot be 
explained by material agencies we refer them to mind. 
Matter and mind, as species of the common genus, substance, 
the ground of union of body and soul, are united in life and 
separated at death. As thought can not be explained by 
matter, it is referred to mind or spirit, as its noumenon or 
necessary condition. Death the dissolution of the union erf 
soul and body does not imply the annihilation of either, and 
we have no reason to suppose that the soul becomes extinct 
at death, but rather that it survives in an eternal state. 
But we must take leave of Kant's immortal work, the Critique 
of the Pure Reason. 

In his Critique of the Practical Reason, Kant shows that 
various principles, empirically determined, serve as guides 
to the will. These principles are subjective, if the condition 
holds only for the will of the subject, but objective if they 
hold for all rational beings. 

Kant says: "It is a matter for surprise that men of intelli- 
gence should imagine that a real distinction may be drawn 
between the lower and higher faculty of desire on the ground 
that some ideas which are associated with the feelings of 
pleasure have their source in sense and others in under- 
standing. " The distinction is not drawn between the lower 
and higher faculty of desire but between the lower and higher 



248 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

objects of desire. Sense and understanding are not faculties 
of desire, but they furnish objects of desire, some of which 
are more worthy to be desired than others. 

The desire for happiness Kant holds to be the usual sub- 
jective condition of individual action, but will not serve for 
a practical, universal guide. Kant, however, does not recog- 
nize any distinction between higher and lower forms of 
pleai^ure; for he says: "The feeling of pleasure, which is the 
real motive by which the will is determined to act, is always 
the same in kind, not only because it can be known only 
empirically, but because in every desire the same vital energy 
is always expressed. The only difference between pleasures 
is, therefore, one of degree." The will, as a faculty, is not 
determined by motive, but the ego itself exerts its power of 
choice and determines its own volitions in view of the motive 
which is a reason not a cause. Again, the desire for pleasure 
is not the only motive for action. Conscience has a voice, 
which is often heard and obeyed. Suppose that in desire 
the same vital energy is always expressed, it does not follow 
that the objects of desire are always the same in quality, or 
that one ought not to be preferred to another. Worthiness 
of character is the supreme subjective object of desire, and 
God the objective; these are the ultimate good. 

Kant teaches that the Practical Reason gives us Ood, 
freedom and immortality, though the Pure Reason fails to 
demonstrate their reality. In this, the practical reason 
must be our guide. 

Self-love cannot be a practical law, for the motive is sub- 
jective and empirical; but the supreme law of practical 
reason, of which we are primarily and directly conscious, 
declares: ''So act that the maxims of your will may be in 
perfect harmony with a universal system of laws." Free- 
dom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, but the moral law 
is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. 

Virtue is the supreme good. The will to be virtuous is 
the chief moral excellence. Not only perfection, but happi- 
ness, even continued happiness, is a legitimate object of 
desire. The will is to be disciplined and confirmed in its 
desire for perfect moral excellence, which it is needful to 
manifest in conduct, habit and character; but as this work 
can never be completed in this life, "the highest good is, 



KANT 249 

therefore, practically possible, only if we presuppose the 
immortality of the soul." Immortality, therefore, as the 
necessary condition for continued moral progress, and for 
the unceasing enjoyment which springs from advancement 
towards perfection, may be accepted as a doctrine warranted 
by the practical reason. 

As to the existence of God, Kant says: "The moral law 
leads us to postulate, not only the immortality of the soul, 
but the existence of God. For it shows us how happiness, 
in proportion to morality, which is the second element of 
the highest good, is possible, and to postulate it for reasons 
as perfectly disinterested as in the former case. This second 
postulate of the existence of God rests upon the necessity 
of presupposing the existence of a cause adequate to the 
effect which has to be explained." 

These three postulates of practical reason, God, freedom, 
and immortality, are, therefore, not theoretical dogmas, 
but are presuppositions which are practically necessary. 
They follow, as corollaries, from the intuition of the moral 
law as the supreme rule of conduct. 



CHAPTER XXI 

Fickle, Jacobiy Schelling 

1, Fichte (1762-1814). Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born 
in Rammenau, a village in Upper Lusatia. Before going to 
school, he was taught many things by his father, which he 
eagerly listened to and readily assimilated, as he was pre- 
cocious in his mental development. His intellectual turn of 
mind impressed his friends and neighbors, who said, after 
he had reached distinction, "we always knew that Gottleib 
was a remarkable boy." 

He was so intelligent, and read with such an appreciation 
of the sense, that his father assigned to him the duty of 
reading the prayers for the family, and cherished the desire 
that he would become a minister. 

His imagination was so powerfully impressed by a remark- 
able book called Siegfried the Horned, that for a time he lost 
interest in other things, and for neglect of duty, was severely 
punished. Resolving to obey, at least the spirit of the 
injunction, If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off and cast 
it from thee, he resolved to make the sacrifice, and taking 
the book to the river bank and after a short struggle with his 
affection, cast it into the stream, and gave way to his tears, 
as he saw it float forever beyond his reach. His father, coming 
up at the moment, and misunderstanding the motive of his 
son, chastised him unmercifully for the supposed wicked 
deed, an illustration of how the purest motives may be mis- 
understood. 

Gottlieb was a favorite with the village pastor, who one 
day asked him how much of the last sermon he remembered, 
and was astonished at the accurate report he heard from the 
boy. Soon after this, Baron von Miltiz, who was one day 
at Rammenau, on a visit to Count Hoffmansegg, the lord 
of the village, expressed his regret that he was too late for the 
sermon, Sunday morning. The Count said, "It is no matter, 
for there is a boy in the village who can preach the sermon 

250 



FICHTE, JACOBI, SCHELLING 251 

from memory." Accordingly Gottlieb was sent for, and to 
the astonishment of the Baron, delivered the discourse in an 
eloquent manner. 

The Baron was so impx'essed that he resolved to provide 
for his education, and accordingly took him to his castle; 
but the gloom of the castle depressed the spirits of the boy, 
and unfavorably affected his health. Sympathizing with 
the boy's feelings, the Baron removed him to the family of a 
neighboring clergyman, where he spent some of the happiest 
years of his life. Here he began the study of language, which 
he continued at the High School of Meissen and then at 
Schulpforte. 

His life at Schulpforte was far from pleasant. His fellow 
students were for the most part uncongenial, and the one 
who especially had him in charge, was unreasonable and 
overbearing; but Gottlieb learned the important lesson of 
self-reliance. 

Meeting with a copy of Robinson Crusoe, he read it with 
great zest, and inflamed with enthusiasm, resolved to make 
his abode in some island, afar off in the ocean, out of the 
reach of troublesome companions. Having reported his 
resolution to his churlish guardian, as he scorned to sneak 
away, he felt free to put his resolve into execution. An 
opportunity presenting itself, he set off for Noumberg. As he 
trudged on, he called to mind what he had often heard his 
pastor say: "It is best when about to engage in a new under- 
taking to ask for the blessing of God to rest on the enter- 
prise." Kneeling by the road-side, he prayed for divine 
direction in his wanderings. It occurred to him, while pray- 
ing, that he would never see his parents again, and that they 
would grieve over his loss. This he could not bear, and at 
once resolved to retrace his steps. On returning he was met 
by a party in pursuit, as his purpose to leave had been re- 
ported by the student to whose charge he had been assigned. 
He was taken before the Rector, and to him he so frankly 
related the whole matter, that he was not only forgiven, but 
placed in the charge of another student who treated him with 
so great kindness that Fichte ever after felt for him great 
affection. 

Knowing the wishes of his parents, Fichte became a candi- 
date for orders, but his patron dying, he abandoned all hope 



252 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

of becoming a minister, and accepted the position of a tutor 
in a family in Zurich, Switzerland, where he remained two 
years, making in the meantime, the acquaintance of Johanna 
Rahn, a niece of Klopstock. This proved a most fortunate 
acquaintance for Fichte, for this lady became his wife, most 
devoted and helpful. While a tutor, Fichte kept a journal 
in which he noted the faults, not only of his pupils, but also 
those of their parents, which he read to them every week. 

This overstrained relation of his tutorship could not endure, 
and it was at length broken off, much to the relief of all con- 
cerned. Fichte went to Leipzig, and engaged in giving 
private lessons in language and philosophy. It was in Leip- 
zig that Fichte first became acquainted with the writings 
of Kant. The philosophy of Kant, especially his ethical 
writings, gave Fichte great satisfaction, and he characterizes 
this period as the happiest of his life. He writes to Kant: 
"To you especially I owe the declaration that I now believe, 
with my whole heart, in free will, and that I see that under 
this supposition alone can duty, virtue, and morality have 
any existence." 

He visited Kant at Konigsberg, taking with him, by way 
of introduction, a treatise which he had just finished, entitled 
A Critique of every possible Revelation, Kant at once recog- 
nized the value of the production, and received him warmly. 
Fichte was in straits for money, but Kant, who was not rich, 
could render him but little aid. 

Fichte revised his Critique and published it anonymously. 
It gained great applause, partly by its merits, and partly, 
no doubt, because it was generally taken to be the work of 
Kant himself; but its authorship becoming known, Fichte 
acquired great celebrity, which secured for him the chair of 
philosophy in the University at Jena, one of the leading 
universities of Germany. Here he labored earnestly, not 
only for the intellectual development, but for the moral 
elevation of the students. The position was favorable for 
the calm maturing of his philosophy, and was so considered 
at first, by Fichte himself; but the cry of Atheism was raised 
against him, and the charge made that he was endeavoring 
to undermine the institutions of the Church. Fichte prompt- 
ly resigned his position. He was called to the chair of 



FICHTE, JACOBI, SCHELLING 253 

philosophy at Erlangen, and afterwards at Berlin, and in 
both these institutions, labored with success, and acquired 
great popularity. 

At Berlin, Fichte lectured to crowds of enthusiastic stud- 
ents. The country was agitated by the Napoleonic wars; and 
at one of his lectures, he was interrupted by martial music 
in the street — the sound of the drum and fife. Fichte raised 
his voice, and said: ''Gentlemen, this course of lectures is 
suspended till the end of the campaign. We will then resume 
them in a free country, or perish in the attempt to recover 
her freedom." Fichte passed through the crowd of applaud- 
ing students, andplacedhimself in the ranks of the army. He 
never resumed his lectures. He fell a victim to a malignant 
fever then prevailing in the army. 

Let us now retrace the principal steps taken by philosophy 
from Descartes, the founder of Modern Philosophy, to 
Fichte, the Egoistic Idealist. 

Descartes began with doubt; but doubt was a fact, since he 
was conscious of it; but to doubt is to think, and to think is 
to exist; or as Descartes expressed himself, Cogito ergo sum. 
His next step was to prove the existence of God. He said: 
"I have an idea of a perfect being; but existence is necessary 
to perfection; that perfect being, therefore, exists. This 
conclusion he strengthened by saying as the idea of a perfect 
being is too great for me to form, it must have been formed 
in me by that perfect being, that is, by God himself; hence 
God exists. He next passed to the existence of a material 
world. Our faculties affirm that material objects exist; there 
must, therefore, be material objects, otherwise God has 
given us lying faculties, which is impossible, since God is too 
good to deceive. Extension is the only essential property 
we can predicate of body; hence material things are not 
dynamic, and cannot affect us, and our knowledge of them 
is caused by the intervention of God, or is miraculous. 

Geulincx and Malebranche, though not denying to matter 
dynamic attributes, and admitting that material objects 
might excite the senses, yet denied that matter could act on 
mind. Therefore, on the occasion, when external objects 
excited the organs of sense, God intervened and gave us 
sensations to awaken attention, and then presented us with 
the idea of the object; hence what we perceive is God's ideas 
of things, or we see all things in God. 



254 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Spinoza held that there is but one substance — God or 
nature, with an infinite number of attributes, two of which, 
extension and thought, having many possible modes, are 
known to us ; and from this he deduced his philosophy, which 
which is not atheistic, but pantheistic. 

Liebniz resolved every thing into monads, or living points, 
without magnitude, greatly differing in degree of perfection — 
some dormant, others semi-conscious or conscious, and so 
on, up to the highest degree of rationality, to God himself. 
The world of matter, constituted of the lower monads, and 
the world of mind of the higher monads, co-operated, though 
without causal interaction, according to a pre-established 
harmony. 

Locke held that all our ideas come from sensation and re- 
flection; that we know things only through the intervention 
of ideas; that matter had two sets of properties — primary, 
as extension, form, divisibility; and secondary, as the causes 
of color, taste or smell; that our ideas of the primary qualities 
correspond to these qualities; that our ideas of the secondary 
qualities have no resemblance to those qualities, which are 
occult. 

Berkeley maintained that we perceive nothing but ideas, 
but as we are affected from without, he did not doubt that 
there was power without capable of affecting us, and that 
power was Spirit. 

Hume denied not only the substantial existence of matter 
but also that of mind; and said all he found was perception of 
some sensation or idea. He denied cause as efficiency, re- 
solving the relation of cause and effect into that of anteced- 
ence and consequence. 

Kant restricted knowledge within the limit of experience, 
maintaining that we can know nothing but phenomena given 
a posteriori, but set in the forms of space and time given a 
priori, merely as forms of thought. The phenomena were 
the experiences of the subject. Kant, however, did not 
deny things in themselves, apart from our perceptions of 
them, and called them noumena, but held that they were 
wholly unknown; that if we attempt to transcend the limits 
of experience, the result will be illusion; that the reality of 
God, freedom, and immortality cannot, therefore, be proved; 
but that we may practically accept these realities as guides 
to a righteous life. 



FICHTE, JACOBI, SCHELLING 255 

Let us now return to Fichte, Starting with the philosophy 
of Kant, it was almost inevitable that he would reject the 
noumenon, or thing in itself, as held by Kant. If the thing 
in itself is unknowable, why retain it, rather why not reject 
it altogether? And this, accordingly, Fichte did. Rejecting 
the noumenon, he began with something he knew without 
question; and what was that.^ Fichte answered, I know the 
rational principle to be true, that if anything exists, it is 
itself; if ^ is, then ^ is ^, which is the highest principle, or 
law of identity. Since / know this law to be true, then / 
exist, and since / exist, then / am /, by the law of identity. 
The law of identity is the fundamental rational principle; 
the ego, which knows the truth of this law, is the fundamental 
reality, the only fact absolutely known to be, and from the 
ego, by the aid of the law of identity, is evolved all genuine 
philosophy. That external thing which seems to limit the 
ego, which Kant calls the noumenon, the thing in itself. 
Ding an sick, is simply the proper act of the mind, or the self- 
limitation of the ego. The foundation of the Fichtean phi- 
losophy is, therefore, the ego, which, with the law of identity, 
evolves, by its acts, including its self-limitations, every thing 
from itself. 

Fichte fortified the ego, as the point of departure thus: 
We have conjointly the ego and an object. Which of these 
must be reduced to the other .^ If we abstract the ego, we 
have left the object as the essential thing, and our sensations 
and representations must be the products of this object; if 
we abstract the object, we have left the ego with its sensations 
and representations. The former, Fichte calls dogmatism, 
the latter idealism, and maintains that each is irreconcilable 
with the other, and that, as there is no third way, we must 
choose between the two. There is, however, a third way, we 
need not abstract either the ego or the object. 

Fichte says the ego appears in consciousness ; and is there- 
fore real, while the object is a mere invention, since in con- 
sciousness we have only that which is perceived; hence dog- 
matism, to account for representation, must start with some- 
thing not given in consciousness, that is, with assumed 
being, not representation, nor capable of giving representa- 
tions. Idealism is, therefore, the only correct alternative, 
for that does not start with being of which we know nothing, 



256 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

but with conscious acts of intelligence; hence intelligence is 
active, not passive, and there belongs to it no being, but 
simply acting. 

But does not acting require something which acts? Can 
acting act? To my reason, this is impossible. Acting is 
acting, of course, as ^ is ^ ; but acting can no more act than 
running can run. Acting requires a being who acts; knowing 
implies an ego who knows; but the knowing is not the ego, 
any more than running is the boy who runs; but knowing is 
the act of the ego, a being having personal identity, as proved 
by his memory of past acts. 

Fichte has not shown that acting is possible without an 
actor, or that thinking is possible without a thinker. He 
has not shown that the noumenon, or thing in itself is im- 
possible. Of course, an object known is no longer a thing 
in itself, but is a thing in relation to a mind that knows the 
thing; the phenomenon which we represent, as the appear- 
ance of the thing, is our knowledge of the thing expressed in 
pictorial form, and is more or less a truthful representation 
of that thing. The idealism of Fichte is simply hypothesis, 
and by no means, the most reasonable explanation of knowl- 
edge. 

Let us take the out-come of Fichte's philosophy as stated 
by himself: "The sum total is this: There is absolutely 
nothing permanent, either without me or within me, but 
only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of 
any existence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing, 
and am nothing. Images there are; they constitute all that 
apparently exist, and what we know of them is after the 
manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there 
being aught to witness their transition; that consist in fact of 
the images of images, without significance and without aim. 
I, myself, am one of the images; nay, I am not even thus 
much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is 
converted into a marvelous dream, without a life to dream 
of, and without a mind to dream; iiito a dream made up 
only of a dream of itself. Perception is a dream; thought — 
the source of all the existence and all the reality which I 
imagine to myself of my existence, of my power, of my destina- 
tion — is the dream of that dream." 

Fichte supposed that his view was Kantian, and that the 
other interpreters of Kant were mistaken when they affirmed 



FICHTE, JACOBI, SCHELLING 257 

that Kant held that sensations must be given to the subject 
from some transcendental object without, as the material 
condition of objective reality. He says: "So long as Kant 
does not expressly declare that he derives sensations from 
an impression of some essential thing, or to use his termin- 
ology, that sensation must be explained from a transcendental 
object existing externally to us, so long I will not believe what 
these expounders tell us of Kant." But Kant emphatically 
rejected the Fichtean interpretation of his system which he 
declared presupposed something external called the noumenon 
or the thing in itself. 

It may be true, however, that Fichte's interpretation of 
Kant's doctrine in regard to the thing in itself is a logical 
deduction from that doctrine. Kant held that the noumenon 
or thing in itself was unknown and unknowable. It is true 
that if the thing itself is entirely unrelated to us, so as in no 
way to affect us, we would know nothing of it, that is, it 
would be to us unknown and unknowable; but if it is to 
related to us as to give us sensations, as Kant believed to be 
the case, it is no longer a thing in itself, but is in relation 
to us. If this is true, as we have reason to believe, since 
sensations are not caused by ourselves, but produced in us 
by a foreign cause, the noumenon, now no longer regarded 
as a thing in itself, we know as the cause of our sensations, 
and the phenomenon is the graphic expression of our knowl- 
edge or belief respecting the noumenon or objective cause of 
our sensations. The phenomena we witness around us, on 
every side, are not phantoms, mere illusions of the subject, 
but are the appearances of real things. An idealist walking 
the street is suddenly encountered by a dog, which growls, 
barks, and bites. The philosopher perhaps swears at the 
dog, and kicks it, and walks on regarding the pain from the 
bite and the whole performance a freak of his imagination. 

To continue the exposition of Fichte's philosophy, returning 
to his starting point: If anything is, it is itself; A is A, if A 
is; but that does not say that A is, nor what A is; it only says, 
if A is, then A =A. Now if I know this, I can say, with 
absolute certainty, that I am, which is the original real fact. 
Since I am, or ego is, I am I, or ego = ego. This ego is not 
any individual ego, but the universal ego, the universal 
rationality. The ego is known to be, because it is conscious 



258 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

of positing itself; the ego is, therefore, the original thesis or 
starting point, the first principle of philosophy giving the 
category of reality. The ego, the subject of any special 
consciousness is, however, a unique individual ego, the original 
reality known. 

The second fundamental principle is, non-A is not Ay which 
supposes that A has been previously posited. What non-A is 
in itself, I do not yet know, I only know that it is the opposite 
of A; but A is posited through the ego, the only reality ab- 
solutely posited. Hence there can be an absolute opposition 
only to the ego, and that opposition is the non-ego. The 
logical law of contradiction is. Ego is not non-ego, or non-ego 
is not ego. This second principle gives the category of 
negation. 

It might seem that by the law of identity we could affirm 
that non-ego = non-ego, and this we can indeed, if we mean 
by it that any non-ego is itself; but not if the two non-egos 
are not the same; for it will not do to say that any non-ego 
is any other non-ego, so that it is not safe to use the formula 
non-A = non-A. 

The third step is to explain the reciprocal relation of the 
ego to the non-ego. Each seems to suppress the other. 
How can the ego know the non-ego? Fichte answers: the 
ego knows the non-ego as a hindrance or limitation of itself. 
In the impression of limitation, the ego seems passive and 
the non-ego active. But is not this non-ego identical with 
Kant's noumenon, or thing in itself.^ In one sense it is, that 
is, in the sense of being something, the opposite of the ego; 
but the non-ego is regarded differently by the two philoso- 
phers. Kant regarded it as something independent of the sub- 
ject, a thing in itself, while Fichte supposed it to be the 
creation by the subject, made by its own act of self-limitation. 
We thus have the category of limitation. The ego and the 
non-ego reciprocally limit each other; hence also the cate- 
gories of quantity and divisibility. The ego, the original 
activity, posits, in itself, a divisible non-ego, as limitations 
of a divisible Ego. 

Can we regard the apparent objects about us as posited 
by the Ego? A person walking through a dark room, stum- 
bles, unexpectedly to himself, on a chair. Did he posit the 
chair in the sense of creating a hindrance? Here Kant's 



PICHTE, JACOBl, SCHELLING 259 

explanation seems better than Fichte's. The chair seemed 
to exist independently of the ego, and proved to be a hin- 
drance. But Kant's theory appears also at fault. The chair 
was no longer a thing by itself, when the person stumbled on 
it, but was in sharp conflict with him, as an obstruction to his 
progress. Kant would say, however, all he knows is the 
phenomenon, the shock, the noise made, the imaginary 
image of what the appearance would be, if the room should 
be suddenly lighted. He knows also that there is an objec- 
tive cause of the shock, the noise, the surprise, and the appear- 
ance, a cause no longer a thing in itself, but in decided rela- 
tion to himself who ran against the chair. 

We may regard the phenomena of the reciprocal relation 
of the ego and non-ego in two lights : With the conception 
of cause we posit, through the passivity of the Ego, the 
activity of the non-ego, as the ground of that passivity. The 
passivity and the activity differ in quality, the passivity being 
not simply a diminished activity of the ego. This is the view 
of Dogmatic Realism, With the conception of substance, 
we posit the passivity of the ego through its activity, by a 
diminished activity, as the real ground of the apparent 
passivity, the passivity of the ego being of the same quality 
as its activity, but less in quantity. The apparent passivity 
and the activity differ in quantity. This is the view of Dog- 
matic Idealism, Thus, D<»gmatic Idealism, aflBrms that all 
reality of the non-ego is only the reality given to it by the 
ego; and Dogmatic Realism asserts that nothing can be given 
to the non-ego unless it be something to receive, as an inde- 
pendent reality, or thing in itself. 

The contradiction between these views, Fichte attempted 
to reconcile in a new ideal synthesis, making the real ground 
identical with the ideal ground, by showing that the simple 
activity of the ego is not the ground for the reality of the 
non-ego, and that the simple activity of the non-ego is not 
the ground for the passivity of the ego. In Fichte's new 
ideal synthesis, he conceives that the ego meets a hindrance 
when its activity can be no farther extended, and is drawn 
back 'into itself, producing self -limitation. The non-ego, or 
what we call an external object, is the activity of the ego 
impinging on some inconceivable hindrance, which we repre- 
sent as an object filling a portion of space. 



260 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

But what is this hindrance? Fichte's new synthesis brings 
us back only to what Kant called the thing in itself, but 
which is truly a thing in relation to us. It is not an incon- 
ceivable hindrance, as Fichte calls it, but a real object which 
we represent, as well as we can, in the phenomenal appearance, 
which with the help of the object, is a construction of our 
own minds, and in this phenomenal appearance lies the real 
truth of idealism. The appearance is ideal; the objective 
cause is real. 

Fichte's ethical philosophy grew out of his theoretical. 
Moral action is a striving after ideal perfection; but as we 
advance the goal advances before us, and seems more remote 
as our vision becomes clearer. The rule. Do that which 
conscience requires, will lead us to conform our conduct 
to the moral order of the universe, which is the order or- 
dained by God himself, or as Fichte conceived it, is itself 
God. 

2. Jacobi (1743-1819). Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, born 
at Diisseldorf, was the second son of a wealthy merchant. 
He was educated, according to the direction of his father, 
for a commercial career, partly at Diisseldorf and at Frank- 
fort-on-the-Main. To complete his education, he was sent 
to Geneva, at the age of sixteen, where he spent four years 
in thoughtful study, associating himself with the literary and 
scientific circles of the city, and enlarging his range of thought 
by extensive reading. 

In 1763, he returned to Diisseldorf, and in the following 
year married and took his father's place as the head of the 
large commercial establishment, which he managed with 
great success. 

He gave up his commercial career in 1770, and became a 
member of the council for the duchies of Juliers and Berg, 
and gained distinction as a financier and reformer. He 
continued, however, to keep up his interest in literature and 
philosophy, and his home was the center of a circle of friends 
distinguished for literary ability. 

Some of his earliest writings, both on Economics and 
Philosophy, were contributions to the Mercury, a new liter- 
ary journal projected by himself and Wieland, with the aid 
of other friends. Among his contributions to this journal 
may be mentioned, the Correspondence of Allwell, a com- 



FICHTE, JACOBI, SCHELLING ^61 

bination of fiction and philosophy, and Waldemar, a phil- 
osophic novel, which exhibits Jacobi's peculiar method of phil- 
osophizing, by a genial speculation, in a pleasing pictorial 
manner. 

Lessing, in a conversation with Jacobi, had avowed that 
he knew no philosophy in the true sense of the term, save 
Spinoza's, and this remark led Jacobi to make a thorough 
study of Spinoza's works. Making the statement of Lessing 
concerning Spinoza public, drew Jacobi into controversy with 
Moses Mendelssohn, who however, showed but slight 
acquaintance with Spinoza's philosophy. In his published 
letters on Spinoza's philosophy, Jacobi expressed decided 
objections to a demonstrated philosophy, but this brought 
upon him the ridicule of the Berlin clique of which Mendels- 
sohn was the head. He was charged with being an enemy 
to reason, an advocate of blind faith, a fanatic, and probably 
a Jesuit in disguise. To vindicate himself, he wrote in 1787, 
a dialogue entitled David Hume, or Faith, Idealism, and 
Realism, in which he develops his principle of faith, or im- 
mediate knowledge. The truth, however, is faith is not 
knowledge, though based on knowledge. 

In 1804, Jacobi was called to the new Academy of Sciences 
in Munich, and in 1807, he was chosen president of the 
Institution, which position he held till his death in 1819. 

Jacobi directed his polemic against the doctrine that all 
knowledge is mediate, or that philosophy is demonstrable 
throughout. He maintained that Spinozism is fatalism and 
atheism; it is fatalism, because it asserts that the human 
will falsely holds itself free, since freedom is a delusion, as all 
events occur from necessity according to invariable law; it 
is atheism, because it holds that the cause of the world is not 
a being endowed with reason and will, not a free creator and 
governor of the world, not a God having great plans to 
accomplish and benevolent ends to realize by the employment 
of wise means, but that nature is the only God, working 
blindly according to the law of strict necessity. 

Fatalism and atheism, Jacobi endeavored to show, are 
the necessary consequences of the attempt to construct a 
strictly demonstrated philosophy. To understand a thing is 
to explain it by its cause. We go back, in a regress order, 
from the conditioned to the condition, which is also condi- 



26^ PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

tioned, and so on. If the series has no end, though we seem 
to account for everything, yet there is alway one thing left 
unexplained, the condition of the last conditioned that was 
explained, and therefore nothing is absolutely explained; but 
we simply assume an endless chain in which each link follows 
from the preceding by inexorable necessity, in which there 
is neither free will, nor a free personal God. If we pause 
anywhere, the last condition is not explained; if we accept 
this last condition as truly ultimate, it is unconditioned, 
absolute or infinite, we accept it without explanation, and 
the so-called demonstrated philosophy fails to be demon- 
strative. Jacobi, therefore held that Spinoza's philosophy is 
the only demonstrated philosophy, but demonstrated only 
on the assumption of an endless chain, which with its necessi- 
tated links, involves both fatalism and atheism. Spinoza, 
however, attempted to escape atheism by identifying God 
with nature, as in his oft repeated expression, Deus vel Natura, 
which is the expression for pantheism. 

Jacobi's philosophy goes back, not in an infinite series, 
but to an Unconditioned Cause, the First Cause, or God, 
which he accepted by faith. He, however, explains that his 
faith is not a blind faith, resting on external authority, but a 
faith having its toot in feeling, not in sensation so-called, 
which has physical conditions, but in pure feeling, through 
reason, or rational intuition. Jacobi's faith is rational intui- 
tion. This rational intuition is not a logical consequent 
deduced from premises, after the syllogistic fashion, but is 
the logical antecedent, presupposition or necessary condition 
of all rational knowledge, and is apprehended, at once, by the 
direct insight of the reason, whose very essence, according to 
Jacobi, is faith, or instinctive feeling, but is truly rational 
insight. Jacobi, however, resolved all cognition ultimately 
into feeling. 

Jacobi complained of the increasing tendency, in the 
philosophic schools, since the time of Aristotle, to subordi- 
nate reason to the understanding, to subject immediate 
knowledge to mediate, to absorb intuitive knowledge by 
demonstrative. He opposed Kant's theory that space and 
time are given a priori as form of external perception, in 
which phenomena, mere determinations of our minds, seem 
to be located, though they have no external existence, holding 



PICHTE, JACOBl, SCHELLING ^6S 

that Kant was illogical in postulating the thing in itself, of 
which, by his own confession, he knew nothing, giving, in 
this respect, the palm to Fichte. 

It is true that phenomena have no existence apart from 
mind, for they are mental pictures, yet as held by Jacobi, 
they are revelations of objective facts, representing as truly 
as pictures can, our discoveries or beliefs concerning external 
things. 

Jacobi admitted that Kant did good practical work in his 
critique of the understanding, in showing its insufficiency 
to know the supersensible, thus destroying a delusive error, 
and clearing the way for genuine rational intuition, the 
ground of valid faith in God and in the reality of the external 
world. In this respect, the philosophy of Jacobi passed 
beyond that of Kant. 

But Jacobi was not in sympathy with the atheistic tenden- 
cies of the post-Kantian philosophy. Kant held firmly to his 
belief in God, freedom, and immortality, as necessary postu- 
lates of practical reason. Rational intuition was, we may 
believe, the foundation of Kant's faith in these realities, 
though he failed clearly to apprehend its nature; if so, he 
was in practical, though not in theoretical agreement with 
Jacobi. Fichte makes the living working order itself, with- 
out substance, to be God, an inverted Spinozism, which makes 
the one sole substance to be God, who thus lives and works, 
though blindly, according to inherent immutable law. 

In Jacobi's philosophy, the understanding and the feelings 
are strictly separated. Jacobi said: "There is light in my 
heart, but it goes out whenever I attempt to bring it into the 
understanding." Jacobi, in order to escape this contradic- 
tion, brought in immediate knowledge, but this will not 
answer for conditioned things, but only for the condition, and 
then only when the condition is a rational principle. But 
will this hold good? Some philosophers say not, since it is 
not divorced from all other knowledge; yet it will hold; for 
it is not deduced from other knowledge as a logical conse- 
quent, but the other knowledge being given, it is apprehend 
immediately by reason as the necessary condition, or logical 
antecedent. Thus we know that every event requires a 
cause, and knowing a particular event, without knowing the 
cause, we know that it has a cause. 



264 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

3, Schelling (1775-1854). Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von 
Schelling was born at Leonberg in Wiirtemberg. His 
father, an excellent Oriental scholar, was chaplain and pro- 
fessor in a Seminary at Bebenhausen, for the preparatory 
training of Theological Students. At his home, Schelling 
received his early training, and showed great quickness of 
intellect. In his tenth year, he was sent to a Latin school 
at Nurtingen, and such was his precocity, that he acquired, 
in two years, all he could receive from that school, and re- 
turning home, was permitted to study with the students of 
the Seminary. 

In 1790, though three years under age, he was, by special 
permission, admitted to the Theological school at Tubingen, 
where he had Hegel for a fellow student. He graduated in 
1792, presenting a Latin thesis. Continuing his Theological 
and Philosophical studies, and his literary activity, he 
received in 1795, his Theological degree, presenting a thesis 
elititled, De Marcione Paulinarum Epistolarum Emendatore, 

From 1792 to 1795, after graduating and before receiving 
his degree, he had studied the works of both Kant and Fichte, 
and with his usual promptness, and perhaps with undue 
haste, published the results of his studies in an essay as early 
as 1794. This essay was followed, in 1795, by a more elab- 
orate attempt to combine Fichte's system with Spinoza's, 
thus giving it a more objective form. 

For two years he was tutor and companion of two youths 
of noble family, at Leipsic, contributing articles, in the 
meantime, to Fichte's Philosophical Journal, besides engag- 
ing ardently in the study of medicine and physical science. 

In 1798, Schelling was called, as professor extraordinary 
of philosophy, to the University at Jena, and became a 
co-laborer with Fichte; and after Fichte resigned his position 
at Jena, Schelling was appointed to fill the vacant chair, 
and this position he held till 1803. His lectures were very 
attractive, and he assumed a more independent position. 
While holding this professorship, he published several works, 
and made numerous contributions to various Literary and 
Scientific Journals. In connection with Hegel, whom he had 
invited to Jena in 1801, he edited a Philosophical Journal, 
thus raising the university of Jena to the height of its reputa- 
tion, as a philosophic center. 



FICHTE, JACOBI, SCHELLING ^Q5 

Schelling was on friendly terms with Goethe, who was 
pleased with the naturalistic and picturesque turn he 
gave to philosophy; and he was hailed as a powerful ally, by 
the representatives of the Romantic School. 

With August Wilhelm Schlegel and his wife, Caroline, a 
gifted woman, Schelling was on terms of intimate friendship. 
Caroline afterwards became his wife, and with his marriage, 
on account of impropriety, his life at Jena came to an end. 

He was called to Wiirzberg in 1803, as professor of Natur- 
philosphie, where he remained till 1806, when he removed 
to Munich, where his positions as state official, associate in the 
Academy of Science, secretary of the Academy of Arts and 
afterwards that of Science, requiring little work, gave him 
abundant leisure for quiet study and literary work. While 
holding these positions, he lectured at Stuttgart and at 
Erlangen. His wife, Caroline, having died, he married 
Pauline Gotter, who was a devoted and helpful companion. 

In these years at Wiirzberg, during Hegel's philosophical 
supremacy, ScheUing was comparatively quiet; but after 
the death of Hegel in 1831, Schelling made public his antag- 
onism to the Hegelian philosophy, stimulated no doubt by a 
remembrance of some sharp criticisms which Hegel had 
made on Schelling's philosophy. 

In 1841, Schelling was appointed a privy counsellor, and 
made a member of the Berlin Academy, which gave him the 
right to lecture in the University. His opening lecture drew 
an appreciative crowd, and thus again Schelling appeared as 
the first figure in philosophy but in this course, nothing new 
of special interest was developed. 

After the death of Schelling in 1854, his sons issued three 
volumes of his works — two on the Philosophy of Mythology , 
and one on the Philosophy of Revelation. 

Schelling's philosophy is not a complete coherent system, 
consistent throughout, but rather a succession of stages 
without organic union, corresponding to six different periods 
of his fife, but each displaying the peculiar bent of his genius. 

In the first period, Schelling's point of view is that of 
Fichte's. His essay On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy 
shows the necessity of the supreme principle — The Law of 
Identity, first propounded by Fichte; and his essay On the 



266 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Ego show that only in the Ego can be foiind the ultimate 
ground of knowledge, reaching as Schelling believes, the con- 
clusion that Idealism is the only true philosophy. 

In the second period, Schelling distinguishes between the 
philosophy of nature and the philosophy of mind. This 
stage of his thinking is found in A System of Natural Philoso- 
phy published in 1799, and in the Journal of Speculative 
Physics for 1800, 1801, also in A System of Transcendental 
Idealism published in 1800. 

In the third period, Schelling returns to Spinoza, and takes 
his stand on the indifference of the ideal and real or of the 
subject and object. His chief writings of this period are: 
Exposition of my System of Philosophy; Ideas for a Philosophy 
of Nature; a dialogue, Bruno or the Divine, and the Natural 
Principle of Things; the Method of Academical Study; articles 
in the New Journal of Speculative Physics, 

In the fourth period, Schelling inclines to Mysticism and 
Neo-Platonism. In this period, his writings are: Philosophy 
and Religion, Exposition of the True Relation of the Philosophy 
of Nature and the Improved Theory of Fichte, and articles in the 
Medical Journal. 

In the fifth period, Schelling attempted a Theogony and 
Cosmogony after the manner of Jacob Boehme, 

In the sixth period, Schelling published lectures On the 
Divinities of Samothrace; a Critical Preface to Becker s Transla- 
tion of a Preface of Cousin, in which he styles his philosophy 
Positive Philosophy, or the Philosophy of Mythology and Reve- 
lation, 

The writings of Schelling are not self-consistent. In fact, 
Fichte said Schelling was muddled. He was imaginative, 
vacillating and inconsistent, though he had great influence 
when at the height of his popularity. 



CHAPTER XXII 

Hegel 

Hegel (1770-1831). George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was 
born at Stuttgart; and in the Gymnasium of the same place 
he received his preparation for the University. 

While in the gymnasium, he kept, for some time, a diary 
in which he recorded matters which interested him. He 
translated the Antigone and other Greek plays, and made ex- 
tracts from the books he studied, and from current publica- 
tions and standard works, arranging them under alphabetic 
heads. Not only did he acquire from others, but he wrote 
many essays displaying original powers, and showing his 
admiration for the ancient classics. He thus combined the 
two characteristics of a great mind — the power of acquisition 
and of origination. 

He entered the University of Tiibingen, at the age of 
eighteen, as a student of Theology; but he manifested little 
interest in either the theology or the philosophy taught 
at the university, preferring to spend his time reading the 
classics. In due time he took his degree, and received his 
certificate crediting him with good abilities, average knowl- 
edge and industry, but deficiency in philosophy. Hegel was, 
however, all the time, laying up stores of knowledge of the 
ancient world, and gathering a mass of miscellaneous informa- 
tion which later served him good purpose, not only for general 
utility, but also for application to philosophy. He also 
gained much from conversation with his associates, but 
especially with Holderlin and Schelling. 

After his university course, Hegel was, for three years, a 
tutor in the family of M. Steiger, whose summer residence 
was Tschugg and winter residence Berne. Hegel made but 
few acquaintances in Berne, yet he systematically studied 
its fiscal system; he also devoted earnest study to Christianity 
and wrote a life of Jesus, in whom he found a noble spirit, 
calm in the consciousness of his oneness of spirit with God. 

267 



268 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

While engaged with these studies, he kept up a correspond- 
ence with Holderiin and ScheUing. He was stimulated by 
Schelling, whose brilliant genius was gaining him fame, to 
direct his attention more especially to philosophy, and was 
thus kept abreast in the latest speculations, especially in 
Kantian philosophy. By the acquisitions thus gained, 
Hegel's niind was enriched and furnished with material for 
future use. 

In 1797, through the influence of his friend, Holderiin, 
Hegel became tutor in the family of a merchant in Frankfort, 
and this position was favorable for study, and brought him 
into intercourse with intellectual society. With Holderiin 
he renewed his interest in Greek literature and with Sinclare, 
a disciple of Fichte, he revived his interest in philosophy, 
as advanced by Fichte's speculations. While in Frankfort, 
he also turned his attention to Economics and the science of 
Government, and on these subjects wrote some able essays. 
He attached great importance to religious questions, and 
emphasized the distinction between a religion enforced by 
authority, and the natural religious development of a people. 

It was while at Frankfort that the philosophic ideas of 
Hegel were first reduced to systematic form. He corre- 
sponded with Schelling in reference to his making. Bamberg, 
a place of residence; but the result of the correspondence 
was an invitation to come to Jena as an assistant of Schelling 
in philosophy. The two philosophers published conjointly 
a Critical Philosophical Journal, for which Hegel wrote the 
majority of the articles. 

The subject of his dissertation, which qualified him for the 
position of Privatdocent was De Orbitis Planetarum, in 
which he expressed doubts in regard to the existence of a 
planet between the orbits of Mars and that of Jupiter, and 
this was afterwards made the ground of attack on his a priori 
philosophy, as a method for the deduction of facts. 

At Jena, Hegel delivered lectures on philosophy, logic and 
mathematics. After Schelling left Jena in 1803, Hegel had 
the field of philosophy to himself. His lectures though ex- 
pressing deep thought were too obscure to be popular. His 
view of art was, that it should express the national taste in 
regard to beauty, and as the expression of the general sense 
of beauty, it is transmitted enriched from generation to 
generation. 



ii\ 



HEGEL 269 

Napoleon's victory at Jena disturbed him in his philosophi- 
cal labors, and threw him out of employment; but he was 
offered the position of editor of the Bamberger Zeitung, 
which he accepted, and filled the place for eighteen months, 
when he was appointed to the rectorship of the Gymnasium 
at Nuremberg. 

In 1811, Hegel married Marie Von Tucher, who proved 
to be an excellent wife. In 1816, he came to Heidelberg, as 
professor of Philosophy, where he published the Encyclopedia 
of the philosophical sciences. After two years' service at 
Heidelberg, Hegel accepted the chair of philosophy at Berlin, 
where he reached the zenith of his fame. The conciliatory 
character of his doctrines, supporting as they did both the 
church and the state, gave them great popularity, and his 
system was hailed as the national philosophy. 

Locke, Berkeley, Hume, form a chain of three links. 
Locke, the first and original, Berkeley, the intermediate 
link, Hume the terminal and logical outcome, constitute a 
natural development. Hume awoke Kant from his dogmat- 
ic slumbers. In like manner, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, 
constitute a chain of four links. The two intermediate 
links, Fichte and Schelling, connect Hegel with Kant, and 
to them Hegel is truly indebted; but it is from Kant that he 
derives his inspiration. 

Hegel's success was especially due to three facts : he had 
made a long and industrious preparation; he had great 
capacity for acquisition; he had strong powers of origina- 
tion. 

The following is the list of his principal works, in seventeen 
volumes: Vol. 1, Minor Articles; 2, Phenomenology; 3-5, 
Logic; 6, 7, Encyclopedia; 8, Philosophy of Rights; 9, Philos- 
ophy of History; 10, Aesthetics; 11, 12, Philosophy of Relig- 
ion; 13-15, History of Philosophy; 16, 17, Miscellanies. 

The Phenomenology and the Logic are the most important 
of Hegel's works, though the Philosophy of History is the 
most readable and interesting. The Phenomenology was 
published in 1807, and the Logic six years later. 

Thd Phenomenology develops the concept, and by analy- 
sis and abstraction, attempts to reach the Absolute in which 
the All is reduced to the One, The Logic, beginning with the 



270 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Absolute, reverses the process, and by continued synthesis, 
develops the One into the All. Individual forms of concrete 
existence are regarded as subjective, or phenomenal mani- 
festations of the Absolute. 

The perception of a tree, for example, is not immediate, 
since the perception cannot exist except through the inter- 
vention of the tree or object perceived, nor likewise save 
through the intervention of the ego or subject perceiving, 
but the ego and the tree are, according to Hegel, merely 
phenomenal manifestations of the Absolute. The idea of 
this tree is, however, individual. Ideas of other trees can, 
in like manner, be formed. 

Now, dropping from the ideas the individual peculiarities, 
retaining what is common, we pass to the concept tree, 
which is equally applicable to every tree, since the individual 
marks, which would exclude any tree, have been dropped. 
We now have the concept of the class tree. Other concepts, 
besides that of tree, can, in Hke manner, be formed, and taken 
in along with the concept tree, if we drop the peculiar charac- 
teristics of each concept, retaining only what is common to 
all the concepts; and so on, we can rise, till we reach the 
highest genus, embracing every actual and possible concept, 
and applicable to any class or individual object. What 
then have we.^ Evidently Being; not Being embracins 
both extent and content, but only content. What is itg 
content.'^ Hegel answers — Nothing; Being = Nothing. The 
true answer, however, is existence, that is the universal content 
of Being, and that only. 

Hegel, however, deals not especially with the extent 
of a class, but with content, the concept, the idea in 
the Platonic sense, and by the dialectical method; his 
philosophy is Idealism, To him, as to Plato, the con- 
crete individual object, or the class, the whole collection of 
individuals to which the concept is applicable, or the extent 
of the concept, is of little account, save as specimens, for 
these are transitory and will pass away. The individual 
diagram of a triangle, for example, drawn on paper or on a 
black-board, may be erased, and another, or many others 
drawn instead, which, in like manner, may be erased; but 
the idea, the concept triangle, abides; and it is with concepts 



HEGEL 271 

that philosophy deals. Nature herself follows this method 
in her carefulness for the species and carelessness for the 
individual : 

"So careful of the type she seems, 
So careless of the single life." 

It is, however, due that philosophy give some account of 
the individual, and this it does by seeing in it the concept, 
the idea embodied, whatever individual peculiarities, or 
accidents, it may contain. 

In rising from the individual, a tree for example, to Being, 
according to the Hegelian method, we neglected the extent, 
that is, individuals and classes, and considered only the 
content, the concept, the common attributes, which become 
less and less, as we ascend, till we reach Being, the highest 
genus, when the content is a minimum^ simply Existence, but 
not Nothing. 

To neglect extent, or to consider only content, is however, 
an arbitrary proceeding. We should consider both kinds of 
quantity — extent and content. Then, in ascending from an 
individual to its species or class, reducing the idea of the 
individual to the concept, or common content of the class, 
and then passing from the species to the genus, and so on, 
we continually increase the extent and diminish the content, 
till reaching Being, the highest genus, which is a maximum 
in extent, since it embraces every object in the universe, but 
is a minimum in content, since its only common attribute is 
existence. 

Does Being, then, equal Nothing? No; it includes in its 
extent every actual object in the universe, and in its content, 
existence, their common content or attribute. It is, how- 
ever, to be understood that Being in its extent, contains 
all objects, and in it content, every actual attribute, not as 
common to all Being, but as found somewhere in the sub- 
divisions of its extent. 

We can now begin with Being, including all reality, and 
descend by the division of its extent, adding the proper 
content to the several divisions and sub-divisions, till we 
reach individuals, which are minima in extent, but maxima 
in content. The law of the relation of the content to the 
extent is: The content varies inversely as the extent. Any 
division between an individual and Being is neither a maxi- 



272 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

mum nor a minimum, either as to extent or content. We 
divide extent, and analyze content. Any subdivision can be 
defined by referring it to its class and designating it by its 
characteristic attribute. Being cannot be defined, its extent 
can be divided, but its content cannot be analyzed; an 
individual can be defined, its extent cannot be divided, but 
its content can be analyzed; any intermediate class, between 
the Individual and Being, can be defined, its extent divided 
and its content analyzed. The name of any division denotes 
its extent and connotes its content. 

What is the nature of Being? It is not necessarily a 
particular thing, as this tree, that horse, John Brown; but 
all these agree in existing, in being, which, as common to all, 
we can abstract from each of these objects. The being is no 
particular thing, and that is what Hegel meant when he said 
being is no thing; that is, Being = Nothing; but certainly 
when we say this tree is, that horse is, John Brown is, the is, 
common to all these statements, evidently has meaning. Is 
the meaning of is nothing? It is truly no concrete thing 
taken as a whole; but we call it Being, or existence; it is the 
actuality of these objects, as opposed to their non-existence. 

Being, then, is existence, not a determinate existence, as 
tree, horse, man, but it has a real meaning, or has objective 
reality in everything, as their common attribute, and though, 
in thought, it can be abstracted from any or all determinate 
things, and has no objective existence apart from determinate 
things, yet it has subjective existence as the idea of the com- 
mon content of all existing things Its objective reality is 
maintained, not by its own energy, but by the energy of the 
determinate things of which it is the common attribute; as 
subjective idea, it is formed, and may be kept indefinitely 
in mind, by thought. Hence, Being, the highest genus, has 
existence, objective as the common attribute of things, or 
subjective as the idea of this common attribute, and is kept 
in existence, in the one case, by the energy of the objects, 
and in the other, by the energy of thought. The First Cause, 
as eternal energy, has eternal Being, and is the Ultimate 
Reality. 

The Logic of Hegel, descending by division, from Being, 
the highest genus, attempts to develop every existing thing. 



HEGEL 273 

Hegel says: '*Being, pure Being, has no distinction within 
itself, and none in any reference outwards. . . There is 
nothing to be perceived in it, . . or it is only this pure 
void perceiving itself. Just as little is anything to be thought 
in it, . . . or it is equally only this void thought, this 
void thinking. Being, the indefinite immediate, is in fact 
Nothing, neither more nor less than Nothing." 

We assent that Being is no definite thing, and that is 
probably what Hegel meant by Nothing; but Being is truly 
existence, indeterminate existence; for wdthout Being there 
can be no determinate existence, no determinate thing; but 
there are determinate things; hence, there must be Being. 
Is pure Being, then, the energy which keeps determinate 
things in existence? No; but determinate things must have 
being, and it is their persistent energy that sustains their 
Being or existence. Pure Being, then, is Nothing in the 
sense of no determinate thing; but it is not absolute Nothing; 
it is that without which there cannot be any determinate 
thing. 

We now can see why Hegel said: "Nothing, pure Nothing, 
is simple equality with itself; . . . it is empty perception 
and thought themselves; and the same empty perception or 
thought as pure Being. . . Pure Being and pure Nothing 
are, therefore, the same. What is the truth, is neither Being 
nor Nothing, but that Being, — does not pass over, — but has 
passed over into Nothing, and Nothing into Being. But 
the truth is just as much not their undistinguishedness, but 
they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinguished^ 
but still, nevertheless, unseparated and inseparable, and 
either immediately disappears in its opposite. Their truth is, 
therefore, this movement of the immediate disappearance of 
the one in the other; Becoming, a movement in which both 
are distinguished, but by a distinction which has equally 
immediately resolved itself." 

In his doctrine of Being and Becoming, Hegel combined the 
Eleatic and the Heraclitic doctrines. Hegel is an Idealist. 
Thinking of Being, the common attribute of all existent 
things, what do we find.^ Nothing that can be definitely 
imagined. Our thought passes over to Nothing, and finds 
Nothing. Calling Being the thesis. Nothing is the antithesis ; 
hence, the movement from Being to Nothing, from the thesis 



274 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

to the antithesis, not objective movement, but subjective 
in thought. As this Nothing is what thought finds Being 
to be. Being = Nothing; in thought, therefore. Nothing swings 
back into Being; that is, the antithesis returns to the thesis. 
This oscillating process of thought from Being to Nothing, 
from the thesis to the antithesis, and back again from the 
antithesis to the thesis, from Nothing to Being, is the process 
called Becoming, The result is the synthesis of Being and 
Nothing, of the thesis and antithesis. This synthesis is, 
however, the synthesis of pure Being and pure Nothing, not 
of determinate Being and determinate Nothing; for the 
Being of $100 is not identical with the not-Being of 100 miles, 
for this might be the Being of 100 acres, since the Being of 
100 acres, is the not-Being of 100 miles. The idea of Being, 
however, is not the idea of something which can be added to 
the idea of any existing thing; for it is already involved in the 
idea of that thing. It is no peculiar or special element of 
any determinate thing, but is the general or universal element 
of all things, and is the same in all. Being, then, is not that 
which constitutes objective things, but is constituted by 
them; it does not constitute the subjective idea of things, 
but is involved in and constituted by the subjective idea. 

To throw further light on Hegel's exact meaning, we 
quote from Stirling's translation: '*We think that Being is 
rather something quite other th^n what Nothing is; that 
there is nothing clearer than their absolute difference; and 
that there seems nothing easier than to show it. It is, how- 
ever, just as easy to convince oneself that this is impossible, 
that it is unsayahle. To those who would persist in the differ- 
ence of Being and Nothing, let them challenge themselves to 
assign in what it consists. 

Had Being and Nothing, each any determinateness by 
which they might be distinguished the one from the other, 
they would be, as has been observed, determinate Being and 
determinate Nothing — not pure Being and pure Nothing, as 
they still are here. Their difference, therefore, is entirely 
blank; each of the two is in the same way indeterminate: 
the difference, therefore, lies not in them, but in a tertium 
quid, in a mere supposition. But supposition is a mere 
subjective state which does not belong to this course of 
exposition. The tertium quid, however, in which Being and 



^ 



HEGEL 275 

Nothing have their support, must also present itself here, 
and it has already so presented itself: it is Becoming. In it 
they are different; Becoming is only so far as they are differ- 
ent. . . 

The challenge to assign the difference of Being and Nothing 
includes this other also, to say, what then is Being and what 
is Nothing .f^ Let those who strive against perceiving that 
the one as well as the other is only a transition, the one into 
the other — and who maintain of Being and of Nothing this 
and that — ^just say what it is they speak of, that is, produce 
a definition of Being and Nothing, and demonstrate that it is 
correct." 

This is a fair challenge. Let us see what can be done by 
way of definition: Considered as to both extent and content, 
Being is whatever is; it is all reality, including object and 
attribute; it is reality itself. Considered only as to content. 
Being is the common attribute of all existent things; it is the 
reality of their existence; it is that without which things 
would have no existence. Nothing is no thing; it is non- 
existence itself. 

It is true that, in Hegel's sense, pure Being, that is. Being 
abstracted from every existing thing, has no determinate 
existence, or pure Being = pure Nothing. The idea of pure 
Being becomes the idea of pure Nothing, and the idea of pure 
Nothing becomes the idea of pure Being; that is, the idea of 
either pure Being or pure Nothing makes a transition to that 
of the other, by the process of Becoming. Nothing is thought 
of, spoken of; it is therefore, in idea, and has its being in 
thought. The transition of Nothing to Being is called 
arising, that of Being to Nothing departing. 

We have dwelt on the fundamental principle of Hegel, 
because it is important to understand this, if we would 
understand Hegel at all. Being = Nothing, Being is the 
thesis. Nothing the antithesis, and Becoming the synthesis of 
the two, the reciprocal transition of each into the other. 

We may regard the sum-total of all things as God's ideas 
objectified; and as all things are related to God, as their 
origin, they are related to one another, and constitute a uni- 
verse. The human mind, the likeness of God, thinks his 
thoughts after him. Philosophy is the result of human 
thought objectified in history; it is not specifically the system 



276 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

of Plato, or of Aristotle, of Descartes, of Locke, of Kant, of 
Hegel, only so far as the individual philosopher seizes the 
entire result, and elaborates it in a cohering system. Stirl- 
ing says of Hegel: *'He believes himself to have explained the 
universe, when he has demonstrated the notion and the 
necessary system of notions." Again, Stirling says: 'Xocke 
says. Notions are abstractions from Sensations; while, for 
his part, Hegel says. Sensations are concretions from Notions: 
where, at bottom, is the difference? Yes, but observe. 
Hegel's series is the organic system of thought, complete, so 
to speak, alive in itself." 

How does Hegel pass from the oscillation of pure Being 
and pure Nothing, through the process of Becoming, to the 
universe of objects, to every thing that excites curiosity or 
elicits thoiight.f^ Let it be remembered that Hegel was an 
idealist; that he held the phenomenal universe to be ideal — 
God's ideas objectified, externalized, arranged, according to 
his thoughts, by the act of his will. 

I quote what Stirling says of Hegel's view of the external 
world: ''Every finite object, whatever truly is, every finite 
object whatever truly is not, every finite object whatever 
truly becomes, and becomes in one or other of the modes of 
its double form. Nor does any object receive such deter- 
mination from us; it possesses such determination in its own 
self; it has received such determination from God, it has 
been so thought by God, it has been created by God on and 
according to these thoughts. Being, Nothing, and Becoming. 
These thoughts are there — without us — ^in the universe, and 
in here — within us — ^in the universe; they are objective 
thoughts in obedience to which the whole is disposed. They 
are necessary pressures or compressures moulding the all of 
things. They are three of God's thoughts in the making of 
the universe." 

The universe is understood through its phenomena, to some 
extent though imperfectly by the average man, but more 
perfectly by the philosopher who, from the history of specu- 
lation and by his own earnest thought, forms opinions, 
beliefs, ideas, and often reaches assured knowledge. With 
Hegel, as with Plato, the idea, or concept, is the chief thing, 
the individual is of httle or no account; but the individual is 
certainly not nothing. 



HEGEL 277 

How do we arrive at a knowledge of the universe? Berkeley 
says by perception; we perceive God's ideas, and mistake 
them for material objects. Hegel says by conception; we 
construct notions in their three-fold character of thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis. A determinate being excludes 
every other being from itself. Omnis determinatio est nega- 
iio, says Spinoza. A determinate notion is not any other 
determinate notion. To affirm a definite notion is to deny all 
other notions; and in the realm of notions, to deny all other 
notions is to affirm the given notion. The affirmation be- 
comes the denial and the denial the affirmation, and by 
synthesis the two become one. In like manner, other deter- 
minate notions are constructed, and so on throughout all 
the processes of thought. 

The human mind. Godlike by nature, constructs its ideal 
system in conformity with the actual universe, which it 
seems to construe and interpret. This, however, has been 
done with an approach towards completeness, not by one 
mind, but by a succession of minds, through the process of 
evolution. The different systems were often in conflict; but 
by their reactions upon one another, errors ha v e been eliminat- 
ed and knowledge advanced. The process has been con- 
struction, criticism, reconstruction, 

Hegel's mind had an immense sweep; it overlooked neither 
quality, quantity, measure, relation, essence, actuality, 
causality, or reciprocity; it considered every science — physics, 
chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology in its two-fold form 
of botany and zoology, history, language, literature, ethics, 
politics, religion; it studied every art — ^landscape and archi- 
tecture, sculpture and painting, music and poetry, conversa- 
tion and oratory. 

It is an interesting question. How could Hegel, employing, 
as he did, the a ^priori method, constructing notions as thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis, make his constructions correspond 
to the facts of the universe, and to the various arts, and 
sciences, and institutions of mankind .^^ We may answer, 
the facts of the universe are God's ideas, and as the human 
idea is a finite copy of the Divine, the system of notions, 
constructed by a mind like Hegel's, would, in some degree, 
correspond to the creations of the Divine mind. 



278 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The correspondence, however is assumed rather than 
proved. An ideahst would say my own ideas are all I know, 
and all with which I am concerned. This is dangerously 
near solipsism. The modesty of the idealist, in spite of his 
logic, would probably restrain him from the outrageous 
egotism of considering himself and his thoughts the sum- 
total of reality. Hegel had all the senses — sight, hearing, 
touch, taste, smell and most likely he reached many of his 
ideas empirically through the senses. 

The better way for philosophy, as for science, is to beg^n 
with the facts of experience, and by examination, generaliza- 
tion, classification, definition, induction, and verication, 
ascend to the summit of Being, increasing the extent, as we 
rise, while decreasing the content. Now, having reached 
Being, we have, instead of Nothing, every existing thing, 
with one universal attribute, existence, but every actual 
attribute somewhere in the subdivisions. 

We can now descend by division, by the process roughly 
thus indicated : Being is divided into dynamic being and non- 
dynamic; dynamic into matter and spirit, the non-dynamic 
into space and time; matter into organic and inorganic, and 
organic in vegetable and animal, and so on till we reach in- 
dividuals. 

Hegel had a propensity for blending opposites. This was 
true of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, and of Ferrier, the 
Scotch philosopher. Contrarieties often blend, but con- 
flictives, never. A hollow sphere is convex without and 
concave within, but it is not concave without nor convex 
within. A body may be both spherical and red, but it is 
not at the same time, both spherical and cubical. 

Attributes are congruent or conflictive — congruent if they 
will blend, conflictive if they will not blend; conflictive attri- 
butes are contraries or contradictories — contraries when they 
do not exhaust their genus, contradictories when they do 
exhaust their genus. Thus red and spherical are congruents; 
spherical and cylindrical are conflictives and contraries, 
regular and irregular are conflictives and contradictories. 

The fundamental laws of thought, if not respected, will 
revenge themselves on the thinker who violates them, they 
are the following: Law of identity; A thing is itself; a thing 
is not anything else than itself. 



HEGEL 279 

Law of congruents: Two congruent attributes may both be 
present in the same object, or both absent, or either may be 
present, and the other absent; hence, the presence or absence 
of either does not involve either the presence or absence of 
the other. 

Law of confliciives: Two conflictive attributes cannot both 
be present; hence the presence of either involves the absence 
of the other. 

Law of contraries: Two contrary attributes can not both be 
present, but may both be absent; hence, the presence of 
either involves the absence of the other, but the absence of 
either does not involve the presence of the other. 

Law of contradictories: Two contradictory attributes can- 
not both be present nor both absent; hence the presence of 
either involves the absence of the other, and the absence of 
either the presence of the other. 

Law of reason and consequent: An inference requires a 
sufficient reason. When the reason is a cause, we infer the 
effect, when an effect we infer some cause. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

Herbaria Schopenhauer, Hartmann 

1. Herbart (1776-1841). Johann Friedrich Herbart was 
born at Oldenburg. His parents were cultured people, and 
their son was an intelligent boy, who early showed a taste 
for philosophy. He studied under Fichte at Jena, and was 
elected professor of philosophy at Gottingen in 1805, and 
appointed Kant's successor at Konigsberg in 1808, and 
recalled to Gottingen in 1833, where, in 1841, he died. 

Instead of beginning his philosophy with an idea of reason, 
as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel had done, he followed the 
method of Kant, and subjected to a critical examination the 
facts of experience. His results, however, were peculiar and 
widely different from those of Kant. He regarded antecedent 
systems mainly as failures, giving phantoms rather than 
truth. 

As the beginning of his system, Herbart takes, for his 
point of departure, the common sense view of things, as given 
by experience. The facts of experience being accepted, it 
becomes the business of philosophy to account for them. 

His first step is to discriminate between immediate experi- 
ence and the thought which endeavors to account for that 
experience. Difficulties are thus seen, and doubt arises, and 
the first result is skepticism. This was seen in early philoso- 
phy in the case of Pyrrho and of Sextus Empiricus, and later 
in that of Hume. In its lower form. Skepticism doubts 
whether things are as they appear, but in its higher form, 
Skepticism doubts whether things have any existence at all. 

Doubts arise from the discovery that the conceptions of 
experience, which constitute the materials for philosophy, 
involve incongruous elements; hence, the second step is so to 
remodel the conceptions of experience, as to render them 
congruous, and thus to transform skepticism into philosophy. 

Herbart agrees with Hegel in regard to the conflictive 
elements in thought; but while Hegel teaches that these 
conflictives blend into one by the process of becoming, Her- 

280 



HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER, HARTMANN 281 

bart holds that the conflict comes from false conceptions, 
which are to be rectified and rendered congruous by the 
elimination of the false elements, and remodelling and recon- 
ciling the true. Herbart thus conforms to the fundamental 
laws of thought, which Hegel disregards. 

At this point, Herbart introduces his doctrine of reals or 
monads, borrowed from Leibniz, though he makes a different 
application of them. If there are no reals, there could be no 
sensation, representation or thought. Real being is, therefore, 
just as certain as appearance. The phenomenal manifesta- 
tion implies a real which manifests itself in the phenomena, 
and which sound philosophy will not fail to recognize. The 
real is positive; its absoluteness is not destroyed by negation 
or limitation; it is simple, neither admitting multiplicity nor 
contradictions, nor of any conceptions of greatness, discreet 
or continuous; it is not a creation of thought, but is to be 
recognized by thought as real in itself. It exists, in fact, 
only in the imagination of Herbart. We have no positive 
evidence of its existence. 

A thing is not simply a manifestation of attributes, but is 
a substance, or rather, a combination, a complexus, of sub- 
stances or monads, each as a real manifesting its own phenom- 
enal attributes. There are therefore as many causes in a 
thing as there are manifestations, and perhaps more also 
which would be manifest, if we had other senses, or if our 
actual senses were more acute. 

Change is explained, not by a change in the monads them- 
selves, for they ever remain the same, though differing among 
themselves, but by their disturbance, and by their self-preser- 
vation in their resistance to disturbance. To explain the 
appearance of change, we resort to accidental views from 
change of relation, as the same line may be, for example, the 
radius of one circle and tangent to another. We can resort 
also to intellectual space, when we regard two points, for in- 
stance, as either coincident or consecutive. We can eliminate 
the contradictions involved in motion, or in the conception of 
a body made up of inextended atoms, or of the ego as an 
identical personality, and at the same time as continually 
changing its phenomena. 

The ego is a real with apparently many powers, faculties, 
activities changing with circumstances; it posits itself, and 



28^ PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

is, therefore, both subject and object, or subject-object, and 
hence full of apparent contradictions. It seems to be a 
commonwealth of reals, yet believes in its own unity; but as 
a unity, it is a monad or real, absolutely simple, indissoluble, 
immortal. It is Kant's noumenon. 

Herbart holds that the so-called faculties of the soul are 
nothing other than its self-preservation, changing and mani- 
fold, in opposition to other reals with which it comes in con- 
flict. The causes of the soul's changing phenomena are, 
therefore, other reals coming in conflict with the soul-monad, 
and these changing operations apparently imply independent 
powers or faculties, which Herbart rejects. It has, however, 
the power of resistance. This discarding of faculties, is well 
enough so long as faculties are regarded as subordinate egos 
within the ego, each doing its own independent work. The 
fact of different mental phenomena cannot be denied, as it 
is given in consciousness; for since the ego feels, it is suscepti- 
ble of feeling, or has sensibility; since it thinks, it has intellect; 
since it chooses, it has will. Feeling, cognition and volition 
cannot pass into one another, and these distinctions are 
marked by the words sensibility, intellect and will; but the 
same ego feels, and thinks, and wills. It is a thoughtless 
act to ridicule the term faculty , or to ridicule those who 
employ the term, by calling them "faculty-philosophers." 
It is better for a philosopher to possess faculties than to be 
destitute of them. Herbart discards the term faculty because 
inconsistent with his own peculiar views, which have not 
yet been established beyond question. Faculty is a con- 
venient term and denotes a power or susceptibility of the 
ego. 

To return to reals: A real in itself can be the object of 
thought, though it is independent of thought; it is absolute, 
simple, spaceless. A line regarded as made up of consecutive 
points, may be conceived as the continuous track of a point 
moving through the consecutive points. A body may be 
conceived to be made up of reals in adjacent positions. 

How can the ego exhibit various manifestations, while, as 
a real, it remains one and identical .^^ It reacts against the dis- 
turbances caused by various other reals, each reaction giving 
a different manifestation, because the other reals are different. 
The ego, as intelligent, is conscious of the changing mani- 



HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER, HARTMANN 283 

testations caused by its conflict with other reals; for con- 
sciousness is the realization of these disturbances which 
appear as phenomena. Representations restrained from the 
clearness of thought are feelings. The resolution to realize 
the object of desire is volition, which, as a dominant repre- 
sentation, implies the hope of success. The character of a 
man is the constant presence of certain dominant representa- 
tions. 

Herbart did good educational work, which has proved to 
be a wholesome stimulus to teachers. He taught that 
Aesthetics deals with beauty which has an absolute value, 
making no appeal to self-interest, but calling out disin- 
terested admiration. Ethics, according to Herbart, is a 
branch of Aesthetics, dealing with those relations among 
the volitions that unconditionally please or displease. This 
would, of course, bring Ethics under Aesthetics, if to please 
or displease, we add the Aesthetic sentiment of taste. It 
would be better to say: Ethics deals with those volitions 
which meet with the approval or disapproval of the moral 
judgment. Five topics, according to Herbart, are embraced 
in Ethics: Internal freedom, perfection, benevolence, right, 
retribution. 

In beginning with the facts of consciousness, Herbart was 
right; and he was also right in maintaining that every 
phenomenon implies a real, and in general, two reals — the 
objective real, and the subjective real, or ego. The two 
reals become one when the subject is also the object; but 
here is a case of difficulty. How can the subject be its own 
object.f^ Empirically, it cannot. The ego is conscious of 
phenomena; but the necessity of the ego itself is apprehended 
by rational intuition. Psychology deals with the facts of 
mind, metaphysics with the ego, or in general, with the con- 
ditions of phenomena. 

There is, of late, a tendency to use the word consciousness 
instead of mind, or ego; but consciousness, as an act or state 
of mind, is phenomenal, and demands, for its condition the 
ego, or as Herbart would say, a real, without which it would 
be impossible. Consciousness takes note of mental opera- 
tions; but it is not the ego; it is the experience of the ego, the 
realization of the ego's activity or disturbances. 

Herbart found contradictions in all phenomena, and these 
contradictions he attempted to * eliminate. To do this he 



^84 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

resorted to mathematics, expressing the states of conscious- 
ness by formulae, by means of which he endeavored to get 
rid of contradictions, and thus to purify conceptions. By 
this method, psychology becomes mental mechanics, exclud- 
ing all freedom, which Herbart allowed. But his mathemat- 
ical method has not been eminently successful. Herbart, 
however, had a penetrating mind, and was a deep thinker. 

2, Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Arthur Schopenhauer was 
born at Dantzic, a free imperial city. His father was a well- 
to-do merchant, and his mother a novelist. After Dantzic 
became incorporate with Prussia, the family withdrew to 
Hamburg. Arthur's early education was under the care of 
his mother. 

The family spent some time in France and England, and 
by his acquaintance with the languages of these countries, 
he acquired a more sprightly style than was usual for a 
German. At first, he was not a diligent student, but finally, 
from the Greek scholar, Passow, he acquired familiarity with 
the Greek and Latin languages. 

He entered the University of Gottingen, and by the advice 
of Prof. Schulze, his philosophic studies were directed espe- 
cially to Plato and Kant, both of which he held in high admi- 
ration. While in the university he was unsocial, gloomy and 
became a confirmed pessimist. With him happiness was 
not positive enjoyment, but negative, the absence of misery. 
After spending two years at Gottingen, he entered the Uni- 
versity at Berlin, and attended the lectures of Fichte and 
Schleiermacher. 

Awakened by the general enthusiasm for German liberty, 
and against French dominion, he bought a set of arms, but 
could not make up his mind to enlist. He withdrew to 
Weimar, and from thence to Rudolstadt, where in quiet, he 
prepared a very able essay for the degree of Doctor of Philos- 
ophy, on The four roots of the principle of sufficient reason. 
These four roots, according to Schopenhauer, are: Causa 
fiendi, causa cognoscendi, causa essendi, causa agendi, relating 
respectively, to the reason for events, the reason of knowing, 
the reason of being, the reason for acting. He received his 
diploma from Jena. 

From the press of Rudolstadt, he issued his first philosophic 
work. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, which, though 



HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER, HARTMANN 285 

written in good style, and abounding in sharp criticisms, fell 
flat from the press, winning neither readers, nor notices from 
periodicals, a result probably due to the prevailing Hegelian- 
ism ; but after thirty years, it came to be regarded as a work 
of merit. Schopenhauer considered himself the true succes- 
sor to Kant; but though our scientific knowledge is limited 
by the line of experience, yet we can penetrate to the mys- 
terious Ding an sich, by the study of ourselves. The desires 
and volitions within ourselves, leading to our hopes and 
fears, strivings and disappointments, reveal to us the core 
of our own nature, and through us the hidden essence of the 
world itself, and that core, that essence, that centraling 
principle, is the desire to be, the will for continued existence, 
the desire to rise to consciousness, as in man. The world, as 
idea, exhibits these struggles of the will, as revealed through 
gravitation, crystalization, chemical affinities, magnetic and 
electrical attractions and repulsions and in organization, 
through feelings, perceptions, reason, and deliberate will; 
but every where no satisfaction, only unrest, unsatisfied 
desire, defeat, pain, disgrace; nor can we hope for anything 
better; all is vanity and vexation of spirit. 

Schopenhauer was no admirer of Fichte, Schelling and 
Hegel, and became suspicious that Schelling and Hegel 
especially conspired against his own success, and regarding 
these great philosophers with contempt, he still more despised 
their disciples. All this, however, only added to his own 
unhappiness, and intensified his pessimism. 

Perception, Schopenhauer held, is to be explained by an 
external cause exciting sensation. This cause in connection 
with time and space, is known a priori, not a posteriori; it 
has a rational root, not an empirical origin. The necessity 
of a cause is known a priori, what the cause is, a posteriori. 
From the principle of causality, the law of inertia, and of the 
conservation of matter and energy follow as necessary conse- 
quences. 

The appearance of the world to us is determined by the 
mode of our knowledge, and would change with the change 
in the constitution of our senses. The world is a series of 
ideas held together by the four-fold principle of sufficient 
reason; but its empirical result is not disturbed by the theory 
of its ideal existence; but as ideal, its explanation falls back 



286 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

to the subject whose very core is will accompanied by feeling 
and thought. But does not this make each ego the center 
of things, and the creator of his own universe? It is true 
that it does, and that is the logical outcome of idealism. 
Any ego, if idealism is true, can say : I am the sole creator of 
all things, and all other egos, so-called, are only the creatures 
of my own act of creation. But the essence of ego is will, 
and this will is identical with the will, the essence of nature, 
or the will of ego is the will of nature. How can will, if only 
phenomenal, if only volition, be the essence of nature? Voli- 
tion is an event, and has a cause. But will as the source of 
volition, is therefore, not merely phenomenal, it is noumenal, 
it is cause itself, essential Being. The individual human 
ego cannot be the essential will of the universe; for this will 
is often thwarted, defeated, disappointed, and does not have 
its way; the essential will is the omnipotent God, who created 
all things, and upholds them by the word of his power. 

Schopenhauer discriminated sharply between knowledge 
and the will, but confounds the feelings, desires, loves, hat- 
reds with the volition, and this is accounted for by his own 
manner of life, for he often gave way to passion and desire in 
opposition to reason. 

Volition, as revealed to consciousness, is outwardly visible 
in the movements of our bodies; the volition and bodily move- 
ment, Schopenhauer held, are not related as cause and effect, 
but movement is the visible volition. As the will in man 
manifests itself in bodily movements, so the will in nature, 
its different forces, become visible in the movements in the 
external world. According to its degree, the will is blind or 
conscious deliberate action, as in the voluntary actions of 
man. Schopenhauer held, as taught by Fichte, that the 
human body enables man to struggle against the limitations 
opposed by nature. 

With Schelling, Schopenhauer held that matter in nature 
attempts to raise itself up to spirit, striving through mechani- 
cal action and all forms of activity to conscious volition and 
reasonable action, and becomes thus the universe made 
visible. The optimist, in his hopefulness, looks for happi- 
ness; the pessimist, in his despondency, anticipates evil; for 
he sees through the illusion, and is confirmed in his opinion 
by his own experience; but the evil he encounters, is brought 
upon himself, for the most part, by his own folly. 



HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER, HARTMANN 287 

Schopenhauer did not find dehverance from evil through 
obedience to the moral law, but he sought peace in aesthetic 
satisfaction, and in intellectual activity; but the achievements 
of authorship only subjected him to the envy and detraction 
of rivals. 

3. Hartmann (1842-1906). Edward Von Hartmann was 
born at Berlin, an only child of the family. His father was 
a military officer permanently stationed at Berlin, at the 
head of a commission for testing proposed improvements in 
heavy firearms. 

Edward was a precocious boy, and at a very early age was 
prepared to enter the University. He, however, chose the 
profession of his father, and took a course in artillery and 
engineering, but a chronic affection of the knee prevented his 
entering upon active service. 

He turned his attention to art, for which he had a taste, 
and even published a poetical drama founded on the story of 
Tristan and Isolde; but as this did not prove successful, he 
turned his attention to philosophy. 

He studied carefully the works of Schelling, Hegel and 
Schopenhauer, and at the age of twenty-two, began The 
Philosophy of the Unconscious. This work was first published 
as one volume of 800 pp. The book was at once popular, 
and has passed through at least nine different editions. We 
use, for this review, the authorized translation of Coupland's, 
published by the Macmillan Company. 

Hartmann's superior success, as an author, compared with 
that of Schopenhauer's, is accounted for by the fact that he 
found a publisher who interested himself in the success of the 
work, which he vigorously pushed, while Schopenhauer pub- 
lished his book himself, and trusted to its merits in giving it 
circulation, and consequently it remained, for a time, com- 
paratively unknown. Hartmann also introduced into his 
book topics suitable for popular conversation, review and 
discussion, and consequently the book at once attracted a 
great deal of attention; even the criticisms of the work made 
it the better known and the more sought after. 

Hartmann opens his work. Philosophy of the Unconscious, 
with '* unconscious idea, " which he finds in Kant. No doubt 
there are subconscious operations of mind, those processes 
which have not yet risen to the plane of consciousness; they are 



288 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

subliminal states, as they are called by others; but whatever 
rises to the rank of knowledge, becomes, by that very fact, 
an object of consciousness; because if I know, I know that I 
know, for if I do not know that I know, I do not know; 
knowledge involves consciousness. 

We are conscious of every phenomenon; for a phenomenon 
is what appears, and if we are not conscious of it, then it does 
not appear, or is not a phenomenon; but it does not follow 
that there may not be latent processes, that is, processes of 
which we are not conscious. Thus we may begin the investi- 
gation of a subject, then drop it for awhile in order to attend 
to something else, and after a time return to the subject, and 
find that we have advanced in its development, though we 
were not conscious, in the meantime, that it had occupied 
our thought. 

To let Hartmann open the subject himself, we quote: 
"I designate the united unconscious will and unconscious 
idea *the Unconscious.' Since, however, this unity again 
only rests upon the identity of the unconsciously willing and 
unconsciously thinking subject, the expression, Hhe Uncon- 
scious,' denotes also this identical subject of the unconscious 
psychical functions, — a something in the main unknown, it is 
true, but of which we may at least affirm, that besides the neg- 
ative attributes 'being unconscious and exercising functions 
unconsciously,' it possesses also the essentially positive at- 
tributes, willing and representing. As long as our speculation 
does not transgress the limits of individuality, this may be suf- 
ficiently clear. When we, however, view the world as a whole, 
the expression, *the Unconscious,' acquires the force, not only 
of an abstraction from all unconscious individual functions and 
subjects, but also of a collective, comprehending the foregoing 
both extensively and intensively. Lastly, it will appear 
that all unconscious operations spring from one and the same 
subject, which has only its phenomenal revelation in the 
several individuals, so that the 'Unconscious' signifies this 
one Absolute Subject. " 

Hartmann says: "In each succeeding chapter, one piece 
more of the world crystallizeSy as it were, around this nucleus, 
until, expanding to all unity, it embraces the Cosmos, and 
at last is suddenly revealed as that which has formed the 
core of all great philosophies, the Substance of Spinoza, the 
Ego of Fichte, Schelling's Absolute Subject-Object, the 



HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER, HARTMANN 289 

Absolute Idea of Plato and Hegel and Schopenhauer's Will;" 
and we may add, Spencer's Ultimate Reality, and the God 
of Theism. 

Like a living tree sustained by the solid stem of heart 
wood within, while the life is in the annular growth, in the 
new shoots and leaves, so all present vital philosophy is a 
growi:h; it has historic roots in the soil of the past, and is 
sustained by the solid products of the deep thinkers of the 
past; but it grows anew from the root, rising still higher and 
expanding in living beauty. 

How are we to reach truth in philosophy? Shall we em- 
ploy the deductive or the inductive method .^^ Or shall we 
use one, the inductive, in discovery, and the other, the 
deductive in proof? Different causes may produce the same 
effect; hence, a cause may be assumed which might produce 
the effect, and yet not be the true cause, and it is not to be 
held true, because accounting for the effect. 

Philosophers who employ deduction, reach their first princi- 
ple by a misty flight; but deduction cannot prove its first 
principles, and its conclusions cannot be communicated. 
This mode of proof inspires the scientific mind with an aver- 
sion to philosophy conducted by the deductive method, 
leading even to contempt. Hartmann, therefore, contends 
that the inductive method is the only legitimate one for 
philosophy as it is for science, whether employed for dis- 
covery or for proof, and so chooses his motto: "Speculative 
results according to inductive scientific method. " 

Hartmann holds to a purpose in nature as in instinct, 
though unconscious of the purpose. He regards causality 
as a logical necessity. Causality may indeed co-operate 
with logical necessity, but does not a logical necessity appeal 
to reason and is not the conclusion clearly apprehended? 
If, in a measure, this is true of instinct, is it certainly true of 
the functions in the vegetable kingdom? 

The conception of an end is a familiar experience of man, 
who forms plans and works to realize them. If the end, 
which is still future, cannot be realized directly, resort is 
had to means, or causes which bring the end to pass. To 
will the end is to will the means; to employ the means is to 
realize the end. Necessity reigns throughout, save that 
freedom exists only in the ego, who chooses the end in view 
of reasons which solicit, but do not compel the choice. 



290 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Hartmann holds the difference between man and the lower 
animals to be one in degree, not in kind. Man's superiority 
arises from his ability to generalize in the formation and 
application of concepts, and in his more perfect language. 
The apparently new faculties are only secondary powers 
which have been developed in certain directions by the 
higher cultivation of primary capacities. 

The mental powers, Hartmann divided into those of will- 
ing and thinking, resolving feeling into one or the other of 
these. Will in animals is essentially the same as will in man; 
but he rightly distinguished between volition and reflex 
action. In volition, we have emotion, and the carrying out 
of an intention with a purpose, but reflex action is mechanical 
and passionateless. Emotion is often present in animals, 
as in ants when one community makes war upon another, 
the conquering tribe reducing the conquered to slavery, like- 
wise anger is exhibited by bees. A decapitated frog seems 
to act with a purpose, indicating that thought is not confined 
to the head; and hence there is will without brains. The 
spinal chord and the ganglia exhibit separate will. The 
meaning of the word will, Hartmann extends so as to take 
in the cause of unconscious movements. Will with a con- 
scious aim, he calls free-will, and unconscious will he calls 
simply will. Desire is inchoate volition, and impulse is latent 
disposition to action. 

Hartmann maintains that when a person wills, for example, 
to lift a finger, the finger is lifted, not by the direct act of 
the conscious will, but by the unconscious; the right nerve 
is not consciously selected to do the work of contracting the 
proper muscle, but the end being consciously chosen the 
mind unconsciously wills the right means by selecting, 
though unconsciously, the right nerve to contract the right 
muscle. 

Instinct is first defined by Hartmann as purposive action 
without consciousness of the purpose; it directs action to an 
end, not by conscious reflection, though the result, when 
realized, gives satisfaction. Is it a mere consequence of 
corporeal organization .^^ or is it a result of mental mechanism .^^ 
or is it the consequence of unconscious mental activity? 

Hartmann gives reasons for denying the first and second of 
these alternatives, and for affirming the third. The work 



HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER, HARTMANN 291 

prompted by instinct varies according to circumstances, 
showing that instinct is somewhat plastic, approaching, 
in certain cases, conscious intelligent action, or is in combina- 
tion with it. Thus bees build hexagonal cells in the middle 
of the comb, but pentagonal at the edges; they kill off the 
drones, when no longer needed. Some birds brood on the 
eggs in the cold of the night, and leave the nest in the heat of 
the day. Instinct is sometimes attended with pleasure, and 
sometimes with pain, and in the latter case it appears like a 
virtue. Even when attended with pleasure, we cannot con- 
sider pleasure the motive, as in the first act from instinct, 
where there has been no previous experience of pleasure from 
that source. Hartmann, therefore, concludes that: Instinct 
is conscious willing of the means to an unconsciously willed end. 

Though Hartmann peremptorily rejects the hypothesis 
that instinct is merely the action of a pre-arranged mechan- 
ism, he does not exclude the constitutional tendencies of the 
organism. The instinctive tendency is augmented either 
by individual habit, or by inheritance, through the customs 
of many generations, or it may be called forth by an uncon- 
scious impuli^e to a particular line of action. Instinct ex- 
plains especially, not why the actions of one individual of a 
class differ from those of another individual, but why the 
actions of one class differ from those of another class. 

Deviations, from custontary instinctive acts are not ac- 
counted for by mechanism; inheritance is possible only 
through unconscious influence in the embryonic develop- 
ment which modifies the mechanism; mere instinctive actions 
cannot be engendered by habit; mechanism may predispose, 
but does not necessitate instinctive acts. Hence, pur- 
posive action without consciousness of purpose is always 
found in instinct. 

Hartmann now raises the question, whether the so-called 
instinctive actions are not, after all, the results of premedi- 
tation. Narrowing the field intensifies the action; but the 
lower the rank,the narrower the field relative to total capacity, 
yet as the instinctive performances remain equal, while the 
perfection of those acts which admittedly proceed from 
conscious reflection is proportional to the mental capacity, 
the instinctive acts have a different origin. The instinctive 
acts of animals are as well performed at first as ever after- 



29^ PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

wards, not so those acts learned by experience. Instinct 
is blind as to the reason why, clear as to the manner how, but 
immediately, not by reflection, as we rise in the scale of 
being, instinct is gradually supplanted by reflection, as in 
man, though traces of instinct remain. 

Reflection operates only on data given in consciousness, 
but certain acts are performed when the data for reflection are 
not possible. From whence then do such acts proceed? 
Hartmann says from clairvoyance, that is from unconscious 
knowledge, or knowledge not produced by sensible experience. 
Witness, the alarm of animals at the approach of enemies 
they have never before seen. Observe their discrimination 
in their choice of food; their avoidance of poisons. Even in 
man, there is often a craving for a certain kind of food, the 
reason for which is not understood. Cats taken from home 
find their way back again by a clairvoyant instinct. 

The instinctive act is vividly realized by the individual, 
and springs from its inmost nature, while neither the end nor 
the means are consciously chosen. 

Clairvoyance and instinct, though not identical, are often 
found together, then clairvoyance serves to throw light on 
instinct, but not conversely. Instinct is the inmost core of 
being, as shown in the effort to preserve the individual, or 
in the more important effort to preserve the species, even at 
the sacrifice of the individual. Instincts are unerring, and 
within the same species, uniform. 

Hartmann closes his chapter on instinct by quoting from 
Schelling: "There is no better touchstone of a genuine philos- 
ophy than the phenomena of animal instinct, which must be 
ranked among the very greatest by every thoughtful human 
being." Though we have very greatly condensed Hart- 
mann's discussion of instinct, we have endeavored to make 
it clear. 

Hartmann discusses the evils commonly attending the 
course of ordinary life. These evils arise chiefly from igno- 
rance or from the selfish desire to enjoy the unlawful pleasures 
of an immoral life. These evils can be obviated by knowledge 
and by the purpose always to obey the moral law. Hartmann 
gives many valuable directions for discovering and avoiding 
these evils, and these directions, may be applied in avoiding 
or greatly modifying these evils, and thus rendering life 
satisfactorily successful. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

Reid, Stewart, Brown 

1. Reid (1710-1796). Thomas Reid, the founder of the 
Scottish school of philosophy, was born at Strachan, near 
Aberdeen. His father, a clergyman descended from a long 
line of clergymen, held his position as pastor at Strachan for 
fifty yeax's. His mother was of the family of the Gregories, 
which was distinguished for scientific and literary attain- 
ments. 

After receiving his primary instruction at the parish school, 
Thomas entered Marischal College, Aberdeen, and was in- 
structed in philosophy by Dr. George Turnbull, a writer of 
considerable ability, and from whom Reid received his bias 
in philosophy. 

Reid graduated at the age of sixteen, but remained ten 
years longer at the University in the capacity of librarian, 
devoting his spare time to reading and to scientific and mathe- 
matical study. 

In 1737, Reid was appointed pastor of the Church at New- 
machar. At first, he was received with hostility by his 
parishioners, but finally, he won them by his affability and 
goodness of heart. While pastor, he devoted much time to 
study, his attention being turned to philosophy by Hume's 
treatise on Human Nature. He was chiefly interested in the 
study of external perception. His first publication, how- 
ever, treated of philosophical method, suggested, as was 
understood, by reading the works of Hutchison. 

In 1752, Reid was elected to the chair of philosophy in 
King's College, Aberdeen, which position he held for twelve 
years. In 1763, he filled the chair of moral philosophy at 
Glasgow. Then resigning to give his time to philosophical 
writing. Owing mainly to the efforts of Reid, the Aberdeen 
philosophical society was organized of which he was the first 
Secretary, this society enrolled the distinguished names of 
Beattie, Campbell, and Dr. John Gregory. Among the 
subjects discussed were the speculations of Hume; and thus 

293 



204 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Reid, in his opposition to Hume, was naturally led to his 
philosophic doctrine of Common Sense. By common sense, 
Reid did not mean the crude notions of the vulgar, but the 
generally accepted opinions of sound minds, capable of 
forming reasonable judgments. 

Reid admitted that Hume's conclusions were logical 
deductions from Locke's philosophy, and therefore concluded 
that the only satisfactory refutation of Hume's doctrines that 
could be made, was to show the falsity of the principles 
assumed by Hume, as the basis of his reasoning. 

To the assumption of Hume that '*all the objects of my 
knowledge are ideas in my own mind," Reid opposed his 
doctrine of ''Common Sense." This designation was un- 
fortunate, because misleading, many taking it to mean the 
crass opinions of the ignorant; but by common sense, Reid 
meant rational intuition, or the imuiediate affirmations of 
reason, though not the process of reasoning. Evidently, 
reason or rational intuition is authority sufficient to estab- 
lish axioms, or rational first principles, such as, for example. 
Every event must have a cause, or either of two equals is a 
substitute for the other. 

Reid, however, applied his doctrine of common sense to the 
explanation of the fact of perception, maintaining that the 
mind has an immediate knowledge of external objects. Surely 
in this application of his doctrine of Common Sense, Reid 
was at fault. Our perception of external objects is not 
immediate, but mediate through sensations. If external 
objects did not affect us giving us sensations, we should not 
be aware of their existence. We . pass judgment on our 
sensations, inferring their causes, and then ideate or picture 
our inferences by the act of the imagination. This fact of 
mental pictures constitutes the truth of idealism that the 
appearances, which the vulgar call things, are ideas of our 
own creation and so far is the theory of idealism true; but it 
is not the whole of the truth. We create the pictures but 
not the causes of our sensations. The appearances are the 
pictures of our discoveries of what we hold to be true of 
external objects. Common sense takes the appearances for 
the objects; subjective idealism takes the pictures as ideas, 
which they truly are, but denies the objective causes of the 
sensations, though Berkeley admitted objective causes of 
sensation, but called them God's ideas. 



REID, STEWART, BUOWN ^95 

In affirming the existence of external objects, Reid is right; 
but in identifying the appearances with the objects he is 
wrong. In identifying the appearances with ideas, idealism 
is right; but in denying external objects, apart from ideas, 
it is wrong. 

Sensations are produced by external causes, and not by the 
ego, which is passive in sensation. Even Berkeley admitted 
this in saying: 'T assert, as well as you, that since we are 
affected from without, we must allow powers to be without, 
in a being distinct from ourselves." That we are affected 
from without is clearly evident whenever we are spoken to 
by another person, as that person himself will testify. 

In holding that we have knowledge of external things, 
Reid is right; but he iis wTong in holding that this knowledge 
is immediate; for if immediate, we should need neither senses, 
nor sensation; but sensation is the condition of perception, 
and the senses point to external objects. Perception is the 
interpretation of sensation, in reference to its cause, and the 
picture or appearance, constructed by the imagination, 
embodies our idea of the cause of sensation. 

The fact, however, is that Reid is not always self-consistent 
in his treatment of the facts of perception. Take his theory of 
color: "The common language of mankind shows evidently 
that we ought to distinguish between the color of a body 
which is conceived to be a fixed and permanent quality in the 
body, and the appearance of that color to the eye, which 
may be varied a thousand ways, by a variation of the light, 
of the medium, or of the eye itself. The permanent color 
of the body is the cause which, by the mediation of various 
kinds or degrees of light, and of various transparent bodies 
interposed, produces all this variety of appearances. . . . 
In particular, the idea which we have called the appearance 
of color, suggests the conception and belief of some unknown 
quality in the body which occasions the idea; and it is to this 
quality, and not to the idea, that we give the name of color." 
If the quality which Reid calls color is unknown, the mind 
does not perceive the very thing itself, and the colored 
appearance is only a representative idea, or picture of the 
external cause. The phenomenal color as sensation is im- 
mediately known; the external cause is inferred. 

That Reid's doctrine in regard to external perception is 
somewhat vacillating can be readily shown. Does he hold 



296 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

that we have an immediate perception of external objects? 
It appears so; for he says that Hume, ''after acknowledging 
that it is a universal and primary opinion of all men that we 
perceive external objects immediately, subjoins what follows; 
'But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon 
destroyed by the slightest philosophy which teaches us that 
nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or 
perception; and that the senses are only the inlets through 
which these images are received, without being ever able to 
produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and 
the object. The table which we see seems to diminish as we 
remove farther from it; but the real table, which exists inde- 
pendent of us, suffers no alteration. It was, therefore, 
nothing but its image which was present to the mind. These 
are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man who reflects 
ever doubted that the existences which we consider, when 
we say this house, and that tree, are nothing but perceptions, 
in the mind, and fleeting copies and representations of other 
existences which remain uniform and independent. So far 
then we are necessitated by reasoning to depart from the 
primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system 
with regard to the evidence of our senses." Reid resumes: 
"We have here a remarkable conflict between two contra- 
dictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the 
one side stand all the vulgar, who are unpracticed in philo- 
sophical researches and guided by the uncorrupted primary 
instincts of nature. On the other side stand all the philoso- 
phers, ancient and modern — every man without exception 
who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I 
find myself classed with the vulgar." 

Reid here admits that he believes we have an immediate 
perception of external objects. The quotation from Hume 
is worthy of attention. He distinguishes rightly between the 
appearance and the real object as the table which he admits 
to be independent of us. The fact is, the appearance of the 
table is the picture constructed by the imagination embody- 
ing our judgment in regard to the real external object, the 
table itself. 

Does Reid hold that we have a mediate perception of 
external objects? It appears so; for he says: "We perceive 
no external object but by means of certain bodily organs." 



REID, STEWAHT, BROWN 297 

Again, *'the impression made upon the organs of sense must 
be communicated to the nerves and by them to the brain." 
Reid, therefore, holds to the doctrine of mediate perception 
of external objects. Hence it is evident that Reid incon- 
sistently holds both to immediate perception and mediate 
perception of external objects. 

Again Reid says: ''If, therefore, we attend to that act of 
our mind which we call perception of an external object of 
sense, we shall find in it these three things: First, some con- 
ception or notion of the object perceived. Secondly, a strong 
and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence. 
And, thirdly, that this conviction and belief are immediate, 
and not the effect of reasoning." 

Perhaps Reid did not mean to say that the conception 
or notion of an object perceived is first in the order of time, 
as it is really the last step in the act of perception, but that 
the conception is inseparable from the perception. There is, 
of course, a conviction of the present existence of the object 
perceived. This conviction, though not the result of the 
ordinary reasoning process, is nevertheless the result of the 
intuition that the sensation, which is the condition of percep- 
tion, has an external cause, and that the cause is the object 
which the judgment declares it to be. 

Reid did great service to philosophy by exposing the 
doctrine that ideas are something intermediate between the 
objects which they were supposed to represent and the mind 
which perceives the ideas. The ideas are not objects of 
perception, but of conception; they are not perceived by the 
mind, but are created by the mind, and embody our infer- 
ences concerning the objects which give us certain sensations. 
These inferences are spontaneous judgments which are 
ideated as pictures expressing our knowledge or belief of 
what we hold to be true in regard to the objects. The ideas 
are mental pictures of the objects and complete the act of 
perception. 

Reid succeeded better in exposing the errors of others than 
in establishing a consistent doctrine of his own. 

2. Stewart (1753-1828). Dugald Stewart, the son of 
Matthew Stewart who, for twenty-five years, held the pro- 
fessorship of Mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, 
was educated at the High School and University of his 
native city. 



298 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

At this school, he cultivated his taste for language and 
literature, and acquired that elegance and finish of style which 
distinguished his subsequent writings. At the University his 
chief studies were philosophy and mathematics, in which he 
became very proficient. 

His instructor in philosophy at Edinburgh was Adam 
Furgerson, though afterwards he attended, at Glasgow, the 
lectures of Reid whom he acknowledged his master in philoso- 
phy. At Glasgow he formed a lasting friendship with Alison, 
who, later in life, was the author of an Essay on Taste 
celebrated for its valuable criticisms, 

Stewart assisted his father for three years in mathematics, 
and in 1775, in conjunction with his father, was appointed 
professor of mathematics, which position he filled for several 
years with distinguished ability. In 1778, Furgerson, being 
appointed secretary of the commission to the American 
colonies, requested Stewart to supply his place as lecturer 
on moral philosophy which he did for one year, in addition 
to his mathematical work, but called it the most laborious 
year's work of his life. 

In 1783, Stewart married Helen Baunatyne, who died in 
1787, leaving an only son, who afterwards became a colonel 
in the army. 

On the resignation of Furgerson in 1785. Stewart was 
transferred to the chair of Moral Philosophy, and for twenty- 
five years adorned his position by the eloquence of his lectures, 
which were attended by many young men who afterwards 
became celebrated. Among these were Sir Walter Scott, 
Lord Brougham, Sydney Smith, James Mill, Francis Horner, 
Jeffrey, Dr. Thomas Brown, Archibald Alison, and Sir James 
Mackintosh. 

In 1790, Stewart married Miss Cranstoun, a lady of rank 
and accomplishments, who, as critic, assisted him in his 
writings. Stewart published the first volume of the Elements 
of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, in 1792 and in 1793, his 
Outlines of Moral Philosophy. His Philosophical Essays 
appeared in 1810; the second volume of the Elements in 1814, 
and the third volume, not till 1827. 

In 1815, the first part of his Dissertation on the Progress of 
Philosophy was published in the Encyclopoedia Britannica 
Supplement, and in 1821, the second part. In 1828, a few 



REID, STEWART, BROWN 299 

weeks before his death, appeared his last work, entitled The 
Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, 

Stewart was perhaps more distinguished for his elegant 
style than for his originality or depth of thought. Dr. John 
Thomson of Edinburgh University said that what impressed 
him most, in the course of his life was the acting of Mrs. 
Siddons and the eloquence of Stewart. 

Stewart avoided daring hypotheses and eccentric theories, 
and followed the safer path of sound judgment and conserva- 
tive opinion. 

By the elegance of his style, Stewart rendered the Philoso- 
phy of Common Sense attractive to many minds that were 
repelled by the bold statements of Reid. Any cultivated 
mind, though not trained in philosophy, can read with 
delight, approaching fascination, Stewart's chapters on 
memory and the imagination. 

Though Stewart added nothing new to philosophy, yet he 
adjusted and made coherent the doctrines of Reid, making 
them more inteUigible and attractive to the common mind, 
and thus, by awaking a philosophical taste, promoted higher 
culture among the people. His works may still be read, 
with interest and profit, even by the philosopher. 

Much better versed than Reid, was Stewart in the history 
of philosophy, and this enabled him to give to his writings 
the richness of all the ages of thought, and to exhibit all the 
wealth and charm of scholarly attainment. 

Stewart improved on the phraseology of Reid, as for 
example, by introducing, in place of the term, "The Principles 
of Common Sense," which is objectionable on account of its 
ambiguity, the more precise and dignified expression, **The 
Fundamental Laws of Human Belief." 

He also made a better classification of the phenomena of 
the mind. In fact, he was a much better psychologist than 
Reid; and yet Stewart's analyses and classifications are by 
no means faultless. Thus, he called consciousness a special 
faculty, co-ordinate, for example, with perception, memory 
and imagination, whereas it is an accompaniment of the 
other acts and states of the mind, and is involved in them as 
a necessary element. Thus, if I know, I know that I know, 
or am conscious of knowing. Of course, if we are conscious, 



300 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

we are capable of being conscious, but this capability is 
involved in all our mental powers. It is the present tendency 
to make consciousness equivalent to mind. 

Stewart was more employed in defending the positions 
gained by Reid than in making advances or in building up a 
complete and compact system of philosophy of his own. 

5. Brown (1778-1820). Dr. Thomas Brown was born 
at Kirkmabreck, at the manse of his father, the Rev. Samuel 
Brown, minister of the united parishes of Kirkmabreck and 
Kirkdale. 

His father died before Thomas was two years old, and his 
mother, shortly after, removed with her family to Edinburgh, 
and there attended to the primary education of her son, who 
was a bright and very precocious child. 

When about seven years of age, Thomas was sent to London 
under the charge of his uncle. Captain Smith, by whom he was 
placed at school. He showed his genius for poetry by writ- 
ing, on the assigned theme, verses on the death of Charles 
the First. These verses so pleased his teacher, that he 
secured their publication in a literary magazine. He attend- 
ed different schools while in London, and on the death of his 
uncle, returned to Edinburgh, at the age of fourteen, and 
entered the University. His books were shipped by water 
and, to his great grief, were lost at sea. 

He commenced his University course with Logic, under 
the instruction of Dr. Finlayson. While spending his vaca- 
tion at Liverpool, he became acquainted with Dr. Currie, 
the biographer of Burns, who placed in his hand the first 
volume of Stewart's Philosophy. Brown was so captivated 
with it, that the next winter he attended the course of 
lectures given by Stewart. Though greatly admiring Stewart 
Brown ventured to make a criticism on a certain point of 
Stewart's doctrine. Stewart listened kindly, and then read 
to him a letter from the distinguished M. Provost, of Geneva, 
making the same criticism. 

Brown spent his time profitably at the University, under 
able instructors, giving also considerable attention to general 
literature. In reading "Zoonomia," the work of the learned 
Dr. Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of the celebrated Charles 
Darwin, Brown found certain points of interest which he 
noted in the margin. These notes were finally expanded 



REID, STEWART, BROWN 



301 



into a volume, which was pubHshed anonymously, and 
attracting great attention, was by the high authority of the 
Monthly Review, and the Annals of Medicine, highly 
praised, and attributed to some distinguished philosopher. 

Brown began the study of law, but abandoned that for 
medicine in which he finished a course and took the degree 
of Doctor of Medicine, In the practice of medicine, he 
became partner of the famous Dr. Gregory. 

On account of declining health, Stewart invited Brown to 
lecture for him, and the next year, 1810, at the request of 
Stewart, he was appointed his colleague in the department 
of philosophy, and thenceforward discharged all the duties 
of the professor of Moral Philosophy. 

Stewart's lectures exhibited classical elegance; Brown's 
poetic imagery, and all the flowers of rhetoric. They com- 
pletely captivated his audience of students from sixteen to 
twenty years of age, Brown's books were exceedingly popu- 
lar, not only in Great Britain, but in the United States. 

For what was Brown distinguished .^^ Not only for the 
attractiveness of his style, but for his penetrating discern- 
ment and masterly powers of analysis. He was accustomed 
to resolve every subject he took up into simpler elements, 
and to present it in a new form. He attained an undue 
popularity for twenty years, his reputation culminating 
during the five years from 1830 to 1835, and then through 
the infiuence, chiefly of Coleridge and Hamilton, passed 
into undeserved neglect. 

Brown's classification of mental phenomena is as follows: 



External 
States 



Mental 
phenomena 



\ Sensations 



Intellectual 



Internal 
States 



Emotional 



Simple Suggestion 
Relative Suggestion 

Passions 
Desires 



302 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The distinction between the external and internal states 
is not well taken. A sensation, though its immediate antece- 
dent is physical, a nervous excitement, is just as clearly 
internal as an intellectual or an emotional state. . Again, the 
distinction of simple suggestion and relative suggestion is 
not clear, nor as correct as that of memory and judgment, 
for which they are substituted. Association undoubtedly is 
of primary importance in memory, but judgment is not 
merely passive, swayed by hints from various sources, but is 
an active operation of the intellect, and in fact is the typical 
form of thought. 

Brown has entirely overlooked the will as a distinct act 
or power of the mind. It is not to be confounded with desire, 
as many of the Scotch philosophers are inclined to do; for we 
desire many things we do not will to appropriate. Will is 
the sovereign power of the mind, and a moral being is justified 
or condemned, according, as its decisions are right or wrong. 

The classifications of the psychical phenomena as cogni- 
tions, feelings, and volitions, implying the powers or sus- 
ceptibilities of intellect, sensibility and will, is much more 
clear, comprehensive and correct than that given by Brown. 

Brown discarded the use of the terms, powers, suscepti- 
bilities, or faculties, and this has also been done by the 
German philosopher, Herbart, but without good reason. If 
we think, we are capable of thinking; if we feel, we are sus- 
ceptible of feeling; if we will, we have power to choose or 
decide; and these capabilities, susceptibilities, and powers 
are conveniently designated by the compendious term 
faculties. This does not, of course, mean that the mind is 
triple, but that the one mind has three generic capabilities; 
for every one says: I think, I feel, I will. It is the same /. 

He who thinks that he is no more than a succession of 
thoughts, feelings and volitions, has no adequate conception 
of himself. In such a state of things, there can be no personal 
indentity. It would certainly be absurd to punish a certain 
collection of thoughts, feelings, and volitions now, for what 
an entirely different collection did a long time ago. 

It is true, that we are conscious only of phenomena; but 
thoughts, feelings and volitions are neither self-originating, 
nor self-supporting. Reason refers them to a subject who 
thinks, feels, and wills. It is by rational intuition, and by 



r 



REID, STEWART, BROWN 303 

that only, that the ego, conscious of phenomena, knows 
itself as a knowing, sensitive, and active being. The con- 
tinuous personal identity of the ego is the condition of mem- 
ory, the justification of punishment or reward, and the seat 
of conscience. 

Antagonistic to Reid's theory of preception was that of 
Brown which held that the object of perception is the mind 
itself as affected in such a manner as to induce in it a certain 
state; but the truth is, perception goes beyond the mental 
state and infers and ideates its cause. But more about 
perception in the next chapter. 



CHAPTER XXV 

Hamilton, Ferrier, McCosh 

1. Hamilton (1788-1856). Sir William Hamilton, Bart., 
was the son of Dr. William Hamilton, who succeeded his 
father, Dr. Thomas Hamilton, as professor of Anatomy in 
the University of Glasgow. On the death of his father, 
which occurred in 1791, William and his younger brother, 
Thomas, afterwards Captain Thomas Hamilton, were brought 
up under the care of their mother, a woman of ability and 
energetic character. 

William received his early education in Scotland, except 
for two years at a private school near London. Returning 
to Glasgow, he entered the University at the age of fifteen, 
and studied Logic under Jardine, and Moral Philosophy under 
Mylne, and held the first rank in both classes. 

In 1807, he went to Oxford, and entered Balliol College. 
He entered heartily with the English students into the 
sports of boating and other gymnastic exercises but threw 
the whole force of his intellect into his studies, delving 
especially into the works of Aristotle. At the close of his 
course he presented himself for examination on many more 
difllcult studies than those required for the first honors. 
His success was triumphant, and was long remembered as a 
tradition in the College. 

Having secured the degree B, A, and first class honors, he 
went to Edinburgh, with the intention of devoting himself 
to medicine, but shortly abandoned that pursuit for the 
study of law. Having studied for the legal profession, he 
became, in 1813, a member of the Scottish bar. Through 
a legal investigation, he recovered for himself the title of 
Baronet, which formerly had been held by the representatives 
of the Hamilton family, but which had been suffered to lapse. 

In 18^0, at the solicitation of his friends, he was a candidate 
for the chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edin- 
burgh, but failed to receive the appointment, which, through 

304 



HAMILTON, FERRIER, McCOSH 305 

political influence, was given to John Wilson; but in 1821, 
he was appointed to the chair of History in the University, 
through the suffrages of the faculty of advocates, who were 
patrons of this chair. In this capacity, he delivered several 
courses of lectures on the history of Modern Europe, also 
on general literature. 

Hamilton also contributed to the Quarterly Magazines, 
and otherwise accomplished a great amount of literary work. 
He examined the claims and exploded the pretensions of 
Phrenology as a science of mind. He reviewed Cousin's 
philosophy of the unconditioned, also Brown's works, and 
wrote on the philosophy of perception, on logic, and unfortu- 
nately for himself, on mathematics. 

In 1829, he married his cousin, Janet Marshall, who proved 
to be a very helpful wife, assisting and encouraging him in 
many ways. It may be mentioned, as a matter of interest, 
that their daughter, in co-operation with Miss E. E. C. Jones, 
translated from German into English, Microcosmus, the 
great work of Lotze. 

In 1836, Hamilton was elected to the Chair of Logic and 
Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, which position 
he held for the next twenty years. This position was what 
he desired, and was exactly suited to his taste. As a philoso- 
pher, Hamilton exerted a most powerful influence, not only 
over Scottish youth, but throughout the philosophic world. 

Hamilton's lectures on Psychology and Metaphysics, as 
well as those on Logic, were written in the winters of 1836-37 
and 38, usually shortly before they were to be delivered. 
They were repeated, year after year, as long as he occupied 
the chair of philosophy. 

In 1846, he published an annotated edition of Reid's works, 
appending notes which exhibited critical thought and an 
extensive and profound knowledge of the history of philoso- 
phy. Instead of spending his time on Reid's works, which 
were scarcely worth the pains, we believe that he would 
have done a greater service to mankind, had he devoted his 
time, learning and energy, in producing a work on the History 
of Philosophy. 

In logic, he elucidated, more clearly than had before been 
done, the distinction between the logical quantities of com- 
prehension and extension — the comprehension connoting the 



306 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

collection of attributes common to all the individuals of a 
species or to all the species of a genus, and the extension 
denoting all the individuals of a species, or all the species of a 
genus characterized by the common attributes. He showed 
how we could reason in either quantity, emphasizing that of 
comprehension, as the form usually overlooked. Thus, we 
can reason in extensive quantity : The class morally responsi- 
ble beings belongs to the class free beings; man belongs to 
the class morally responsible beings; therefore, man belongs 
to the class free beings. In comprehensive quantity, we 
reason: The attribute responsibility involves the attribute 
free agency; man has the attribute responsibility; man, there- 
fore, has the attribute free agency. 

Hamilton claimed originality for his doctrine of the thor- 
ough quantification of the predicate, making eight categori- 
cal propositions instead of the four usually recognized: the 
affirmatives, all S is all P, all S is some P, some S is all P, 
some S is some P; the negatives, any S is not any P, any S 
is not some P, some S is not any P, some S is not some P. 
No doubt Hamilton thought that these propositions were 
unambiguous, but this is true of only four of them. The 
other four are all ambiguous. The last especially, some S 
is not some P, as Mr. De Morgan has shown, has nothing to 
contradict it, or is always true, except when S and P denote 
the same individual by different n^ames. 

Relation is the important thing in logic, and in extensive 
quantity, only four relations between the terms of a proposi- 
tion are possible: one is co-extensive with the other, one is 
excluded from the other, one is subordinate to the other, or 
one intersects the other. If in case of subordination, we 
always take, as we may, the subordinate term for the sub- 
ject, we can write: S is co-extensive with P, S is excluded 
from P, S is subordinate to P, S intersects P. Denoting these 
relations by (C), (E), (S), (I,) placed between the terms, we 
can write: S(C) P, S (E) P, S (S) P, S (I) P, which are read 
as above. 



HAMILTON, FERRIER, McCOSH 307 

We give the syllogisms which prove co-extension, exclusion, 
subordination, and intersection, using the notation (C), (E), 
(S), (I). These conclusions are proved in order, thus: 

1. (C). 

2. (E). 



M (C) P, 

/ P (S) M, 
\ P (C) M, 
f P (E) M, 
I P (E) M, 


S (C) M, . 
S (E) M, . 
S (E) M, . 
S (S) M, . 
S (C) M, . 


• . S (C) P. 

• . S (E) P. 

• . S (E) P. 

• . S (E) P. 

• . S (E) P. 


f M (S) P, 

{ M (C) P, 

, M (S) P, 


S (S) M, . • 
S (S) M, . 
S (C) M, . 


. S (S) P. 

• . S (S) P. 

. S (S) P. 


r M (C) P, 
I M (I) P, 


S (I) M, . 

S(C)M, . 


• . S (I) P. 

• . S (I) P. 



3. (S). 

4. (I). 



It will be interesting to represent the arguments by Euler's 
notation with circles. These syllogisms are imambiguous, and 
perfectly clear. I give the above as a contribution to logic. 
Reasoning, it is to be remembered, is an indirect comparison. 
The relation of two terms to each other is determined by 
their separate relation to the middle term. 

As to psychology, it is quite clear that Hamilton's classi- 
fication of the faculties of the mind, as the cognitive, the 
emotive, and the causative, is a great advance beyond that 
given by Brown, though he is certainly wrong in including 
desire under the causative phenomena, rather than under the 
emotive, a mistake characteristic of the Scotch philosophy. 
Desire is a feeling rather than volition. 

In his use of the term consciousness, Hamilton, though 
clearly right in not making it a special faculty, seems to waver 
between its use as a compendious term, co-extensive with all 
the cognitive powers, and its use in a special sense, which he 
calls self -consciousness, as affording a knowledge of all the 
phenomena of the mind; but this designation, self -conscious- 
ness, is improper, unless by self, he means the acts and states 
of the mind — its cognitions, feelings and volitions, and not 
the mind itself. The truth is, we are conscious of the phenom- 
ena of the mind; but we know the ego, or mind itself, by 
reason, that is, by rational intuition, as the condition, or 
sine qua non, of mental phenomena. 



I \ 



308 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

In maintaining his doctrine of perception, which he called 
Natural Realism, Hamilton exerted all his strength, which 
was indeed formidable, as his antagonists knew to their cost. 
He seems to teach that we are immediately conscious of ex- 
ternal objects, as in the following passage: '*For example, 
I see the inkstand. How can I be conscious that my present 
modification exists, that it is a perception, and not another 
mental state, — that it is a perception of sight to the exclusion 
of every other sense, and finally that it is a perception of 
the inkstand, and of the inkstand only, — unless my con- 
sciousness comprehends within its sphere the object, which 
at once determines the existence of the act, qualifies its kind, 
and distinguishes its individuality. Annihilate the inkstand, 
you annihilate the perception; annihilate the consciousness of 
the object, you annihilate the consciousness of the operation. " 

It is true that if you annihilate the inkstand, you annihilate 
the perception; but it is not true that if you annihilate the 
consciousness of the object, you annihilate the consciousness 
of the operation. Hamilton holds that when we see an 
inkstand we are conscious, not only of the perception, but 
of the inkstand. We have knowledge, it is true, of the ink- 
stand, but mediate knowledge through the sensations which 
it causes in us; but consciousness is immediate knowledge. 
Between the sensation and the idea of the inkstand, there 
may be no process of reasoning, but there is, at least, a judg- 
ment as to the object causing the sensation, and the idea, 
or appearance, embodies this judgment. Of this idea, as 
our own mental construction, we are, of course, conscious; 
but the idea, as our own construction, formed to account for 
the sensation, and of which we are conscious, is to be dis 
tinguished from the inkstand itself, the cause of the sensa- 
tion. 

On the other hand, Hamilton seems to teach that we are 
not conscious of the external object. He says: "What is 
the external object perceived .^^ Nothing can be conceived 
more ridiculous than the opinion of philosophers in regard 
to this. For example, it has been curiously held (and Reid 
is no exception), that in looking at the sun, moon or any 
other object of sight, we are, on the one doctrine, actually 
conscious of those distant objects, or on the other, that those 
distant objects are those really represented in the mind. 
Nothing can be more absurd; we perceive through no sense 



HAMILTON, FERRIER, McCOSH 309 

aught external but what is in immediate relation and imme- 
diate contact with its organ." Then we are not conscious of 
the sun nor of the inkstand. In perception we are conscious 
of the perception and of the idea, but not of the object. 

A system of philosophy, to be impregnable, must be based 
on the necessary principles of reason. Contingent facts, 
laiown empirically, can form no adequate basis for philosophy; 
for such facts not being necessary, may or may not be; 
though the facts do not constitute philosophy, yet philosophy 
should account for the facts. 

The primary laws of thought are either laws of sequence 
or laws of harmony. Take the law of causality: Every event 
must have a cause, Hamilton derives this law from the 
impotence of the mind to conceive an absolute commence- 
ment; but impotence is no warrant for a philosophical 
principle. The fact is, reason is potent to apprehend, not 
that every thing, but that every event has a cause; for non- 
entity cannot spring into being. Eternal existence is, there- 
fore, a reality. Imagination, it is true, cannot picture 
eternal existence, but that does not disprove its reality; for 
imagination cannot show its impossibility. It is not im- 
possible to the reason. On the other hand, an absolute com- 
mencement, though it can be pictured by the imagination, 
is impossible to reason. It is reason, not imagination, that 
deals with fundamental truth, and this explains why the 
common sense of all intelligent minds, in choosing between 
the contradictory alternatives, a cause for every event, and 
an absolute commencement, rejects the absurdity of an 
absolute commencement, and asserts that every event must 
have a cause. An event without a cause, Hamilton can't 
see how it can be; I can see that it can't be. 

The principle of causality, the reason of being, is one 
branch of the generic law of reason and consequent, the other 
branch being merely the reason of knowing. Thus, rain 
causes the ground to be wet; it is thus a reason of being, and 
it may also be a reason of knowing. The witness of the 
ground, after a drouth, is a reason of knowing that it has 
rained, but it is not the cause of the rain, or the reason of 
being. 

The laws of harmony of which Hamilton gives three, that 
of identity, of non-contradiction, and of excluded middle, can 
be more fully presented : 



310 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The law of identity ^ in its positive form: A thing is itself; 
in its negative form: A thing is not any other than itself. 

The law of congruents: Two congruent propositions may be 
both true, or both false, or one true and the other false. 

The law of conflietives: Two conflidive propositions cannot 
both be true. 

The law of contraries, the species of conflietives not univer- 
sally inclusive: Two contraries cannot both be true, but may 
both be false. 

The law of contradictories, the species of conflietives uni- 
versally inclusive: Two contradictories cannot be both true nor 
both false. 

The names here given tell what these laws are applicable 
to, as congruents, conflietives, contraries, and contradictories. 
The name, for example, of excluded middle, does not tell the 
kind of propositions to which it is applicable, that is, to 
contradictories. 

In his treatment of space and time, Hamilton was too 
greatly influenced by Kant. The contradictory proposi- 
tions : Space is finite, and space is infinite, cannot be affirmed 
on equal authority. The imagination is impotent to con- 
ceive the infinity of space, but it cannot prove it finite. On 
the other hand, reason clearly apprehends that there is no 
limit beyond which there is no ulterior space. Reason, 
therefore, knows that space is not finite. In knowing that 
the proposition, space is finite, is false, reason knows its 
contradictory, space is infinite, is true. 

Hamilton accepts the existence of God on faith, not on the 
evidence of reason; but that there is an eternal ultimate 
reality, involving the possibility of all actual existence, 
reason intuitively apprehends, otherwise there never would 
have been anything. 

That Hamilton was great is manifest in all his writings. 
His works will live and be read for all coming time, yet his 
philosophy will be modified. 

2, Ferrier (1808-1864). James Frederick Ferrier was 
the son of John Ferrier and the grandson of James Ferrier, 
intimate friend of Sir Walter Scott. His mother was the 
sister of Professor John Wilson. 

James Frederick was born in Edinburgh, and received his 
earliest education at the manse of Rothwell, Dumfriesshire, 



HAMILTON, FERRIER, McCOSH 311 

in the family of Rev. Dr. Duncan, through whose influence 
he acquired a love for the Latin poets, Vergil, Ovid, and 
Horace, which he never lost. He attended later the Edin- 
burgh High School, and the University of Edinburgh from 
1825 to 1827. He entered Magdalen College, Oxford, 
where in 1831, he took the degree of Bachelor of Arts. In 
1834, he spent some time at Heidelberg; and in 1837, he 
married his cousin, the daughter of Professor John Wilson. 
He studied law, and was admitted as an advocate in 1832. 

Ferrier formed an intimate acquaintance with Sir William 
Hamilton, and lectured for him in the session, 1844-5, during 
Hamilton's illness. 

On the death of Prof. Wilson, Ferrier was an applicant 
for the vacant chair of Moral Philosophy, but failed to 
receive the appointment. He failed likewise as an applicant 
for the chair of Logic and Metaphysics which became vacant 
by the death of Hamilton. He, however, received the 
appointment of Professor of Civil History at Edinburgh, 
and in 1845 was elected Professor of Moral Philosophy at 
St. Andrews, which position he held till his death. 

Ferrier contributed a series of articles for Blackwood 
under the title, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Con- 
sciousness. The collected works of Ferrier have been pub- 
lished in three volumes, entitled, respectively. Lectures on 
the Early Greek Philosophy, Institutes of Metaphysics, and 
Philosophical Remains. These we notice in the above order. 

It is safe to assert that no more interesting book on Greek 
Philosophy was ever written than that of Ferrier's. He had 
a clear conception of what Philosophy is in itself, and what 
a History of Philosophy ought to be. He exhibited clearly 
the significance of the Ionic Philosophy, and the Eleatic, 
and the obscure systems of Heraclitus and Pythagoras. 
He entered sympathetically into the spirit, and traced the 
connection of the theories of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, 
Democritus, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Epicurus and 
Zeno. A few points only in this history, it is needful to 
mention. 

Ferrier dwells with favor on the principle of change, brought 
forward by Heraclitus, and called by him becoming, a com- 
bination of being and not-being. It is, however, at once 
evident that change cannot be the^r^^ or ultimate principle; 



312 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

for change itself is an effect brought about by the action of 
cause, which is truly the ultimate or first principle. Cause 
is also apprehended by reason, which is an essential requisite 
of a first principle, while change is known empirically, either 
experienced in consciousness, or perceived through the senses, 
which excludes it from being a first principle. 

Ferrier also accepts the opinion attributed to Heraclitus 
that contrary determinations enter into the constitution of 
every object. This is true, if by contrary determinations we 
mean diverse attributes^ as any form, as spherical, may com- 
bine with any color as red; but it is not true, if by contrary 
we mean conflictive, as for example spherical and cubical. 

It is true that objects are undergoing continuous changes, 
and Ferrier would say, when water is raised from the freezing 
to the boiling point, calling the successive temperatures, 
a, 6, c, — that a is not-a, and not-a is 6, that b is not-b, and 
not-b is c, and so on till the water boils. But if a is not-a, and 
not-a is b then a is b; if b is not-b and not-b is c, then b is c, 
and since a is 6 and b is c, then a is c, and so on. Therefore, 
the water is freezing and boiling, and has all intermediate 
temperatures at the same ime ! Ferrier declares that the 
law of conflictions holds not-a and b apart, since it holds 
not-being and being apart, as incompatible. Yes, it -s true 
that absolute not-being and being are held apart, as incom- 
patible; so also is the not-being of a and the being of a; but 
not the not being of a and the being of fe, which are not 
incompatible, though not identical; for not-a mayb e c or d. 

Again Ferrier says a body falling in a vacuum changes its 
velocity every instant, and that no calculus can tell what 
its velocity is at any instant, since at the instant it has any 
velocity, it has another velocity; but that is the very thing the 
calculus can tell, and this velocity can be stated in common 
language, so as to be understood. Its velocity at any instant 
is the distance it would fall the next second, if at that instant, 
gravity should cease to act. 

In distinguishing between sensation and thought, and in, 
assigning the superiority to thought, Ferrier awards, in the 
antagonism between Socrates and the Sophists, the palm 
to Socrates. Both parties said: Follow Nature, but what is 
nature.^ The Sophists said Sensation; Socrates answered 
Thought, The fact is, man has both sensation and thought. 



HAMILTON, FERRIER, McCOSH 313 

Why ignore either? Yet to reason, as the distinguishing 
characteristic of man, should be assigned the control. 

Ferrier upholds Plato in his doctrine of innate ideas. He 
says: "It may be asked, for example, in what sense are the 
conceptions expressed by the words, animal, man, tree, to be 
regarded as innate? I answer, that these conceptions are 
not innate, if we suppose them to denote, as most people do, 
some faint or vague representation of animal, man, or tree; 
nothing which is representable as an object is, in any degree, 
innate, and therefore these conceptions, if they are innate, 
must not express anything which can be represented as an 
object. What then do these terms denote? They denote 
the fact that, on the occasion of an animal, a man, or a tree 
being presented to the mind, the mind thinks not merely of 
the one man, the one animal, or the one tree, but of some- 
thing wider, in short of a class, which class is to be construed 
to the mind not as an object, but as a fact or law; a fact or 
law by means of which unity is given to a number of our 
resembling impressions. Viewed in this way, the conception 
man may be said, with perfect truth, to be innate. I place 
him (man) under a class, that is, under an idea wider than 
himself." The class and the idea, however, are not identical; 
the class is the collection of objects, the idea, as here used, 
is the concept of the class — the collection of attributes com- 
mon to all the objects of the class, and by the possession of 
which the individual is known to belong to that class. But 
is the idea (concept) innate? No; it is created by the mind 
by comparing individuals of the class, abstracting and com- 
bining their common qualities. Ferrier 's doctrine of innate 
ideas is decidedly in opposition to the ordinary logical doc- 
trine of the formation of classes and concepts. 

In his Institutes of Metaphysics, Ferrier has undertaken to 
develop philosophy as a body of reasoned truth; ''because 
while truth may, perhaps, be undiscoverable by man, to 
reason is certainly his province and within his power;" he 
therefore concludes that "a system which is reasoned without 
being true is always of higher value than a system which is 
true without being reasoned." Ferrier 's aim is worthy of 
his ambition; his failure is in details, and in restricting 
philosophy to necessary truth, thus shutting it off from the 
facts of experience which mainly absorb our attention, 



314 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

relating, as they do, to the joys and the sorrows of life. 
Fundamental truths, the necessary conditions of the phenom- 
enal, are at once apprehended by rational intuition. The 
philosophy which accounts for sensations, appetites, instincts, 
emotions, affections, desires and aversions, will never lose 
its interest for the human mind. The truths of reason 
account for the facts of experience. Ferrier says: "All 
certainty depends on rigorous evidence — on strict demonstra- 
tive proof." This is not true either of axioms, or of the 
facts of consciousness, which are as certain as demonstrated 
truth. 

In justification of the polemic character of his system, 
Ferrier says: ''The object of philosophy is the correction of 
the inadvertencies of ordinary thinking; and as these inad- 
vertencies are generally confirmed, and never corrected by 
psychology, and are thus converted from oversights into 
something worse, it is further the business of philosophy to 
refute psychology. This is what philosophy has to do,'' 
Philosophy may properly correct the errors of psychology; 
but it should not make war on psychology itself, which aims 
to be the true science of mind. 

As each deliverance of ordinary thinking, according to 
Ferrier, contradicts some necessary law or truth of all reason, 
he confronts the natural opinions, and the psychological 
doctrines which conform to them, with the necessary truths 
or laws, which they contradict, stating first the necessary 
laws, and facing each with the counter proposition expressing 
the ordinary opinion, or the corresponding error of psychol- 
ogy. It is, however, the business of philosophy not only to 
overthrow error, but to establish positive truth. Ferrier 
thus repudiates the common sense scheme of Reid and the 
Scotch philosophy. 

Ferrier treats of philosophy in three divisions : Epistemology, 
or theory of knowledge; Agnoiology, or theory of ignorance; 
and Ontology, or the theory of being. This order of proced- 
ure is the reverse of the order of ordinary thinking, which is 
the secret of so many failures. The questions of being can- 
not be properly answered till the questions of knowledge and 
ignorance have been decided. 

Ferrier contends that the unit or minimum of knowledge, 
in regard to what is known, is Object plus Subject, smd that 



HAMILTON, FERRIER, McCOSH 315 

these, though distinguishable, are inseparable in cognition. 
This is true. Knowledge implies an object known, a subject 
that knows, and synthesis of subject and objects; but in 
knowing the object, the subject knows itself; the two are 
known together, but in a different way. The object is 
known empirically, if a fact, but rationally, if a necessary 
truth, and in either case, as not-self; the subject is always 
known rationally, as self. Knowledge is not self-supporting; 
it requires, as its indispensible condition, an ego or subject 
that knows. The ego in knowing an object, refers the knowl- 
edge to itself, in saying / know that object. That knowledge 
is impossible without a subject is at once apprehended by 
rational intuition. The subject is, however, not strictly 
conscious of itself, though conscious of the knowledge of an 
object; that is, it does not know itself empirically, but it 
rationally apprehends the necessity of itself as the indispens- 
able condition of knowledge, and that whenever it knows 
any object, otherwise knowledge is impossible. The ego, 
however, being always present, is not made a special object 
of attention, and on this account, the rational intuition of 
self is unobstrusive, since the attention is usually directed 
to the object. The subject however, may, by a special 
effort, be made the chief object of reflection. 

Ferrier discusses the Minimum object of knowledge, before 
he answers the question. What is knowledge? what is it to 
know ? How is knowledge distinguished from belief ? Knowl- 
edge involves certainty; but does certainty always involve 
knowledge? Knowledge excludes doubt, so often does 
belief. 

Ferrier contends, and rightly too, that independent matter 
is not only unknown to human intelligence, but that it can- 
not be known by any intelligence, and is thus shut out from 
all cognition, by a necessary law of reason; for cognition of 
matter implies along with it, a rational apprehension of the 
knowing mind. But we are to note that it is not the inde- 
pendent existence of matter, but the independent knowledge 
of matter that is thus shut out. Ferrier then says : ''By these 
considerations matter per se is reduced to the predicament 
of a contradiction." A contradiction is self -destructive; 
but it is not matter per se that is self-destructive, but a 
knowledge of matter per se. The impossibility of matter, 
per se has not been proved. 



316 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The above answer, Ferrier anticipates, and endeavors to 
set it aside, thus: "The contradiction besieges, not merely 
the knowledge of the thing, but the thing itself. The differ- 
ence between the two contradictions may be illustrated, in 
this way. The cognizance of a circle is contradictory, unless 
that figure be presented, either really or ideally, to the mind. 
This contradiction, however, is limited exclusively to the 
cognizance; it does not extend to the circle. A contradiction 
of this kind would leave matter, per se altogether unaffected. 
But the cognizance of a centerless circle is not only a contra- 
dictory cognizance, the object of it is, moreover, a contra- 
dictory object. A centerless circle is absolutely incogita- 
ble in itself." Yes, and we may add impossible in itself, for 
by definition, a circle has a center from which all the points 
of the circumference are equally distant. Ferrier then goes 
on to say: **The contradiction which attaches to matter, 
per se, is of this character. Matter per se is a contradictory 
thing, just as much as a circle without a center is a contra- 
dictory thing." This Ferrier has signally failed to show, 
though he attempts it thus: 'Tn the case of the centerless 
circle, the object is contradictory, because it lacks an element 
(to wit, the center) which is essential to the constitution, 
not only of every known, but of every knowable circle; and 
in like manner, matter, per se is contradictory, because it 
wants the element (to wit, the me) which is essential to the 
constitution not only of every known, but of every knowable 
thing. It is thus certain that matter per se is a contradictory 
thing, and that the contradiction (as these remarks have 
been introduced to show) cleaves not only to the cognition 
but to its object." 

The center is a point of the circle which is impossible 
without it; but Ferrier has not shown that matter is impos- 
sible without the subject, which is no part of the matter 
but only a part of the object of cognition. Matter may 
exist, though it cannot be known, apart from the subject. 
Did Ferrier know all matter .^^ 

Ferrier then contends that matter, per se, as an object of 
knowledge, is the contradictory; yes, as an object of knowl- 
edge; for an object of knowledge implies a subject; that is, 
a known object implies a knowing subject; but Ferrier has 
not shown that matter, per se, as a reality, is the contradictory. 
Where is the contradiction? If it is asked how can it be 



HAMILTON, TERRIER, McCOSH 317 

known that matter, jper se, is a reality? The answer is, it is 
not needful to show that; but only to show that Ferrier has 
failed to prove that matter, per se, is not a reality. He has 
taken the burden of proof upon himself; let him carry it. 
Idealists in general resort to the expedient of asking their 
opponents to prove that there are external material objects, 
when the burden of proof, that there are no such objects, 
falls upon the idealists themselves; this they neither have 
done nor can do. It is not simply the reality of matter that, 
brings it into relation with mind, but the conception of the 
reality. 

Ferrier contends that matter per se is the contradictory; 
but the contradictory is self -destructive and impossible; yet 
Ferrier holds that '*this system is as far, as any system can 
be, from maintaining that matter per se is a nonentity — a 
blank.". . . ',*The materialist supposes that, according to 
idealism, when a loaf of bread ceases to be a phenomenon 
of consciousness, and is locked away in a dark closet, it must 
turn into nothing. , . No — in the absence of all con- 
sciousness, the loaf, or whatever it may be, lapses, not into 
nothing, but into the contradictory." Contradictory to 
what.f^ to itself? Then it lapses into the impossible, for the 
contradictory is the impossible. The appearance or idea 
of the loaf vanishes, but not the loaf itself. Suppose after 
a week, the loaf, for the time, not thought of, the closet is 
opened, and the loaf is found to be moldy, what has been 
going on in the mean time? There was an object there, 
apart from the idea. 

As a compact example of reasoning, Ferrier's Metaphysics 
ranks with Spinoza's Ethics; its study is a valuable discipline, 
but as a body of information, it reminds one of the Latin 
proverb : 

Parturiunt monies, nascetur ridiculus mus. 

The Philosophical Remains consist of papers on philosophi- 
cal subjects published in Blackwood's Magazine, also several 
occasional lectures delivered at various times, and deemed 
worthy of publication. They exhibit the characteristic 
clearness and attractiveness of all of Ferrier's writings, and 
will abundantly repay for their perusal. This is especially 
true of the articles on the Philosophy of Consciousness, Reid, 
and the Philosophy of Common Sense, and A Speculation on 
the Senses. 



S18 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Ferrier, however, overestimated the influence of his works, 
when he took it for granted that they would overthrow the 
older Philosophy and Modern Psychology. 

3. McCosh (1811-1884). James McCosh was born in 
Ayrshire, Scotland. After acquiring his primary education 
at home, he received his university training at Glasgow and. 
at Edinburgh. He was both a Theologian and a Philoso- 
pher. 

While at Edinburgh, he wrote an essay on Stoic Philosophy, 
for which, on account of its merit, he received, on motion of 
Sir William Hamilton, the honorary degree of Master of 
Arts. 

In 1835, McCosh was ordained minister of the church of 
Scotland, and in 1839 became pastor at Brechin, where he 
was active in the movement for the establishment of the 
Free Church, which was organized in 1843. While at Brech- 
in, he published his book entitled Methods of Divine Govern- 
ment, Physical and Moral, which Hamilton commended by 
saying: *'It is refreshing to read a work so distinguished for 
originality and soundness of thinking." This book laid the 
foundation for his reputation as a philosophical thinker. 

In 1841, he was elected professor of Logic and Meta- 
physics in Queen's College, Belfast, where he distinguished 
himself as a lecturer. Jointly with Professor George Dickey, 
in 1856, he wrote Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation, 
and in 1862, the Supernatural in Relation to the Natural. 
In 1866, he published Intuitions of the Mind Inductively 
Investigated, being a Defense of Fundamental Truth. It is, 
however, somewhat difficult to understand what the induc- 
tive method has to do with fundamental truth, which is at 
once apprehended by rational intuition. Truths reached 
by induction are not fundamental. 

There is, however, an interesting relation existing between 
intuition arid induction which may be discovered by the 
investigation of the nature of cause. We find by our experi- 
ence, for example in the effort we make to lift a weight, that 
cause is the efficiency of force or power. In this case, the 
effort, the exertion of power, is an object of observation; but 
in an external event, we do not observe the efficiency. How 
then do we know that an external event requires a cause? 
We know it by the intuition that non-entity cannot spring into 



HAMILTON, FERRIER, McCOSH 319 

beingy for that would require action of which mere nothing is 
incapable. This is the real intuition, and it is known at 
once by reason, not by induction. 

As it is true of any event that it requires a cause, we may 
generalize by induction and affirm that every event requires a 
cause; but this generalization by induction is not the intuition 
that any particular event requires a cause. The real intui- 
tion is known at once by reason, that is by rational intuition, 
but the generalization of the intuition, which is not intuition, 
is reached by induction. 

The induction here employed is not ordinary probable 
induction in which a certain thing is found by observation 
to be true of many instances of a class, that is of all the 
instances examined, and is therefore probably true of the 
whole class; but is a perfect induction, not the ordinary case 
where the number of instances are limited, and each has 
been examined and the fact found true; for the number of 
events are indefinite, or practically infinite. But it is known 
by rational intuition that each has a cause, then by a perfect 
induction, we know that every event has a cause. 

It is interesting to note that after making the generaliza- 
tion that every event requires a cause, we can reach, by 
deduction, the conclusion that any particular event has a 
cause. Suppose we witness an occurrence. The witnessed 
occurrence is identical with an observed event. The occur- 
rence is an event. Then we can say: Every event has a 
cause; this occurrence is an event; therefore this occurrence 
has a cause. But as this occurrence is identical with this 
particular event, we can say this particular event has a 
cause. 

McCosh also published An Examination of Mill's Philoso- 
phy in which he makes some telling hits. 

In 1865, McCosh was elected president of New Jersey 
College at Princeton, and gave to the institution a wide 
reputation and greatly enlarged its usefulness. 

In 1869, McCosh published a treatise on Logic entitled 
The Laws of Discursive Thought. In this treatise he gave 
much thought to the discussion of concepts. 

McCosh gave a series of lectures on Christianity and Pos- 
itivism in 1871, at the Union Theological Seminary in New 
York. 



SW PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

McCosh engaged in a controversy with Mark Hopkins 
on the fundamental principle of Ethics, Hopkins maintain- 
ing the opinion that benevolence is the fundamental princi- 
ple, while McCosh held that other principles are combined 
with benevolence in forming the foundation of virtue. Mc- 
Cosh found Hopkins a worthy foeman. 

In 1875, McCosh published a book entitled The Scottish 
Philosophy, This book, which is very interesting and valu- 
able, treats of Scotch philosophy for the period extending 
from Hutcheson to Hamilton. In the same year he wrote 
a reply to Tyndale's Belfast lecture. 

In 1887, McCosh published two volumes on Realistic 
Philosophy, These volumes contain his mature thoughts 
forcibly expressed. 

In addition to these works, McCosh was a frequent contrib- 
utor to the Princeton Review, and also gave many public 
lectures. He thus lived a notable and useful life, and will be 
held by many for the future in grateful remembrance. 

Without adding much that is original in thought, McCosh 
was a stout defender of Scotch Philosophy, not that of Brown 
or Ferrier, but that of Reid, Stewart and Hamilton. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

Associational and Empirical Philosophy 

1. Hartley (1705-1757). To bring the Associational 
Philosophers together, we go back in time to David Hartley 
who, by common consent is justly regarded the founder of 
the Associational School of Philosophy. 

His father, the Vicar of Armley, in Yorkshire, designed 
him for the church, and sent him to Jesus College, Cambridge. 
Hartley studied under Sanderson, a celebrated mathematician, 
and distinguished himself so much by his attainments that 
he was elected a fellow of his college. Feeling that he could 
not conscientiously subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles, he 
abandoned the design of entering the ministry, and devoted 
himself to the study of medicine, though he remained in 
communion with the church, deeming it his duty to obey 
ecclesiastical law as well as civil. He had many intimate 
friends among the churchmen, as Bishop Butler, Warberton, 
Law, and Young. Having completed his course of study, he 
entered upon the practice of medicine, and became a con- 
scientious and successful physician. 

At the age of twenty-five, he commenced a series of essays 
entitled Observations on Man, His frame, his duty, and his 
expectations. In these essays, he exhibited keen observation 
and original thought. He agreed with Locke in asserting 
that all knowledge comes from sensation and reflection, and 
that prior to sensation the human mind is a blank. In the 
order of time, this, no doubt, is true. Reason is dormant 
till it is called upon to account for sensation, which it does, 
not by its innate ideas, but by its innate power of apprehend- 
ing the necessity of the conditions of phenomena. 

Locke accounted for all knowledge by sensation and re- 
flection; but Hartley attempted to account for reflection 
itself, by showing how from sensation those states of con- 
sciousness arise which are remote from simple sensation. 
He believed that he had discovered what really was the sole 

321 



322 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

law, which he styled, The Law of Contiguity, Synchronous 
aud Successive. This law he applied to explain, not only 
memory, as had been done by others, but emotion, reasoning, 
volition, and action, both voluntary and involuntary. 

Following Hartley, in this respect, other philosophers of 
this school are wont to explain every mental state or process 
by an inseparable association; and undoubtedly, thought may 
pass from one idea through a second to a third, and the second 
may be dropped. This may be observed in the course of a 
conversation. 

In his physical theory, Hartley led the way in tracing the 
intimate connection between physiological facts and psychi- 
cal states, and thus originated Physiological Psychology. 
He held sensation to be the result of the vibrations of the 
minute particles of the nerves, postulating a subtle elastic 
ether thus caused to vibrate in the interstices of the brain; 
but the vibration of the minute particles of the nerves is not 
thought, neither is the vibration of the ether, unless the ether 
itself is intelligent spirit. We may, however, suppose the 
ego, the human spirit, to be so intimately connected with 
the ether, as to experience sensation whenever the ether 
vibrates, and upon this sensation, the ego, as intelligent, 
passes judgment, which is thought, and thought awakens 
emotions, affections, desires, volitions, which transcend 
sensation. 

Hartley's opinion cannot be admitted that reasoning is 
nothing more than a series of ideas united by association; 
for it has cogency. The premises are not merely associated 
with the conclusion, but they necessitate the conclusion. 
In mere association, the premises would simply lead us to 
think of the conclusion, but as a matter of fact, the truth of 
the premises, there being no formal fallacy, compels us to 
accept the truth of the conclusion. 

Hartley also gave attention to ethical and theological 
questions; but he derives all knowledge of these subjects from 
sensation. His style is simple and attractive, and his specu- 
lations entertaining, whatever may be said of the truth of his 
conclusions. 

The doctrines of Hartley were warmly advocated by Dr. 
Priestley, who was distinguished in science, and who hoped 
to reduce the science of mind to a branch of physics, as he 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 323 

was inclined to materialism. In regard to Hartley, Priestley 
said: '*Dr. Hartley has thrown more useful light upon the 
theory of mind than Newton did upon the theory of the 
external world." 

2, Foley (1743-1805). William Paley, a celebrated 
theologian and moralist, followed in philosophy the line of 
thought marked out .by Locke and Hartley. Paley had the 
power of clear statement, and the ability to make a con- 
vincing argument. In ethics he was an extreme utilitarian; 
and in the pursuit of virtue he had his eye on the loaves and 
fishes, as is seen in his celebrated definition of virtue which 
he thus states: "Virtue is the doing of good to mankind, in 
obedience to the will of God, for the sake of eternal happi- 
ness." Utility has its place in ethics, both egoistic utility 
and altruistic; but we should aim to be virtuous, not solely 
for the reward external to virtue itself, but chiefly for the 
satisfaction we take in virtue as the most worthy attainment 
of a moral being. 

3. Bentham (1748-1832). Jeremy Bentham was bom in 
London. His father, who was wealthy, gave him the advan- 
tages of a good education. He early studied Latin and Greek, 
and became proficient in those languages. He entered 
Queen's College, Oxford, where he thoroughly studied Sander- 
son's logic. He received the bachelor's degree, and became 
a student of law at Lincoln's Inn. He listened with delight 
to the decisions of Lord Mansfield, and heard the lectures of 
Blackstone at Oxford. 

He investigated the principles on which all sound legisla- 
tion must be based, and published his views. His reputation 
as a thinker rapidly extended, and he was consulted, as an 
authority, in regard to legal principles, by many correspond- 
ents in different countries. 

In 1823, he established The Westminster Review, a journal 
noted for vigorous thought and liberal opinions. 

Bentham was the author of many works, on finance, 
politics, and morals. Seeking for a solid foundation for 
both law and morals, he accepted the principle of Beccaria, 
the Italian jurist, *'The greatest happiness to the greatest 
number." He made a systematic application of this vital 
principle in his treatises on Rewards and Penalties, as also 
in his writings on Law and Ethics. 



3^4 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Bentham was intimate with James Mill and John Stuart 
Mill, and in no small degree influenced their speculations. 

Jf. Mill (1773-1836). James Mill was born in the village 
called Northwater Bridge, in the county of Forfar, Scotland. 
His parents were respectable people, and his mother, who 
was an ambitious woman, resolved to give her son a good 
education. He was sent to the Montrose Academy, where he 
remained till his eighteenth year, and then entered the 
university at Edinburgh. 

Mill enjoyed the friendship of Sir John and Lady Jane 
Stuart, and was a tutor of their daughter. He was distin- 
guished, at Edinburgh, for his attainments, in Greek and 
Logic. He greatly admired Dugald Stewart, whose lectures 
he attended. 

After graduating, he was licensed as a preacher, but did 
not continue to preach, owing probably to doubts he enter- 
tained in regard to certain doctrines, and to the great interest 
he took in the study of history and moral and political philos- 
ophy. 

In 1802, he accompanied Sir John Stuart, who was a 
member of parliament, to London, where he soon found 
literary occupation suited to his mind, and to which he 
applied himself with great assiduity. 

He started a new periodical called The Literary Journal 
which, comprehensive in its scope, was enriched by the 
contributions of distinguished scholars. Mill himself writing 
articles for it on history, biography, and on political and 
social subjects. 

In 1804, he wrote a pamphlet on the Corn Trade which was 
the first of his economic writings. In 1805> he married 
Harriet Burrow. His eldest son was named John Stuart, 
after his distinguished friend and patron. Sir John Stuart. 
In 1806, he began his History of India on which he was en- 
gaged for twelve years. 

Mill became acquainted with Jeremy Bentham in 1808, 
and co-operated with him in elaborating and disseminating 
his political and ethical doctrines, and by his clear statements 
and logical reasoning gave to the Utilitarian philosophy wide 
currency. 

From 1806 to 1818, he contributed able articles to various 
periodicals, such as the Edinburgh Review, the British 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 325 

Review, the Eclectic Review, and the Annual Review. For 
the Annual, he wrote a review of ''Fox's History' and an 
article on ''Beniharns Law Reforms,'' also one on Money 
and Exchange for the Edinburgh. He also wrote on the 
Liberty of the Press, and a severe article on the East India Com- 
pany, Mill co-operated with William Allen in founding and 
writing for a periodical called "The Philanthropist," which 
was published from 1811 to 1817. He also contributed 
many valuable articles to the fifth edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica. 

In 1878, Mill published his History of India, which met 
with great success, and gave him an important position in 
the India House, in which he gradually rose to the headship 
of the oflSce. 

Mill was a principal writer for the Westminster Review, 
one of his articles was a vigorous criticism of the Edinburgh 
Review. Other articles dealt with English History and with 
Ecclesiastic establishments. 

In 1821, he published his Political Economy, and in 1829, 
appeared his Analysis of the Human Mind. In addition to 
all these labors. Mill took charge of the education of his son, 
John Stuart Mill. 

These various labors exemplify the activity of his mind 
and exhibit the immense amount of intellectual effort he put 
forth. All his writings show deep logical thought and clear- 
ness of expression. 

Mill's Analysis of the Human Mind is, however, the work 
that chiefly claims our attention. We shall make use of the 
second edition, in two volumes, with valuable notes by 
Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater, George Grote and John 
Stuart Mill. 

Mill begins with sensation, following, in his exposition of 
the five special senses, the following order: Smell, hearing, 
sight, taste and touch. He considers also the muscular 
sensations, and those of the Alimentary canal. 

Mill properly begins his "Analysis" with a discussion of the 
senses, for they are the means of communication with the 
external world, pointing unmistakably to the fact that there 
is an outer world, not ideal, but real. 

After an interesting discussion of the senses. Mill passes 
on to the treatment of ideas. He says : " The sensations which 



3^6 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

we have through the medium of the senses exist only by the 
presence of the object, and cease upon its absence. . . . 
When our sensations cease by the absence of their objects, 
something remains; so hke, that I call it a copy, an image of 
the sensation; something, a representation, or trace of the 
sensation. Another name by which we denote this trace, 
this copy of the sensation, which remains after the sensation 
ceases, is idea. . . The one class of feelings I call sensa- 
tions; the other class of feelings I call idxas. " 

The consequence of an object exciting any of the senses is 
more than a sensation. There is the rational intuition of 
the conditional necessity of a cause of the sensation, and of 
the subject which experiences the sensation; there is also the 
judgment inferring what the cause is; also the ideation, or 
formation of the idea or image representing not the sensation, 
but the cause, constructed by the imagination, embodying 
the inferential judgment concerning the cause. The idea 
is reinforced and made vivid so long as the cause is present, 
and is strengthened by a co-operation of several of the senses. 

The actual sensations induce definite judgments and 
corresponding ideas giving, in normal cases, clear perceptions 
answering to the objects. Thus, a tree near by, clothed with 
verdure, cannot be made to appear denuded of leaves, since 
the actual sensations will not permit. Going from the tree, 
we can, by an act of the imagination, call up in memory the 
idea of the tree representing the actual perception, though 
less vividly, because of the absence of the sensations caused 
by the presence of the object. Now, the tree being absent, 
we can vary the idea, and imagine it stripped of leaves and 
even of branches, or picture a very different tree, or any 
other object, in its place. 

Mill calls the entire process of perception sensation, which 
term is more properly restricted to the feeling occasioned by 
the presence of an object affecting any of the senses. The 
idea formed in the absence of the object has usually but a 
faint trace of sensation, though in extraordinary circum- 
stances, it may become so vivid as to call back the sensation, 
and cause an apparent perception of the object. Thus a 
ghost may be apparently seen by a vivid idea stimulated by 
credulous anticipation or fearful apprehension. 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 327 

Mill's greatest service to philosophy is his treatment of the 
association of ideas. This led to the formation of the school 
of Associational Psychology. Ideas, often thought of to- 
gether, tend, according to Mill, to form an indissoluble union, 
so that when one is revived, the other is an invariable accom- 
paniment. Instead of the word indissoluble John Stuart 
Mill suggested the word inseparable, which, however, means 
much the same thing. 

Bain represented the associated ideas as adhering to one 
another, as if there was an attraction between them. The 
real explanation is the law : That the mind tends to act as it has 
acted before. The associated ideas having been thought of 
together, or in immediate succession, the mind passes from 
the one to the other, since it has passed that way before. 

The laws of association can be most clearly expressed as 
three: 1. The law of recurrence: Ideas tend to recur; for the 
mind tends to act as it has acted before. 

2. The law of integration: A revived train of ideas once 
begun, tends to completion; for the mind has completed that 
train before. 

S. The law of transition: A transition from one train of 
ideas to another is liable to occur, when the two trains have 
similar or antithetical links; for the mind has passed from 
the similar links to the completion of either train; and in 
case of antithetical links, since the knowledge of opposites 
is one, the antithesis is suggested, and the mind passes to 
the second train, since it has passed that way before. In 
either case, when the second series is reached, the mind tends 
to complete that train by the law of integration. 

The fault of the Associational Psychology, however, is that 
the philosophers of that school make too much of it, and 
endeavor to account for almost any process whatever by 
the inevitable law of association. A good thing may be 
greatly overworked. 

Following the example of Locke, Mill devotes considerable 
space to the subject of language; and though this part of his 
work is worthy of consideration, we must pass it without 
further notice. 

In regard to the words conscious and consciousness. Mill 
correctly says: ''If we are in any way sentient, that is, have 
any of the feelings of a living creature, the word conscious 



328 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

IS applicable to the feeler, and consciousness to the feeling,'' 
This is a fine distinction between the mind and its activities. 
Likewise it can be properly said : If we have any thought or 
volition, the word conscious is applicable to the thinker or 
wilier, and the word consciousness to the thinking or willing. 
Feeling is not the only mental phenomenon. If we are 
conscious, we are capable of being conscious; but Mill cor- 
rectly held that consciousness as a capability, is not a special 
faculty, but an element of any faculty, or a general capability 
of being aware of what is going on in the mind, and con- 
sciousness, as a state, is involved in any mental phenomenon 
whatever. 

Mill uses the expression, the conception of an object to signify 
the same thing as the idea of an object. In logical usage, 
however, the conception of a class of objects signifies the 
formation of the notion of the qualities common to all the 
objects of the class. The product of the act of conception 
is called a concept, which is not the same as idea; for an idea 
can be imagined, since it is a mental picture of an object; 
but a pure concept cannot be imagined; it can only be thought. 
The word imagination, Mill employs as the name of a train 
of ideas, and shows why it is especially applicable to poetic 
creations. 

In regard to classification. Mill maintains that men resort 
to classification for the sake of economy in the use of names. 
He says: *'Man first becomes acquainted with individuals. 
He first names individuals; but individuals are innumerable, 
and he can not have innumerable names. He must make 
one name serve for many individuals. It is thus obvious, 
and certain, that men were led to classify solely for the 
purpose of economizing in the use of names." 

Little account Mill makes of the common qualities, or 
similar attributes found in all the objects of a class, though 
these objects have individual attributes that distinguish the 
objects of the class from one another. The common qualities 
form the basis of the class. 

Classification is, however, of greater value in securing 
economy of thought than economy of names. If objects 
were studied singly, the finite powers of man would be over- 
whelmed by the infinite wealth of nature. Take a flock of a 
hundred thousand black-birds. It would be a hopeless task 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 329 

to study them all individually; but they are essentially so 
nearly alike, that if we study a few, we know all. The same 
holds true of the various classes of objects, whether mineral, 
vegetable, or animal. 

The name denotes the class itself , with all its subdivisions, 
down to and including the individuals, called the extent of 
the class; also the name connotes all the similar attributes 
common to all the subdivisions including the individuals of 
the class, called the content of the class. The higher we 
ascend in classification, the greater the extent and the less 
the content; and the lower we descend the greater the con- 
tent and the less the extent. We ascend by generalization; 
we descend by division; and classification properly embraces 
both processes. 

In division, we find certain agreements running through 
only a part of a class to be divided. Withdrawing the 
thoughts from the differences and retaining the agreement 
is properly called abstraction. Mill says: ''We have already 
observed the following remarkable things in the process of 
naming : 

1. Assigning names of those clusters of ideas called objects, 
as men, fish. 

2. Generalizing these names so as to make them represent 
a class. 

3. Framing adjectives by which minor classes are cut out 
from larger." Mill speaks of ''those clusters of ideas called 
objects, as man/' Suppose one man says to another, "You 
are my idea,'' The other man could retort, "You are mis- 
taken. I am myself, and you are my idea." Surely we 
have here a drawTi game. The truth is, in such cases, the 
object is more than an idea. What is the difference in the 
wealth of two men, one having a million dollars, and the other 
an idea of a million dollars? 

James Mill says the name denotes the attributes and 
connotes the object, thus reversing the usage of the old 
logicians; but John Stuart Mill has properly restored the 
older and better usage, by saying that the name denotes 
the objects of a class, and connotes their common attributes. 
James Mill says : Adding the syllable ness to black, we have 
blackness, in which all connotation is dropped. The fact is, 
all denotation is dropped, while the connotation is retained. 
The common qualities, or the connotation, or content of the 



SSO PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

species cut out from the genus are, of course, associated with 
the denotation, or extent, and the name of the species, so 
that the content, the extent, or the name, will call out all 
with which it is associated. 

As to memory, Mill says: ''Now these two, 1, the idea of 
the thing, ^, the idea of my having seen it, combined, make 
up, it will not be doubted, the whole of that state of con- 
sciousness which we call memory." Yet J. S. Mill adds: 
"The belief of my having seen it. " We, however, remember 
other experiences than those acquired through sight. We 
remember what we have heard, touched, tasted, smelt or 
thought. 

Memory is the present recognition of past experiences; it 
involves the retention, reproduction, and recognition of these 
past experiences. In retention without memory, though 
there is a retiring of the idea from consciousness, yet there 
is a conserving of the effect, otherwise the past experience 
could not be recalled. In reproduction there is a recalling of 
the idea back to consciousness, and the reconstruction of the 
idea. Recognition identifies the idea as representing a former 
experience, localized in space and time. There is also in- 
volved a belief in our personal identity, and in the trust- 
worthiness of memory. Mill, of course, explains the whole 
process, as he was bound to do, by the law of association; and 
his explanations are remarkably clear, calling it "a train of 
antecedents and consequents of which the present feeling is 
one extremity. " 

Personal identity, or the continued essential sameness of 
the ego, is more than a string of experiences bound together 
by indissoluble association. I am more than a string of 
experiences. Memory is proof of personal identity, though 
it does not constitute it. I could not remember a past 
experience as mine, unless I were essentially the same being 
then as I am now. Does the word I mean simply a string 
of associated sensations and ideas? 

The chapter on Belief is the most important one in Volume 
I. Mill considers belief under three heads: Belief in events 
or real existences, present, past, or future; belief in testimony, 
and belief in the truth of propositions. He says: "In my 
belief, then, of the existence of an object, there is included the 
belief, that, in such and such circumstances, I should have 



ASSOCIATION AL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 331 

such and such sensations. Is there anything more? It will 
be answered immediately 5 yes; for that along with my belief 
in my sensations as the effect, there is belief of something as 
the cause; and that to the cause, not to the effect, the name 
object is appropriate. . . The word cause denotes the 
antecedent of a consequent, where the connection is con- 
stant. . . From this, it necessarily follows, that between 
none of our ideas is the association more intimate and intense, 
than between antecedent and consequent in the order of 
events." 

Again Mill says: "That a cause means, and can mean 
nothing to the human mind, but constant antecedent, is no 
longer a point in dispute." On this assertion J. S. Mill 
says: "So far from being no longer a point in dispute, that it 
is denied with vehemence, by a large numerical majority of 
philosophers; and its denial is perhaps the principal badge 
of one of the two schools which, at this time, as at most 
other times, bisect the philosophical world — the intuitional 
school and the experimental." The experimental method 
may do for science, but it will not do for philosophy, since 
philosophy is the employment of reason in establishing 
fundamiental principles that shall give unity and harmony 
to knowledge. Is a constant antecedent the sole meaning 
of caused It is, if the antecedent is not efficient; but if it is 
not eflScient, if it fexerts no energy, no influence, it might as 
well be absent, in which case, no effect would follow; it. 
therefore is efficient, exerts an influence or is dynamic. Is 
it not strange that the experimental philosophers, who claim 
to build on experience, do not consider that they exert their 
energy whenever they lift a weight .f^ Their own experience 
ought to teach them that the antecedent is dynamic, that is, 
more than a mere antecedent. Philosophy requires a rational 
basis. If the antecedent exerted no influence, the conse- 
quent would not follow. Whatever be the belief. Mill in- 
variably explains it by the principle of association. He says : 
"Our first assertion was, that in every instance of belief, 
there is indissoluble association of ideas. . . Our second 
assertion was that cases of indissoluble association admitted 
by all men to be this, and nothing more, are acknowledged 
as belief. . . There is not a more decisive instance of 
the identity of belief and association than the dread of 



332 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

ghosts. . . There is here, indisputably a case of indis- 
soluble association." Mill has been successful in showing 
that association enters into belief; but in many cases, belief 
depends on evidence, at least on probable evidence, taken 
as the reason for the belief, and evidence is more than mere 
association. When the evidence is conclusive, the belief is 
transformed into knowledge. 

Mill attempts to show that all evidence, including that of 
syllogistic reasoning, is resolvable into association. Why is 
not. All P is M, all S is M, .*. all S is P, just as valid as, all 
M is P, all S is M, .*. all S is P.^ The conclusion depends 
on the right relation of P and S to M, not on their associa- 
tion with M. 

In Volume II, Mill carries forward his investigations by 
his ever ready law of association, that a former experience is 
recalled whenever anything recurs which was known along 
with that experience in time or place. 

He resumes the discussion of language and considers 
especially the subject of names, as relative terms, and abstract 
relative terms. This is one of the most interesting and 
instructive chapters in the whole work, and will well repay 
careful study. He then passes on to numbers, privative 
terms, space and time. 

In regard to quality. Mill says: "The names of all qualities 
of objects are names of sensations. Are they anything else.^^ 
Yes; they are the names of our sensations, with the connota- 
tion of a supposed unknown cause of those sensations. As 
far, however, as our knowledge goes, they are names of 
sensations, and nothing else. The supposed cause is never 
known; the eflFects alone are known to us." 

This quotation brings out the difference between the 
experimental and the intuitional philosophy. We experience 
the effects, the sensations, and the experimental philosophy 
says that is all we know, and virtually, that is all there is; 
the intuitional philosophy says, we know that there is a 
cause for the sensations, whether we know the specific cause 
or do not know. There is a cause for the peculiar taste of 
salt, and a different cause for that of sugar, though we may 
not be able to account for either, or to explain the reason 
for their difference. In many cases the difference of sensa- 
tions is clearly explicable. Thus an iron ball three inches in 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 333 

diameter exerts a greater pressure on the hand than a ball one 
inch in diameter, because it contains more matter, every 
particle of which has weight, and adds to the sensation of 
pressure. 

Again Mill says: "When the smell of a rose is perceived 
by me, or the idea suggested to me, immediately all the 
other ideas included under the term rose, are suggested along 
with it, and their indissoluble union, presupposed. But this 
belief of the previous indissoluble union of each of those 
sensations with all the other sensations is all which I really 
mean when I refer each sensation to the rose as its cause." 
The sensations are united because the qualities which excite 
them are united in the object called the rose. The sensa- 
tions, or their ideas, are united in experience, and thus 
associated, so that any one of them will call up the rest. 
When a person takes the rose you are admiring, and gives it 
to another, does he transfer your sensations or the cause 
of them? 

As to time. Mill says: ''Succession, without objects, is 
precisely the meaning of the word time." That is, from a 
train of sensations or ideas, of whatever nature, abstract the 
succession, and this abstract, this succession is time. To my 
mind, time is that in which things persist and succession 
takes place. At first thought, this would seem to mean, 
that, without things or succession, there could be no time; 
but before things existed, or succession took place, supposing 
them not to be eternal, there was time — that in which things 
could persist and succession take place, if things should come 
to be or succession should occur; that is, time is the condition, 
the opportunity, the possibility of persistence and succession. 
If there should be no succession, no change, but a continuance 
of all things as they are, time would still be a condition of 
that continuance; hence, succession, or change, is not time, 
though it is the chronological antecedent of our idea of time. 
If there should be no continuance of things, but an unceasing 
succession or change, time would still be a condition of that 
succession or change; hence time is not the continuance of 
things. Time, then, is that which renders both continuance 
and succession possible; it is their condition, or that without 
which they could not be. 

In regard to space. Mill says: "The word space is an 
abstract, diflfering from its concrete, like other abstracts, 



334 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

by dropping the connotation (denotation). In all cases 
abstract terms can be explained through their concretes, 
because they note or name a part of what the concrete 
names, leaving out the rest." This may be illustrated by 
taking a cord, a wire, or a rod, and leaving out the matter, 
we have length. Take a cubic foot of wood, or of iron, or of 
stone, and dropping the matter, we have the geometric cube. 
This may aid us in reaching the idea; but when we have the 
idea, a cubic foot, as a geometric object, without reference 
to the concrete matter, remains as a limited form of pure 
space. Likewise we may form the idea of a sphere, which 
we may enlarge indefinitely, and if we drop all limitations, 
we have infinite space. If there were no matter, would space 
be annihilated.^ If all mind should go with the matter, 
though there would be no knowledge of the reality, would 
space go too.f^ 

Mill derives the idea of motion from tactual and muscular 
sensations, as in moving the tips of the fingers of the right 
hand along the bare left arm. We have here a continuous 
sensation in the tips of the fingers, local change of sensations 
in the left arm, and muscular sensations in the right arm 
and the idea of force or energy involved in the effort to move 
the right hand. The ideas of space, time, and motion are 
also involved. The movement may be followed by the eye, 
and thus ocular sensations are blended with tactual and, 
muscular, till finally motion can be detected by the eye alone. 
Motion implies the space through which an object moves, 
also the time required for the passage of the object from one 
point of its path to another. Any change in the motion of a 
body requires force, that is, a cause, a dynamic antecedent. 

In regard to personal identity, we have a series of associ- 
ated sensations and ideas, past and present, including the 
memory of the past and a consciousness of the present. 
Does this series constitute the ego? Is it I? Mill says: ''I 
believe that a train of antecedents and consequents which 
forms the existence of other men, has also formed my exis- 
tence." 

J. S. Mill adds in a note: ''There is a bond of some sort 
among the parts of the series which makes me say they were 
the feelings of a person who was the same person throughout, 
and this bond to me constitutes my ego." We do not say. 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 335 

I was the past series of sensations and ideas, or I am the 
memory of that series, neither do we say I am the conscious- 
ness of the present ideas and feehngs, but I remember the 
past and am conscious of the present. I am not sensations, 
but I have sensations; I have ideas, but am not ideas, nor a 
train of ideas and feeUngs. The ego holds the experiences to- 
gether. 

Mill begins his discussion of reflection by quoting Locke: 
"That notice which the mind takes of its own operations." 
He then says: "Reflection is nothing but consciousness; and 
consciousness is the having sensations and ideas." Reflection 
is, however, more than simple consciousness, or being aware 
of what is passing in the mind; it signifies the study of these 
phenomena, their examination, discrimination or identifica- 
tion, and classifications. 

A careful investigation of reflection reveals the following 
processes: Abstraction, the withdrawal of the thoughts from 
irrelevant phenomena; attention to the phenomena desired 
to be understood ; analysis, the separation of these phenomena 
into their elements; synthesis, or putting together again the 
elements found by analysis; comparison, or ascertaining re- 
semblances and differences; discrimination, the distinguish- 
ing of differences; identification, the detection of sameness or 
resemblance; classification, or assigning the unlike to different 
classes, and the like to the same class; denomination, the 
naming of classes and individuals, and definition, the descrip- 
tion of things by genus and differentia that enables us to 
discriminate or to identify. 

Pleasure and pain, Mill correctly says can be known only 
by experience. The idea of pleasure he identifies with desire, 
and the idea of pain with aversion, each with a reference to 
the future. It seems, however, that desire involves the wish 
to enjoy pleasure, as well as the idea of it; and that the 
aversion to pain combines, with the idea of pain, the wish to 
avoid it. Hope is a compound of the emotional element 
desire with the intellectual element expectation based on 
the probability of reahzation. In like manner, fear is a 
compound of aversion and expectation. They agree in the 
intellectual, but differ in the emotional element. 

Mill has noted the fact that it is not always the immediate 
cause of pleasure, as food, that is most eagerly sought after, 



336 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

but very frequently the more remote cause of pleasure, as 
money, the means of affording many pleasures, and of grati- 
fying innumerable desires. Men desire wealth, power, 
knowledge, wisdom, the passports to dignity and to fame, 
the means of securing the friendship, the favor, or the sub- 
serviency of their fellows; and they have strong aversion to 
their opposites — poverty, impotence, ignorance, folly, con- 
temptibility. It is regarded praiseworthy to cultivate the 
domestic affections, patriotism, philanthropy, and benevo- 
lence. 

The motives to action spring from the sensations, the 
appetites, the instincts, the emotions, the affections, as love 
or hatred, and the desires or aversions. These are not 
strictly causes of volition, but are reasons in view of which 
the ego makes its choice and decides to act. 

Virtue involves purity, decision, independence and heroism. 
The specific egoistic, or self-regarding virtues are prudence, 
courage, temperance, chastity, and the economic virtues of, 
industry, frugality, and enterprise. The altruistic virtues, 
embrace sympathy, justice and benevolence, including also, 
pity, compassion, mercy, gratitude, honesty and veracity. 
These virtues command the approbation of mankind, and 
the opposite vices their detestation. The virtues are linked 
together by association, so likewise the vices. 

To possess the virtues, to exhibit them in conduct, is by 
common consent, considered right, and is approved by the 
individual conscience, and fully justified by the good conse- 
quences. The vices are condemned by society, by the 
individual conscience, and by their evil consequences. The 
obligation to do right and to avoid wrong finds, in the good 
or evil consequences, its final confirmation. As Mill says: 
"With the idea of our own acts of virtue, there are naturally 
associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive 
from the virtuous acts of our fellow-creatures. When this 
association is formed in due strength, which it is the main 
business of a good education to effect, the motive to virtue 
becomes paramount in the human breast." 

In regard to Will, Mill says: ''The object of the inquiry 
is to find out what that peculiar state of mind or consciousness 
is by which action is preceded. From all men it receives the 
same name. It is called Will by everybody; and by every- 
body this will is understood to be a state of mind or conscious- 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 337 

ness. . . The will was invariably and justly assumed as 
the cause of the action; but unhappily there was always 
assumed, as a part of the idea of this cause, an item which 
is found to be altogether imaginary. In the sequence of 
events called cause and effect, men were not contented with 
cause and effect; they imagined a third thing called force or 
power, which was not the cause, but something emanating 
from the cause, and the true and immediate cause of the 
effect." 

The fact is, the cause is the force or power which produces 
the effect, though it may be connected with other elements 
in an antecedent object. An antecedent, without force or 
power, might as well be absent, but if the cause is absent, the 
effect will not occur; it has, therefore, something to do with the 
effect, or is efficient. 

Mill says: "In all this, however, there is nothing but the 
idea of an antcedent and a consequent, and a fixed order of 
association. . . The actions of a human being may be of 
two sorts: 1. Those which are called actions of the body; 2. 
Those which are called actions of the mind. . . The 
actions of the body are all of one sort. They consist essenti- 
ally of that action of certain fibers which is called contraction. 

. . . Muscular or fibrous contractions follow, 1st, sen- 
sations; 2d, ideas." Muscular contractions may follow a 
stimulus terminating in a ganglion, and not reach the brain. 
In this case there is no sensation of which we are clearly con- 
scious though the ganglion responds to the reported irrita- 
tion; but suppose a mosquito lights on your left hand, and 
commences to satisfy his appetite. The nervous excitement 
which follows is carried to the brain. A sensation follows, 
and you will to knock off the intruder by a movement of 
the right hand. Here you are conscious of a sensation and a 
volition, and a movement of the right hand. The effort to 
get rid of the intruder reveals the nature of cause as antecedent 
energy. The pain from the bite was a reason for the volition 
which caused the movement for relief. In like manner, 
volition and action may have their origin in an idea which 
awakens desire that becomes a reason for volition, the cause 
of action. The desire awakened by the idea is, however, the 
reason, not the cause of the volition. The ego itself wills, 
that is, causes the volition, and through the volition, the 
action. 



338 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Mill gives numerous and interesting examples of muscular 
contraction immediately following a sensation or idea without 
the intervention of the will, a result of habit or instinct; and 
in case of volition, he holds: ''that our power of willing con- 
sists in the power of calling into existence the appropriate 
idea; that the power of the will is not immediately over the 
muscle, but over the idea." 

Even if this were the case, the will has an indirect power 
over the muscle through the intervention of the idea; but the 
idea, of itself, is not of the nature of a cause; yet the idea and 
the muscular action have been so often associated, that the 
ego could scarcely will the one without willing the other. 
When I reach forth my hand and take up a book, conscious- 
ness informs me that I not only willed the idea, but the act. 

I have been quite explicit in treating of James Mill, chiefly, 
because he was a leader in making the psychological method 
prominent, and for the reason that he was a distinguished 
representative of the school of Associational Philosophy. 

In Ethics, Mill was a Utilitarian. His son, John Stuart 
Mill, says of him: ''In his personal qualities the Stoic pre- 
dominated. His standard of morals was Epicurean, inas- 
much as it was Utilitarian, taking as the exclusive test of 
right and wrong, the tendency of actions to produce pleasure 
or pain." This is confirmed, as is seen, in his description of 
The Book of Ethics, for which he gives the alternative title: 
''The Book of Rules for regulating the actions of human 
beings, so as to deduce from them the greatest amount of 
good, both to the actor himself and to his fellow-creatures 
at large." This is not objectionable, if praiseworthiness 
is regarded a greater good than praise, and blameworthiness 
a greater evil than blame. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

Associational and Empirical Philosophy — {Continued) 

5. Mill (1806-1873). John Stuart Mill was born in 
London, and was instructed by his father. He began the 
study of Greek when three years of age, that of Arithmetic 
at five, and the study of Latin and Algebra at the age of 
eight. He read a great amount of both Greek and Latin, 
and began Logic when twelve and Economics when thirteen. 

In regard to his education Mill says: ''I do not believe 
that any scientific teaching ever was more thorough, or 
better fitted for training the faculties than the mode in which 
Logic and Political Economy were taught me by my father." 
He read Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and Ricardo's 
Theory of Rent. He says: "It was my father's main object 
to make me apply to. Smith's more superficial views of Polit- 
ical Economy, the superior lights of Ricardo, and detect 
what was fallacious in Smith's arguments or erroneous in his 
conclusions." Thus he was taught to think for himself. 

Mill read a great deal of history, taking notes as he read, 
and rehearsing the substance to his father, as they took their 
walks together before breakfast. He was thus under the 
careful tutorship of his father till he was fourteen years of 
age. He then left England for France, in company with the 
family of Sir Samuel Bentham. He spent a year in France, 
but kept up his studious habits, and recorded in a diary what 
he found interesting in his experience. 

When eighteen, he entered the India House as clerk in 
the examiner's ofiice, and soon became assistant examiner. 
The duty of the examiner was to examine the letters of the 
agents of the company, and write instructions in reply. 
The many dispatches which Mill wrote gave him experience 
in practical affairs. 

In concert with a few kindred spirits. Mill organized a club 
which he called The Utilitarian Society^ the object of which 



S40 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

was the reformation of society by reaching a rational solution 
of social problems, according to the principles of Hartley, 
Bentham, and James Mill. He disseminated his views 
through two newspapers, the Traveller and the Chronicle, 
The Westminster Review and the Parliamentary History and 
Review, new magazines, were open to him. He wrote many 
articles for both, some of which exhibited great ability. At 
Bentham's request, he edited an edition oi Bentham' s Ration- 
ale of Judicial Evidence, and found the work congenial. He 
took an active part in a reading society which met at Grote's 
house, and engaged in the debates of a speculative character. 

In the autumn of 18^6, a crisis occurred in Mill's mental 
life. He had marked out for himself the career of a social 
reformer. He says: 'T was in a state of nerves, such as every 
one is occasionally liable to. . . In this frame of mind, 
it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself: 
Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the 
changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking 
forward to could be completely effected at this very instant, 
would this be a great joy and happiness to you.^^ And an 
irrepressible self -consciousness distinctly answered, No! At 
this my heart sank within me; the whole foundation on which 
life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have 
been found in the pursuit of this good. The end had ceased 
to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in 
the means. I seemed to have nothing left to live for." 

The cloud did not soon pass away. The fact was. Mill 
had overworked; he had also starved his affections and his 
aesthetic nature. He ceased for a time to write, and after a 
prolonged rest, from writing, though he still continued to 
read, slowly recovered his health and tone of mind. He 
says: **The cloud gradually drew off, and I again enjoyed 
life; though I had several relapses, I never again was as 
miserable as I had been. . . I had now learnt by experi- 
ence that the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated 
as well as the active capacities, and required to be nourished 
and enriched as well as guided." 

He found satisfaction in reading Wordsworth's poems : He 
says: "These poems addressed themselves powerfully to one 
of the strongest of my pleasurable susceptibilities, the love 
of rural objects and natural scenery." 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 341 

Mill enjoyed the friendship of Mrs. Taylor, a congenial 
spirit, who aftewards became his wife, and assisted and 
encouraged him in his literary labors, and who, if his estimate 
of her was correct, had an intellect not inferior to his own. 

Mill served one term as a member of the House of Commons 
and though he was not an eloquent orator, his speeches com- 
manded attention, and his opinions had great weight. 

In addition to many pamphlets and numerous articles for 
magazines. Mill was the author of numerous important books : 
Logic, 1843; Political Economy , 1848; On Liberty, 1859; 
Representative Government, 1860; Examination of Hamilton s 
Philosophy, 1865; Subjection of Women, 1869; Autobiography, 
1873; Dissertations on Nature, Religion, and Theism (Posthu- 
mous), 1874. 

Of Mill's magazine articles, the one on Utilitarianism, 
published in Frazier's in 1861, will serve as a type, as it was 
a carefully reasoned answer to the objections to his ethical 
theory. In this article he explained that he meant by utility, 
not only what gave sensational pleasure, but whatever con- 
tributed to the pleasures of the imagination, or afforded 
satisfaction to the reason. 

His book On Liberty, he describes as a joint product of 
himself and wife. He says: "The Liberty is likely to survive 
longer than anything else that I have written (with the 
possible exception of the Logic), because the conjunction 
of her mind with mine has rendered it a kind of philosophic 
text-book of a single truth, which the changes progressively 
taking place in modern society tend to bring out in ever 
stronger relief: The importance to man and society, of a 
large variety of types of character, and of giving full freedom 
to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and con- 
flicting directions." 

Of Mill's other books, I shall notice the Logic at some 
length and shall then pass on. 

For many years Mill had contemplated writing a work on 
Logic. With Whately, whose book on Logic he had reviewed, 
he had accepted the theory that all reasoning can be thrown 
into the syllogistic form; but he said: 'T puzzled myself, like 
others before me, with the great paradox of the discovery of 
new truths by general reasoning. As to the fact, there could 
be no doubt. As little could it be doubted, that all reasoning 



342 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

is resolvable into syllogisms, and that in every syllogism the 
conclusion is actually contained and implied in the premises. 
How, being so contained and implied, it could be now truth, 
and how the theorems of geometry, so different in appearance 
from the definitions and axioms, could be all contained in 
these, was a difficulty which no one, I thought, had suffi- 
ciently felt, and which, at all events, no one had succeeded in 
clearing up. ' 

The fact is, neither premise alone involves the conclusion, 
and one taking the premises separately, does not see the 
conclusion, but taking them together he sees the conclusion, 
which appears to him a new truth, new to him. 

Mill maintained the untenable position that the syllogism 
involved the fallacy of begging the question. He says: "It 
must be granted that in every syllogism, considered as an 
argument to prove the conclusion, there is a petitio principii. 
When we say, All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, there- 
fore Socrates is mortal; it is unanswerably urged by the 
adversaries of the syllogistic theory, that the proposition, 
Socrates is mortal, is pre-supposed in the more general 
assumption, AH men are mortal; that we cannot be assured 
of the mortality of all men, unless we are already certain of 
the mortality of every individual man; that if it be still doubt- 
ful whether Socrates, or any other individual we may choose 
to name, be mortal or not, the same degree of uncertainty 
must hang over the assertion. All men are mortal : that the 
general principle, instead of being given as evidence of the 
particular case, can not itself be taken for true, without 
exception, until every shadow of doubt which could affect any 
case comprised within it, is dispelled by evidence aliunde 
and then what remains for the syllogism to prove? That, 
in short, no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as 
such, prove anything, since from a general principle we can 
not infer any particulars, but those which the principle itself 
assumes as known." 

Mill here chose the most favorable case for this view, 
where the major premise is proved probable by ordinary 
induction. It is, of course, impossible to establish the 
major premise, that all men are mortal, as a certainty, as is 
done in perfect induction where the instances are few, and 
where it is possible to examine every instance; but from 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 343 

general experience, it can be accepted, as in the highest de- 
gree probable that all men are mortal. Now suppose the ques- 
tion is raised, Is Gabriel mortal? it not being known whether 
Gabriel is a man or an angel. Now I can say, All men are 
mortal; Gabriel is a man; therefore Gabriel is probably mortal. 
Any one can truthfully say. All men are probably mortal, 
without knowing the existence of any such man as Gabriel; 
and then when informed that Gabx'iel is a man, he can say 
that Gabriel is probably mortal. 

Sometimes the major premise is established, beyond ques- 
tion, independently of the knowledge of the particular in- 
stances involved. To repeat an illustration before given: 
Suppose I stand on the summit of a hill, on the sea-shore 
and see a ship go down with all on board. I do not have to 
know that John Brown was drowned to know that all on 
board were drowned, for I may not know that John Brown 
was aboard ; but suppose I learn, the next day, that John 
Brown was aboard that vessel when it went down. Then I 
can say that all on board a certain vessel, at a certain time 
were drowned; John Brown was on board that vessel at that 
time; therefore John Brown was drowned. Where is there 
the shadow of the petitio here.^ There is none, hence Mill's 
statement that every syllogism involves the petitio is not true. 

Again, I can find the last term of an arithmetical progres- 
sion of n terms, if the first term is a, the common difference 
d, the number of terms n, and the last term /, thus : 

a, a-{-d, a-\- 2rf, a -f- 36?, a + 4rf, . . . a + (n — l)d. 

The coefficient of d being one less than the number of the 
term, / or the n term is evidently expressed by the formula : 

Z = a + (n - l)d. 

Now, suppose I wish to know the last term of a series whose 
first term is 5, the common difference 3, and the number of 
terms 100. I write: 

I = a-{- {n — l)d. 
a-]- 5,n = 100, and d =»= 3, 
. • . Z = 5 + 99 X 3 = 302. 

I did not have to know this answer, to know the formula. 



344 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Again, it may be objected that a deduction from a perfect 
induction is useless, since the conclusion simply asserts what 
was already known, when the major premise was established. 
Thus, Capt. Smith has three sons, John, Thomas and Henry, 
and these are all of the Captain's sons. John has visited 
England, Thomas has visited England, and Henry has visited 
England, as Capt. Smith well knows, and can state as a 
perfect induction, all my sons have visited England. Now 
it may not be worth while for Capt. Smith to prove for him- 
self that John has visited England, by saying, All my sons 
have visited England; but John is one of my sons; therefore 
John has visited England; for he knew that before. 

Let us see, however, whether a legitimate deduction, which 
will reveal a new fact to some one, cannot be drawn from 
this perfect induction. Suppose you, from another part of 
the country, should visit Capt. Smith, and in the course of 
conversation he should inform you that all his sons had 
visited England. Suppose the next day you fall in with a 
young man, a stranger, you would know neither that he was 
one of Capt. Smith's sons, nor that he had visited England; 
but entering into a conversation with him, he informs you 
that he is the son of that Captain Smith with whom you 
conversed yesterday. Now you can make a legitimate 
deduction syllogism thus: All of Capt. Smith's sons have 
visited England; this young man is the son of Capt. Smith, 
therefore, this young man has visited England. You have 
deduced a fact new to you and have not been guilty of begging 
the question. 

Mill refers to the common opinion that there are two kinds 
of reasoning — inductive, from particulars to generals, and 
deductive, from generals to particulars, and then says: 
*' There is a third species of reasoning which falls under 
neither of these, and which is not only valid, but is the 
foundation of both the others. . . The third kind of 
reasoning is from particulars to particulars." He says: 
"The proposition that the duke of Wellington is mortal is 
evidently an inference; it is got at, as a conclusion from some- 
thing else; but do we in reality conclude it from the proposi- 
tion, All men are mortal .^^ I answer, no. . . If from our 
experience of John, Thomas, etc., who were living, but are 
now dead, we are entitled to conclude that all human beings 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 345 

are mortal, we might surely, without any logical inconse- 
quence, have concluded, at once, from those instances, that 
the Duke of Wellington is mortal. The mortality of John, 
Thomas, and others is, after all, the whole evidence we have 
for the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. " This has the 
force of truth. But what of the opinion that the reasoning 
from particulars to particulars is the foundation of both the 
others, that is of both Induction and Deduction? Take the 
following example : A president of a college made the follow- 
ing announcement, one morning, at the chapel exercises: "I 
invite all the Seniors to meet, for a social time, at my house 
this evening." Any one of the seniors would reason: All 
the Seniors are invited; I am a Senior; therefore I am invited. 
Has this, for a foundation, the reasoning from particulars to 
particulars? 

To pass on to Induction; Mill says; "For the purposes of 
the present inquiry. Induction may be defined, the operation 
of discovering and proving general propositions. . . The 
process of indirectly ascertaining individual facts is as truly 
inductive as that by which we establish general truths. . 
Whenever the evidence which we derive from observation of 
known cases justifies us in drawing an inference respecting 
one unknown case, we should, on the same evidence, be 
justified in drawing a similar inference with respect to a 
whole class of cases. " The inference, however, is less proba- 
ble for the whole class than for one individual; for since there 
is a chance of failure in any one individual case as the infer- 
ence is only probable for each case, then when the whole class 
of cases is taken, there is a greater probability of failure, 
somewhere, than for any one case taken alone. 

As to the ground of Induction, Mill says: ''Whatever be 
the most proper mode of expressing it, the proposition that 
the course of nature is uniform is the fundamental principle 
or general axiom of Induction. It would yet be a great error 
to offer this large generalization as any explanation of the 
inductive process. On the contrary, I held it to be itself an 
instance of induction, an induction by no means of the most 
obvious kind. Far from being the first induction we make, 
it is one of the last, or at all events, one of those which are 
latest in attaining strict philosophical accuracy. . . The 
truth is, this great generalization is itself founded on prior 



g46 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

generalizations. . . In what sense then can a principle 
which is so far from being our earliest induction, be regarded 
as our warrant for all the others? In the only sense in which 
(as we have already seen) the general propositions which we 
place at the head of our reasonings when we throw them into 
syllogisms, ever really contributed to their validity. " 

In founding the great generalization, that the course of 
nature is uniform^ on prior generalizations, and at the same 
time, making it the warrant of those prior generalizations, 
has not Mill been guilty of reasoning in a circle? The objec- 
tion that his explanation involves the fallacy of the petitio 
principii is even more forcible than his objection to the 
syllogism, on the same account; for the major premise was 
not used in finding the particular cases, from which it was 
the generalization, while according to Mill's theory, the 
uniformity of nature is the warrant for those prior inductions 
of which it is the generalization. 

Well, what is the warrant for the principle that the course 
of nature is uniform, in the realm of cause and effect? All 
events have their conditions and causes, otherwise they would 
not take place, since non-entity cannot spring into entity. 
Like conditions and causes are allowed by like consequences. 
Like signifies essentially alike, not identical. If the effects 
are not alike, it is because the conditions or causes differ; 
for whenever two causes are essentially alike, then whatever 
determines the effect in the one case is present to determine 
it in the other. The cases, however, must be essentially alike, 
otherwise there is no warrant for the inference. 

Why did not Mill accept, at once, the principle of the 
uniformity of nature, as a rational intuition? Because, as 
an empirical philosopher, basing all knowledge on experience 
he rejected the Intuitional Philosophy altogether. He says: 
"The notion that truths external to the mind may be known 
by intuition or consciousness, independently of observation 
and experience, is, I am persuaded, in these times, the great 
intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. 
By the aid of this theory, every inveterate belief and every 
intense feeling, of which the origin is not remembered, is 
enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by 
reason, and is erected into its own all sufficient voucher and 
justification. There never was such an instrument devised 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 347 

for consecrating all deep-seated prejudices. " The reception 
or rejection of a theory should turn on its truth or falsity, not 
on the fact that a wrong use is sometimes made of it. Noth- 
ing, perhaps, is more frequently used, for wrong purposes, 
than the tongue; shall we, therefore, cut it out, and cast it 
to the dogs? In fact. Mill's theory reduces rational philos- 
ophy to empirical science. 

Mill defines cause, thus: "The cause, then, philosophically 
speaking, is the sum-total of the conditions, positive and 
negative, taken together, the whole of the contingencies of 
every description, which being realized, the consequent 
invariably follows." It will be seen that Mill includes 
under the term cause, the non-dynamic condition as well as 
the dynamic. The absence of support, then, is as much the 
cause of the fall of a body as gravity itself. It would, how- 
ever, accord better with the popular view, which is important, 
when there is no serious objection, to call the combination 
of the dynamic conditions the cause, and the non-dynamic 
conditions, simply the conditions; but Mill's idea of cause is 
not that of efficiency, but that of immediate and invariable 
antecedence, which is the theory of Hume and of James 
Mill; but there is more in cause, as we have before shown, than 
immediate antecedence. 

Mill's theory of the four methods of experimental inquiry, 
which he calls, the Method of Agreement, the Method of Differ- 
ence, the Method of Residues, and the Method of Concomitant 
Variations, exhibits clear and profound thought. In fact, 
his extensive treatise on Inductive Logic is a monument of 
untiring industry and deep research, unrivaled in this field of 
investigation, and merits the sincere thanks of every lover of 
science. The subject, however, in consideration of our 
limited space, is too extensive to follow minutely in a detailed 
examination. We must be content with one brief quotation, 
as a specimen of his method: "Let A, then, be an agent or 
cause, and let the object of our inquiry be to ascertain what 
are the effects of this cause. If we can either find or produce 
the agent A in such a variety of circumstances that the 
different cases have no circumstances in common except A; 
then, whatever effect we find produced in all our trials, is 
indicated as the effect of A, Suppose, for example, that A 
is tried along with B and C, and that the effect is A B C; and 
suppose that A is next tried with D and E, but without B 



348 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

and C, and that the effect is A D E, Then we may reason 
thus: B and C are not effects of A, for they were not pro- 
duced by it in the second experiment; nor are D and E, for 
they were not produced in the first. Whatever is really the 
effect of A must have been produced in both instances; now 
this condition is fulfilled by no circumstance except A, The 
phenomenon A can not have been the effect of B or C, since 
it was produced where they were not; nor of D or E, since it 
was produced where they were not. Therefore A is the 
effect of ^." 

Mill sharply criticizes Hamilton's theory of the relativity 
of knowledge, but as this criticism, though severe on Hamil- 
ton throws no new light on Mill's doctrine concerning the 
relative of knowledge, it need not be considered in this con- 
nection. 

Mill's theory of space, however, exhibits the inherent 
weakness of the empirical philosophy. He says: "Space is 
the muscular sensation we experience, for example, in moving 
the hand from one point to another. Space a muscular sensa- 
tion ! 

Mill discusses a great variety of phases of philosophy, and 
in all of these discussions displays great knowledge and 
acute critical skill, and though he fails in doing justice to 
necessary truths, yet he commands our respect for his candor 
and ability, and may be justly regarded as one of the most 
eminent thinkers of the world, and well worthy of the high 
consideration with which he undoubtedly will always be 
regarded, by all who honor high attainments and noble 
character. 

6, Bain (1818-1903) . Alexander Bain, Professor of Logic, 
in the University of Aberdeen, continued the investigations 
in the line of Empirical and Associational Philosophy, adding 
important contributions by his investigations in Physiological 
Psychology. 

His principal works are entitled The Senses and the Intel- 
lect; the Emotions and the Will; Mental and Moral Science; 
Psychology and Ethics; Logic, Deductive and Inductive. 

It will not be necessary to enter upon a detailed discussion 
of these works, since they follow essentially the course taken 
by the two Mills, and present really no new phase of Philoso- 
phy. I shall, therefore, content myself with a notice of only 
a few points of Bain's doctrines : 



ASSOCIATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 349 

He says: "The operations and appearances that constitute 
mind are indicated by such terms as feehng, thought, memory, 
reason, conscience, imagination, will, passions, affections, 
taste. But the definition of mind aspires to comprehend, 
in few words, by some generalization, the whole kindred of 
mental facts, and to exclude everything of a foreign charac- 
ter." 

In speaking of "the operations and appearances that 
constitute mind," Bain identifies mind with its phenomena. 
If "the mind is the sum total of subject experiences," as 
Bain elsewhere declares, then mind is not that which thinks, 
feels and wills, but is the thinking, feeling and willing, apart 
from any thinker, feeler or wilier; but the recognition of a 
phenomenon on its recurrence, implies a spiritual subject 
enduring through the period from the occurrence of the 
phenomenon to its recurrence, and therefore distinct from 
the fleeting phenomena. The discrimination of one psychical 
phenomenon from another can be explained only by refer- 
ring them to a common subject, which, being differently 
affected by them, discriminates the one from the other. 
Memory does not constitute personal identity, neither do 
the ever shifting phenomena of which we are conscious. 
Memory is the proof of personal identity, and the shifting 
phenomena find their explanation in the ego, and so far as 
reason can see, can have no other foundation. 

Again Bain says: "We are incapable of discussing the 
existence of an independent material world, the very act is a 
contradiction." We can, of course, know nothing of an 
external world that is not in any way related to our minds; 
but we do not know, and are not warranted in affirming, 
that nothing exists unknown to any human mind. 

As to the Will, Bain says: "The word 'choice' gives us one 
of the modes of designating the supposed liberty of voluntary 
actions. The real meaning of this word, that is to say, the 
only real fact that can be pointed at in correspondence with 
it, is the acting out one of several different promptings. 
When a person purchases an article out of several submitted 
to view, the recommendations of that one are said to be 
greater than of the rest, and nothing more needs really be 
said in describing the transaction. It may happen that for 
a moment the opposing attractions are exactly balanced, and 



350 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

decision is suspended thereby. " But suppose he must make 
the choice then and there. The motives, being equal, do not 
compel choice; but he does decide, and therefore the power of 
decision is in the person and not in the motive, which is only 
an inducement, not a cause. 

Bain goes on to say in case of balanced motives: '*^The 
equipoise may even continue for a long time; but when the 
decision is actually come to, the fact and the meaning are 
that some consideration has risen to the mind, giving a 
superior energy of motive to the side that has preponderated. 
This is the whole substance of the act of choosing." That 
is, according to Bain, the motives are the causes of volition, 
and the supposition that there is an ego that makes the 
decision, in view of motives as reasons, is a fiction; that is, 
there is no ego that deliberates and chooses, but there is only 
deliberation and choice as operations without an operator, 
save the motives which produced them. 

Again, Bain says: "The designation 'liberty of choice' has 
no real meaning, except denying extraneous interference. . . 
But, as between the different motives of my own mind, there 
is no meaning in 'liberty of choice.' Various motives — 
present or prospective pleasures and pains — concur in urging 
me to act; the result of the conflict shows that one group is 
stronger than another, and that is the whole case." Does 
Bain mean by ' 'me, " when he says : " Various motives concur 
in urging me to act," the sum-total of subject experiences 
that he has had during the course of his life? How can such 
a conglomerate bundle act? The ego is not the sum of the 
phenomena, but the subject, and when one says : " I will do it, " 
he means that he has made the decision, and will perform 
that act himself; and in this, he counts himself not passive 
but active, not arbitrarily but rationally active, and by "1," 
he means himself, a personality, not a bundle of operations. 

It is, however, due to Bain to state that his works exhibit 
great ability. The one entitled The Senses and the Intellect 
will especially well repay careful reading; for it introduces the 
important subject of physiological psychology. 

To Prof. Bain great credit is due for enterprise and 
liberality, as a projector and generous supporter, both in 
money and in philosophic contributions, of Mind, an English 
Psychological Journal of a high order of merit. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

French Enlightenment Philosophy 

1. Voltaire (1694-1778). The importance of Voltaire in 
Philosophy is not that of an originator, but that of a pro- 
mulgator of the doctrines of a certain school. As philosophy 
was not his chief field of work, it is due him, to set forth, 
though necessarily in the briefest possible manner, the chief 
facts of his life, and his wonderful literary career. 

His early education was intrusted to the Abbe de Chateau- 
neuf, who instructed him in belles lettres and Deism. He 
soon showed facility in making verses, and in these attempts, 
received encouragement. 

At the age of ten, he was sent to the Jesuit College, Louis- 
le-Grand, where he remained seven years. This college not 
only gave a wide course of instruction, but encouraged 
dramatic performances which, no doubt, gave Voltaire his 
taste for the theater. 

Coming home from college, he found himself in conflict 
with his father who desired him to prepare for some profes- 
sion, regarding|literature, the choice of the son, as no pro- 
fession worthy the name. The young man formally sub- 
mitted to the will of his father and read law, in pretense, 
while actually engaged in pursuits more suited to his tastes. 

He formed some romantic attachments, and wrote libelous 
poems for which, to avoid the danger of prosecution, his 
father sent him into the country, with his friend, the Marquis 
de St. Ange, where he was supposed to study law; but he 
spent his time writing essays and gathering the gossip of 
history which he afterwards used with telling effect. 

Returning to Paris, and entering into literary society, he 
read his tragedy of Oedipe privately to his friends, and was 
introduced to the famous *' court of Sceaux," the coterie of 
the ambitious Duchesse du Maine. For his supposed aid 
in lampooning the regent Orleanes, whom the Duchesse 
hated, he was banished from Paris. After being allowed to 

251 



352 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

return, he again fell under the suspicion of again engaging in 
Kbels, and by the spy Beauregard, was inveigled into con- 
fession, and was arrested and sent to the Bastile, where he 
recast the Oedipe and began the Henriade, 

An interview with the regent induced him to curb his 
propensity to sarcasm and libel. His Oedipe was acted at 
the Thfeatre Francais, and brought him both reputation and 
money. The next year, the Lagrange-Chancel's libels called 
Philippiques, again brought him under suspicion, and he 
was informally banished, and spending some time with Villars, 
he added to his stock of historic gossip. 

Later he was employed by the government, as a secret 
diplomatist; but falling in with his old enemy Beauregard, 
he got the worst of an encounter. He met with Rousseau 
with whom he quarrelled. He went to the Hague, and 
continued his work on the Henriade which was first printed 
at Rouen and afterwards revised. 

The Mariamne, sl tragedy, appeared first with great suc- 
cess, but at length fell into disrepute; it was afterwards 
revised and regained its popularity. 

Insulted by the Chevalier de Rohan, he replied with keen 
satire for which he was beaten by the servants of the Cheva- 
lier. Voltaire sent a challenge, but was himself sent to the 
Bastile, and shortly after to England. This was an impor- 
tant visit for him, as it gained him distinguished friends, as 
Young, Pope, Congreve, Malborough, and exerted a great 
influence on his subsequent life. 

Returning to France, he published, in 1731, his Charles 
XII, and in 1733 appeared Lettres Philosophiques sur les 
Anglais, and the Temple du Gout, The latter was con- 
demned, searched for, and burned. Voltaire took himself 
out of harm's way by going to the independent duchy of 
Lorraine, and dwelt at the chateau Cirey, where he did 
important literary work, as well as minor work of more fugitive 
writings. Among the latter, was a pamphlet with the 
sounding title, Treatise on Metaphysics, Though Voltaire 
knew little of metaphysics, this pamphlet served his purpose, 
as a vehicle for his ridicule of religion, though softening his 
attack under the cloak of Deism. 

In 1739, he made a journey to Brussels, thence to Paris, 
and back again to Brussels. He visited Frederick, the 



FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY 353 

King of Prussia, and this visit laid the foundation for his 
subsequent residence of three years with the great King. 
About this time, he pubhshed his plays Merope and Mahomet, 
and continued his miscellanies, but his main work, at this 
time, was Essais sur les Moeurs, and the Steele de Louis XIV. 

Through the influence of Richelieu, he was employed in 
the fetes of the Dauphine's marriage, and rewarded by the 
appointment of histriographer-royal with a salary of two 
thousand livres. He received medals from the Pope to 
whom he dedicated his Mahomet, and was elected a member 
of the Academy; but his rising fame provoked fenvy, and 
his popularity declined. 

On urgent invitation from Frederick the Great, he went 
to Berlin and spent three years with the King, who notwith- 
standing his economical habits, treated Voltaire with gener- 
osity. It was, however, out of the question for Frederick 
and Voltaire to live together a great length of time without 
quarreling. Voltaire also quarrelled with Lessing, the most 
distinguished author in Prussia. 

At Potsdam, the Royal residence, he finished his Siecle 
de Louis XIV, and began his Didionnaire Philosophique, 
A quarrel with Maupertuis, the president of the Berlin 
Academy, led to such a misunderstanding with Frederick as 
to cause his expulsion from Prussia and as he was not per- 
mitted to return to Paris, he found a refuge at Geneva, and 
bought and fitted up a country house just outside the walls 
of the city, which he called Les Delices; it was a beautiful 
home, with fine views. Here he fitted up a theater, and 
had the pleasure of acting a part in one of his own plays. 
This brought him into conflict with the authorities of the 
city who had forbidden theatrical performances. 

The earthquake at Lisbon gave Voltaire an opportunity 
to ridicule the orthodox view of providence. This was done 
first in verse and later in a tale called Candide. 

His troubles at Geneva induced him to buy property at 
Ferney on the lake, and he became known all over Europe 
as the Squire of Ferney. Here he was visited by distin- 
guished men from all parts of Europe, and though he re- 
ceived them with commendable hospitality, yet reserved 
considerable time for his literary work. Here he lived and 
labored for many years. He adopted, as a daughter, Reine 
Philiberte de Varicount, a young girl of noble family, 



354 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

though poor, and gave her in marriage to the Marquis de 
Valette. In gratitude she made the last days of Voltaire as 
happy as was possible. From her beauty and goodness 
she received the pet name of Belle et Bonne. 

In 1778, the last year of his life, Voltaire was invited to 
Paris to witness the tragedy Irene which he had just finished. 
He left his home, and after five days, arrived in Paris, which 
he had not seen for twenty-eight years. Though not well, 
he witnessed his play, and was crowned with laurels. He 
also met and warmly embraced Dr. Franklin, the world 
renowned American philosopher. 

His time had come, he became seriously ill, and shortly 
died, whether a Deist or a Christian is not very certain. 

The literary works of Voltaire may be grouped as. Theatri- 
cal, Poems proper, Prose Romances, Historical Works, 
Scientific Works, Philosophic Writings, Criticisms, Miscel- 
laneous Writings, Correspondence, so many indeed that the 
"hundred volumes" of Voltaire has become a current say- 
ing. In all the above named divisions, Voltaire did great 
work, and for literary form, he stands, as an artist, unsur- 
passed, if not unrivaled; and will ever hold his place among 
literary men as one of the marvels of the world. 

Voltaire's importance in philosophy is not to be attributed 
to original power as a thinker, but to his gift as a popularizer 
and disseminator of opinions. His principal philosophic 
work, Dictionnaire Philosophique, gave him the opportunity 
to exhibit his skill in paraphrasing, which he employed with 
great effect. He thus set forth his philosophic views, and 
gave currency to the Physics of Newton and the Empirical 
philosophy of Locke. 

Voltaire commends Locke for deriving from sensation 
everything found in the understanding, thus giving the 
history of the human mind instead of romance. He even 
regards memory and thought as sensation continued and 
modified, thus carrying sensation far enough to cover the 
ground assigned by Locke to reflection. 

If it be true that mental operations are simply transformed 
sensations, what then can we know of the infinite and the 
eternal, or of any form of necessary truth .^^ Voltaire's reply 
is : " God has given thee, O man, understanding for thy own 
good conduct, and not for the purpose of penetrating into 
the essence of the things he has created." 



FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY 355 

He eagerly accepted Locke's assertion that there can be 
no valid objection to the opinion that matter can think, 
thus rejecting the hypothesis of the soul as a spiritual sub- 
stance, and reducing all reality to God and matter, regard- 
ing both as eternal. For he says: "No axiom has ever been 
more generally received than this, that nothing comes out of 
nothing.''' He sarcastically observes: "We of the present 
day are so happy as to know, by faith, that God created 
matter out of nothing." Just here, if Voltaire were still 
alive, I would like to ask him whether he regarded the knowl- 
edge of the axiom. Nothing comes out of nothing, as a modified 
sensation. 

Voltaire held that the belief in immortality was essential 
to the preservation of morality, and encouraged this belief 
for its practical value to society. 

Pleasure, it would seem, Voltaire found in taking dark 
views of things, especially of human life, and the prospects 
of humanity. He dwelt on disasters such as the burial of 
Pompeii by the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius, or the earthquake 
of Lisbon, asking the question, as if directed to Leibniz, 
"If this is the best possible world, what must the others be?" 
Hence he concludes that if God is good, he is not omnipotent. 

Notwithstanding his cynicism, Voltaire proved himself 
to be a philanthropist by his defense of the oppressed and 
his compassion for the friendless. He held that morality 
is the essence of religion, and had little or no respect for 
dogma. He denounced impostors, and advocated tolera- 
tion, and urged upon the enlightened and ruling classes of 
society their duty of ca,ring for the masses. Voltaire was 
an ethical reformer rather than a metaphysical Philosopher. 

^. Montesquieu (1689-1755). Charles de Secondat, 
Baron de La Br^de et de Montesquieu, was of a noble and 
wealthy family. He was well educated at the Oratorian 
School of Juilly and at Bordeaux, and was destined to the 
profession of law. His uncle left him his fortune and an 
important judicial office, the presidency of a district of 
France. 

The fame of Montesquieu rests chiefly on his three im- 
portant works: The Lettres Persanes were in the guise of 
letters purporting to be written by two Persians of distinction 
traveling in Europe. In this book, Montesquieu satirized 



356 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

the social, political, and ecclesiastical follies of the day, and 
shocked his grave readers by tales of scandal from social 
life. The book made sharp hits, was eagerly read, and went 
through three editions the first year. Its questionable 
morality, however, prevented Montesquieu's election to the 
Academy, but for a time only, as he afterwards canceled the 
objectionable features of his book. 

Traveling over Europe, he met Lord Chesterfield in Italy, 
and they became fast friends. Continuing his travels, he 
arrived in England, where he remained nearly two years, and 
acquired a high admiration of the English government and 
the character of the English people. 

His next book was entitled Considerations sur les causes de 
la grandeur des Romains et leur decadence. This was a more 
dignified book than the Persanes, though not so popular in 
Paris. The salons called the Persanes the grandeur, and 
the Considerations, the decadence of Montesquieu; but the 
Considerations was the greater book; it had extraordinary 
merit. In it Montesquieu dropped scandal, and discussed 
the more serious questions of politics and sociology. It is a 
noteworthy incident that a copy of the Considerations, anno- 
tated by the great Frederick, was abstracted from the Pots- 
dam library by the great Napoleon. 

Montesquieu's third and greatest book, called Esprit des 
Lois, contains his mature views on political and social ques- 
tions, forms of Government, and whatever could affect the 
condition and happiness of the people. It entitled Montes- 
quieu to be regarded the pioneer in the philosophy of history. 

His important views can be thus summed up : That differ- 
ence of character is determined by difference of circumstances, 
and especially by the peculiar laws of the state; that it is 
better to worship duty rather than wealth or social position; 
that extremes should be avoided and the safe middle course 
pursued; that absolutism was a great wrong to the people, 
whether found in the State or in the church; that the pros- 
perity of the people depends not so much upon victory in 
war, as on public sentiment, love of liberty, patriotism, 
industry and morality; that the laws of nature are the orderly 
movements resulting necessarily from the constitution of 
things; that civil law should reflect the constitution of man; 
that the prevalence of religion is proof that there is in it 
something essential to the happiness of man. 



FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY 357 

Montesquieu considered the English government the 
ideal of perfection. He won over the educated class to 
liberal ideas, and made the political doctrines of Locke the 
common property of Europe. His importance is that of a 
social philosopher, and his province the philosophy of history. 

3, La Mettrie (1709-1751). La Mettrie was the founder 
of French materialism. He lost his position as physician 
in the army on account of his attack on the prevailing medical 
practice, and for his too free expression of his opinions, at 
that time unpopular. He was persecuted, but took refuge 
in Holland, but this refuge was at length denied him owing 
to the indignation aroused by his work, Vhomme Machine, 
the man machine. He fled to Prussia and found refuge 
with Frederick the Great, who appointed him court reader. 

La Mettrie attempted to prove that the difference between 
the mind of man and that of the brute is one merely of 
quantity, not quality. He extended the analogy to plants. 
Animals have something in common with plants; but they 
also have higher wants, and more enlarged desires. Man 
has what is common to plants and animals, plus what is 
peculiar to animals, plus what is characteristic of himself; 
but the higher we ascend the scale of being, the more numer- 
ous the wants, and the greater the struggle for existence. 

According to La Mettrie we see nothing but matter and 
its changes, yet we cannot know its real nature. We know 
its extension, motion, change of form; and we know our 
sensations, which are qualities of matter, since they always 
accompany certain organic changes. As thought springs 
from sensation, it also is a mere modification of matter. 
To this it may be replied that La Mettrie has not shown 
that the sensation of which we are conscious is nothing but a 
change in matter. When external objects act on some 
sense organ, the afferent nerves carry the impression to the 
brain from which a response is sent back along the efferent 
nerves, and the muscles move some organ, as the hand. 
Of this action of the nerves there is no consciousness. Sensa- 
tion is not a part of the process, but an accompaniment. 
The quivering of a nerve is neitlier sensation, nor thought, 
nor consciousness. The nervous agitation belongs to the 
realm of matter, the sensation, the thought, the conscious- 
ness, belong to the realm of mind. The one is physical, the 



358 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

other psychical. The states of consciousness are not expKca- 
ble by the laws of matter and motion. Regarding matter 
and mind as the two species of the genus substance, the 
support of attributes, we may possibly find the ground of 
their union and the explanation of their interaction, in 
"potency y the essence of the genus substance, and common to 
its two species, matter and mind. 

La Mettrie-was never popular, and was disowned by the 
materialists themselves; but he will always be known as the 
inventor of L'homme Machine. 

4. Condillac (1715-1780). Etienne Bonnot de Condillac 
received holy orders when a young man, and late in life, was 
presented with the Abbey de Mureaux and its revenues. He 
is the psychologist of the French Enlightenment Philosophy. 

Like Locke, he began with a polemic against innate ideas — 
a mere man of straw. There are, of course, no innate ideas, 
but there are, in an infant, the germs of powers which, 
when developed, will, under proper conditions, evolve ideas. 

Condillac was a voluminous writer, the author of more 
than fifty volumes. He wrote one of the greatest treatises 
on economics, entitled, Le Commerce et le Gouvernement, 
which was published in 1776, the same year as Smith's 
Wealth of Nations. The books giving his philosophical 
opinions are: L'Origine des Connaissances Humaines, Traite 
des Sensations, Traite des Systemes, Grammaire, UArt de 
Ecrire, UArt de Raisonner, L'Art de Penser, La Logique, La 
Langue des Calculs. 

Condillac derived all mental operations, even Locke's 
"reflection," from the one origin, sensation. Memory, 
imagination, judgment, reasoning, all actual or conceivable 
mental processes, are transformed sensations. It is pertinent 
to enquire, What transforms the sensations? As passive 
effects, they can not transform themselves. There is, 
therefore, a power called mind, which is conscious of these 
sensations, examines them, analyzes, interprets, and classifies 
them. The memory, the imagination, the judgment, the 
reason, are not independent powers, but are capabilities of 
the same continuous ego, which is the very core of personal 
identity, the very same which each person calls /. 

Condillac criticized abstract systems, and contrasted their 
obscurity with the clearness of the concrete system built up 



PHENCH ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY S5d 

from sensations. He divides philosophic systems into three 
classes: Systems resting on abstract principles, systems 
based on hypotheses, systems, like Locke's, built up from the 
facts of sensation. 

Reasoning, according to Condillac, consists in evolving 
one judgment from another in which it is implicitly involved; 
that is, the force of reasoning is found in the essential identity 
of two judgments which differ merely in form. In a series 
of continued reasoning, each judgment is deduced from the 
judgment next preceding. This, however, is not true of the 
syllogism in which the conclusion is derived from two prop- 
ositions, through the intervention of a middle term. Con- 
dillac, however, rejects the middle term in his endeavor to 
reduce reasoning to the arithmetical form of calculation, an 
operation purely mechanical; but Condillac objects to the 
syllogism because it deduces particulars from generals, 
whereas thought sets out from particulars, and passes on to 
generals. He therefore accepts inductive reasoning and 
rejects deductive; but this contention will not stand criticism, 
since Science employs deduction as well as induction. 

Condillac discards the Cartesian test of truth, clearness 
and distinctness, but makes identity the test, not identity in 
form, but in essential meaning. He did not begin with 
doubt, as Descartes began by doubting everything it was 
possible for him to doubt; for doubt leaves everything un- 
determined, and to doubt in mathematics is impossible. 

Condillac held that we can have a positive beginning in 
the threefold evidence of fact, of feeling, and of reason. 
Series of facts are transformations from one initial fact of 
sensation. There is, therefore, one method of analysis 
common to all the science, verifying each step by the test 
of identity, taking mathematics as a model, and nature as a 
guide. 

The development of the faculties of a human being, Con- 
dillac illustrated by a statue cut out by a sculptor from a 
block of marble. 

At first it is destitute not only of thought, but of sensation. 
Suppose that the sensation of odor is first given to the statue 
by an object, as a flower; attention is awakened, then memory , 
then the idea of succession, then comparison by a variety of 
sensations. Let the other senses be awakened, in succession, 



360 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

in a similar manner, then finally we should have a sensitive 
thinking being, like man; but it is evident that the statue 
has no senses to begin with, and could not be given a sensa- 
tion, nor be converted into a thinking being. But if sensa- 
tions could be thus awakened, being passively induced, they 
would have no power of interaction. There would be needed 
an indwelling mind conscious of the sensations, analyzing 
them, recombining, comparing, discriminating, identifying, 
classifying, defining. A sensation is itself and nothing else; 
it is not an idea, nor a thought, nor a volition; the law of 
identity will not apply; and Condillac has certainly failed in 
his attempt to deduce mind from sensation. 

5. Helvetius (1715-1771). Claude Adrien Helvetius was 
descended from a good family, mainly physicians. He was 
handsome in person, agreeable in manners, and ready in 
conversation. When only twenty-three years of age, he 
was elected a member of the Academy of Caen, and shortly 
after, at the request of the Queen, was appointed farmer- 
general, which gave him a very great income. 

Helvetius had a versatile mind, and was capable of excel- 
ling in any one of several various pursuits; but finally he 
entered upon the investigation of philosophic questions, 
especially those having a moral and social bearing. 

His first philosophic work was entitled De VEsprity taking 
sensation for its point of departure. Though Helvetius 
fondly imagined that this book would make him famous, it 
aroused great opposition. It was condemned by the Sor- 
bonne, by the priests, by the Archbishop of Paris, and by 
the Pope himself. This opposition, though led by the 
dauphine, and supported by the church and the influential 
classes, served as an advertisement for the book. It was 
published in several languages, and had a multitude of 
readers. The book did not, however, long maintain its 
popularity, and in a few years was quite neglected. 

Alarmed by the storm which his book excited, Helvetius 
hurried from France, and took refuge with that friend of 
persecuted authors, Frederick the Great, who highly esteemed 
him for his amiable qualities. 

Why did De I'Esprit raise such a storm.? On account of 
its doctrines, the mere statement of which will answer the 
question: All man's faculties, memory, imagination, judg- 



FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY 361 

ment, reason, may be resolved into physical sensations, and 
he differs not from the lower animals, save in his superior 
physical organization. Man's self-interests — ^his desire for 
pleasure and aversion to pain — are his only springs to action, 
and afford the final explanation of his conduct. There is 
no liberty of choice between good and evil, and our ideas of 
right and wrong vary with the customs of the people. To 
promote general happiness, it is needful that the people be 
led to see that the happiness of each is involved in the com- 
mon welfare, and that the true method of reform is to labor 
for the renovation of society, and the reconstruction of the 
government, rather than the reformation of individuals, 
according to the practice of the church. The inequalities 
among men depend upon the inequalities of their educational 
advantages. Helvetius was bitterly opposed to priest-craft, 
and a strong advocate for freedom of thought, and equality 
of political rights. But the fact is, society needs the services 
of the clergy, to lead in social religion, to marry the young 
people, to bury the dead, and these needs not only call for a 
class of men, but will insure their support. The abuses 
incident to the profession can be properly guarded against 
by the intelligence of the people. 

Helvetius prepared another book called De Vhomme, whose 
publication was posthumous. In this book, he expresses 
some noble sentiments: "No one has ever contributed to the 
public good to his own hurt." ''A good^man obeys a noble 
interest." Helvetius taught that we need a more compre- 
heni^ve morality — one that will harmonize the good of the 
individual with the welfare of society. He was a tender- 
hearted man and a philanthropist, and employed his large 
fortune in disseminating what he believed to be the truth; 
and though the popularity of his works, after a short success, 
rapidly waned, yet he advocated certain opinions, especially 
political, which will yet find general recognition. 

The religious point view of Helvetius was Deistic, not 
Atheistic, and he enlarged on the unknowableness of God. 
He advocated a rational morality that could be accepted by 
all the people. 

6, Diderot (1713-1784). Denis Diderot was born at 
Langres and educated by the Jesuits. He did not follow 
his father's advice and choose some regular profession, as 
Law or Medicine, but entered upon a literary career. 



Bm PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

His writings are so numerous that it is out of the question 
even to name all of them. They extend over a large variety 
of subjects, and exhibit a mind of great versatility and 
originality. SuflBce it, then, to mention the works that have 
a philosophic bearing. 

In 1745, he made a free translation of Shaftesbury's 
Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, adding original notes. 
In 1746, between the morning of Good Friday and the 
evening of Easter Monday, he wrote Philosophic Thought, and 
shortly after supplemented it by an essay On the Sufficiency 
of Natural Religion. He wrote the Sceptic s Walk in 1747. 

His letter on The Blind, published in 1749, made him 
known to the world of letters, as an original thinker. It was 
written to show the dependence of ideas on the senses. It 
was, however unacceptable to the authorities, and he was 
thrown into prison. 

A bookseller applied to him for a translation of Chambers' 
Cyclopcedia, He consented to undertake the work; but, on 
reflection, concluded that it would be better to produce an 
original work which should contain the latest thought of the 
time, and to this the publisher assented. License for the 
work was secured, the contributors engaged, who were 
afterwards known as the French Encyclopoedists, and Diderot 
was appointed Editor-in-chief. 

After reaching the seventh volume, the work fell under the 
displeasure of the authorities, and its continuance forbidden. 
Diderot, however, carried forward the work under vexatious 
difficulties, in a clandestine manner. By incessant work for 
twenty years, the Encyclopaedia was finished and published, 
though marred through the timidity of the publisher in 
striking out certain passages he feared might give offense 
to the authorities. The Encyclopaedia, however, was Diderot's 
monumental work, and gave him lasting fame. 

Two dialogues of Diderot's Conversations between D'Alem- 
bert and Diderot, and D'Alemberfs Dream, are classic in 
Philosophy. Diderot held that sensibihty was inherent in 
the atom from the beginning; for it is absurd to suppose 
that a combination of several dead atoms could have life 
and sensation. D'Alembert raises the question: If we 
attribute to the original atom sensation, yet how, by the 
conjunction of such atoms, can a consciousness arise which 



FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY 363 

has its seat in no one atom but in their aggregate? Diderot 
repHed: All finite individuals, by their inner relation, form 
one aggregate whole. What do you mean by individuals? 
There are no individuals. The whole is the one great single 
individual. The sensations of the atoms blend into one, as 
the music of the many instruments of the orchestra. 

Diderot was noted for his conversational powers, so that 
it has been said, whoever did not know Diderot as a con- 
verser did not know him at all. At his friend Baron D'Hol- 
bach's Salon, he charmed a circle of admiring friends by his 
wonderful gift in conversation. 

Diderot, notwithstanding his extensive literary labors, 
never amassed a fortune. His income did not average more 
than $600 a year. Voltaire indignantly exclaimed: Think of 
Diderot working a whole year for £120, while an army con- 
tractor often makes £500 in a single day ! 

When Diderot wished to provide a suitable dower for his 
daughter, he found himself straitened for means, and 
proposed to sell his library, his most valued possession. The 
Empress Catherine of Russia, hearing of it, directed her 
agent in Paris to buy the library at a price of £1,000, and 
then requested the philosopher to retain the books till she 
called for them, in the meantime appointed him her librariafi 
with a generous salary. 

Diderot was the life and soul and the culmination of the 
French Enlightenment Philosophy, but he contributed little 
of permanent value to the progress of philosophy, though his 
insight, clear and brilliant as the light, and his penetrating 
originality, gave to his views, expressed in his written works, 
and especially in conversations, the fascination of Romance. 

Religious faith as exhibited in the church, he regarded as 
an evil; for as he believed it inevitably degenerates into 
dogmas and ritualistic ceremonies, first deforming then 
displacing true morality. This opinion should have due 
consideration and the evil results guarded against by those 
who regulate religious worship. 

7. Holbach (1723-1789). Paul Heinrich Dietrich Von 
Holbach, a wealthy German Baron, born at Heidelsheim 
in the Palatinate, came to Paris when a young man, and 
made it his home for life. He was the center and heart of 
the brilliant circle of the French Enlightenment Philosophers. 

Holbach was a man well-informed, and his excellent 



364 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

memory placed ready at his disposal his vast store of knowl- 
edge. He was qiiiet in manner, generous to his friends, and 
tenacious of his opinions. Impassive and inflexible, he was 
the center of gravity of the group of philosophers, who 
statedly assembled at his salon for conversation. 

His principal work, Systeme de la Nature, the Bible of 
Atheism, appeared pseudonymously in 1770, bearing the 
name of Miraband, who had died ten years before. No one 
attributed the authorship to Miraband, and for some time, 
Holbach was not even suspected, though later the author- 
ship of the book was assuredly known. It reflected the 
opinions of the brilliant circle, though Holbach reduced the 
whole to the order of a compact system. 

Holbach combined the systems of materialism, sensation- 
alism, fatalism, and atheism, hitherto somewhat detached, 
into one — The System of Nature. He thus invokes Nature: 
"O Nature, Sovereign of all being, and Ye her Daughters, 
Virtue, Reason, and Truth, be forever our only Divinities!" 

He taught that virtue is the art of making ourselves happy 
through the happiness of others; that nature chastises im- 
morality; that religion applies inefficient remedies by re- 
quiring renunciation contrary to human nature; that true 
morality cures the mind through the body, instead of mythi- 
cal beliefs; and that the one sure road to happiness is to 
labor for the general welfare. 

Theology is mythology, and class government oppression. 
Necessity rules in the moral world as in the physical. In 
fact, the moral world is the physical with superadded con- 
sciousness. Since nature is alive, there is no need of the 
hypothesis of a spirit, as the author and governor of nature, 
nor of the Soul, as the ruler of the body. The physical 
organism acted on by external causes explains the phenom- 
ena of mind. 

Voltaire was greatly shocked by the doctrine of the Sys- 
tem of Nature, and called it illogical in its deductions, absurd 
in its physics, and abominable in its morals. Voltaire's 
refutation was conducted after the popular method of com- 
mon sense, rather than by a method strictly philosophical; 
but Voltaire was a Deist, not an Atheist. 

Holbach taught that mythical hypotheses will be aban- 
doned so far as scientific explanations of phenomena are 
discovered. 



FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY 365 

8. Rousseau (1712-1778) Jean Jacques Rousseau was 
a native of Geneva. When ten years of age, he was separated 
from his father who had brought him up in a very irregular 
fashion. 

He led an irregular and wandering life, finding many 
patrons and friends with whom he usually quarreled, and 
passed on to other places, finding new adventures, and 
gaining additional experience. From Geneva to Paris and 
back again, he wandered many times, and to other places, 
even to England, at the invitation of Hume. He saw society, 
and learned human nature, and this knowledge he turned to 
profit in his writings. 

In 1749, the Academy of Dijon offered a prize for the best 
essay on the subject: The Influence of the Progress of Science 
and Art on Morals, Rousseau won the prize, and at once 
became famous. His contention was that civilization is too 
artificial, and that, if we are to attain happiness, we must 
go back to nature. 

He wrote another essay for a prize on The Origin of In- 
equality, which though not securing the prize, was at least 
equal in merit to the other. 

The books which brought him the greatest notoriety were 
Emile, a work on education; Confessions, an Autobiography; 
La Nouvelle Heloise, a novel; and Contrat Social, a political 
treatise. 

The relation of Rousseau to the French Illumination was 
not that of harmony, but of opposition. He turns from 
reasoning to feeling, from speculation to conscience, from 
theological dogmas to the experience of the heart. Morality 
recedes as knowledge advances. This may be true, at 
certain epochs, but the experience of mankind, that the 
greatest happiness attends the highest morality will, at 
length, be heeded by the human race, but that morality 
will be based on knowledge. 

Social order, according to Rousseau, rests on a contract, 
not beween ruler and people, but between the people them- 
selves, who agree to certain regulations for mutual protec- 
tion, each citizen submitting to the law for his own good, 
thus securing the general welfare. The government is the 
middle term between the citizens as sovereign law-giver 



366 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

and the citizen as subject. The sovereign is the consensus 
of pohtical opinion of at least the majority, the subject is 
the individual citizen. 

Rousseau's theory of education is founded on faith in un- 
corrupted human nature. Let the child, under proper 
guidance, largely educate himself. His views on education 
influenced Basedow, Pestalozzi and Froebel. 

Proofs for the existence of God are profitable as checks to 
Materialism and Atheism; but the real evidence is that of 
feeling. The Soul, the world, God, freedom and immortality, 
all have the inward assurance of instinctive feeling. Like- 
wise morality finds its authority in conscience, and its justi- 
fication in its consequences. 

Rousseau did not excel in speculative Philosophy; his 
views were too erratic, yet in educational, social and political 
matters, he has exerted a wide and lasting influence, largely 
through his literary gift in making his writings interesting. 
His political theories were influential in bringing about the 
French revolution. 

We add, at the close of this chapter, that The French En- 
lightenment Philosophy is distinguished more for the brilliancy 
of its Literature than for the profundity of its Philosophy. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

Reaction, Eclecticism, Positivism 

1. Maistre (1754-18^1). Joseph de Maistre was of a 
noble family. His father was president of the Senate of 
Savoy. 

Joseph having completed his studies at Turin, received 
an appointment in the civil service, and at length became a 
member of the Senate of Savoy. When Savoy was annexed 
to France, he went to Lusanne where in 1796, he published 
a work entitled Considerations sur la France. This book 
was directed against the prevalent skeptical and revolution- 
ary theories of the time, but from a religious point of view. 

His most celebrated works, Z)w Pope and De V Eglise Gal- 
licane, were polemics against the philosophy and political 
views of the philosophers of the so-called illumination. He 
regarded all such speculations as a crime against order, 
against religion, and against the well-being of mankind. 

De Maistre's opinions can be thus summed up: He denied 
the possibility of physical causation, and affirmed that all 
material movement origiaates from spiritual beings. Let 
scientists amuse themselves, if they will, with physical 
phenomena, but let them beware of intermeddling with social 
and religious questions. The guide of mankind is faith, not 
reason. God imparts his guiding truth through the church 
and the state, and not through philosophers. Human reason 
is a blind guide. There must be an authoritative guide. 
Free thought should never have been permitted. The mis- 
chief began with the so-called reformation, and was con- 
tinued by the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Vol- 
taire was a buffoon. Montesquieu, Condillac, Helvetius, 
La Mettrie, Holbach, were disseminators of mischief. The 
only remedy is to go back and recognize the infallibility of 
the Pope, and submit to his authority as a heavenly guide. 
He commended war, the hangman, and the inquisition, as 
purifying agencies, necessary in the disordered condition of 
humanity. Man is purely passive, he receives his sensations 
from without, and his illumination from above. 

367 



368 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

As the philosophy of the eighteenth century was a wicked 
conspiracy against legitimate authority, it ought to be 
crushed. He wrote an examination of the philosophy of 
Bacon, and made an acrimonious attack on Locke; but he 
was an able man, and struck heavy blows. 

2. Cabanis (1757-1808). Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis 
was the son of a prominent lawyer who was also chief magis- 
trate of a district in lower Limousin. 

His early education was intrusted to priests, and at ten 
years of age, to the college of Brives. He was an apt scholar, 
but independent and obstinate in his opinions, and so difficult 
of management that he was dismissed from the college, and 
left to carry on his studies by himself. He read Locke with 
delight, and attended some of the university lectures. 

He cultivated poetry, and was intimate with the poet 
Roucher. He became acquainted with Turgot, Diderot, 
D'Alembert, Condillac, D'Holbach, and the distinguished 
Americans, Franklin and Jefferson. He was intimate with 
Mirabeau, land with Condorcet. 

Cabanis finally chose the profession of medicine, and 
studied the mysteries of physiology with the deepest interest. 
He was a member of the National Institute, and was appoint- 
ed professor of Clinics. 

In the winter of 1797-8, Cabanis read a series of papers on 
the relation between the body and the soul, which were 
published in 1802, with some additions, in book form. 
Though he entertained a great respect for Condillac, he held 
against him that our sensations were not wholly excited by 
external causes; for physiological conditions, the internal 
workings of the various organs of the body, were the causes 
of sensations of which we are distinctly conscious. 

The instincts and appetites, in close relation with the vital 
feelings, the emotions, the affections, the desires, are all 
a constant source from which the higher operations of thought 
take their rise. His works are not to be regarded as con- 
tributions to materialistic philosophy, though he says "the 
brain excretes thought as the liver, bile." 

Cabanis maintained that there is a universal instinct, and 
one force pervading all nature. 

3, Maine de Biran (1766-1824). Maine de Biran was 
the son of a physician who gave him a good education. He 
was one of the life-guards of Louis XVI. 



REACTION, ECLECTICISM, POSITIVISM 369 

At the breaking out of the revolution, he retired to his 
estate near Bergrae, where he escaped the horrors of the 
reign of terror, and as he says of himself, passed per saltum, 
from frivolity to philosophy. This decided his life pursuit, 
though he was called in the more quiet times which followed 
to take part in administrative affairs; but he retired to his 
retreat, at every opportunity, to engage in his favorite 
study. Maine de Biran had especial aptitude for psychology, 
and though, at first, he took Condillac for a guide, he soon 
became convinced that he did not grasp the whole truth in 
regarding man only passive, receiving impressions and all 
mental material through sensations excited by external 
causes; for the body itself, by its internal workings furnishes 
material for thought, and in connection with this, the will 
itself consciously directs the train of intellectual processes. 
If we do not immediately perceive cause, as the source of 
energy, we are conscious of effort, we feel the exertion of 
energy. Maine de Biran makes the effort ultimate; but 
the effort would be impossible without a power which exerts 
the energy or makes the effort; for manifestly nothing, mere 
non-entity, cannot make an effort, and the effort is not self- 
supporting; that is, the effort does not make itiself. 

Right here we have a rational intuition of the ego, or soul, 
as the source of psychical activity, and though not conscious 
of the ego itself, we are conscious of the activities, which 
require the ego as their indispensable condition. We know 
phenomena by consciousness, but the ego by reason. 

Maine de Biran did not question the truth in Condillac's 
theory of passivity; but he discovered that it was but half 
of the truth. He supplemented the passivity by activity, 
the other half. 

De Biran accepted Kant's distinction between phenomena 
and noumena; yet he differed from Kant in this: Kant ac- 
cepted the noumenon by faith, Biran grasped the phenom- 
ena by feeling, and postulated the noumenon. But the 
noumenon is not known either by feeling or by faith; for 
feeling gives phenomena, known immediately by conscious 
experience, but consciousness deals directly with phenomena, 
which appear, yet not with noumena which do not appear. 
Neither does faith give knowledge of noumena, for faith is 
belief, not knowledge. Rational intuition, however, at once 



370 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

apprehends the necessity of noumena to the existence of 
phenomena; for phenomena are not self-supporting, neither 
can they spring from non-entity into being. 

We can now see that empirical philosophy can not deal, 
with noumena, the reality of which it will either ignore or 
deny. Empiricism is, therefore, a one-sided philosophy, a 
partial system. Philosophy itself, in its entirety, is both 
empirical and rational. 

Judged by its history, philosophy includes the five phases : 
Empiricism, Idealism, Skepticism, Mysticism, Rationalism. 

^. Ampere (1775-1836). Andre Marie Ampere, the origi- 
nator of the science of Electro-dynamics, was a physicist, a 
mathematician, and a philosopher, and eminent in all these 
respects. 

He was the associate and friend of Maine de Biran,and 
for the most part, in agreement with him, as in making the 
consciousness of the energy of the ego the starting-point in 
philosophical investigations. His psychological method was 
that of the English associational philosophers. 

He investigated how sensations and ideas are involuntarily 
associated, and how scientific knowledge is possible through 
mental activity. He is not content with mere description, 
but explains the appearance of complex phenomena by the 
blending or association of simpler elements. Thus, a low 
voiced reader may not be ui^erstood when reading an 
unfamiliar passage, but may be followed, word by word, 
each distinctly heard, when he reads a familiar passage, 
with no increase in the strength of the voice, the words being 
known are distinctly heard. 

In moving an arm, Ampere distinguished between the 
consciousness of effort, and that of the muscular sensation, 
since when another moves one's arm, there is a consciousness 
of muscular sensation, but not of effort. From effort, we 
learn the nature of cause, as more than antecedent, even as 
force, or energy, the effort of power. 

Though Ampere correctly held that we are conscious of 
phenomena only, yet he maintained that the relations be- 
tween the phenomena, involving causality, imply noumenal 
validity. Cause, time, and space have noumenal reality, 
though we reach them by way of inference under the form 
of hypothesis. We apprehend their necessity as conditions of 
phenomena. 



REACTION, ECLECTICISM, POSITIVISM 371 

The hypothesis, however, is necessary, and has all the 
force of a rational intuition, which apprehends the necessity 
of the conditions of ph^iomena, not the absolute necessity, 
but the conditional necessity; that is, phenomena being 
given, cause must be. We know change empirically, for 
example, change in the movement of a body; but this change, 
known by experience, is impossible, without cause, without 
space, without time. Hence, the necessity of cause, of 
space, and of time, is infalhbly apprehended by rational 
intuition. 

In Maine de Biran's opinion, the passage from the knowl- 
edge of self as cause to that of external causes is over a gulf 
we cannot bridge. Here we encounter one of the profound- 
est questions of metaphysics. The gulf, however, can be 
bridged, not empirically, but rationally. The bridge is the 
principle that non-entity can not spring into being, Maine de 
Biran asks the question: ''What experience can teach us 
whether the forms in which phenomena are co-ordinated are 
absolute, that is, in things, or whether they are only in the 
mind which apprehends them.f^ Can external experience 
ever shed any light on this question which reflection must 
raise? Do not both possibilities fit in equally well with the 
phenomena?" The answer is, experience cannot tell, nor 
perhaps Ampere's theory of relations; but reason can tell. 
Events are continually happening without our knowledge, 
away from us, on the other side of the globe, or elsewhere 
far removed from us. The events are real, the causes are 
real and necessary, since the events are real; but this necessi- 
ty is not, as Kant held, merely the subjective necessity of 
apprehension, but the objective necessity of the cause appre- 
hended. If the events are, the cause must be. 

The question is, do we necessarily apprehend what may 
not be an objective truth, or do we apprehend what is a 
necessary objective truth? Is the necessity in the apprehen- 
sion, or in the reality apprehended? Kant's great mistake 
was in placing the necessity in the apprehension, and this 
mistake has thrown philosophy on the wrong track from 
his day to ours. 

There is no subjective necessity with the empirical philos- 
ophers, while consistently adhering to their theory; for a 
cause with them is not efllciency, but antecedence, and is 



S7^ PHILOSOPHICAL THEOHIES 

reached by induction, which gives only probabiHty, not 
necessity or even certainty. This comes from their empiri- 
cism; but when they lose sight of their one-sided philosophy, 
they say, with the rest of mankind, that every event must 
have a cause, placing the necessity, the event being given, 
in the objective cause, and not in the subjective affirmation; 
and in this cause we find noumenal reality, not only in our- 
selves but in the objective world, which strikes a fatal blow 
to subjective idealism. 

In the course of nature, in the development of science and 
philosophy, cause is the dynamic agency which explains the 
tendency of everything to order, to a comprehensive and 
symmetrical unity. 

5. Cousin (1792-1867). Victor Cousin began life in 
troublous times, but was fortunate in receiving a good 
classical education in the Lycee where he studied eight years. 
The teaching he received gave him a taste for rhetoric and 
oratory. On leaving the Lycee he was crowned in the hall 
of the Sorbonne for an eloquent Latin oration, and thus 
entered the Normal School of Paris with well-deserved dis- 
tinction. 

In the Normal School, he listened with delight to Laro- 
miguiene's lectures on philosophy, which made a deep im- 
pression on him, as he was highly susceptible to the Influence 
of powerful minds. He afterwards said: "Those lectures 
decided the course of my life." He also heard the lectures 
on philosophy by Royer-Collard of whom he always spoke 
in terms of great respect. He says: ''Royer-Collard turned 
me, by the severity of his logic, from the beaten path of 
Condillac, into that of the Scottish philosophy." He was 
also influenced by Maine de Biran and Ampere. 

Cousin's philosophy early shows its eclectic character by 
combining Reid's theory of immediate perception of external 
objects with Maine de Biran's doctrine of the consciousness 
of self-activity, and with Ampere's view of absolute rela- 
tions. To these, at a later date, he added the doctrine of 
the absolute reason taken from the German speculative 
philosophy of Schelling and Hegel. He taught that reason 
is impersonal, since it is alike in all; but this is because it is 
not vitiated by the senses. Every man's reason is his own, 
though similar to that in others. 



REACTION, ECLECTICISM, POSITIVISM 373 

As professor of philosophy in the Normal School of Paris, 
Cousin gave lectures on the history of philosophy to en- 
thusiastic audiences, who were charmed with his eloquence. 
He took the position that all schools of philosophy have 
elements of truth, and that absolute error is impossible to 
the human mind, and therefore that the true procedure is 
the method of eclecticism, to take what is true from all the 
systems, and form a complete whole. He insisted on method, 
and said: * 'As is the method of a philosopher, so is his system, 
and the adoption of a method decides the destiny of his 
philosophy." 

A conglomerate system, however, will not do; it will lack 
consistency. There must be unity in the central principles, 
and these must be fundamental; but having complied with 
this condition, a philosopher may rightfully be eclectic, for 
this will secure, or at least tend to completeness. 

Cousin gave currency to the division of the faculties into 
intellect, sensibility and will. His lectures on the history 
of philosophy are well worth reading, especially his searching 
review of Locke's philosophy. His most valuable work is, 
perhaps, that entitled, Du Vraiy du Beau, du Bien, that is, 
the work on the true, the beautiful and the good. 

6. Germain (1776-1831). Sophia Germain, a lady mathe- 
matician and philosopher, investigated the course of develop- 
ment of the sciences and philosophy, and sought for the 
criterion of truth. 

She held that the human mind realizes the need of order 
and inter-relation to guide in scientific and philosophic 
researches, and found the sole type of the true in order and 
proportion, giving unity and harmony to the whole, and 
including the principle of causality as a special form. 

Instead of asking why that is, seeking for the final cause 
or purpose, we are beginning to search for the how, and the 
how ivhat; that is, we are tending towards positive philosophy; 
and this was, at that time, undoubtedly the drift of thought. 

7. Jouffroy (1796-1842). Theodore Jouffroy empha- 
sized the importance of the psychological method of con- 
sciousness or introspection, and exaggerated it to the neglect 
of both physiology and metaphysics. He carried forward 
the eclecticism of Cousin with more sobriety, but not with 
such lofty flights of eloquence. 



374 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Eclecticism was also strongly advocated by Damiron, a 
pupil of Cousin, who in 1828 published a work on French 
philosophy in the nineteenth century, in which he maintained 
that eclecticism was a true mean between the school of 
Condillac, on the one hand and that of theological philosophy 
on the other, and thus reconciled them in a higher unity. 

8. Saint-Simon (1768-1825). Claude Henri, Comte de 
Saint-Simon, was a reformer; and if he is entitled to the 
name of philosopher, he should be called a social philosopher. 

He served as a French soldier in aiding the American 
colonies to gain their independence from Great Britain. 
He advocated the project of connecting the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans by a ship canal through the isthmus of Darien. 

He took no part in the French revolution, but made some 
money by dealing in real estate, as he said, to aid him in his 
proposed reforms. He lost his fortune, but continued to 
work in poverty. 

Saint-Simon was not a systematic thinker, yet, as the 
founder of French Socialism, he is a conspicuous figure. He 
had the attractive power to draw around him men of talent; 
and both Augustin Thierry and Auguste Comte were reck- 
oned among his disciples. 

He did not advocate the abolition of private property, 
but held that capitalists and leaders of society should 
devote their wealth and influence to the relief of the poor, 
and the elevation of society. 

Saint-Simon in his greatest work. The New Christianity^ 
aflirms his belief in God, and proposes to reduce Christianity 
to its essential elements by clearing away its dogmas and 
excrescences. He said: ''The new Christian organization 
will deduce the temporal institutions, as well as the spiritual, 
from the principle, that all men should act towards one 
another as brethren," an important truth. 

On account of Saint-Simon's religious views, Auguste Comte 
parted company with him, though Comte, at a later date 
attempted to organize a religion on the basis of his positive 
philosophy, the religious nature forcing its recognition in 
spite of an atheistic philosophy. 

After the death of Saint-Simon, the leadership of the 
Socialistic School was assumed by Bazard and Enfantin. 
Bazard was thoughtful and logical in his turn of mind; but 
Enfantin was flighty and impractical, and endeavored to 



REACTION, ECLECTICISM, POSITIVISM 375 

found a Socialistic church with fantastic rituals, and allow- 
ing the immoral practice of free love. Bazard and his fol- 
lowers could not endure this, and withdrew from the fellow- 
ship of Enfantin and his party, which, on account of their 
doctrines and practices, was suppressed by the civil authori- 
ties. 

9, Comte (1798-1857) Auguste Comte, the founder of 
the Positive Philosophy received his elementary education 
at Montpellier, his native town. At the age of sixteen, he 
was admitted to the Ecole Polytechnique, where he strenu- 
ously applied himself to study. After two years at this 
institution, Comte, taking a leading part in a students' 
rebellion, was sent home, but he shortly returned to Paris, 
and supported himself by teaching. 

Comte was a great admirer of Franklin, and wrote to a 
friend: "I seek to imitate the modern Socrates, not in talents, 
but in the way of living. At five and twenty, he formed a 
design of becoming perfectly wise [moral], and fulfilled his 
design. I have dared to undertake the same, though I am 
not yet twenty." He thought of going to America, but a 
friend told him that the Americans were so practical, that 
not even Lagrange, the great mathematician, could make a 
living there only by land surveying. 

By the aid of a friend he attained a position as tutor in the 
family of Casimir Perier, at a good salary, but finding the 
work irksome, he resigned his position after a trial of three 
weeks. 

When about twenty years of age, he became acquainted 
with Saint-Simon, and was assobiated with him for about 
six years. After beginning his own independent career, he 
wrote to a friend: "I certainly am under great obligations to 
Saint-Simon; that is to say, he helped, in a powerful degree, 
to launch me in the philosophic direction I have now definitely 
worked out for myself, and I shall follow that, without 
looking back, for the rest of my life. " But after six years of 
association, Comte and Saint-Simon parted company, as the 
master's pretensions to superiority could no longer be en- 
dured by his ambitious disciple, who placed no low estimate 
on his own intellectual powers. Later in fife, Comte so far 
forgot his indebtedness to Saint-Simon, as to call him a 
"'depraved quack," and to say that his influence over him 
was merely mischievous. 



376 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Comte's marriage was not happy and finally ended in 
separation from his wife, though they kept up a friendly 
correspondence. Later, in 1848, Comte formed the ac- 
quaintance of Madam Clotilda de Vaux, whose husband had 
been condemned for hfe to the galleys. Comte rated her 
very highly, even extravagantly. She supplied the cravings 
of his heart, and he deeply mourned her death, which occurred 
after the acquaintance of one year. 

In 1833, Comte was appointed examiner of boys who were 
candidates for admission to the Ecole Polytechnique at Paris. 
The salary for this work gave him, with other sources of 
revenue, a respectable income. He discharged his duties as 
examiner thoroughly. An incident connected with this work, 
shows that Comte was not destitute of a generous heart. He 
wrote to his wife: "I hardly know, if even to you, I dare 
disclose the sweet and softened feeling that comes over me 
when I find a young man whose examination is thoroughly 
satisfactory. Yes, though you may smile, the emotion would 
easily stir me to tears, if I were not carefully on my guard. " 

In addition to all his other work, even when writing his 
Positive Philosophy, he gave, for seventeen years, a free 
course of popular lectures on Astronomy. He lost his posi- 
tion as examiner, and with it half his income, by a needless 
statement in the preface to the sixth volume of his philosophy, 
which offended the men who had given him the appointment. 

He applied to M. Guizot, Minister of State to the King, 
Louis Philippe, to establish, in the University, a chair of 
the History of Science, hoping to receive the appointment to 
this chair as professor. He gave, in substance, the following 
reasons for the chair: "If there are four chairs devoted to the 
history of philosophy, that is, to the study of dreams and 
aberrations of thought through the ages, surely there should 
be one at least to explain the progress of real knowledge." 
The chair was not established. Comte says : '' The suggestion 
was at first approved by Guizot's philosophic instinct, and 
then repelled by his metaphysical rancor." 

Hearing of Comte's financial straits, his friend, J. S. Mill, 
with the help of Grote, Carrie and Molesworth, advanced 
him the sum of £240. The same was repeated for another 
year, when Mill, learning that Comte made no effort to 
mend his own fortune. Informed him that he must take care 



REACTION, ECLECTICISM, POSITIVISM 377 

of himself; but Comte intimated the contribution was due 
the distinguished author of the Positive Philosophy who was 
working for the good of humanity. 

In the later years of his life, Comte endeavored to establish 
a religion which he called the Religion of Humanity. It was 
to have a ceremonial worship, with a ritual. Thus the very 
thing for which he quarreled with Saint-Simon, he introduced 
for his own followers, though he did not call it New Chris- 
tianity. 

Comte's great work, that on which his fame rests, is en- 
titled, Cours de Philosophie Positive, in six volumes. Of this 
work a good abridged English translation was made by 
Harriet Martineau, and printed in one volume. This trans- 
lation, approved of by Comte himself, is used in this review. 

Comte gives the law of human progress in the following 
terms: ''From the study of the development of human intelli- 
gence, in all directions, and through all times, the discovery 
arises of a great fundamental law, to which it is necessarily 
subject, and which has a solid foundation of proof, both in 
the facts of our organization, and in our historical experience. 
The law is this: — that each of our leading conceptions — each 
branch of our knowledge — passes successively through three 
different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; 
the Metaphysical, or abstract, and the Scientific, or positive. 

. . . Hence arise three philosophies, . . each of 
which excludes the others. The first is the necessary point 
of departure of the human understanding; and the third is 
its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of 
transition. 

In the theological state, the human mind, seeking the 
essential nature of beings, the first and final causes (the 
origin and purpose) of all effects — in short, Absolute Knowl- 
edge — supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immedi- 
ate action of supernatural beings. 

In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of 
the first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, 
abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstrac- 
tions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all 
phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena 
is, in this stage, a mere reference of each to its proper entity. 

In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the 



378 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of 
the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and apphes itself 
to the study of their laws — that is, their invariable relations 
of succession and resemblance. " 

There is, without doubt, a large measure of truth in Comte's 
theory of the three stages of human progress; but these 
stages overlap and are not strictly successive. Many minds, 
not simply the ignorant, but those highly cultivated, yet 
hold to the validity of Theological conceptions. Metaphysics 
shows vitality, and has come to stay. Science, despairing to 
find the ultimate explanations of things, and though legiti- 
mate in its method, and the prevaihng stage at the present 
time, does not go to the depth of things, and is, by its own 
confession, superficial. Philosophy is deeper than Science, 

Not knowing the natural causes of phenomena, the human 
mind, in the early periods, referred them to supernatural 
agencies. The theological stage, is as Comte admits, the 
point of departure for the human mind; yet he denies to 
theological conceptions any validity. He says: "I must 
remark upon one very striking truth which becomes apparent 
during the pursuit of astronomical science — its distinct and 
ever increasing opposition, as it attains a higher perfection, 
to the theological and metaphysical spirit. Theological 
philosophy supposes everything to be governed by will, and 
that phenomena are, therefore, eminently variable, at least 
virtually. The positive philosophy, on the contrary, con- 
ceives them subject to invariable laws, which permit us to 
predict with absolute precision. 

The radical incompatibility of these two views is nowhere 
more marked than in regard to the phenomena of the heavens, 
since in that direction, our prevision is proved to be perfect. 
The punctual arrival of comets, and eclipses, with all their 
train of minute incidents, exactly foretold, long before, by the 
aid of ascertained laws, must lead the common mind to feel 
that such events must be free from the control of any will, 
which could not be will, if it was thus subordinated to our 
astronomical decisions." 

But it is a theological conception that with God "is no 
variableness, neither shadow of turning." How is the 
uniformity of the astronomical laws incompatible with the 
conception of God who is "the same yesterday, today, and 



REACTION, ECLECTICISM, POSITIVISM 379 

The stability of the material universe, consequent on the 
uniformity of the laws of nature, is essential to the continued 
existence of the inhabitants of the world, as they are at 
present constituted. If God wills the existence of man on 
earth, he also wills the uniformity of the laws of nature, and 
this uniformity, which is the indispensable condition of the 
act of prevision, is not subversive of theological conceptions, 
nor incompatible with the idea of God. 

Again, in reference to Physics, Comte says: **With this 
science begins the exhibition of human power in modifying 
phenomena. In astronomy, human intervention is out of 
the question — in physics, it begins; and we shall see how it 
becomes more powerful as we descend the scale. This power 
counterbalances that of exact prevision we have in astronomy. 
The one power or the other — the power of foreseeing or of 
modifying — is necessary to our outgrowth of theological 
philosophy. Our prevision disproves the notion that phenom- 
ena proceed from a supernatural will, which is the same 
thing as calling them variable; and our ability to modify them 
shows that the powers under which they proceed are subordi- 
nate to our own. 

As the phenomena of any science become more complex, 
the first power (that of prevision) decreases, and the other 
(that of modifying) increases, so that one or the other is 
always present to show unquestionably that the events of 
the world are not ruled by supernatural will, but by natural 
laws." 

But it is a theological conception that it is God's will that 
man should *'have dominion over the fish of the sea, and 
over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the 
earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the 
earth." This certainly gives man ample license to modify 
the circumstances which surround him, and cause them to 
subserve his interests, and thus to promote his happiness, 
and this modification is not subversive of theological con- 
ceptions nor incompatible with the idea of God. 

Comte's classification of the sciences begins with the most 
simple and general, and passes on to the more complex and 
special. Leaving out the subdivisions, we have: Mathe- 
matics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Sociology, 
This classification follows the historical order according to 



380 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

which each has passed from the theological, through the 
metaphysical, into the positive stage. The deductive method 
of reasoning prevails in the more simple and general of the 
sciences, and the inductive in the more complex and special. 
The six groups Comte regards as irreducible. The passage 
from a lower to the next higher is accomplished by a leap 
over a gap. The same law holds as to the subdivisions, also 
as to the organic species. This, of course, does not accord 
with Darwin's theory of the origin of species Comte does 
not establish the discontinuity by the positive method of 
observation and experiment, but metaphysically and dog- 
matically, thus forsaking his own methods; but discontinuity, 
when it is a fact, does not disprove the existence of a common 
law, more general, as generic, than the narrower laws of the 
species. The branches of the hyperbola are discontinuous, 
yet both are represented by the one and same equation. 

The transmutation of energy from one mode of manifesta- 
tion to another raises the question whether continuity or 
even identity of fundamental cause may not admit of discon- 
tinuity of manifestations, and also explain those cases where 
apparent discontinuity of manifestations has been found, by 
closer inspection, to resolve itself into continuity. At least 
later investigations have proved that, in many cases, the 
hiatus of discontinuity, supposed by Comte, has been resolved 
into continuity; but the fact of continuity may be regarded 
as a triumph of the positive method, since it has been found by 
that method, and not by the metaphysical, and hence that 
Comte's mistake arose from his forsaking the positive method 
for the metaphysical ; but this is a clear proof that the methods, 
metaphysical and positive, by their overlapping, are not 
discontinuous and successive. 

Comte objects to psychology, because it is founded upon 
consciousness or observation of mental phenomena. He says : 
"In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; 
yet it is this very activity you want to observe. If you 
cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe; if you do effect 
it, there is nothing to observe. The results of such a method 
are in proportion to its absurdity. After two thousand 
years of psychological pursuit, no one proposition is established 
to the satisfaction of its followers. They are divided, to 
this day, into a multitude of schools, still disputing about the 
very elements of their doctrine." 



REACTION, ECLECTICISM, POSITIVISM 381 

But instead of its being impossible to be conscious of 
knowing, it is impossible to know without being conscious of 
knowing. Consciousness is involved in knowing as an essen- 
tial element. If I know, I know that I know; for if I do not 
know that I know, I do not know. In like manner, it may be 
shown that feeling and volition involve consciousness. We 
are conscious of all phenomena, all that appear; but there 
are subliminal operations, not phenomena, of which we are 
not conscious. 

The psychological method has not been so fruitless of 
good results as Comte supposes. We need only refer to the 
laws of association and memory, as exhibited by the Associa- 
tionalist philosophers, of whom James Mill is the typical 
representative. The more modern work of the Physiological 
Psychologists has been fruitful in rich results. The means 
of psychological investigation may be divided into principal 
and collateral; the principle employs consciousness, reflection 
and rational intuition; the collateral, uses the works of 
various authors who have written on the subject; it studies 
comparative psychology, biology, physiology, anthropology, 
and sociology; it observes the phenomena of society, and 
acquaints itself with literature, as found in history, biography, 
poetry, the novel and the drama. Psychology has estab- 
lished something worth knowing; for writers on economics, on 
sociology, on ethics, appeal to psychology for fundamental 
principles. 

For logic, Comte would substitute mathematics. He says: 
"Whatever is found of advantage in logic in directing and 
strengthening the action of the understanding is found, in a 
higher degree, in mathematical study, with the immense 
added advantage of a determinate subject, distinctly cir- 
cumscribed, admitting of the utmost precision, and free 
from the danger which is inherent in all abstract logic — of 
leading to useless and puerile rules, or to vain ontological 
speculations." 

But certainly logic has performed a valuable service in dis- 
closing the fundamental laws of thought — the law of identity, 
of congruents, of conflictive whether contraries or contra- 
dictories, and of reason and consequent; it has also exhibited 
the doctrine of concepts, of judgments and of reasoning, 
whether deductive or inductive, and laid down the safe- 



S82 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

guards against fallacy. All this it has done, and which 
mathematics, notwithstanding its great achievements, has 
not done. 

Comte held strictly to the immutability of natural law; 
but how did he arrive at this principle .^^ Not by the intui- 
tion of reason; for he discarded that method as metaphysical. 
He must, therefore, have reached it by real induction; but 
such induction gives only the probable; and therefore the 
necessary immutability of the laws of nature may not be a 
fact; and according to the positive method, it can be certain 
only so far as experience confirms it. It can be extended in 
its application only by analogy. This accords with the 
tendency of the mind for generalization; but if it seems to 
satisfy a subjective craving for certainty, it does it without 
due warrant; for it has no logical objective foundation, and 
the positive philosophy is resolved into pure empiricism, and 
is not a philosophy at all, though it may be good science. 

Comte was something of a mystic; he assigned to feeling 
its due place in human nature, and made it co-ordinate with 
thought, if not superior to it in importance. His religion of 
humanity does no discredit to his heart, whatever may be 
said of its relation to his head. Every religion ought to be a 
religion of humanity; but is humanity a proper object of 
worship .f^ Worship humanuy, is scarcely acceptable as a 
guiding precept. A better precept is. Worship God and 
strive to elevate humanity. True religion is a quality, it has 
for its first part. Love to God; for its second part. Love to man, 
or human brotherhood. 



CHAPTER XXX 

Later German Philosophy 

1. If a^^r (1814-1878). Julius Robert Mayer, after study- 
ing medicine at Tubingen, Munich and Paris, was chosen 
Surgeon for a Dutch ship bound for Java. After returning, 
he obtained a position as physician in Heilbronn, his native 
city. 

The indestnictibihty of matter, by human agency, had 
already been proved by Lavoisier, and this prepared the way 
for the kindred truth — the conservation and transformation 
of energy. Mayer inferred this from a principle of reason — 
causa aequat effectuin, rather than proved it by experiment. 

The cause, as Mayer held, passes into the effect; it no 
more passes out of existence than do oxygen and hydrogen 
when they unite to form water. Motion, when checked, 
passes into heat, and heat, in turn, produces motion. There 
is a constant relation between the vanishing cause and the 
effect into which it is transformed, and this constant relation 
is the fact of prime importance. The relation, being ex- 
pressed by a formula, can be applied to mechanics in estimat- 
ing the effective work of given forces through the inter- 
vention of machinery. 

Theory, however, needs the test of experiment, and it is 
only by the combination of the theoretical and the practical 
that valuable results can be obtained. Mayer's merit con- 
sists not only in discovering the principle of the conservation 
of energy, but in applying it to a variety of physical phenom- 
ena. 

The law of conservation was also independently discovered 
by Colding, a Dane, by Helmholtz, and by Joule, an English- 
man, and this illustrates, what is often found to be true, that 
several minds, without intercommunication, often work at the 
same thing, and reach similar results, illustrated by Newton 
and Leibniz in the discovery of the Calculus. 

^. VogL (1817-1895). Karl Vogt, a Naturalist and 
Physiologist, maintained that matter is the only substance; 

383 



384 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

that the brain is the organ of which consciousness is the 
function; that thought is to the brain as gall is to the liver, 
thus either making thought material, or resolving it into the 
motion of matter^ — the vibrations of the filiaments of the 
brain. 

3, Moleschott (1822-1893). Jacob Moleschott took for 
his principle the conservation of matter, which he held to be 
never devoid of energy. Force is the constant accompani- 
ment of matter, and circulates with it through the universe; 
and with force, life; with life, thought; with thought, will; 
with the most highly organized human brain, the highest 
thought, the firmest will. 

He believed that his standpoint could be regarded one- 
sidedly materialistic only by those who can conceive matter 
without force, or force without any supporting substance; it 
is, therefore, monistic, dealing with two attributes, material 
and spiritual, in one substance, which is the conception of 
Spinoza. The opposition it sets up is not that between 
matter and spirit, but that between a two in one, or a two 
hopelessly sundered. Of his conception he says: "Since 
matter is a bearer of force, endowed w ith force, or penetrated 
with spirit, it would be just as correct to call it a spiritual 
conception." 

Moleschott's doctrine may be thus stated : The foundation 
of all reality is substance with two attributes, material and 
spiritual, and that these are never found apart, but are not 
always in the same ratio to each other, and so vary as to 
approach extension and inertia, on the one hand, or the 
highest thought and firmest will on the other. His principal 
work he called Kreislauf des Lebens. 

^. Buchner (1824-1899). Louis Biichner held that mind 
and matter, or to speak more generally, force and stuff, are 
necessarily and inseparately connected, though he does not 
attempt to explain the nature of the relation, more than to 
say that mind is a property of matter, or force a property of 
stuff; but even this is a matter of belief rather than of scien- 
tific knowledge. His famous work, Kraft und Siqff was sug- 
gested by Moleschott's Kreislauf des Lebens. 

Biichner holds that the ultimate basis of all being is matter, 
and that the conservation of matter involves the conservation 
of energy; that the intricate complexity of the organism, 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 385 

especially that of the brain, produces certain effects which, 
bound together into unity, constitute the ego or personal 
identity, called the soul, the mind, or thought. He also 
held that force and matter may be regarded as two different 
aspects or modes of that [substance] which underlies all 
things. 

These two statements are in conflict; for matter cannot 
be the fundamental reality, if it is only an aspect or mode of 
something else which underlies all things. May not the 
whole mystery be solved by calling the fundamental reality 
cause^ which manifest material attributes on the one hand 
and spiritual attributes on the other, and that these two are 
related by their common connection with cause? Biichner's 
training as a physician influenced his thinking as a philoso- 
pher. 

5. Czolhe (1819-1873). Heinrich Czolbe was, like Buch- 
ner, trained as a physician. He held that the same motion 
which, starting in the outer world, was carried, without 
modification, through the sense organs and nerves, to the 
brain, where it was turned back into a circular motion, 
giving rise to sensation, thought and consciousness, which 
are motions in space and wherever such motions occur, 
whether in the brain or out of it, there is consciousness. 

Czolbe admitted the difficulty of explaining the world 
from a single principle, whether found, as by BUchner in 
matter, or by Metaphysicians in mind, or by Theologians in 
God. We reach a reasonable solution by taking the three 
elements — material atoms, organic forces, and psychical 
elements .found in the world soul, and these elements co- 
operate in their action and unite in their result, manifesting 
both physical and psychical phenomena. 

Czolbe was a clear thinker, and strove for comprehensible 
results. 

6. Haeckel (1834 ). Ernst Haeckel, Professor of 

Zoology at the University of Jena, calls himself, not a mate- 
rialist, but a monist. He holds to an underlying ground con- 
necting matter and spirit, as manifestations of one common 
substance, Spinoza's theory. 

The psychical life, one of the original elements of nature 
manifests itself, though varying greatly in degree, from the 
soul of the atom to the most highly developed human brain. 



386 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Psychical phenomena are the activities of the complex ner- 
vous tissues of the hving organism. The law of the conserva- 
tion of matter and energy, is the basis of the stability of the 
universe. The law of substance, according to Haeckel, is the 
true and only cosmological law. 

Haeckel accepts the theory of evolution as expounded by 
Darwin, and regards Pantheism as the only true system of 
Theology. His views are forcibly expressed in his writings: 
The History of Creation, The Evolution of Man, and The Riddle 
of the Universe, 

In The Riddle of the Universe, Haeckel says of Spinoza: 
**We adherel firmly to the pure, unequivocal monism of 
Spinoza: Matter, or infinitely extended substance and spirit 
(or energy), or sensitive and thinking substance, are the two 
fundamental attributes, or principal properties of the all- 
embracing divine essence of the world, the universal sub- 
stance." Again, "All the changes which have since come 
over the idea of substance are reduced, on a logical analysis, 
to this supreme thought of Spinoza's; with Goethe, I take 
it to be the loftiest, profoundest, and truest thought of all the 
ages. " 

5. Lotze (1817-1882). Rudolph Hermann Lotze was 
born at Bautzen, the district of Fichte and Lessing, and was 
educated as a physician at Leipzig. His teachers in medicine 
and physics were Weber, Volkmann and Fechner. Weisse 
was his guide in philosophy. He graduated the same year, 
both as a doctor of philosophy and a doctor of medicine, and 
at once became a docent in both. He was afterwards profes- 
sor of philosophy at Gottingen, and was elected to the same 
chair at Berlin, but soon after died. 

Lotze's ideal was that of the romantic philosophers, to 
trace the development and interconnections of the world to 
one eternal idea. In him were combined the scientific and 
speculative tendencies, thus leading him to attempt the 
reconstruction of idealism on a realistic foundation. To 
accomplish this, he saw that he must avoid, on the one hand, 
the mistake of romanticism of overlooking the real conditions 
and mechanical connections of nature, and on the other, 
that of materialism of taking matter, which is only a frame- 
work, for the sum total of reality. 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY S87 

Lotze's point of departure is the mechanism of nature. 
He endeavored to show, by an analysis of the concept, that 
an ideal principle is involved, which is the eternal source of 
whatever is of any value. Ideas represent things, and 
thoughts the relations of ideas, and hence also of things. 

In his medical works, Lotze attributed physical phenomena, 
not to a mystical vital force, but to the regular operations of 
universal forces in living organisms; but mechanism con- 
stitutes only a part of nature, the spiritual also has its place; 
it is the relation of the material and spiritual that has interest 
for philosophy. This relation he traces in his Microcosmus, 
a work which supplements Humboldt's Cosmos and Herder's 
Ideen. 

The Microcosmus treats of psychology in relation to 
physiology, human culture as shown n history, cosmological 
theories, and the philosophy of religion. 

Lotze holds that spiritual life, at its highest value, is 
realized only in combination with a mechanical system of 
causes and losses. It is the business of philosophy, rather 
than of science, to inquire into the nature and relation of 
cause and effect, means and end, substance and force, freedom 
and necessity, matter and spirit, which, in practical life, and 
in the special sciences, are taken for granted. Philosophy 
goes deeper than science. 

Though the nature of ca^se, the source of all change, may 
be learned from experience in the consciousness of effort we 
make in overcoming resistance, yet its necessity is presupposed 
by reason whenever there is experience of change, thus im- 
plying the interconnection of phenomena. The very concep- 
tion of nature is of a plurality of real elements in reciprocal 
interaction; but this mechanical interaction is not the only 
feature of our conception of nature, which is even impossible 
without a connecting cause. There must be an all embracing 
cause to constitute a cosmos, that is, a universe which is all 
things turned into one system. The one great cause is, there- 
fore immanent, not transcendent. Things in their relation 
to this ground cause are related to one another. There is, 
then, an original substance the all embracing principle, the 
Deus sive Natura of Spinoza, which Lotze called the ultimate 
fact of all thought — the ultimate postulate; it is presupposed 
in the simplest case of reciprocal action. 



388 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Materialism and Idealism are thus reconciled and united. 
Neither the monads of Leibniz, nor the reals of Herbart afford 
thought a resting place; the basis must be monistic-Spirit, as 
Lotze held, which could exert itself as energy at all points, 
and cause the points of energy to interact. The points can- 
not be extended solids, however small, for then they would 
have parts and be divisible; neither are they inextended solids, 
for then they would be nothing; they are, therefore, points of 
energy, loca-ly placed, but without extension. This view 
renders the creation of so-called matter possible and con- 
ceivable. What is this one substance or primal cause? We 
can understand it only by analogy to ourselves as causes; 
but we know ourselves as subjects of activities or suscepti- 
bilities. As finite spirits, we can do and suffer, so likewise 
can the infinite Spirit. 

To obviate objections to freedom, Lotze says: "The soul 
evolves from itself resolutions, starting points for future 
movements, ... if experience convinces us that every 
event of external nature is at the same time an effect having 
its cause in preceding facts, it still remains possible that the 
cycle of inner mental life does not consist throughout of a 
rigid mechanism working necessarily, but that along with 
unlimited freedom of will, it also possesses a limited power of 
absolute commencement. " This " absolute commencement," 
however, is not a commencement from nothing, not from 
antecedent events, but from mind, human or Divine. A 
volition, as an event is caused, and therefore not free, but 
caused by the ego. The freedom is not in the volition, but 
in the ego, the subject of the volition, which is not an event, 
but a being, free to cause its own volitions. Now, because 
volitions are caused, it does not follow that the cause of the 
volitions is caused to cause them. The doctrine of freedom 
does not require free volitions, but a being free to cause them. 
The ego, as a being, is free, not in its origin^ but in its acts. 

A perfectly new beginning, not connected with the primal 
cause, or with anything else, is an event without a cause, and 
is therefore impossible. Yet it is conceivable and possible 
that the primal cause can act, at any time, and originate a 
new line of events, unless its energies are so engaged as to 
leave no reserved power, thus implying that it had exhausted 
itself in the universe. Even if the primal cause originates new 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 389 

events, these events are related to all other events, by their 
relation to the primal cause, and we would still have a uni- 
verse. The new events are not violations of any laws of 
nature, though miraculous, not caused by existing events, 
but by the primal cause. Miracles should never be con- 
ceived as violations of the laws of nature. God does not 
violate his own laws, he simply does that which would not 
be done by the existing forces of nature. 

The supposition of an absolute commencement, or a com- 
mencement from nothing, admits the possibility of a time, 
far back in the past, when there was absolutely nothing, not 
even the first cause; if so, non-entity sprang into entity, and 
cause is not the necessary condition of an event, or the doc- 
trine of causality is a delusion, and any event may come of 
itself, or there is no causal connection between events, but 
this would destroy foresight, a firmly established fact of 
experience, and would disintegrate the entire universe, or 
rather there would never have been any universe. Lotze's 
expression, "absolute commencement," is unfortunate. A 
new series, originated by a mind, has not an absolute com- 
mencement; it is related to the mind which originates it. 

Lotze held that the facts of the universe need not be wholly 
similar or even commensurable to be reciprocally related, and 
that, in the last analysis, it is not a logical, but an aesthetic 
necessity, that leads us to conceive a universe, all the parts of 
which exhibit infinite variety in perfect harmony. 

If we desire to understand the inner nature of things, we 
must conceive them after the analogy of our own spiritual 
nature, as feeling beings, and this method goes deeper than 
the mechanical conception. Things are real beings, existing 
for themselves, and are not merely poetic ideas of our own 
creating. It may, however, be true that they are God's 
ideas. The all-embracing world spirit renders the universe 
comprehensible in the interactions of its parts, and in its 
relation to ourselves. 

Lotze held that we can, in some degree, understand, by 
analogy from our own spiritual states, that the absolute world 
principle is a personality, since in that case only could it 
possess independence and originality. But in our case, 
personality encounters obstacles which resist our efforts and 
disturb our feelings; but in the all-embracing cause, feelings 



390 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

are set in motion by its own activity. It may be conceived 
that God encounters objects, and even resistance in the finite 
beings he has created, and to whom he has granted some 
degree of independence. Free beings, within certain limits, 
manage themselves, and may even run counter to the will of 
God, as in fact man often does, and God suffers his ill manners 
and is thereby grieved; but can this be, if as Lotze holds, the 
form of time is not applicable to the Divine Being? Timeless 
action and timeless suffering are inconceivable. 

Lotze held that matter and spirit are contradictories; but 
this is the case only when we consider them species under 
the genus substance. In this case, a substance cannot be 
both matter and spirit, though it must be one or the other. 
Passing to a higher genus than substance, matter and spirit 
are not contradictories, but contraries. We may conceive 
other forms of existence than matter and spirit, as geometric 
forms in pure space, or even of non-existence as opposed to 
both matter and spirit. Not-matter is not necessarily spirit, 
for it may be a form of space or a portion of time, or even 
nothing. 

The unity of the universe makes the reciprocal action of 
the parts possible; and this action, which is continual, is a con- 
stant witness of a common interest and a common end — the 
highest possible good for the whole. The ethical principle of 
reciprocity is, therefore the controlling law according to which 
the universe is carried forward to its consummation. Lotze's 
system may, therefore, be entitled Ethical Pantheism. 

Reciprocal action does not require complete homogeneity 
in the interacting things, or even proportionality, as the 
density of a body varies inversely as its extension; there is no 
inconsistency in supposing that interaction pertains between 
soul and body, and to this fact experience testifies. The 
connection finds its ground in substance, of which both soul 
and body are species, or if we prefer to say, both matter and 
mind are attributes. 

What are the reasons for supposing a special soul substance.^ 
Two alternatives appear: psychical phenomena must be 
referred to a soul or to the interactions of physical forces; 
but personal identity cannot be explained by varying physical 
forces; therefore, the soul, the only alternative, remains the 
true explanation. 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 391 

Stimuli are carried from the nerves to the brain, and the 
reaction of the brain is accompanied by sensations, which are 
signals the soul interprets, and thus arise ideas, and thoughts, 
and all other mental phenomena. Idealism is true so far as 
mental pictures are concerned, but false when it denies the 
external causes of sensation. Lotze, however, prefers not to 
call material objects, so-called, causes, but effects of mental 
states. They may be effects of God's mental states, but not 
of ours. The senses all point to something external. Even 
Berkeley says: "Since we are affected from without, we must 
allow powers to be without in a being distinct from ourselves. " 

The dualistic conception of the relation of body and mind 
Lotze regarded as a provisional assumption which will give 
place to maturer views; for he held that extension itself is 
subjective; that matter itself is nothing but the phenomenal 
form of interaction between inextended beings, as the monads 
of Leibniz, or the reals of Herbart; and that the immortahty 
of the soul does not depend upon its nature, but on its place 
in the ethical order of the world. He says: ''No principle 
can serve us here except the general idealistic conviction that 
every created thing, whose continued existence holds a part 
of the sense of the world, will continue to exist, and that 
everything will pass away the reality of which can find a 
place only in the transitory phase of the world's history." 
This means, if it means anything, that a person will be im- 
mortal if he can fill worthily a place in the moral realm, and 
if he does so fill that place, but otherwise, he will pass out of 
existence. 

9. Fechner (1801-1887). Gustav Theodor Fechner was 
born at Lanwich. His chief studies were medicine and 
physics. In 1835, he was appointed professor of physics, 
but in a few years, he was forced to retire from his post on 
account of weakness of his eyes. 

In his thinking, he was influenced, to a considerable extent 
by Weisse, as was Lotze, and with him he endeavored to con- 
struct an idealistic world conception on a realistic basis. 

Fechner formed the conception that there is a definite 
quantitive relation between connected mental and material 
facts, and by working out this conception he became the 
founder of the experimental science of psycho-physics, or as 
it is otherwise called, of physiological psychology. To ascer- 



392 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

tain the facts pertaining to the connection of the nervous 
system and mental manifestations, and to determine their 
laws became the work of his life. 

In Fechner were found two strong tendencies — to employ 
the experimental method, and to give free rein to his imagina- 
tion. He does not separate mind from matter, nor God from 
the universe, nor does he derive the world from conscious 
thought, or the poetic pictures of the imagination from the 
darkness of material things. The infinite embraces the 
finite, and God is immanent in the world as its life and 
support, just as the human spirit, by pervading the body, 
is its life and support. Each person is conscious of his own 
spiritual activities, and by analogy extends like activities to 
animals, to plants, and, if he pleases, to inorganic objects. 

In the interaction of all things, Fechner found the basis 
for philosophy and religion, and thus the fact, which to some 
minds rendered the being of God superfluous, made the 
belief in his existence necessary both to Fechner and to 
Lotze. The concept of the world is the concept of God whose 
life is the life of the world. The perfection of God is seen in 
the unfolding and progress of the world through infinite time. 
Herein Fechner' s view is superior to that of Lotze, who does 
not regard time as applicable to God. 

The material and spiritual worlds are the outer and the 
inner aspects of Deity, the one substance with two attributes, 
matter and mind, which is the doctrine of Spinoza. We may 
see the world as a universe of matter or as a universe of mind, 
according to our point of view, just as an observer without a 
hollow sphere would see only its convex surface, while one 
within would see its concave ," but one, by changing his point 
of view, would see the surface as it is, convex without and 
concave within. 

Fechner advanced beyond Spinoza in attempting to dis- 
cover an exact mathematical relation between matter and 
mind, the two sides of existence, or the two attributes of the 
one substance. He found that the changes in corresponding 
mental and physical states were not directly proportional, 
but that the change in the mental state is equal to the ratio 
of the change in the physical state to that state multiplied by 
a constant. Thus, if the change in a mental state m is dm, 
and the change in the corresponding physical state j) is dp. 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 393 

then c denoting the constant, we shall have dm =c dp/c. The 
constant is different for the different senses. Fechner evolved 
this law from facts discovered by Weber from experiment, 
and called it Weber's Law. He did a good work in investi- 
gating the laws of relation connecting physiological phenom- 
ena with physical. 

10, Lange (1828-1875). Freidrich Albert Lange was the 
son of J. P. Lange, the celebrated commentator and profes- 
sor of theology at Zurich. He was a good scholar and well 
versed in the history of philosophy. He led an active life as 
teacher, author, editor, and political agitator as a reformer 
in social affairs. The philosophers that impressed him most 
deeply were Hegel, Herbart, and Schleiermacher. 

Lange's principal work is The History of Materialism, in 
three volumes. It is a work of great merit, clear and candid, 
and to most readers, convincing. His method of treatment 
is to push materialism forward to its limit, showing that it 
finally breaks down, and ends in failure in its attempts to 
deduce thought from matter. A reader of his book would be 
likely to think, in the course of its perusal, till he reached the 
climax, that Lange was an advocate of materialism. 

The afferent nerves carrying stimulus to the brain, the 
efferent carrying the response to the muscles, the obedience 
of the muscles to the command, frequently take place with- 
out any conscious mental action; but in emergencies, sensa- 
tion is excited, thought awakened, and decision made, con- 
stituting an entirely new process, all in another realm, that of 
mind; and this may be followed by an outward act, again in 
the realm of matter. 

The passage from the physical to the mental realm, or the 
reverse, is the great mystery. There is no consciousness till 
we reach sensation; and the material process is not mental, 
though it may be its condition. The mental process, the 
sensation, the thought, the whole content of consciousness, 
find no explication in the law of conservation of matter and 
energy. At this point, in Lange's opinion, materialism fails. 

If the laws of matter cannot explain the phenomena of 
mind, can the laws of mind explain the phenomena of matter.f^ 
If the passage in one direction is impossible, can the passage 
in the opposite direction be possible? Lange says: ''While it 
always remained an insurmountable difficulty for Material- 



894 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

ism to explain how conscious sensation could come about 
from material motion, yet it is, on the other hand, by no 
means difficult to conceive that our whole representation of 
matter and its movements is the result of an organization of 
purely intellectual dispositions to sensation." 

But is the representation of matter identical with matter 
itself? One can imagine a chair. Let us call it a repre- 
sentation; but what is the consequence when one attempts 
to sit in it? A man deeply in debt, and troubled by his 
creditors, can imagine himself rich; but will his imaginary 
money pay his debts? If materialists err in believing that 
they can deduce mind from matter, do not idealists, on the 
other hand, err, in believing that they can deduce matter 
from mind? Matter and mind, however may be species of 
the genus substance, which is the ground and explanation 
of their connection, and the true unity of all existence. 

11. Duhring (1833^ ). Eugen Diihring was born in 

Berlin, and was brought up in the atmosphere of free religious 
thought. Mathematics and astronomy were his favorite 
branches of knowledge. He studied for the legal profession, 
and entered on its practice, but was forced to abandon this 
vacation on account of disease of his eyes which finally made 
him blind. His affliction increased his natural tendency to 
suspicion, and to regard all who differed from him as enemies. 
His wife and later his son becaijie his amanuensis. 

Cut off from the practice of law, he turned his thoughts 
to the investigation of philosophical questions, paying 
especial attention to Epistemology,or the theory of knowledge. 
He took up the Kantian problem of the scope and limits of 
knowledge, and discussed it in the spirit of positive science. 

His principal work he called Naturliche Dialiktik, This 
book, excellent in form and matter, is valuable on account of 
the light it throws on the relation of the critical to the positive 
philosophy. He distinguished between the principle of 
sufficient reason, a law of thought, from the wider law of 
reality; and this principle knocks dogmatism out. He 
directed attention to what he called the principle of insufficient 
reason, which requires that the burden of proof should fall 
on the one who proposes a new theory in conflict with that 
which is generally accepted as true. This hits the idealists 
who call upon realists to prove that things exist, as is gener- 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 395 

ally believed, apart from human thought, when it is the 
business of the idealists to prove that they do not so exist. 
Realists, in meeting the challenge of Idealists should throw 
back the burden of proof where it belongs. 

Diihring calls his philosophy, the philosophy of reality, 
the fundamental facts of which, as known by experience, 
must afford the subject matter of theoretical investigation. 
To throw aside the facts, and to speculate on concepts, is to 
leave the solid ground of reality to explore the cloudy region 
of the unreal fictions of the imagination. 

Diihring admired the great thinkers of the seventeenth 
century, such as Newton, Galileo, Hobbes and Spinoza, and 
regarded the philosophers of the nineteenth as reactionists; 
but the advance of science in the nineteenth is its glory; the 
subjection of theory to the test of experiment is a matter of 
great practical importance. 

In his theory of knowledge, conducted in the critical spirit, 
Diihring seeks to ascertain the relation of thought to reality. 
Thought strives to advance by continuous interconnection, 
and like a line, to stretch on indefinitely; but a real thing is 
definite, and continuation can take place only by the addition 
of particular reals, also definite in magnitude and in number. 
Pure thought is not restricted to real things. Thought, 
however, may restrict itself, as it does in science, to the 
realities of nature, save when it makes hypotheses which are 
overthrown by the test of facts; but confirmed hypotheses, 
of course, correspond to facts. 

From the law of definite number, Diihring deduced the 
consequence that the processes of nature cannot go back in 
an infinite regress, and hence that nature had a beginning. 
From this we can deduce the further consequence that there 
must be an eternal creator of the universe^ since non-entity 
cannot turn itself into entity. There may, however, be no 
series of facts, but they will have their origin either in the 
absolute first cause, or in some finite but free causes, as human 
beings. In the series of causes and effects, there is no abso- 
lute break or discontinuity, but the chain is connected, link 
by link, back to the cause at its head. 

We often discover continuity in apparent discontinuity, 
or we may fail to find continuity by experiment where it was 
thought to exist. Hence science forsakes its sphere and 



396 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

dogmatizes, when it says an event, not depending on any 
natural causes, is impossible; it must, however, be dependent 
on some cause; it is not an absolute commencement. 

For the most part, there is a correspondence between 
thought and reality, or the relation of premise and con- 
clusion corresponds to that of cause and effect. They stand 
related as the reason of knowing and the reason being; but 
the deep principle, underlying all reality, that causes nature 
to work, induces mind to think, and between the two, there 
should be harmony. 

It does not, therefore, destroy the validity of knowledge, 
because it is the product of two factors — the objective nature 
of things, and the subjective nature of thought. In specula- 
tive thought, there may be disagreement between the concep- 
tion and the reality, but in real knowledge, there is harmony. 

Diihring held that to give a complete picture of real exis- 
tence is the task of philosophy. He recognized one reality — 
nature and all it embraces; but in nature he included, not 
only phenomena, but all reality, including the first cause — 
the one substance, the Deus sive Natura of Spinoza. He 
assigns ends to nature, the results or final outcome, whether 
intended or not. The lower forms exist for the higher; the 
mechanical finds its end in the rational. 

The resistances conscious beings encounter are the foils, 
which lend a charm to existence, lead to effort, promote 
happiness, and make life worth living. 

Diihring finds the basis of ethics in sympathy. The in- 
dividual realizes his highest good in society, and the con- 
summation of human progress will be universal brotherhood. 

12, Wundt (1832- ). Wilhelm^ Wundt, Professor of 

Philosophy in the university of Leipzig, bases his psychology 
on physiology, and thus is a physiological psychologist. He 
makes physiology, however, an introduction to psychology, 
which he holds to be the science of immediate consciousness 
of phenomena. 

In regard to Fechner's work, Wundt said: '*The Psycho- 
"physics which he founded was only the first conquest on a 
field in gaining full possession of which there can be no more 
insurmountable obstacles, now that such a beginning has been 
made." 

Wundt's work which he called Physiologische Psychologic, 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 397 

first published in 1874, aims to accomplish the co-operation 
of science and philosophy, thus giving philosophy a positive 
basis. 

Wundt wrote three volumes on Ethics : /. The Facts of the 
Moral Life; II. Ethical Systems; III. The Principles of 
Morals and the Sphere of Their Validity. He classifies Ethical 
Systems, as to motives, and as to ends. Under ethics of 
motives, he classes Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Em- 
piricism, placing ethics of feeling under intuitionism, and 
ethics of understanding under empiricism; but ethics of 
reason, he relates to both. 

Under ethics of ends, he places the heteronomous systems, 
political and religious; and under autonomous systems he 
places eudemonism, individual and universal; also evolution- 
ism, individual and universal. 

Science and philosophy are not identical either in aim or 
method, as science deals with facts, their classification, and 
laws, while philosophy deals with causes and fundamental 
principles which account for the facts; but the labors of 
Wundt tend to the harmony of science and philosophy, and 
to their co-operation in the advancement of knowledge. 

Wundt holds that the laws of our apprehension of objects, 
are the laws of the objects themselves, thus postulating the 
harmony between man and nature, manifest in their inter- 
action. 

Other important works by Wundt are Logic, System of 
Philosophy, Human and Animal Psychology, Folk Psychology. 

13. Paulsen (1846-1908). Friedrich Paulsen, Professor 
of Philosophy in the University of Berlin, has written a work 
called Introduction to Philosophy, also one entitled A System 
of Ethics, both of which have been translated by Professor 
ThiUy. 

Paulsen's special merit is his success in making philosophy 
intelligible to the people. He has aimed to do this especially 
in his treatise on ethics. His historical sketch of ethics from 
Socrates down to the present is remarkably interesting and 
instructive. He has presented practical ethics in such a way 
as to impress its importance on the mind of his readers, and to 
inspire them with a noble ambition to live a higher moral life. 
His system may be called Teleologic Energism, since it teaches 
the duty of striving for the highest end. 



398 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

In his second edition, Paulsen did not call his system 
utilitarianism, as he did in the first, and though admitting that 
morality is older than moral philosophy, yet he holds that 
experience decides what is advantageous or disadvantageous. 
The consequences of conduct stand, therefore, in his opinion, 
as its final justification or condemnation. 

IJf., Stirner (1808-1856). Max Stirner is best known as 
the author of a work entitled Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum, 
which may be translated. The Unique One and his Property, 
or more smoothly, though less accurately. The Ego and His 
Own. His system is Anarchism. 

This remarkable book, published in 1845, at first attracted 
considerable attention, but being in advance of the current 
thought, it sank out of sight for a generation. In the last 
ten years, the interest in it has revived, and it has been 
translated into several of the languages of Europe. An 
excellent translation into English, made by Steven Byington, 
was published by Benjamin R. Tucker, in 1907, at New York., 

Lange, in his History of Materialism, calls Stirner, '*The 
man who in German Literature has most preached Egoism 
recklessly and logically," and says, ''Stirner went so far in 
his notorious work, as to reject all word ideas. Everything 
that, in any way, whether it be external force, belief, or mere 
idea, places itself above the individual and his caprice, Stirner 
rejects as a hateful limitation of himself." 

By Ego, Stirner did not mean the part of human nature 
common to all egos, but the unique personality peculiar to 
any individual ego. Each ego is for himself sui generis, the 
sole ego, all other egos being his own ideas. / then am the 
important reality, and as far as myself am concerned, the 
supreme fact, rightfully free from all law, civil, ecclesiastical, 
social, or moral, save my own will. 

Egoism, therefore, obliterates justice, or reduces it to the 
will of the strongest, and logically resolves itself into anarch- 
ism, not necessarily anarchism as popularly understood, 
signifying disorder, robbery, bloodshed and murder, but the 
abolition of all law above the will of the ego. This reminds 
us of Hobbes who held to the egoistic view of human nature. 
He believed, however, that mankind would exterminate 
themselves unless held in check by civil law eaforc^d by 
penalties. 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 399 

J. L. Walker, who wrote a very able introduction to Bying- 
ton's translation of Stirner's work, says: '*He [Stirner] would 
lay aside government, but would establish any regulation 
deemed convenient, and for this only our convenience is 
consulted." But would not the strong oppress the weak? 
Stirner believes that the strong would refrain from such con- 
duct, not for the sake of the weak, but for their own sake, 
knowing that it would bring the best results to themselves. 

The doctrine of exclusive egoism, with its consequent 
anarchism, is based on the assumption of the total selfishness 
of the ego, which it is assumed always acts in view of its own 
interests. Benevolence is, therefore, rejected as constituting 
no original element of human nature. Let us see. Suppose 
an ultra egoist to have his choice between the two courses of 
action. He can get, say $1,000 worth of good for himself by 
a certain action, and at the same time benefit his neighbor A 
$1,000 worth, or he can get $1,000 of good for himseK, by 
damaging his neighbor B $1,000, no other person being 
affected by his act, which course of conduct would he choose .^^ 
If he had no regard for A or J5, the choice, so far as they are 
concerned, would be a matter of indifference; but the egoist 
would answer, and this is Stirner's belief, I would take the 
course that would benefit A, because I should get more good 
out of that course. I would eiijoy helping A, and regret 
damaging B, To this answer it may be replied, if you were 
not benevolent, you would neither enjoy helping A nor regret 
damaging B, To help A would not please you, nor to damage 
B displease. Benevolence therefore, as well as selfishness, is 
an ultimate element of human nature; that is, the doctrine 
that the ego is exclusively selfish is false. Granting that a 
man's motive always contains a selfish element, that does not 
invariably exclude benevolence. A motive is usually com- 
plex, containing more than one element. The will of the ego 
would answer for law only when the ego is enlightened and 
benevolent. 

Other considerations, it must be admitted, more exclusively 
egoistic, may enter into the foregoing case. The egoist might 
say: If I help A, he will probably in turn, help me, or if I 
damage B, he would likely damage me, and on these con- 
siderations I act. Suppose, however, these considerations 



400 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

were, by some possibility, entirely removed, still the egoist 
would prefer to help A, rather than to damage B, which 
would be a choice purely benevolent. 

How would Stirner secure the weak against the encroach- 
ments of the strong? He says, page 386: "I love men too, — 
not merely individuals, but every one. But I love them with 
the consciousness of egoism; I love them because love makes 
me happy. I love because loving is natural to me, because it 
pleases me. . .1 have a fellow feeling with every feeling 
being, and their torment torments, their refreshment refreshes 
me too." But why.^ If Stirner was utterly selfish, the tor- 
ment of others, or their refreshment, would be a matter of 
indifference. He would be neither tormented nor refreshed 
by their torment or refreshment; but since he is tormented 
or refreshed with the others, he has a benevolent heart. 
Egoism can be the final philosophy only if benevolence as 
well as selfishness, is an ultimate element of the ego, but that 
would be a combination of egoism and altruism. 

Let us reconsider, at this point, the two kinds of quantity 
involved in knowledge — content corresponding to the Pla- 
tonic idea or the modern concept, and extent, the class em- 
bracing objects having common content, with its subdivisions 
down to individuals. From Plato to Hegel, philosophers 
have generally attached more importance to content than 
to extent; but why? because content is practically invariable, 
except from the slow growth of advancing knowledge, while 
the extent is subject to continual change, and philosophers 
attach more importance to the permanent than to the 
transitory. The concept corresponding to the content, 
though it may be an object of thought, and gradually become 
more complete and perfect, cannot, by itself, be pictured by 
the imagination. It contains nothing subject to either pain 
or pleasure, while the extent embracing classes and individuals 
which may be imxproved or damaged, or suffer pain or pleasure, 
has value in itself, equal if not superior to that of the concept. 

Take an individual, for example Aristotle. His uniqueness, 
that in which he differed from other men, gave him value. 
Disturb that, or destroy it, and Aristotle had lost his individ- 
uality and his value. Aristotle as capable of thought of will, 
as susceptible of happiness or misery, of pleasure or pain, had 



LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 401 

more value than all the ideas Plato ever had, plus all the 
concepts of modern philosophers. 

Let philosophers study, not only content and concepts 
but extent, classes and individuals, and seek their welfare, 
and they will find that people will not only listen to them 
with pleasure, but will profit by their instructions. 

In forming alliances, as in marriage or otherwise, the fatal 
mistakes are made, not because of a want of knowledge of the 
common attributes of human nature, but because of ignorance 
of the unique characteristics of individuals. To know the 
idiosyncrasies of our friends gives power to secure our mutual 
welfare. It was to the uniqueness of each individual Ego 
that Stirner assigned such importance as to place him above 
all law, save his own capricious will. This can be done with- 
out danger only when all men are so enlightened and con- 
scientious, that they not only know what is best to be done, 
but will not fail to do it. 



CHAPTER XXXI 

Philosophy of Evolution 

1. Darwin (1809-1882). Charles Darwin was born at 
Shrewsbury, England. He studied medicine in Edinburgh, 
and theology at Cambridge, but engaged in neither of these 
professions, as he felt a strong attraction towards science. 
He joined the Beagle in its voyage round the world, from 
1831 to 1836. This voyage settled Darwin's destiny as a 
Naturalist. 

The following are the most important of Darwin's works : 
Origin of Species, published 1859; Variation of Animals and 
Plants under Domestication, 1868; Descent of Man, 1871; 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 1872; We 
are especially concerned with The Origin of Species and The 
Descent of Man, 

The importance of Darwin's teaching does not rest on the 
origination of the theory of evolution^ — that the different 
organic species have been produced by natural causes, for 
this opinion had been held by others before him, but on his 
method of supporting this theory, by collecting facts in the 
organic kingdom, indicating the action of natural causes in 
the production of variations leading to new species. 

Darwin did not attempt to explain the origin of life by 
natural causes, but the origin of species by natural selection, 
or the survival of the fittest; for the origin of life he, at first, 
referred to the Creator, but later called it an inexplicable 
mystery. 

Darwin was led to his investigations by reading the theory 
of Malthus, that the population tends to increase more rapid- 
ly than the means of support, and seeing that the law applied 
to the entire animal kingdom. Hence would arise a struggle 
for existence in which the fittest would stand the best chance 
of surviving, while the unfit would be likely to perish. The 
struggle for life is a means of evolution, and the qualities 
developed would be transmitted by heredity. The process, 

402 



PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION 40S 

continued for generations, would, by gradual accumulations, 
form new varieties, which, becoming permanent, are called 
species. 

While the struggle for existence develops certain qualities, 
or powers, in the organisms, adapting them to their environ- 
ment, natural selection, the environment itself, favors those 
varieties which have developed these powers. The outcome 
of the struggle, in some instances at least, is progress, which 
in case of man, means especially intellectual, moral, and social 
advancement. 

Darwin's writings afford an illustration of the thorough 
application of the inductive method of investigation, and are 
otherwise interesting and instructive. But does the fact that 
two species have many features in common prove that the 
more advanced is the development of the other? Cannot 
the common features be explained from the fact of a common 
creator.^ A carpenter builds a barn, then a house. Many of 
the features of the barn he carries forward to the house; but 
does that prove that a house is a developed barn? The 
common builder will explain the common features. There is 
no proof that the primordial forms of life were few. God was 
not restricted in this respect. The human line, for all that 
we know, may have been human from the beginning; but 
many features of man's organism may be found in lower 
organisms, without proving that the lower evolved into the 
higher, or that man had a simian origin. Examples are 
wanting which, by the test of fact, would make the theory 
conclusive. 

The origin of life has never been proved to be inorganic 
matter; but the method of nature is, as Tyndall declared: 
'Xife is the issue of antecedent life." How then did life 
originate? The rational answer seems to be: From the living 
Creator. It may be asked, "How did the living Creator 
originate?" The answer is, the living Creator is eternal, 
and did not originate from anything. Events, new beginnings, 
have causes, but eternal realities have no causes, for if so, 
they would not be eternal. 

Darwin discussed the effect of the disuse of certain organs, 
causing them to be atrophied, and finally to disappear, save 
a slight trace; and thus sometimes an organism reverts to 
a former type or simpler form. 



404 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

The origin of the variations is not to be confounded with 
natural selection. The origin of variation, produced by 
whatever cause in the environment, change in the climate, 
abundance or scarcity of food, the presence or absence of 
enemies, confirmed habits, or growing intelligence, fits or 
unfits the animal for its habitat. Then, by natural selection, 
those fittest for their environment survive and transmit the 
fortunate variation, while those unfit finally perish. The 
natural selection follows the variation as a necessary conse- 
quence. The selection implies improvement as to the con- 
ditions of life. 

Darwin traces the effects of natural selection between the 
variations, however caused. Calling the variations accidental 
simply means that the causes are unknown. The theory of 
evolution, in its broadest sense, includes the investigation 
both of the causes and the effects of variation. 

Variations may be continuous and progressive up to the 
point where the organism, instincts, habits, intelligence, are 
best fitted for the environment, and then cease, and the 
animal and its descendants, remain the same as long as the 
environment remains essentially the same; but a change in 
the environment, after a lapse of time, would call for new 
variations, though it would meet with more resistance, on 
account of established organization and confirmed habits, 
than it would meet, if the change in the environment had 
been more continuous. 

The survival of the fittest, so far as man is concerned, does 
not, in certain cases, at least, always mean the survival of 
those intellectually and morally the best; for the savage 
tribes of Africa, compared with Europeans, are fitter to 
survive in the malarious regions of that continent; but it 
holds true, take the world over, and for a long period, that 
the survival of the fittest means the survival of the best; and 
this gives, as may be inferred from the history of the past, a 
hopeful outlook for the future of the human race. Intelli- 
gence, morality, manhood and brotherhood, finally will pre- 
vail, and become established. This is the natural conse- 
quence of evolution, and so optimism is more reasonable than 
pessimism. , 

There is no doubt that materialists and atheists have 
eagerly accepted evolution as favoring their opinions; but the 
truth in evolution favors neither materialism nor atheism. 



PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION 405 

The Creator, regarded as iminent in nature, works the 
whole process of evolution, and the working of natural forces 
is his working, and the mode of his working is natural law. 
God does not violate any natural law in producing any result 
he may will; for his working, always consistent, is natural 
law; but he does certain things which otherwise would not be 
done, but in doing so, neither sets aside, nor violates any law; 
he is not a law breaker^ but a law maker. 

The divine working, therefore, is not to be restricted to the 
beginning of life, but is continued in the progress of evolution 
through the entire realm of nature. The processes of nature, 
occurring according to general laws will inevitably be at- 
tended by certain evils, but certainly by less evil than that 
attending continual intervention, and interruption of law, 
thus throwing every thing into confusion, and rendering it 
impossible to foresee, to anticipate, and to prepare for, the 
irregular and lawless changes. 

The evils which are undoubtedly in the world give ample 
scope for the exertion of our powers in mitigating them, and 
for relieving the unfortunate, and for laboring for the intel- 
lectual and moral elevation of the human race. Though we 
may not be able to solve the problem of evil, yet we can, as 
Darwin has nobly said, ''do our duty." To mitigate evil, to 
do our duty, is the best means of moral development. 

2, Spencer (1820-1903). Herbert Spencer was born at 
Derby. He was encouraged by his father to think for him- 
self, and this he was not slow to do. At an early age, he 
showed a taste for history and for natural science and mathe- 
matics. He worked several years as a civil engineer; but his 
calhng was to authorship in the line of philosophy. 

In accepting the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, 
he followed Hamilton and Mansel, but carried the doctrine 
boldly forward to its consequences. He was, however, more 
in agreement with Mill, Lewes, Darwin and Huxley, than 
with the Scotch philosophy. 

His study of Lyell's Geology led him to accept the theory 
of natural development, and to extend it as universal evolu- 
tion; to the exposition of this he devoted his life. 

Spencer's Philosophy of Evolution, which he called Synthetic 
Philosophy^ is found in his collected works of which the fol- 
lowing are the titles : First Principles, Principles of Biology, 



406 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Principles of Psychology, Principles of Sociology, Principles of 
Ethics, Essays, Social Statics, Study of Sociology, Education, 
Facts and Comments, Various Fragments, Inadequacy of 
Natural Selection, Descriptive Sociology, and Autobiography, 

Spencer's originality consists in his extension of the theory 
of evolution to all specialized investigations, rather than in 
his elaboration of a new theory of knowledge. He has not, 
however, reconciled conflicting views, by extending the doc- 
trines of empiricism and positivism, to all objects of knowl- 
edge, through the fact of evolution. Empirical knowledge 
does not embrace all that may be known. We have rational 
knowledge, as well as empirical. 

The relativity of knowledge may mean that the objects of 
knowledge are related to our faculties of knowing, in which 
case, it is self-evident, or it may mean that our knowledge is 
of the relative as distinguished from the absolute. What do 
we mean by the absolute.? If we mean the unrelated,that 
is, that which is not related to anything, even to our thought, 
it is, of course, unknown and unknowable; but if we simply 
mean, by the absolute, the not-dependent, it may possibly be 
an object of knowledge. 

Spencer's teaching in regard to the absolute, which he 
calls the ultimate reality, is certainly contradictory. For 
he says: "The ultimate reality is of all things the most cer- 
tain." He also says: "The ultimate reality is unknown and 
unknowable '' These two statements, irreconcilable as they 
appear, may be accounted for by the fact that knowledge is 
of two kinds : rational, and empirical or positive. 

That the ultimate reality is of all things the most certain 
is rational knowledge; it is known by reason; for if there were 
no ultimate reality, there never would have been anything. 
But the ultimate reality is unknown by sensation and per- 
ception; that is, it is unknown empirically or as positive 
knowledge. How easily might Spencer have reconciled the 
conflicts in philosophy, between the empirical and rational 
schools, had he admitted the authority of rational intuition 
in consistency with his own teaching that what is intuitive to 
the individual was empirical to the race, the faculty of rational 
intuition being gradually evolved by the long experience of 
mankind; yet it could not have been evolved had there been 
no faculty to be developed; but however, formed, the individ- 
ual has now the faculty of rational intuition. 



PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION 407 

If the absolute, as the first cause, the ultimate reality, is 
of all things the most certain, as Spencer declares, it certainly 
is not unknown and unknowable. Spencer probably meant 
that it is unknown and unknowable, as to its essence and the 
mode of its existence, and not as to the reality of its being. 
We know that the first cause is; we know that it is eternal; 
we know that it is the ultimate power in the universe; our 
knowledge of it is positive, not negative; and Spencer him- 
self calls it '*an object of religious sentiment." Well did 
John Stuart Mill say : '^Spencer has a prodigious amount of 
knowledge of the unknown and unknowable." 

Spencer attempted to find a philosophic basis for the 
reconciliation of science and religion. Assuming that there 
is truth in each case, there must be fundamental agreement. 
The basis for reconciliation, he declares, is the tacit convic- 
tion that the ultimate truth for both is an insoluble mystery, 
utterly inconceivable, and therefore unknowable. Incon- 
ceivable it is to the imagination, but not unknowable to the 
reason. Spencer's doctrine amounts to this: The power 
which the universe manifests, and which we, therefore, know 
to exist, is wholly inconceivable, and therefore unknown and 
unknowable. The apparent contradiction, that the ultimate 
reality is both known and unknown, may possibly be recon- 
ciled by a restatement: The power, or ultimate reality, is 
known by reason to exist as a reality, but is wholly unknown 
empirically as to its essence. 

The essential realities corresponding to religious and 
scientific ideas are expressed by the words — God, creation, 
soul, matter, time, space, force. If the realities expressed 
by these terms are wholly unknown, then we cannot distin- 
guish between them; but we do distinguish. These terms, 
therefore, have not the same meaning. Space is not time, 
and neither space nor time is force. We know by experience, 
as when we lift a weight, what force is, though we may not 
know the essence of the substance which exerts force. 

Spencer's criterion of knowledge is conceivability ; that is, 
what is inconceivable is unknowable, thus making the imag- 
ination, which is the picture forming faculty, the test of 
knowledge; but it is not the business of the imagination to 
test truth, but to make mental pictures, and as a poetic 
power, to give us aesthetic satisfaction. 



408 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Let us apply Spencer's test of conceivability to the idea 
of space: We cannot conceive space as necessarily finite; for 
we can imagine space beyond any supposed limit. We can- 
not conceive space as infinite; for to imagine an infinite 
picture is impossible; therefore space, whether finite or 
infinite, is inconceivable, and therefore, according to Spen- 
cer's doctrine, unknowable. So much for making the imag- 
ination the test of knowledge. 

Now, let us apply to our idea of space the test of reason. 
We have clear ideas of body and motion; but neither body 
nor motion is possible without space, the room for body and 
motion. We then have the idea of space as that which con- 
tains body, a part of which the body occupies, and through 
which it moves. Space, then, is a reality, though not a 
substance; it is extension in three dimensions, whether empty 
or filled; yet the filling is not the space, but the filled is a part 
of space. 

We know by the law of contradictories, that space is either 
finite or infinite. Let us see what reason declares with 
respect to its finitude or infinitude. If we suppose space 
finite or limited, the limit, if infinitesimal in thickness, would 
inclose a finite portion of space, leaving an unlimited portion 
without; if the boundary has finite thickness, it occupies space, 
still leaving unlimited space without; if the enclosing bound- 
ary has unlimited thickness it occupies unlimited space; 
hence in any case, the whole of space cannot be limited or 
finite, and is, therefore, infinite, and this is known to be true 
though not picturable by the imagination. Reason therefore 
apprehends space to be infinite. We know first, by the law of 
contradictories, that space is either finite or infinite; we 
know next that it is not finite; therefore, we know that it is 
infinite. Conceivability is not, therefore, the test of truth; 
for we cannot, by the imagination, conceive space to be 
finite, neither can we conceive it to be infinite; but it must be 
either finite or infinite. 

We repeat: If by the absolute, we mean the unrelated to 
anything else, even to thought, it is, of course, not known to 
exist, and the assumption of its existence is utterly groundless; 
but if, by the absolute, we mean the non-dependent, it is not 
necessarily unrelated to thought, and may be rationally 
known. The dependent must be dependent on something. 



PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION 409 

otherwise it is not the dependent; but that on which the 
dependent depends is either independent or dependent; if in- 
dependent, we have found the absolute; if dependent, we go 
back further, either in an infinite series, which has no ultimate 
support, or as a whole, is dependent and dependent on noth- 
ing, which is impossible, or back, till we reach an independent 
basis, and hence the absolute. To know the dependent, or 
the conditioned, is, therefore, to know the existence of the 
independent or the non-conditioned, that is, the absolute. 
It is, however, to be remembered that we may know the 
conditioned empirically, while we must know the uncon- 
ditioned rationally; we may know the relative, as an event, 
empirically, and if its immediate cause is relative, we may 
know that empirically; but the ultimate cause, we must know 
rationally. Sound epistemology requires both empirical and 
rational knowledge. 

Spencer gives the rationale of explanation thus : To explain 
a given fact is to reduce it to a more general fact, and that to 
a still more general fact, and so on, till we reach an ultimate 
fact, which cannot be further reduced, and is, therefore, inex- 
plicable, and hence unknowable. We must, therefore, con- 
clude that all so-called knowledge rests on the unknowable; 
hence no knowledge is possible, if the ultimate is unknowable. 

Spencer, however, would say we know the relation of the 
fact to the more general fact, which proves that all knowledge 
is relative; but the more general fact depends on a fact still 
more general, and so on till we reach the ultimate fact, which, 
as inexplicable, is unknowable, and then nothing is truly 
known. Thus we are led to the nescience of Hamilton and 
Mansel, who, for the lack of knowledge, fell back on faith; 
but faith though going further than knowledge, requires a 
basis of knowledge. We cannot have faith in an object, about 
which we know nothing. Absolute ignorance affords no 
basis for faith. 

The demonstration of a necessary truth, as in Geometry, 
requires, for its ultimate basis, a self-evident necessary truth. 
As the basis is ultimate, it is not proved, and must, therefore, 
be self-evident, or not known at all, but if not known at all, 
the entire demonstration fails; the ultimate basis must, 
therefore, be self-evident. The ultimate basis must be a 
necessary truth, and not a contingent fact; for if contingent. 



410 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

it might possibly not be at all, and again the demonstration 
would fail; the basis must, therefore, be a necessary truth, 
if the demonstration be possible; and the ultimate basis must 
be, at once, apprehended as self-evident by the insight of 
rational intuition. 

Let us try, in another way, to reach the ultimate of thought, 
though declared by Spencer to be inexplicable and unknow- 
able. We may begin with any object, either mineral, vege- 
table or animal, say, for example, the class quadruped. What 
is implied in thinking quadruped as existing? We answer 
the thinking subject and the class quadruped, at least as an 
object of thought. We call the subject /, or the ego. The 
object thought of is a class or collection of individual objects, 
and may be defined thus : Quadrupeds are vertebrates having 
four feet. We now have the wider class vertebrates, which 
includes quadrupeds and all other animals having a skeleton. 
Quadrupeds are not dropped, but only their determination, 
their characteristic attribute; their existence is retained 
without specification, along with the existence of all other 
vertebrates. The extent has been increased, while the con- 
tent has been diminished. The ego, conscious of its thinking, 
remains. Suppose we say vertebrates are animals; we in- 
crease the extent, diminish the content, and retain the exis- 
tence of the class, making it wider, and the existence of the 
ego. Let us now say animals are organized beings; we in- 
crease the extent, by taking in vegetables, without dropping 
animals, and decrease the content, retaining still both the 
object and the ego. Let us say organized beings are beings; 
retaining the ego, we have dropped from the content every 
attribute but existence, and have taken in every object in 
the universe. Does being equal nothing, as Hegel asserts? 
No; it has for its content one attribute, existence, and for its 
extent every object of the universe including the ego, who 
thinks being. Being equals everything existing. 

Is being unknown? No; although it is inexplicable, in the 
sense that it can not be referred to a wider class, it is known 
immediately in itself and along with the ego which knows 
its existence. Were it possible to drop existence, everything 
would vanish, including the ego, leaving nothing to know 
and nothing to be known — a perfect blank. We could not 
even assert the blank; for to assert would call back the ego. 



PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION 411 

even supposing it annihilated; but it is not annihilated; for 
to deny existence is to assume the ego that denies. To deny 
reality is, therefore, contradictory, since it assumes reality. 

Even if we could deny objective ex stence, we could not 
deny, without self -stultification, the ego, or subjective exist- 
ence. If we could drop being, we would annihilate ourselves, 
and could neither affirm nor deny anything. To deny exist- 
ence, is to assume existence, paradoxical as it may seem, since 
thinking, even in the form denying, implies self. Thinking 
existence away, is thinking self away, which is impossible. 
Existence, therefore, cannot be thought away. But can not 
all objective existence be thought away, leaving subjective 
existence? That would require the ego to be self -existent, 
self-dependent, or absolute; but the finite ego knows itself as 
consciously dependent; it is, therefore, not the absolute. 
The dependent, however, must depend on something else, and 
that, if dependent, must depend on something else, and so on, 
either till we reach the independent, or on, in an infinite 
series of dependent things, but dependent without an inde- 
pendent support, which is impossible, and if so, we must 
finally reach the independent, the absolute, not absolute in 
the sense of the unrelated, but absolute in the sense of not- 
dependent. The absolute is, therefore, not unknown and 
unknowable; for knowledge of the dependent implies the 
knowledge of the independent or the absolute. The knowl- 
edge of the absolute opens the way for valid knowledge of 
other reality, subjective or objective, and we are not driven 
to the monstrous absurdity that all knowledge depends on 
the unknown, and hence is not knowledge at all. Though 
the essence of the ultimate reality is unknown, and perhaps 
unknowable, its existence is certainly known, and this is 
probably what Spencer meant, when he declared it to be of 
all things most certain, though inconsistently calling it un- 
known and unknowable. There is therefore a known positive 
basis both for science and religion, which are reconciled by 
the known ultimate, not the unknown. 

Spencer defines life thus: *'Life is a continual adjustment 
of inner relations to outer relations." A more complete 
definition is the following: 

Life is the active cause which adjusts the inner relations 
to the outer, and the outer to the inner, and each relation, 
whether outer or inner, to any or to all the others. 



412 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 

Spencer's definition of evolution runs thus: "Evolution is 
an integratiorr of matter and concomitant dissipation of 
motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, 
incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; 
and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel 
transformation. " 

What are matter, motion, and force? Spencer says: "The 
interpretation of all phenomena in terms of matter, motion 
and force is nothing more than the reduction of our complex 
symbols of thought to the simplest symbols; and when the 
equation has been brought to its lowest terms, the symbols 
remain symbols still." Again, Spencer says of Spirit and 
matter, in the last sentence of his First Principles: "the one 
is no less than the other to be regarded as a sign of the Un- 
known Reality, which underlies both." This reminds us of 
Spinoza's One Substance of which mind and matter are attri- 
butes. If "matter, motion, and force are but symbols of 
the Unknown Reality," does not this reality reveal itself 
to us through these symbols, and, to some extent at least, 
become known? From the order of the universe, it may be 
inferred that the ultimate reality is intelligent power mani- 
fested in matter, mind, force, and motion. 

Again, Spencer says: "A power of which the nature re- 
mains forever inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time 
or Space can be imagined, works in us certain effects. These 
effects have likeness of kind, the most general of which we 
class together under the names of matter, motion and force. " 
This reduction of matter, motion, and force to subjective 
effects wrought in us, looks like what Spencer calls "the 
insanity of idealism. " If effects wrought in us can be 
logically referred to any cause, that cause, so far forth, is not 
wholly unknown, though Spencer may see fit to call it un- 
known, and yet it may not be wholly known. We may 
know that it is, though we do not know how it can be. 

Spencer's attitude towards religion he thus expressed: 
"However untenable may be any or all of the existing relig- 
ious creeds, however gross the absurdities associated with 
them, however irrational the arguments set forth in their 
defense, we must not ignore the verity which, in all likeli- 
hood, lies hidden within them. The general probability 
that widely spread beliefs are not absolutely baseless is, in 



PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION 413 

this case, enforced by a further probability due to the omni- 
presence of the behefs. . . We may be sure, therefore, 
rehgions, though even none of them be actually true, are yet 
all adumbrations of the truth." 

The greatest service Spencer has rendered mankind is in 
the line of Sociology and Ethics. He was a great generalizer, 
and possessed the power of clear statement, so that his books 
are readable, as well as instructive. The drift of his mind is 
seen in his attempt to bring all science under the law of 
evolution. 

Spencer held that the power of rational intuition has been 
developed in man by evolution through the long ages of 
human experience. The acts of intuition have, no doubt, 
by reflex action, modified the nervous system, and built up an 
organic basis in the brain for further and clearer apprehen- 
sion, so that fundamental truth, as the necessity of an ulti- 
mate reality, is now intuitive to the individual, though the 
ability to apprehend it has been gradually acquired by the 
experience of the race. The individual has, therefore, now 
the power of rational intuition, so that he can apprehend, as 
axiomatic, the principles: Space is infinite; time is infinite; 
every event must have a cause; there must be an ultimate 
reality. 

Note: Philosophy has many votaries in America, where 
it has been assiduously cultivated by a good number of 
original thinkers; but, at least for the present, it is thought 
best to defer entering into this field, however inviting it may 
appear. 



INDEX 



Abelard, 124 

Absolute, 269, 407 

Academic School, 82 

Aenesidemus, 83, 96 

Aeons, 105 

Aetiology, 84, 93 

Agnosticism, 106 

Agnostic, 84 

Agrippa, 84 

Albertus Magnus, 130 

Alexander, the Great, 63 

Alfarabi, 127 

Algazel, 128 

Alison, 298 

Alkendi, 127 

Ambrose, 113 

Ammonius, 99 

Ampere, 370 

Amyntas, 63 

Anaxagoras, 25 

Anaxarchus, 30 

Anaximander, 10 

Anaximines, 11 

Andronicus, 64 

Anselm, 122 

Antinomies of Pure Reason, 242 

Antiochus, 97 

Antisthenes, 50 

Apellicon, 64 

Apologists, 109 

Arabic Philosophy, 127 

Arcesilaus, 82, 94 

Arete, 50 

Aristippus, 49 



Aristophanes, 42 
Aristocles, 53 
Ariston, 53 
Aristotle, 63 
Arius, 111 
Amauld, 169 
Association, 321 
Athanasius, 112 
Atheism, 261 
Atomists, 27 
Augustine, 113 
Averroes, 128 
Avicenna, 127 

Bacon, Fr., 144 
Bacon, R., 127 
Bain, 348 
Basilides, 105 
Bayle, 184 
Bentham, 323 
Berkeley, 208, 254 
Bernard, 139 
Boehme, 141 
Boethius, 74 
Bona Ventura, 139 
Brown, 300 
Bruno, 142 
Biichner, 384 
Butler, 331 

Cabanis, 368 
Campanella, 143 
Cardanus, 142 
Carneades, 95 



415 



416 



INDEX 



Categories of the Understanding, 239 

Cato, 95 

Cause, 16, 26, 219, 239 

Celsus, 111 

Christianity, 104, 107 

Chrysippus, 76 

Cicero, 98 

Clarke, 203 

Cleanthes, 75 

Clement, 105, 110 

Common Sense, 294 

Compte, 375 

Conceptualism, 120, 125 

Condillac, 358 

Condorcet, 368 

Consciousness, 302 

Cooke, 145 

Cousin, 372 

Crantor, 94 

Crates, 73, 75 

Cudworth, 188 

Cumberland, 190 

Cynic School, 50 

Cyrenaic School, 49 

Czolbe, 385 

D'Alembert, 368 

Darwin, 402 

Deduction, 67 

Definition of Philosophy, 5, 10, 26 

Democritus, 28 

Descartes, 158, 176, 253 

Diderot, 361 

Diodorus, 48 

Diogenes of ApoUonia, 11 

Diogenes, the Cynic, 51 

Diogenes, Laertius, 84 

Dionysius of Syracuse, 53 

Dionysius, the Areopagite, 118 

Dogmatists, 86 

Diihring, 394 

Duns Scotus, 132 



Eckhart, 140 
Eclecticism, 97 
Ego, 199 

Eleatic Philosophy, 13 
Empedocles, 23 
Empiricism, 321 
Epictetus, 74 
Epicurus, 71 
Epistemology, 409 
Erigena, 118, 138 
Eubulides, 48 
Euclid of Megara, 47 
Euclid of Alexandria, 47 
Eusebius, 112 
Evolution, 402 
Existence of God, 243 

Fatalism, 261 
Fechner, 391 
Ferrier, 310 
Fichte, 250, 255 
Freedom of the Will, 155 
Fox, 141 

Gassendi, 169 

Genus and Species, 124 

Germain, 273 

Geulincx, 166, 176, 253 

Gilbert, 124 

Glanvill, 167 

Gnostics, 104 

God, Proofs of Existence, 243 

Gorgias, 38 

Grote, 32 

Guyon, 141 

Haeckel, 385 
Hamilton, 304, 409 
Hartley, 321 
Hartmann, 287 
Hegel, 267 
Helvetius, 360 
Heraclitus, 18, 57 



INDEX 



417 



Herbart, 280 

Hilarius, 113 

Hippias, 41 

Hobbes, 151 

Holbach, 363 

Horace, 317 

Hugo of St. Victor, 125, 139 

Hume, 93, 215, 254 

Idealism, 59, 240 
Induction, 67. 345 
Innate Ideas, 60, 194, 313 
Irenaeus, 105, 110 
Isocrates, 40 

Jacobi, 260 
Jamblichus, 102 
Jerome, 113 
John, the Apostle, 110 
John of SaUsbury, 125 
Jouffroy, 373 
Justin Martyr, 109 
Justinian, 104 

Kant, 227, 254 

LaMettrie, 357 
Lange, 393 
Law, 141, 279, 309 
Leibniz, 180, 254 
Lessing, 261 
Leucippus, 27 
Locke, 192, 217, 254 
Logic, 307 
Logos, 99, 109 
Lotze, 386 
Lucretius, 30, 73 

Macaulay, 149 
Malebranche, 166, 176, 253 
Malthus, 402 



Maimonides, 172 
Maine de Biran, 368 
Maistre, 366 
Mansel, 409 
Marcion, 105 
Marcus Aurelius, 74 
Meyer, 383 
McCosh, 318 
Megaric Philosophy, 47 
Menander, 105 
Metrodorus, 30 
Mill, James, 324 
Mill, J. S., 339 
Mnesarchus, 20 
Moleschott, 384 
Monads, 181 
More, 141, 189 
Musonius Rufus, 74 
Mysticism, 136 

Neleus, 64 
Neo-Platonism, 98 
Nichomachus, 63 
Nicene Creed, 112 
Nicole, 169 
Nominalism, 120 

Optimism, 185 
Origen, 105, 110 

Paley, 323 
Panaetius, 74 
Pantheism, 136 
Parmenides, 14, 57 
Pascal, 168 

Patristic Philosophy, 107 
Paulsen, 397 
Pelagius, 113 
Perception, 77 
Peripatetic School, 70 
Personal Identity, 218 



418 



INDEX 



Philip of Macedon, 63 

Philo, 106 

Philolaus, 20 

Plato, 53, 56, 57 

Plotinus, 100 

Polemo, 73 

Polus, 41 

Poly carp, 110 

Polytheism, 102 

Porphyry, 101 

Port Royal Logic, 169 

Posidonius, 74 

Positivism, 367, 377 

Pre-established Harmony, 182 

Principle of Contradiction, 183, 196 

Principle of Identity, 187, 265. 

Principle of Sufficient Reason, 183, 

187 
Proclus, 103 
Prodicus, 37 
Protagoras, 33 
Pyrrho, 82 
Pythagoras, 20, 58 

Quadrivium, 117 

Realism, 59, 120, 124 
Reid, 293 

Relativity of Knowledge, 406 
Richard of St. Victor, 139 
Roscellinus, 120 
Rousseau, 365 
Ruysbroeck, 141 

Saint-Simon, 374 
Scepticism, 82 
Schelling, 264 
Scholasticism, 117, 127 
Schopenhauer, 284 
Scotism, V. Duns Scotus, 132 
Scottish School. 293 



Scotus Erigena, 118, 138 

Self, 199 

Seneca, 81 

Sensational Philosophy, 37 

Sextus Empiricus, 84 

Socrates, 42, 62 

Socratic Schools, 47 

Sophists, 32 

Space, 233, 310 

Spencer, 405 

Spinoza, 172, 254 

Stewart, 297 

St. Martin, 141 

Stilpo, 73 

Stirner, 498 

Stoics, 74 

Substance, 199 

Syllogism, 66, 342 

Telesius, 142 
TertuUian, 110 
Thalis, 9 

Theodicy, 81, 183 
Theology, 104, 107, 117 
Theophrastus, 64 
Thomas Aquinas, 131 
Thomas a Kempis, 141 
Thrasymachus, 41 
Time, 235 
Timon, 83 
Toland, 117 
Trivium, 117 
Tropis, 84 
Tyrannion, 64 

Unconscious, 287 
Universals, 120, 130 
Utilitarianism, 341 

^'alentinus, 105 
Victorines, 139 



INDEX 419 



Voet, 161 Wundt, 396 
Vogt, 383 

Voltaire, 351 Xenocrates, 73 

Xenophanes, 13 

Whewell, 67 Xenophon, 42 
Will. Freedom of, 155 

William of Champeaux, 122 Zeller, 57 

William of Occam, 134 Zeno of Elea, 16 

Wolff, 187 Zeno, the Stoic, 73 



SEP 29 1913 
























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